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Abstract

Virtues, as described by Aristotle and Aquinas, are understood as dispositions of
character to behave in habitual, specific, positive ways; virtue is a critical
requirement for human flourishing. From the perspective of Aristotelian-Thomistic
anthropology which offers an integrated vision of the material and the rational in
the human person, I seek to identify the neural bases for the development and
exercise of moral virtue. First I review current neuroscientific knowledge of the
capacity of the brain to structure according to experience, to facilitate behaviours,
to regulate emotional responses and support goal election. Then, having
identified characteristics of moral virtue in the light of the distinctions between
cardinal virtues, I propose neural substrates by mapping neuroscientific
knowledge to these characteristics. I then investigate the relationship between
virtue, including its neurobiological features, and human flourishing. This process
allows a contemporary and evidence-based corroboration for a model of moral
development based on growth in virtue as understood by Aristotle and Aquinas,
and a demonstration of a biological aptitude and predisposition for the
development of virtue. Conclusions are drawn with respect to science, ethics, and
parenting.
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primary motor cortex

MA

motor adaptation

MEG

magnetoelectroencephalography

MRI

magnetic resonance imaging

MRS

magnetic resonance spectroscopy

MSL

motor sequence learning

MSN

medium spiny neuron

MTL

medial temporal lobe

mPFC

medial PFC (in some literature, the rodent equivalent to human DLPFC)

NAc

nucleus accumbens

nAChR

nicotinic receptor

NE

norepinephrine

NMDA

N-methyl-D-aspartate

NMJ

neuromuscular junction

NMP

neuromotor prosthesis

NMR-MOUSE

nuclear magnetic resonance mobile universal surface explorer

NOIR

near optical infra red
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NTF

nerve growth factor

OCD

obsessive compulsive disorder

OFC

orbitofrontal cortex

PAS

paired associative stimulation

PCD

programmed cell death

PET

positron emission tomography

PKA and PKC

particular protein kinases

PNS

peripheral nervous system

PPC

posterior parietal cortex

preNMDARs

presynaptic NMDARs

PSP

post synaptic potential

pSTS

post central gyrus

rTMS

repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation

SACD

social and character development programs

SMA

supplementary motor area

S-O

stimulus-outcome

SN

substantia nigra

SNpc

substantia nigra pars compacta

SNr

substantia nigra pars reticulata

STDP

spike timing dependent plasticities

S-R

stimulus response

S-S

stimulus-stimulus

STN

subthalamic nuclei

STS

posterior superior temporal sulcus

TAN

tonically active neuron

tDCS

transcranial direct current stimulation

tLTD

spike timing-dependent LTD

TMS

transcranial magnetic stimulation

VBM

voxel based morphometry

VGCC

voltage gated calcium channel

VL

ventrolateral nucleus of the thalamus

VLPFC

ventrolateral PFC

VMPFC

ventromedial PFC

VP

ventral palladium

VTA

ventral tegmental area
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Chapter 1
Aristotle and the neuroscientists sit down to talk.
“There is something at work in my soul, which I do not understand.”
Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus
Mary Shelley

1.1 The structure of this study.

This study argues that the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of human flourishing, the
acquisition and development of virtues that are understood as stable and
intentional dispositions of character to behave in habitual, specific, positive ways,
is supported by neuroscientific knowledge.

Chapter 1 commences with a preamble in which prima facie evidence is presented
to support the view that there are both material and non-material factors
involved in the analysis of human rationality. I situate this task on the spectrum of
contemporary approaches to philosophy of mind, discussing advantages of the
hylomorphic philosophy of the person and critiquing various other philosophies of
mind. I place the study within eudaimonist virtue ethics in the tradition of
Aristotle and Aquinas. Further possible outcomes of this study are then projected:
a scientific validation of virtue ethics, benefits to be derived by virtue ethics itself
from the cross disciplinary insights of neurobiology, and brief reflections on the
potential contribution of moral education and parenting.

This multidisciplinary study will focus both on current neuroscience and on
Aristotelian-Thomistic notions of virtue. Chapter 2 proposes six lines of neural
investigation that appear to be of most relevance to this study. In Chapter 3 I
examine the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of virtue illustrated by real life case
studies. In Chapter 4 I investigate the distinctive contributions of prudence,
justice, temperance and fortitude, the virtues which Aristotle and Aquinas
regarded as core dispositions of mature character. I seek to draw conclusions
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about what is known as the “unity of the virtues”, the view that these four
cardinal virtues play an integral part in every human act.

The central methodology of the study will be to propose the neural structures and
processes that appear to underpin the identified characteristics of virtue. Chapter
5 proposes this alignment of neuroscientific data. Finally, in the light of what has
proceeded, in Chapter 6 I investigate the notion of flourishing. I reflect on the
biological aptitude of the human being for the acquisition and development of
virtue, and draw out implications of this study for science, ethics and moral
education.

In summary, the central areas of investigation in this thesis are:


To develop a methodology by which I can identify the core characteristics
of the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of moral virtue.



To identify, on the basis of current neuroscientific knowledge, the neural
substrates that may reasonably be demonstrated to play a substantial role
in the acquisition and exercise of virtue.



In the light of neurobiological evidence, to draw conclusions about the role
of virtue in human flourishing.



To consider wider implications of these findings, with particular respect to
philosophy of mind, ethics and parenting.

1.2 Preamble. The prima facie case.

The monster that Victor Frankenstein fashions from the sinew and cartilege of
dead men is endowed with intelligence, a yearning for happiness and love, but
also a fearsome capacity for burning hatred and vengeance. Frankenstein had
proclaimed that his experiments would “unfold to the world the deepest
mysteries of creation”,1 and he does not disappoint us. There is a depth of being
in the creature for which dead flesh can offer no account. I do not intend a

1

Mary Shelley, Frankenstein, (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1993), 40.
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deeper analysis of this fable, yet, as an introduction to the task of this study, it
confronts us with questions about human existence, about that by which we are
constituted, and about that to which we look for fulfilment. We too are bone and
sinew, yet we too yearn for happiness.

In this preamble I overview prima facie evidence that our biological processes are
implicated in our rational function. First of all in 1.2.1 I examine phenomena that
suggest there is a physical substrate to human rationality. Second I consider
phenomena suggesting that any wholly material conception of human rationality
may have explanatory deficiencies. Third I look briefly at intimations of a profound
integration of the rational and the material.

In 1.2.2, I consider the prima facie evidence for neuronal implication in the
acquisition and exercise of moral virtue, understood as good habits.

1.2.1 Material and non-material constituents to human rationality.

Phenomena at the genetic, biochemical, and neuroscientific level suggest that the
material is implicated in what is commonly understood as the rational. Philosophy
also offers arguments that implicate the physical in mental activities.

At first sight many of the points below (in 1.2.1.1) would seem to invite material
explanations for rationality that would overcome the apparent problems. Yet (as
will be seen in 1.2.1.2) material explanations for rationality struggle to account for
human freedom.

1.2.1.1 We are not disembodied spirits. Evidence of the involvement of the
physical in rationality.
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Aristotle pointed out that the health and age of the body affects intellectual
function. Just as the elderly would see more clearly had they eyes of youth; so too
we think with greater clarity when our bodies are in their prime.2

What we do with our body, and what happens to our body, influences our mental
state.3 It is clear that all cognitive activity is unconditionally dependent on certain
bodily parameters, for example, loss of oxygen leads to loss of consciousness and
cognitive function. Experiments show time and again that a negative environment
can contribute to a negative mood, and vice versa. In a similar way we see that
learning is dependent on directed attention, and knowledge on accurate
information gathering by the bodily senses.

There is considerable prima facie evidence for a strong biochemical component to
human behaviours. For example behaviours can be triggered by sensory inputs
(the need to care for a sick child elicits extraordinary generosity from a mother);
drug therapies can profoundly affect our mood, our behaviours, and the way we
perceive the world; the dissemination of hormones in the body can also affect
behaviour.
Conversely, thought seems to lead to bodily changes,4 thoughts seem to trigger
chemicals! For example, just thinking of a scene can increase our blood pressure.
The mere apprehension of a stimulus can initiate behaviours, or unleash passion,
triggering a biochemical cascade propelling action. This would appear to suggest
that there is natural affinity between thought and biochemical processes or at
least a biochemical component to the human experience of thinking. Without
such connaturality, no interaction would be possible. Furthermore we see that our
past behaviours influence even unintentional future behaviours, as is the case
2

Aristotle, De Anima, 408b. (Hereafter DA.) Aristotle. The complete works of Aristotle. ed Jonathan
Barnes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Volumes 1 and 2.
3
Typified in the science of biological psychology. See for example, S. Marc Breedlove, Neil V.
Watson and Mark R. Rosenweig, Biological Psychology. An introduction to Behavioural, Cognitive
and Clinical Neuroscience, 6th ed. (Sunderland: Sinauer Associates Inc, 2010).
4
See discussion, for example in J. M. Schwartz and S. Begley, The Mind and the Brain (New York:
Harper, 2002), 319.
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most dramatically in addiction. That this can happen even in the case of
unintended future patterns of behaviour, seeming to suggest that our actions can
create some material blue print for future action. Our actions seem to change us
as people.

Furthermore, our genetic makeup, including temperament, exerts forces on us to
act in particular ways: often a decisive influence on behaviours specific to the
species, and a major influence on our temperamental behaviours over which we
maintain some capacity for modification. Genetically attributable behaviour may
be traced to the programmed release of specific amino acids into our developing
metabolism. In other words, chemicals are ultimately a significant influence on the
type of person we allow ourselves to become.

Neural studies show that illness, and impairment in specific brain areas, have
cognitive consequences. It has been shown that certain cognitive processes (such
as the capacity to plan and to have due regard for consequences) are impaired if
there is damage to the prefrontal cortex (PFC).5 It is also well documented that
these neural pathways of the PFC can be interfered with by powerful emotional
experience. Also, vivid memories and extreme sense input can override activity in
the PFC, cutting out of the loop circuitry apparently essential for cognitive
processes.6

Memories, initiated by electrical messaging from the senses, can have rich
emotional associations and be integrated with our cognitive life. Images arising in
our memories are capable of evoking not only impulsive behaviours but of
initiating considered behaviours; for example sight of an animal suffering beside a
road may, on the basis of certain past experiences, provoke us to stop a car, pick
up the animal, and pay veterinary fees. All this suggests that concrete material
5

To be discussed at length in Chapters 2 and 5.
For example Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) deficits can be effectively treated by
cognitive-behavioural therapies (CBT). See discussion: JoAnn Difede and Judith Cukor “Evidencebased long-term treatment of mental health consequences of disasters among adults” in Y. Neria
et al. Mental health and disasters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 336-339.
6
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input to the mind is decisive in higher function. Furthermore, it is clear that there
is emotional interaction with cognition. Encouragement and emotional
affirmation are shown to help children learn; the provision of information may
well be inadequate to help a child acquire knowledge, behaviours or habits, or the
motivation to do so. 7

It is common experience that specific memories can be very concretely associated
with other specific memories created at the same time.8 Hence, a memory can
trigger very specific previous associations in the mind: for example sliced potatoes
might always bring to mind Friday nights in front of TV as a child; potato scallops
always bring to mind a specific fish shop; the sight of a vodka bottle evokes a
particular moment in time thirty years before, etc. This is consistent with the
accepted principle of neuronal development, “neurons that fire together wire
together” (see 2.2.1), that more direct connections form between associated
memories and associated actions. Too often experience shows that people out of
sight fall out of mind. Skills, memories, and even human relationships, can
deteriorate over time. Such degradation is consistent with biochemical
explanations at the synapse.

1.2.1.2 Nor are we mere bodies. Intimations of the non-material.

Learning takes time, but insight and choice, can be instantaneous. In a flash of
illumination, a person may conceive a new profound and complex insight, or
totally change an opinion. This suggests a fundamental difference between these
manifestations of rationality. That certain intellectual processes take place in what
appears to be an instantaneous way suggests that material processes are less
significant in certain operations of knowing or choosing. This is consistent with the
insights of Aquinas.9 The bodily process of acquiring sense data, and presenting a

7

Teresa M McDevitt and Jeanne Ellis Ormrod, Child Development and Education (New Jersey:
Merrill, 2010), 425-427. Also see Motivation. 480-515.
8
This associative principle is central to the development of neural connectivity.
9
Aquinas, Summa Theologia, ed. various (Cambridge: Blackfriars/McGraw Hill, 19650, Q.75, Art.2.
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coherent image to the mind may take time, but the person grasps knowledge
instantaneously.10 For this reason, Aquinas argues it is “impossible for (the mind)
to understand by means of a bodily organ.” 11

Man can transcend the material and the concrete. He may, for example, choose to
respond with habitual detachment to the material world; in the midst of constant
contact with consumerism and access to all comforts and pleasures, he may keep
himself detached. As an extension of this insight, it is universal experience that
man has the capability of acting contrary to emotional and bodily impulses. For
example, one can resist action consequent to a specific emotion such as anger or
hatred. Not only can one resist emotion, one can still carry out an action out of
conviction or will power when there is indifference or apathy at the level of
feelings.12

Although man’s senses may access only sense knowledge, we see that man can
develop and hold to beliefs and convictions that are not sense derived however
much sense experience may be necessary to convey them.

The not infrequent occurence of altruism, of aid to others through one’s time,
energy or money without tangible reward, indicates that non-material factors play
a significant role in human motivation.13 Non tangible realities can move us
physically and even change us as persons.14

(Hereafter ST.) Aquinas suggests that while “The body is necessary for the action of the intellect”,
it is so, “not as its organ of action, but on the part of the object; for the phantasm is to the intellect
what colour is to sight.”
10
Furthermore, human beings are capable of conceptual discussion, again indicating a capacity to
transcend the immediate and material.
11
ST, Ia, Q.75, Art.2.
12
Mischel’s experiments in 1972 into infant capacity for delayed gratification demonstrate the
human capacity to transcend concrete incentives. Behaviours can be opposed to considered
choices at times: one can find oneself following behaviours contrary to what one wishes were the
case, for example in the case of addictions or a weakness of will. We are conscious of alternatives
to the material and immediate. Walter Mischel, et al., "Cognitive and attentional mechanisms in
delay of gratification," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21,2 (1972): 204–218.
13
That rationality has the capacity to respond to the non material is also demonstrated in the
observation that faith-based convictions or ideals that motivate behaviour. Take for example the
teaching of Therese of Lisieux that we should attend to the smallest detail out of love of God:
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In contrast it appears that an animal can only be motivated by sense-affecting
incentive. The apparent contrast between human and animal behaviours suggests
that man is capable of operating at a level transcending the immediate. There is
no conclusive evidence that any animals, even primates, have the capacity to
manage their own actions outside of an immediate context, nor do they appear to
have any equivalent to man’s capacity to direct his own actions on the basis of
prior mental reflection.

1.2.1.3 A prima facie case exists for a profound integration of the physical and
rational in the human person.

This study, in line with the Aristotelian-Thomistic view, understands human beings
as “ensouled bodies”, “animated flesh”. Human rationality and biology are fully
integrated. Possessing a non-material dimension, human beings enjoy, within
limits, the capacity to make free choices.

By this view it appears incorrect to attribute agency to the body or to the mind.
Rather it is the position of this study that it is the person who acts. Our somatic
and rational faculties are integrated in human operations. It is the sensing,
emotion-responding person who acts. The person imagines, remembers, desires,
conceptualises, and thinks logically and rationally.

A strong prima facie case exists for a profound integration of the physical and
rational in the human person:
i.

It may be argued that the capacity we have to modify our habits and
behaviours, and ultimately personality, derives from the material
dimension to our personality. Matter by its very nature is changeable. A

“Miss no single opportunity of making some small sacrifice, here by a smiling look, there by a
kindly word; always doing the smallest right and doing it all for love.”
14
Loving relationships attest to the reality of the non material. The reciprocal gift of persons in a
loving relationship, a non-material form of gift that does not diminish the giver, is only conceivable
in a world of non material realities.
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corollary of this profound integration of body and mind is that man
achieves his end in his body or not at all.
ii. Passion and reason are able to be integrated. Emotion and passion may
lead to impulsive, imperfectly rational responses, yet universal experience
is also that an emotion-proposed course of action can be tested against
principles of reason and either pursued or rejected.
iii. We are able to inform these principles of reason by general laws to which
we bind ourselves in conscience. We are capable of testing intended
actions against conscience. Conscience then may be reasonably proposed
to consist in a judgement based on universal principles, transcending
specific memory and hypothetical action. In each judgement of conscience
there are complex interplays of concrete and the universal evident.15
iv. The interplay of the immediate and the universal suggests a profound
integration of body and rationality. Aquinas and Aristotle proposed a
psychological model in which universal knowledge is derived from
immediate sense knowledge.16 They suggested that intellectual knowledge
is derived from the senses. Universals are necessarily linked to experience
of the particulars. Aquinas argues that the material phantasm or image
facilitates the grasp of universals. Whenever we reason, we reason with
reference to the particular. Even in a simple syllogism, universal terms
evoke accompanying specific images and specific characteristics:
Frankenstein’s creature seeks vengeance on humankind.
Dr Frankenstein is human.
The creature seeks vengeance on Frankenstein.
v. Rationality appears to begin in sense knowledge but utilises rules of logic,
analogy, and inductive processes to move from the specific to the general
rule or conclusion. The concrete and material plays a necessary role in
rationality, but rationality transcends the concrete. Reason would not be
able to know universals and manipulate sense data by means of inductive
and deductive reasoning were the intellect not integrated with the senses.
15
16

Refer for example to the model of the human act proposed by Aquinas. See 3.1.3.
See discussion below in 1.4.2.
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vi. It can be argued that distinctively human activity always requires
involvement of the intellect. It would appear that the body can operate
without the mind (although such “vegetative function” may not be
described as truly human activity), but application of the rational powers
appears to require bodily-dependent capacities such as imagination, sense
knowledge or memory of the specific events or of concrete objects, and
desires. For example, human acts can be triggered at times by simple
sensory input, such as the smell of food, the picture of a loved one.
Concrete symbols, such as a blood soaked flag, or a cross, can carry
associations of meaning that can stir us to considered action.17 The
Thomistic view is that the point of death is that point at which bodily
functions are no longer able to sustain rationality.
vii. A rational act may be conducted through the instrumental activity of the
body. Action in and through the body involves complex neural instruction
to muscles as well as monitoring of feedback from our senses and muscles.
There is a profound integration of the biomechanical with higher functions
of goal setting and executive direction of activity.
viii. Persons are able to express their very selves and communicate by medium
of material things. For example, we express our love of benevolence
towards others by means of material gifts. We use words, complex
patterns of compression waves through the atmosphere, to convey
notions of truth, beauty, and goodness.
ix. Rationality is not an end in itself. It may be argued that rationality
empowers human beings to love, to unite their own will to that of another.
In this view, rationality is fulfilled by generosity and gift of self.18 In this
context, reason enables us to transcend the material, in order to know and
love others.

17

See discussion pertaining to scenarios in 3.1.2.
An advocate of this rationally founded view has been John Paul II who insisted that man is
fulfilled by loving and experiencing the love of others. John Paul II, Familiaris Consortio, 11. “Love is
the fundamental and innate vocation of every human being.” See also discussion of fulfilment in
my Appendix 1. A Response to the Claims of Emergent Rationality by Non-reductive Materialism.
18
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x. A profound unity of hearts and minds is seen to exist in certain
relationships between persons. Such profound union appears to be
nourished by positive emotional engagement, attention, touch and
communication. The material facilitates the transcendent. It is generally
agreed that the bodily phenomenon of emotions plays a significant role in
helping us empathise and connect as persons. Furthermore, love between
human beings appears better able to flourish where there is contact and
communication. The more present, the more personal; the more concrete
our experience of the other, the more love is facilitated.
xi. Similarly, it may be argued that the capacity to choose to unite oneself to
the will of another is necessarily evidence of freedom and hence of a nonmaterial dimension to personality.19 It may be argued that the highest
expression of human existence is to be found in reciprocal relationships
where fulfilment of the will of the other is the goal.

1.2.2 Prima facie evidence for a neuronal underpinning of virtue

I suggest that the neuroscience of virtue, understood in the Aristotelian/Thomistic
sense, offers a pleasing consonance with the natural world. The development of
virtue, in contrast with other ethical paradigms, is proposed as necessarily
experiential: this is consistent with the explanation that developing neural
structures of the human brain require experience and environment for maturity.20

19

The capacity to be able to choose to unite one’s own will to the will of others (a capacity we see
in obedient children and teenagers, diligent workers, spouses in close relationships, soldiers in
battle) counters arguments asserting that human actions are predetermined by biology. Even if, in
refutation of such a free will argument, one attempts to argue that the very choice to do what
someone else suggests may be biologically dependent, nonetheless to commit oneself to always
follow the will of another, for example in a committed relationship of love, effectively cuts one’s
actions loose from one’s biology. It is absurd to argue that while some people have a biological
predisposition to act in individual and specific ways (ie heeding sensible appetency), others have a
biological predisposition to commit themselves to the choices of another (ie heedless of sense
appetency). This would be to have a bet both ways. Hence, this is an effective refutation of
biological determinacy.
20
It is evident that there are no “child prodigies” when it comes to virtue. It is necessary to work at
one’s character.
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Furthermore, informed by the explosion of neuroscientific knowledge in recent
decades, it is reasonable to propose that several major neurobiological strands are
implicated in any neurobiological component to virtue.


Neural plasticity which permits alterations to established, or establishing,
neural connections. Closely associated to plasticity are the mechanisms of
synaptic strengthening.



Mechanisms for learning, memory, habit formation, imitation, emotional
management, goal election, and executive control.



An understanding of the various discrete constituent structures of the
brain, together with a mapping of neural interconnections.



The contribution that integrated systems and complex neural mechanisms
play in support of human rationality.

On the basis of advances in neuroscientific knowledge and on the Aristotelian
notion of moral virtue as a habit directed towards human flourishing (see 1.6.3
and Chapter 3), it is reasonable to propose for investigation the following prima
facie evidence for a neuronal underpinning of virtue:

i.

Insights into neuronal development and its relationship with behaviour
appear to be consistent with the notion of virtue as a preferred model for
moral development. This is because virtue development is experience
based rather than theory based. It is derived from analysis of the facts of
human experience, development and flourishing, rather than from
intuitive, internally consistent, principles. Hence, a study of the
neuroscience of virtue is not an arbitrary choice to study one ethical
system among many, but a choice well grounded in the compatibility of
virtue development with neuroscientific knowledge.

ii.

The brain is plastic. Every experience brings about functional response of
some type in the brain. Structural change can accompany and underpin
functional responses, in a wide array of neural processes collectively
known as structural plasticity. Developmental plasticity is essentially
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irreversible; this plasticity with respect to processing of sensory inputs and
control of motor function is now well established. It is also well established
that plastic neuronal change is at work in learning and in that particular
form of learning classified as habit formation. I argue that plasticity is also
a central neuronal process in those specific types of habit that we call
virtue. (See extensive discussion of plasticity in 2.2.)
iii.

Virtue is a form of learning. Various features of learning, for example habit
formation, suggest a neurobiological basis, that learning has a material
substrate in the brain. (See discussion of habit learning in 2.4)

iv.

Certain pathways of habit formation are now quite well described. All
behaviours are essentially reinforcing: the more we do something the
more we reinforce that behaviour. (See discussion of habit formation in
2.4.)

v.

Memory too plays a significant part in learning, and appears to operate via
neurobiological mechanisms. (See discussion of memory in 2.3.)

vi.

Imitation is a form of learning from direct experience. A neural component
facilitating imitation, the mirror neuron, has recently been identified.
Imitation is known to play a role laying down new neural pathways. (See
discussion in 2.3.6.)

vii.

There is considerable work now written on the interplay between emotion
and rationality. This study focuses on the interplay of emotion, rationality
and habit formation. (See discussion regarding regulation of emotion in
2.5.)

viii.

The cognitive processes at the heart of executive control are understood
to be supported by areas and processes in the cortex, particularly the PFC
This area of the brain maintains rich inhibitory linkages with the emotional
centres of the brain. (See discussion regarding cognition and executive
function in 2.7.)

ix.

“Happiness is the reward of virtue” wrote Aristotle.21 Virtue is the facility
to act in ways that complement our nature bringing us increased self-

21

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1099b16. (Hereafter NE.). Aristotle. The complete works of
Aristotle. ed Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Volumes 1 and 2.
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mastery and fulfilment. This study will argue that human flourishing,
including moral flourishing, has a biological basis, showing that there is a
neuroscience of virtue development in which the brain has neural
mechanisms that, if perfected, provide for ease of action in the moral
sphere. I argue that virtue development is therefore the path of
development for the human being most in accord with human nature,
denoting maturity at the levels of personality and biological development.

1.3 Situating this study within contemporary approaches to the philosophy of
mind.

This current study falls into the field of philosophy best described as philosophy of
mind. Therefore at this introductory point it is most appropriate to situate and
justify this study in the field of contemporary approaches to the philosophy of
mind. This will be a three step process. First I offer a broad overview of the various
currents of contemporary philosophy of mind. Second (1.4) I review the basic
tenets of hylomorphic theory as proposed by Aristotle and Aquinas. Third,
especially in Table 1.1 and in Appendix 1, I summarise the spectrum of
contemporary positions in philosophy of mind and offer a brief hylomorphic
critique of each.

In the history of twentieth century philosophy of mind there have been a number
of more significant figures and lines of development. Among these we find Ryle
and his articulation of logical behaviourism, Identity Theory developed by Lewis
and Armstrong, Functionalism proposed by Putnam and Fodor, Davidson’s
articulation of non reductive materialisms, Dennett and Churchland with respect
to instrumentalism and eliminative materialism, and Block and Chalmers, among
others, in the search for philosophical understandings of consciousness and
qualia.

This panorama has been characterised, for the most part, by materialistic and
physicalist explanations for mental phenomena in which language also has played
34

a significant role. Recent years have been dominated by non-reductive physicalist
acknowledgement of the reality of consciousness in an emergent paradigm. To
some extent these currents are reactions to substance dualism, with its inability to
explain causation in any rationally satisfying manner, and to behaviourism, with its
reluctance to discuss matter at all.

Despite the quantity of writing and energy of debate, there is a certain sameagainness evident. None of the major lines of development of philosophy of mind
in the twentieth century have accorded ontological legitimacy to the nonmaterial. The non-material has been dealt with:
i.

In pragmatic fashion with no interest in metaphysical possibilities and
explanations (logical behaviourism).

ii.

As causally disconnected (epiphenomenalism).

iii.

As immediately dependent on the material (Identity Theory, and type
functionalisms).

iv.

As ultimately dependent on the material (emergentism, forms of
functionalism, non-reductive materialisms such as Davidson’s Anomalous
Monism, and mentalist emergent views).

v.

Or as a fictional construct (eliminative materialists and projectivists,
neurobiological physicalist explanations).

The inevitable outcome of mechanistic and materialistic approaches, and of
epiphenomenal inabilities, is that contemporary philosophy of mind is generally
dismissive of non-instrumental rationality and human freedom. None of the
current approaches to philosophy of mind offer a way forward able to
accommodate human freedom in a manner that is rationally acceptable.22 This is
the elephant standing in the philosopher of mind’s lounge room because freedom
cannot be easily dismissed. It is apparent that man possesses a certain freedom;
22

This is not to say that many philosophers don’t accept and advocate an emergent free will. They
do; but they are unable to offer any articulation of how the limitations of animal life can have
given rise to man’s demonstrable capacity for universal truths and freedom. In contrast stands the
Thomistic model, based on an enriched notion of causality embracing formal causality, that man
enjoys participation in rationality as a principle of unity and function.
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indeed, freedom must be a prerequisite for such widespread belief in the need for
ethics. Either the great architects of ethics, from the times of Socrates and
Confucius, have been deluded, the historical and political figures who sought to
improve the lot of man were acting on false presumptions, and the teachings of
Christ and Muhammad deceive over half the human race into thinking we have
any control over our actions – or our moral philosophies require an adequate
account of human freedom. It is time to revisit the suppositions of contemporary
philosophy of mind.

This denial of human freedom in philosophy of mind is found in much of
contemporary neuroscience.23 Larry Squire writes in standard reference text,
“Neuroscience is a large field founded on the premise that all of behaviour and all
of mental life have their origin in the structure and function of the nervous
system.”24 Another prominent neuroscientist, Nobel prizewinner Eric Kandel, is
equally adamant. He writes,
Most neuroscientists and philosophers now take for granted
that all biological phenomena are properties of matter. This
physicalist stance breaks with the tradition of dualism
stemming from ancient Greek philosophy. The break with the
tradition that mind and consciousness arise from a mysterious
interaction of spirit with body actually focused the problem of
consciousness for the 20th century neuroscientist.
Philosophically disposed against dualism, we are obliged to find
a solution to the problem in terms of nerve cells and neural
circuits.25
The common view in neuroscience is simply that the materialist and the dualist
are the fundamental categories defining attitudes to the mind-body problem: the

23

Neuroscientist Christof Koch substitutes “compatibilism” for freewill, the view that man has the
capacity to follow his desires as determined by his chemical programming. See Christof Koch,
“Finding Free Will,” Scientific American Mind, May/June, 2012, 22.
24
rd
Larry Squire et al. Fundamental Neuroscience, 3 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008).
25
th
Eric R Kandel et al. Principles of Neural Science, 4 ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001), 1317.
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materialist says that the mind is the body; the dualist says that the mind and body
are two different things.

Kandel appears not to have considered the implications of a “different substances
view” nor any non Cartesian understanding of mind and body interaction, namely
the integrated view of Aristotle and Thomas.

1.4

The hylomorphic underpinnings of this study.

An Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of the human person underpins this
project. This multidisciplinary investigation into the neural substrates for virtue
emphasises the rational person, the ensouled body, as the subject of action. In the
sections that follow I explore this concept. The sections below (1.4.1 - 1.4.3) set
out the hylomorphic, psychological, and personalistic frameworks underpinning
the philosophical reflections in this current study. In 1.4.4 I discuss the relative
merits of the hylomorphic approach.

In the quotation above Kandel reveals that he does not conceive of a third
possible understanding of matter, one that is neither materialistic nor dualistic:
this third way will now be presented as the hylomorphic view, that matter and
mind are both expressions of the same reality. The clues are of course implicit in
matter itself –when a human being dies, the body itself ceases to be a body,
decomposing to a mess of chemicals that no longer have a principle of unity: it is
evident there was a principle of unity that held the constituent substances in
order. We need a wholly different view of this type of matter, matter that is
ensouled. Only while it is ensouled is there a human body; the soul, or form,
makes it to be what it is. The clues are in what we see; acceptance of
hylomorphism does not depend on an interpretation of qualia or an appreciation
of subjective experience, nor even on the debate about the degree of freedom
man enjoys. Hylomorphism provides an account of matter that not only
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accommodates universals and the possibility of freedom, but also what is
manifested to our senses about matter itself.26

I look first at the key features of hylomorphic theory, the Aristotelian theory of
substances, then specifically at living intelligent material substances in a review of
the rational psychology developed by Aristotle and refined by Aquinas. Finally I
review the evolution of the concept of personhood, in the Boethian sense as
individual rational substance, through the fragmentation that followed Descartes
and at recent efforts to restore the hylomorphic understanding of person. In the
process I review the significance of an adequate understanding of person.

With these understandings, we then return in more detail to the principal currents
of contemporary philosophy of mind (1.5) in order to offer the summary of
current positions. In so doing I argue for the suitability of an hylomorphic solution
to the mind-body problem and so prepare the way for the proposition that brain
function is part-constitutive of human moral development.

1.4.1

An overview of hylomorphic theory27.

Aristotle’s studies of the what, how, and why of existence were further developed
by Aquinas. Their metaphysics and rational psychology seek to explain what
makes things, including creatures and people, to be, to be what they are, and why
they act the way they do. It is a satisfying, rich, coherent and systematized
account that integrates science, psychology, ethics and social philosophy. Some
understanding of the principles of their teaching is required in order to appreciate
the potential it has to accommodate human behaviour and learning, the core area
of this study.
26

See 1.5 and 6.4.2.
According to Royce, William James is on record as accepting hylomorphism as “probably the best
ultimate explanation of man”, although he himself did not adopt it in his writing. James also
reached acceptance of the notion of soul “in which scholastic psychology and common-sense have
always believed.” William James, The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular
Philosophy (1897), reprinted in Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine,
(New York: Dover, 1956), Vol. 1, 181.
27
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a) Substance

An appreciation of causality underpins the hylomorphic notions of substantial
form and prime matter.
Aristotle proposed a theory of hylomorphism that non-material properties adhere
together with material properties in a single substance.28 Hylomorphism means
“matter and form” (meaning “lumber”, later “matter”;  meaning
“form”); the underpinning constituents of substance. Hylomorphism underpins
the Aristotelian-Thomistic notion of virtue, the core matter for this study, and best
describes the approach to philosophy of mind.

To understand what something is, Aristotle argued that it is necessary to employ a
notion of causality, what causes it to be what it is. Defending the unity of
substance, he argued that any material being is a composite of two co-principles
of substance: substantial form and prime matter, reflecting notions, respectively,
of act and potency. Substantial form makes something what it is; prime matter
makes it potentially other things.29

He proposed that form perfects matter, making something the fundamental sort
of thing it is. 30 Prime matter and substantial form bestow essence and compose
actual material substance, which itself will be expressed through its
characteristics, or “accidents”. Individual substances exist in themselves; a
substance is that which can be “by itself”.

Aristotle’s notion of causality extends beyond activation of matter, to psychology,
to learning and to acting, with significant implications throughout this study. 31
28

The Shorter Oxford defines “hylomorphism” as “the doctrine that primordial matter is the first
cause of the universe.”
29
James E Royce, Man and his nature (NY: McGraw Hill, 1961), 287.
30
th
Leslie Stevenson and David L Haberman, Ten Theories of Human Nature, 4 ed, (NY: OUP, 2009),
94.
31
Alan Donagan, “Thomas Aquinas on human action”, in Cambridge History of Later Medieval
Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 653. Donagan writes, “To many
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The act of esse.
To the preoccupation with “what things are” in Aristotle’s matter and form,
substance and accidents, and act and potency, Aquinas adds an overriding
existential concern about “why things are”, with the distinction of essence (what a
thing is) and existence (the fact of its being).32 “Because of (this)… stress on the
act of existence, rather than upon substantial form, Thomistic metaphysics is said
to rise above Aristotelian metaphysics.”33

Aquinas wished to address squarely the challenge of explaining how things may
come into existence and may cease to be. He emphasized what he called the unity
of being. He observed that finite beings may come to be and cease to be: they do
not possess being. He taught that finite things are compositions of potentiality
and act in two senses, first matter and form, but also, importantly with respect to
essence (what they are) and esse.34 A possible being has essence, but only a really
existing being has esse. Hence essence is “in potency to” esse.

Aquinas emphasized that matter and spirit differ in degree of perfection of being,
not in kind. This is a particularly significant insight providing a key to the refutation
of a substance dualism that overlooks any principle of actual existence, the act of
esse, and considers only the essence of material and non-material reality.35

Aquinas taught that unity of being comes from esse, and that every being that is
created must participate in the Divine act of existing. Aristotle too had argued for

twentieth century philosophers, the feature of Aquinas’ theory that is most objectionable is his
retention of Aristotle’s conception of causation as the exercise of a power or capacity, which
allows him to think of human beings themselves, and not only of events occurring within them, as
genuine causes of their actions –‘agent causes’”.
32
Joseph Torchia OP Exploring Personhood. (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 128.
33
Herman Reith, The Metaphysics of St Thomas Aquinas (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958), 111.
34
“This being is distinct from that being inasmuch as it is the being of this or that nature”. Aquinas,
On the Power of God, trans. English Dominican Fathers (Westminster, Maryland: Newman, 1952),
Q.7.2. ad 9.
35
Aquinas also differentiates between the human soul and the possibility of spiritual beings,
subsistent and complete in themselves, such as angels or even God himself.

40

such an ultimate principle of existence. 36 “Since everything that moves and
undergoes change requires an act responsible for initiating these processes,
Aristotle reasons that the entire universe requires some ultimate principle of
actuality.” To avoid the impossible situation of infinite regress, an unmoved mover
is posited, the ultimate end, “the final cause producing motion as being loved.” 37

The concept of participation.
Aquinas taught that substances possess being only by participation, that being is
predicated of finite creatures by participation. 38 He wrote: “From that one being
all other beings that are not their own being, but have being by participation,
must needs proceed.”39

In summary, each actual finite being will be actualized in three ways: by a
substantial form making it to be that which it is; by a participatory act of being,
that by which a thing is, eg its colour, shape and smell; and, by further perfection
by its accidents which are non essential characteristics of a substance.

Nature: the principle of operation.
Our behaviour follows upon the type of creature we are: “operatio sequitur esse”.
Do follows be: “agere sequitur esse.” Observations of the operation of a being
allow us to draw conclusions about its nature: “The nature of a being as such is
not directly observable. We must observe its operations and then draw
conclusions about its nature.” 40

b) Soul
36

In seeing existent reality as a dynamic act, Aquinas transcends the essentialist approaches that
preceded him. He argued that the distinctive nature of human beings, with their capacity to grasp
the non material, derives from their rationality which imparts a unique mode of existence. The
intentionality of God is the first efficient cause, bringing things into being so his goodness might be
communicated to creatures in a manifold and variegated manner. Torchia, Exploring Personhood,
131-2. See also ST, I, 47 1.
37
Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 77.
38
Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 129.
39
Aquinas, On the Power of God Q.3. ad5. Aquinas, On the Power of God, trans. English Dominican
Fathers (Westminster, Maryland: Newman, 1952), Q.3.5.
40
Royce, Man and his nature, 25.
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Soul as life principle and principle of unity.
Aristotle taught that all life forms a hierarchy and that the life principle of
something is its soul. Aristotle defines soul as “the actuality of a body that has life
potentially”.41 In other words, the soul activates the body.

Hence it is not accurate to think of the soul as a free standing substance. It is not a
thing, but the very principle of unity of the body itself. The soul can admit no
division for there is no further principle of unity. Whereas substances without
souls expand through “addition”; a living thing is nourished when it “receives in its
very self something that serves to maintain it”.42 “Only ensouled things truly
grow.”43

It is the soul that bestows on a substance its nature. “While it cannot be a body, it
is in a body and a body of a definite kind.”44 In contrast with Plato, Aristotle
affirms the explicit contribution of the body to humanness. The body is
potentiality with respect to the soul, “The soul is suited to be the form of a body;
the body in turn has a receptivity to ensoulment.”45

It is better to talk of “ensouled”, having distinctive ways of functioning, rather
than “having a soul” as if it were a substance.46 Body and soul make one thing
(unum) according to Aquinas. 47The unity of the soul and body is illustrated by the
integrity of wax and the imprint it bears.48
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DA, 2.1, 412a
DA, 2.9, 135-36.
43
DA, 2.9, 152-3.
44
DA, 2.1, 414a.
45
Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 85.
46
Matter of course is vital to the whole understanding; forms exist only in individuated matter.
Matter is the principle of individuation.
47
Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on human nature: a philosophical study of “Summa Theologiae”
1a75-89 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 73.
48
DA 2.1, 412b.
42

42

Aristotle proposes that there are three kinds of soul: the rational, sensitive, and
vegetative. Adopting a teleological perspective from Plato49 Aristotle argues that
the potency of matter is limited by its form, or soul. Fullness of potentiality, for
example, “human flourishing”, is inherently associated with final causality, the
purpose of human existence. Thus final and formal causes are related. As its form,
the soul directs each living body to its true telos.50
Aquinas emphasises that the parts cannot survive without the whole. 51 The soul
“perfects not only the whole but each part” of the organism, it is present as a
whole in every part of the matter that it actualizes.52 Nor, he writes in anticipation
of Descartes’ error, is the soul to be found in a determined location in the body,
“as a sailor in a ship.” 53 54The body itself does not remain after death;55 as has
been noted, the substance that is the being of the animal decomposes to its
constituent substances.
“For living things, living is existing”56; “living is the mode in which living things
have existence”. “The soul does not merely make the body to be of a certain kind,
the living kind; the soul also gives a body its very existence.”57 Hence, the
decomposition of death, entails division and loss of this specific form; the prime
matter is activated by other forms. “The soul itself forms that body that fits it; it
does not take up one already prepared.”58 The body has no existence outside of
49

Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 6.
Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 77.
51
43, Thomas Aquinas on human nature: a philosophical study of “Summa Theologiae” 1a75-89,
93. This is not to say that the whole cannot survive without some of its parts at times.
52
“The whole soul is in the whole body and in each of its parts, nor is is joined bodily as bodies are
joined to each other… The soul performs all its operations through its powers.” Aquinas, Summa
Contra Gentiles, trans. James F. Anderson (NY: Hanover House, 1955-7), II.72; cf ST, Ia, Q.76, Art.8.
53
Aquinas wrote of ridiculous assumptions of those who consider the soul’s being in body as in a
place, like a sailor in a ship, or as if it is a point at an indivisible location. cf In 1 Sent 8.5.3c.
54
ST, Ia Q.76, Art.1. Nor is rationality united to the body as a “motor”.
55
Aquinas writes, on death, “No part of the body has its proper function, whereas anything that
retains its species retains the operation belonging to that species” ST, Ia, Q.76, Art.8. See also
Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on human nature: a philosophical study of “Summa Theologiae” 1a75-89,
88.
56
Aquinas quotes Aristotle DA, II 4, 415b13.
57
Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on human nature: a philosophical study of “Summa Theologia” 1a7589, 96.
58
In DA I. 8.358-59.
50
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the substance, and exists as a human body or not at all, corrupting into secondary
substances59.
The human soul is the substantial form of man.60
Aristotle argues that man, as other material substances, is composed of the two
constitutive principles of matter and form: 61 “People are constituted in two
substantial elements, the soul with its reasoning power (understanding and will),
the flesh with its senses.”62 Man’s soul is the “ultimate integral formal principle
by which we live”. 63 The soul is not within man causing him to act in certain ways;
rather “it refers to the fact that man is capable of causing these activities, and that
man is not just matter since matter of itself does not live.”64 65

The soul, in actualising matter, forms the body. It has no specific locus within the
body. “It is really just as correct to say that matter is in the soul as to say that soul
is in matter.”66 The soul is wholly there, wherever man is.67 The soul has a virtual
presence, by virtue of power exerted.
Integrity of the human person.68
Aristotle insisted that it is the person who acts, not the soul, not a part of the
person: “It is surely better not to say that the soul pities, learns, or thinks, but that
the man does these with the soul.”69 As the immaterial soul admits of no real
division, rationality is predicated essentially: “Humans are sentient as well as

59

Richard Taylor, “Mind and Body” in Exploring Philosophy: an introductory anthology, ed. Steven
M. Cahn (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 102.
60
See discussion in Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 135.
61
Royce, Man and his nature, 282.
62
ST, Ia, Q.75, Art.6 ad3; and ST, Ia, Q.77, Art.8.
63
Royce, Man and his nature, 293
64
Royce, Man and his nature, 293
65
Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 149. “The soul is the primary metaphysical principle of the
essence of human nature... being or esse provides the constitutive principle and a way of being
appropriate to nature.”
66
Royce, Man and his nature, 316.
67
ST, Ia, Q.75, Art.8.
68
This section draws from excellent discussion in Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 130-150.
69
DA, 408b15.
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intelligent beings. By extension, then, the body which allows for sensation, is part
of a being that is essentially rational.”70

He divides the powers of the human being into reason and that which can obey
reason.71 He writes of theoretical and practical reason,72 and of the rational and
non rational aspects of the soul.73

Aquinas also maintained the complementarity of soul and body. He adopted the
Aristotelian hylomorphic understanding of humans “as composites of the formal
principle of the soul and the material substrate of the body”, that the human
subject is an “inextricable union comprising one substantial reality”.74

In virtual anticipation of contemporary philosophy of mind dilemmas, he strongly
rebutted the naturalism that did not distinguish between body and soul, and the
ancients who asserted “that only bodies were real things; and that what is not
corporal is nothing; hence they maintained that the soul is something
corporeal.”75

Adopting a Boethian line of thinking, he wrote, “In a more special and perfect way,
the particular and the individual are found in rational substances, which have
dominion over their own actions… actions belong to singulars. Therefore
individuals of a rational nature even have a special name among other substances;
and this name is person.”76 Person derives from persona, the Latin word for
“mask”; it suggests the voice sounding through the mask of the individual actor,
per-sonare, possibly conveying the dignity of the great person portrayed.77
Thomas suggests that the dignity of the person derives from its spiritual, therefore
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indestructible, act of subsistence.78 He wrote, “Person signifies what is most
perfect in all nature – that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature”79

Ensouled bodies; animated flesh.
Classical philosophical texts typically describe human beings as “composite
realities of soul and body” but this can be more confusing than helpful. It is much
truer to the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas to think of soul as the “animating
principle of matter”. I suggest the term “animated flesh” even more than
“ensouled body” for it better avoids any erroneous suggestion that the soul is
somehow an entity in itself.

Both Aristotle and Aquinas argued that when the soul is in a state united to the
body the soul and the body may only act in concert. This understanding is of great
importance in this study. Aristotle emphasised that the highest part of the rational
soul, the intellect, is inseparable from the body: “No one can learn or understand
anything in the absence of sense, and when the mind is actively aware of
anything, it is necessarily aware of it along with an image.”80Thomas too avoids
both “excessive spiritualism and naive materialism regarding human nature”.
Torchia sums up this feature: “Soul and body require each other: the soul depends
on the body as its instrumentality in the world, and the body depends on the soul
as its principle of life and activity.”81

The reality of ensoulment allows our thoughts to impact on our physical
constitution, and conversely the body to influence our mental life. It is clear that
thought is in constant and reciprocal interchange with bodily state: anxiety causes
tummy ache, stress induces cancer, life meaning impacts on bodily health, hope
prolongs the life of a terminally ill person… and neural pathways are instruments
for higher thinking.

78

Reith, The Metaphysics of St Thomas Aquinas, 119.
ST, Ia, Q.29, Art.3.
80
DA III 8 431b.
81
Torchia, Exploring Personhood, 138
79

46

Immortality of the soul.
Aristotle wrote of the human capacity for “thought and intellect”82 and does
suggest that the faculty of contemplation can exist separately from the body “as
the everlasting can from the perishable”.83 Yet ultimately, both Aristotle and Plato
deemed the only basis for human individuality to be the perishable body. 84 85

86

Aquinas held the view that the disembodied soul enjoys another mode of
existence.87 88 He argued that the human soul must be a substantial reality,89 but
that alone the soul does not constitute a human being. 90

1.4.2

Rational psychology

Overview.
Rational psychology is the discipline whereby we seek to understand human
nature by “diligent and subtle investigation”91, as a preliminary to understanding
what fulfils human nature and how human beings should act. A correct grasp of
the Aristotelian understanding of soul is crucial if one is to arrive at an adequate
metaphysical understanding of the role of matter in the human constitution, of
great relevance to this current study. Aristotle writes of the nature of man in De
Anima. Aquinas sets out his anthropology in the Summa Theologiae 1a 75-89. It is
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DA, 414b19.
DA, 413b26.
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Stevenson and Haberman, Ten Theories of Human Nature, 90-92.
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immediately apparent that Aristotle and Aquinas firmly ground their discussion in
material reality. Aquinas writes, for example, “It belongs to the notion of this
particular man to be composed of this soul, of this flesh, of these bones.” 92 93

In this section we look briefly at the psychology that follows from an hylomorphic
notion of substance, and in particular an hylomorphic understanding of the
relationship between the rational soul and the body. This is of essential
significance to this study which looks in detail at the interconnection between
rationality, and bodily emotion and passion. It is within rational psychology that
Aristotle and Aquinas developed their understanding of virtue and its role in
human action and fulfilment.

I start with the notion that human biology must be attuned to the operations of
the soul.

Man is endowed with a body suited to the operations of the soul.
Man is endowed with a “distinctive cluster of faculties including reasoning, that
are fundamental to the human way of living and functioning.”94 The soul is the
principle of these operations. The most complex relationship exists between the
soul and human body. “It was necessary that the intellectual soul be united to a
body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense”.95 In other words, the body
possesses a suitable potency.96 Man as a type of animal uniquely capable of
rational thought has a body with biology attuned to human operations: cognition,
perception, belief; appetite and desire; locomotion, growth, flourishing, and
92

ST, Ia, Q.75, Art.4.
Royce, Man and his nature, 157. Investigation in rational psychology may move inductively (a
posteriori) from observation of experience and of what man does, to conclusions about his
abilities, powers and principles of operation, to conclusions about the kind of being he is, his
nature, essence and ultimate principles of being. Investigation may also proceed by reasoned
analysis (a priori). For example, applying the principle of finality to cognition, a form possessed by
the knower, we can say that this form must be for the sake of something else.
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Stevenson and Haberman, Ten Theories of Human Nature, 94.
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ST, Ia, Q.76, Art.5.
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decay. These correspond to the three powers of the human soul: the rational,
sensitive, and vegetative.97

It is inaccurate to suggest that the soul as the life principle of the body operates
through the body, as if the body were a mere instrument. Torchia writes, “If
powers are related to the soul, it is because the soul is their cause or principle, not
necessarily their subject.”98 When the soul animates the body there can be only
one subject operating, the person, the ensouled body. There is no other
possibility. Aquinas insists that we understand not because we are moved by our
intellects, but that we are moved by our intellect because we understand, because
we are rational.99 Hence, intellect is not just another cause among physical
causes.100

Rationality embraces the whole person but it will be argued there is a dependence
of rationality upon the body as upon a material cause.101 This carries enormous
significance in this current study. All human operations, including rationality, are
conducted with cooperation of the body. While the soul is always the “principle of
action”, in its united state, it is the person, animated body, who acts.

The process of knowing.
Aristotle and Aquinas insisted that the pursuit of knowledge is fundamental to the
human psyche, “All humans desire to know by nature”102 and that this pursuit of
wisdom is characterised by knowledge of first causes.103 For this task man
97

Royce, Man and his nature, 148. Aristotle and Aquinas “preferred to talk about a substantial
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possesses non-material powers of rationality: the intellect (our power to
understand).104 105

106

Knowledge starts with sense impressions. According to Aquinas, man uses his
senses to grasp realities external to himself. Raw sense information informs
memory, imagination and appetites, impulses and drives, emotions and passions.
And at the rational level, this information may inform simple apprehension,
judgements (including conscience), reasoning, rational desires, and choices. This
accords with the scholastic adage: “There is nothing in the intellect that was not
previously in some way in the senses.” 107

Motivation and action.
The intellect has being as its object; the will, which is the power of the soul to
choose and to love, has that which is good for one’s nature as its object. 108 Just as
we can be moved by sense appetites, the will is our intellectual appetite. Aquinas
defines will as a rational appetite in keeping with the rationality we find in the
human soul. We seek what our bodies or our intellects perceive as good.

Our appetites sideline rational decision-making when we act impulsively to satisfy
that appetition, be it hunger or the craving of a kleptomanic; alternatively our
sensory appetites inform our rational choices when behaviour is consequent to
the judgements we make in our will. 109 We will see this has great relevance in the
action of the moral virtues.
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ST, Ia, Q.76, Art.2.
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Will is this power of rational appetition.110 In a well balanced personality, our
choices are based on an appreciation of the facts. Normally our intellect, assisted
by our emotions, and with sound convictions and reasoning processes, guides the
judgements and choices of our will.

Emotions and passions.
Embodied souls have emotions “passiones animae”, essentially physical
phenomena, involving “some physiological modification”.111 People are agents
with desires, purposes and goals, and their actions are performed by virtue of
intellect and will. People chose in accord with what they know.

Emotions and passions are closely linked to our senses, but, as we have seen,
require the guidance of reason. We are a package deal; our happiness is linked
with use of our reason to manage our choices, our passions and our emotions.
Ultimately our actions all may be traced back to considered or impulsive choices,
to well or poorly managed passions and emotions.

Human acts.
Aquinas distinguishes acts of a human being (actus hominis) from human acts
(actiones humanae), genuinely moral acts. The acts of a human may not
necessarily involve reason, whereas human acts are rational and voluntary - acts
motivated by reason. Aquinas argues that “That over which we hold mastery can
be said to be voluntary.”112 He accepts that animals can undertake limited forms
of voluntary action.113

Virtues and vices.
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Habitual dispositions for positive human acts are known as virtues. 114 Human life
is not limited simply to isolated acts, episodic and detached from the bigger
perspective; this can overlook the importance of action on the basis of
“habitus”115, dispositions. “For Aquinas, habitus ... puts one’s activity more under
one’s control than it might otherwise be.”116 The concepts of habitus (“an
acquired quality that we change only with difficulty” according to Thomas) and
connaturalisation are essential to the notion of virtue.117

Cardinal virtues.
The four cardinal virtues are the umbrella habits that accord us effective
management of our thinking, and of our passions and feelings. In a well rounded
personality, through these four habits we maintain a level of management over
our passions, acknowledging their aptitude for the good, but not surrendering to
them.

Of the four cardinal virtues, sound judgement refers to effective management of
our thinking. But the other three help us manage our passions, feelings and
relationships so that passions and feelings do not manage us, and so that we truly
respect others. For example, without self control, our passions of desire or anger
could dominate our decision-making. Without fortitude, our fears would stop us
thinking clearly, and without responsibility to keep our self love in check, our
decisions could neglect our duties to others.
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Human fulfilment.
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle addressed human fulfilment. He argued that
human flourishing is to be found most perfectly in the life of the mind. Aristotle
wrote in the Nicomachean Ethics of “The life of the intellect (as) the best and most
pleasant life for man”.118 Both Aristotle and Aquinas held that, nevertheless, a less
perfect beatitude is to be found in the practice of moral virtue as it is disposes us
to rational operations, and hence to contemplation.
Further Aristotle and Aquinas regarded man as a social animal.119 Rationality may
be seen as the capacity for loving personal relationships. In this sense, intelligence
and virtue are at the service of freedom and love. 120 121

Flashing insights into the truth of things nor the instants of choice characterize us
as rational. Our rationality is a state of being. It is an abiding participation in the
capacity for rational thought and choice that empowers us to know ourselves, to
understand the real world in which we operate as agents, but at the same time to
stand above that world, capable of altering it and of discovering in it the pleasures
of loving relationships.

Aquinas argued that only God can fulfill a composite of a body and a soul with a
capacity for infinite good. 122 Love of God in the will is better, in this sense, than
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knowledge of God in the intellect.123 Thomas says the human will is in a state of
potency to its summum bonum, the ultimate Act of Being.124 The will cannot be
moved necessarily by any created finite good; it is only “our rational apprehension
of an unqualified good (that)... frees us from ... attachment to any finite good”.
Man may only be fulfilled, ultimately, in love of God. He argued that this capacity
to love is a consequence of rationality, which in turn, is disposed to perfect
operation by virtue. 125

He argued that it is the potency for a loving relationship with God as first cause
and final end of the person, that bestows on each human person an intrinsic
dignity. Man’s fulfilment is in the activation of this potency. “...all things exist to
the extent that they share in God’s self-subsistent esse, all things desire to be like
God as their final end. Accordingly to become like God is the ultimate goal and
completion of all things.”126

This lies beyond the strict scope of this study.

1.4.3

Restoring the hylomorphic notion of person.

The concept of person (1.4.1) within an hylomorphic understanding of reality
provides a powerful alternative to the current fragmentation of approaches that
characterize contemporary explorations into philosophy of mind. In this section
following a brief overview of how different schools of philosophical thought have
approached the concept of person, and I outline certain advantages that the
notion of person offers for reaching valid conclusions about human agency
including virtue development.

Overview of changing understanding of person.
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Aristotelian-Thomistic anthropology presents an integrated vision of the material
and the rational in the human person. Torchia articulates the view that
perceptions of personhood have moved through relatively distinct phases. Plato
and Aristotle reached an understanding of humans in generic terms, as anthropos
or homo. The Christian era, viewing persons as individual, unique and relational,
reached a high point in the work of Aquinas. Following the Cartesian revolution
and reactions to it, Torchia identifies a “steady undermining of a metaphysical
understanding of a unified abiding self during the modern and contemporary
periods”.127

Essential to the Platonic and Aristotelian vision was the notion of an underlying
subject. Plato identified that subject with the soul. Plato argued that the human
soul has a non corporeal nature. 128 He was criticized by Aquinas for regarding the
soul in the body “as a sailor in a ship”129 from which the inescapable conclusion
had to be that soul and body were distinct things unable to make one composite
unity.

Addressing this dilemma, Aristotle argued that the subject possessed both
physical and psychic properties. Aristotle in De Anima regarded people as
composite individuals, “complex unities both mental and physical”. 130 Crucially, as
we have seen, he proposed that people are ensouled bodies: 131 “We can wholly
dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the body and soul are one: it is as
meaningless as to ask whether the wax and the shape given to it by the stamp are
one.”132 Aristotle argued that semantics must reflect reality.133

The neo-Platonic early Christian era built on these understandings. In City of God
Augustine emphasised the composite model: “Man is not a body alone or a soul
127
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alone. He is composed of both body and soul.”134 He insisted on an “harmonious
union” of the inner spiritual and outer bodily man, and acknowledged the
subjective ego: “You stood me face to face with myself...”135. In line with Plato and
Aristotle, he proposed that will underpins personal moral responsibility.136 The
later Augustine referred explicitly to individual person of composite body and
soul.

Building on Augustine’s concept of “harmonious union”, Aquinas argued not only
for the dual properties of the one subject, “a compound whose substance is both
spiritual and corporeal”137, and that the mental and physical are notions that are
not reducible to each other, but that the soul is the very principle of life. Anima,
for Aquinas is “that which animates”, “that which gives life”; it is “the root
principle of life in living things within our experience.”138 There is no “medium
connecting the two together”. As we have seen above he argued that the soul is
the form of the body. “The soul is the substantial form of the body, giving to the
whole body and to each of its parts their act of existing and species. Furthermore,
the whole constituted of these parts is a substantial unity.”139

Importantly too, Aquinas took Boethius’s landmark definition of person:
“rationalis naturae individual substantia” 140 (individual substance of a rational
nature) adapting it to “a person is a subsistent individual in a rational nature”.141
He argued that substance is the basis of individuality clarifying the equivocal usage
in Aristotle who used substance to mean both the individual and the genus. 142
Aquinas thus more clearly reflects the autonomy of the individual.
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In texts such as Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes interpreted
personhood in terms of consciousness. In a dualist paradigm, he identified the
person with his mind or soul. He held that mental stuff (mind) and physical stuff
(body) are distinct but connected, and able to influence each other. He argued
that persons are identical with their minds but not with bodies. “I have a body
that is closely joined to me”.143

The immediate successors of Descartes, Geulincx (1625-69) and Malebranche
(1638-1715), rejected interaction of soul and body, and in its place advocated
occasionalism, a psychophysical parallelism dependent on God’s intervention,
with a denial of causality.144 This denial of common sense helped to provoke the
intellectual reaction that sought no further explanation for human behaviour in an
incorruptible and immaterial mind.

In the centuries following the Cartesian revolution, the concept of person was
effectively lost under pressure from empiricism.

Once we discard any metaphysical understanding of personhood and dismiss any
non-material dimension we are left only with the perceptions themselves.

John Locke (1632 – 1704) argued that personal identity derives from
consciousness.
To find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider
what person stands for, which, I think is a thinking intelligent
being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as
itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places,
which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable
from thinking.145
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The empiricism of Locke was followed by Hume’s arguments against
consciousness and person. Finding his antecedents in Francis Bacon (1561-1626)
and Newtonian physics, Hume (1711-1776) employed a mitigated scepticism that
questioned the dogmas of metaphysics. The impact of the new science was felt
everywhere, mathematics focused on efficient causality, and a demand that
conclusions should be evidence based.146 He argued that “We have no perfect
idea of anything but of a perception. A substance is entirely different from a
perception. We have, therefore, no idea of a substance.”147 Ultimately, he argued
that human beings are no more than “bundles” of perceptions.

These reactions have led to the physicalist, the functionalist and the non reductive
materialist views of the last seventy years. The physicalist understanding of the
person, widely encountered in contemporary neuroscientific literature and
contemporary philosophy of mind, regards people as only made of matter, for
example:
According to the Identity Theory, persons are identical with a set of physical
states or events just as lightning is identical with electrical discharge, or just as
the Morning Star is identical with the Evening Star.148

Somewhat ironically numerous commentators have pointed out that the
physicalism appears as much a reaction to the inadequacies of dualism as a
conviction in materialism. Of course both dualism and physicalism contrast with
Aquinas’s view of what people are.149

More recent approaches have blended physicalist and functionalist approaches.
Daniel Dennett, dismissing a qualitative distinction between matter and spirit,
ascribes personhood according to function and behaviour, the fulfilment of
146
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experimentally verifiable descriptors. He proposes six conditions for personality:
rationality, intentionality, an attitude or stance towards intentionality, reciprocity,
verbal communication, and consciousness in some special way (eg self
consciousness).150 151

Reductionist (or, more properly, eliminative materialist or epiphenomenalist)
understandings have replaced teleological understandings of the person. For
some, selfhood is essentially denoted by conscious experience.152Dennett also
targets Cartesian dualism, insisting that there is “no Cartesian Theatre”153, in other
words references to the mind derive from Cartesian misconceptions.154 His work
represents a current endpoint of reductionism. See “Fictionalism” in Table 1.1.

Francis Crick has harnessed the neuroscience in a further strain of contemporary
reductionism. He writes, “The Astonishing Hypothesis is that ‘You,’ our joys and
your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity
and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve
cells and their associated molecules.”155 See “Competition for Executive Control
Accounts” in Table 1.1.

Searle is a proponent of non reductive approaches. He emphasises the subjectivity
inherent in consciousness which he compares in some ways to “a surface feature
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of physical systems”.156 Consciousness is simply bracketed off, too hard to explain,
but material by definition. See “Biological Naturalism” in Table 1.1.

Chalmers also resists reductionism but his epiphenomenal approach fails to bridge
the mind body divide. Nevertheless his work has highlighted the transcendent
nature of consciousness.
Even such “revolutionary” developments as the invocation of
connectionist networks, non linear dynamics, artificial life, and
quantum mechanics will provide only more powerful functional
explanations... but the mystery of consciousness will not be
removed.157
See “Epiphenomenalism” in Table 1.1.

Simultaneously, there are various other currents which have defended the
“person”. Bernard Williams, pursuing a non Aristotelian, relativistic, anti-utilitarian
approach, argued that if there is no body there can be no person, and that human
identity is necessarily bodily, although body is seen as a separate substance, not
integrated to the mind.

Henry P. Stapp, Evan Harris Walkers and others, including Roger Penrose, have
proposed a quantum theory explanation of consciousness. Some, among them
Jeffrey Schwartz158, have seen this as a way of preserving a spiritual dimension to
the human person, but it appears essentially to be another form of non reductive
materialism, in this case proposing that sub particle physics can have something to
tells us about the soul.159 Essentially it is another physicalist explanation for the
mind body connection. See “Quantum Indeterminism” in Table 1.1.

An enriched understanding of “person”.
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It was not until the early 20th century that there was a rediscovery of “person”
through the philosophy of Jacques Maritain and others. Much of this work is
inherently attuned to hylomorphic theory.

In recent decades through Karol Woytyla’s (the future Pope John Paul II’s)
articulation of “personalism”, the notion of the person as “an objective entity,
which as a definite subject has the closest contacts with the whole (external)
world, and is most intimately involved with it precisely because of its
inwardness”160 has gained traction. Woytyla’s notion of person is founded
broadly and synthetically on hylomorphic principles. He writes of the distinctive
character of the person, having an “inner life”, “of whose nature reason is a
property”161, and with the power of free will, of self determination. 162 He
proceeds to argue that love is “always a mutual relationship between persons”163,
in fact, “the unification of persons”164 and it is the “authentic commitment of the
free will of one person (the subject), resulting from the truth about the other
person.”165 He says, “Freedom exists for the sake of love.”166 Woytyla proposes a
vision of human fulfilment in which our materiality and sexuality are truly
integrated with rationality. He provides a philosophical defence of human
rationality and freedom, and a vision of human flourishing dependent upon the
integration of the spiritual and material properties of man. It is significant that
Woytyla ties his discussion explicitly to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.167

Furthermore, without a vision of the integration of the rational and the material, it
is not possible to attribute to man non-material goals.168 Charles Taylor writes:
A self or person ... is not like an object in the usually
understood sense. … We don’t have selves in the way we have
160
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hearts and livers.... We are only selves insofar as we… seek and
find an orientation to the good.169

Note these analyses also would not be possible without the hylomorphic
foundation. 170

Torchia has noted the postmodern tendency to separate human nature from
moral personhood, an approach at contradiction with Aquinas’s definition of
person as an individual subsistent reality. Torchia writes, “A qualitative sense of
personhood must rest on a fundamental metaphysical one, as the core of our
humanity and individuality.”171He notes the scepticism or even hostility of many
contemporary thinkers to the claim that there is a set of universal human traits
grounded in a stable abiding “nature” which all humans share (simply by virtue of
their humanity.)172 This is found, for example, in the work of Peter Singer.

In another line of investigation relevant to the task of this study, Haldane and
Torchia both question the possibility of consciousness studies offering a way
forward in philosophy of mind. Haldane comments, “Contemporary philosophers
of mind confirm the persistence of Cartesianism in their preoccupation with the
status of qualia. I remain agnostic about the possibility of a naturalistic account of
qualia.”173
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In like vein Torchia writes that personal identity is not based only on continuity of
self awareness but “rooted in enduring human nature that persists in the midst of
accidental changes flowing from the substantial union of soul and body. This is
why humans require a metaphysical explanation that is more encompassing and
penetrating than any scientific account of any biological or biochemical
processes.”174

The discussion in 1.4.1 - 3 highlights the significance of Haldane’s analysis above:
that the current impasse in philosophy of mind can only be broken by a
metaphysical breakthrough about the nature of man. Torchia concludes, “Once
we define ourselves as embodied spirits, the insolubility of the modern mind-body
problem is effectively neutralised.”175 The physicalist backlash to dualism has
ultimately failed to explain human nature and human behaviour. A richer
understanding is needed.

1.4.4 Advantages offered by an hylomorphic notion of person.

Serious deficiencies arise in discussion of the human being or human agency when
the hylomorphic notion of person is lost:

i.

The concept of an underlying subject is easily compromised. Man becomes
equated either to his mind, or to his physiology. To equate man to his mind
implies a loss of dignity of the body. To equate him to his physiology
implies a loss of dignity and a denial of any necessary distinction between
human nature and animal nature.

ii. A loss of the concept of form, a loss of the notion of an animating principle
for matter, opens the way to a dual substance view in which matter and
man’s actions can be too easily diminished in comparison to subjective
perceptions and intentions, and in which it becomes impossible to explain
satisfactorily psychic causality of the physical (or better to say “non174
175
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material causality”). Ultimately this line of thinking leads, as in the work of
Hume, to a denial of the very principle of causality.
iii. A loss of this integrity of mind and matter also makes it very difficult to
account for the interaction between thought and emotion, or to account
for choice and election of action. Ultimately too, it diminishes the dignity
of human sexual relationships, expressed bodily.
iv. A lack of understanding of the potential of the hylomorphic explanation for
the human person has led, in neuroscientific circles, to the assumption
that all theories of a non physical component to the human person have a
substance dualism at their core.
v. We have seen that explanations for the interaction of the material and the
rational resort either to some form of non reductive physicalism or
epiphenomenalism. These non reductive approaches assume there to be
no metaphysical difficulty in accounting for rationality within such
frameworks. They are unable however to provide a satisfactory physicalist
or epiphenomenalist explanation for the hylomorphic conclusion that
rationality must be considered as a spiritual power because it permits the
possession of truths which are universal, not just particular. (See Appendix
1.)
vi. The lack of a satisfying rational psychology opens the door to empiricist,
behaviourist, and functionalist approaches, in which a richer metaphysical
explanation can be dismissed as inaccessible, irrelevant, or simply too
hard.
And this, I suggest, is precisely what has happened.

An Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of person provides:
i.

An effective response to physicalist understandings that deny the
possibility of human freedom. (See 1.3 and Table 1.1).

ii. A scientifically coherent alternative to dualist understandings for the
interaction of body and mind. (In the process I will draw attention to the
simplistic understanding of non-materialism, considering all proponents as
dualists, by many in contemporary neuroscience.)
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iii. A satisfying epistemology that accounts for the interaction of human being
with the material world.
iv. A metaphysical basis for human dignity. Human dignity is founded not in
our rationality, as such, but in the fact that we have a rational soul. 176 As
persons we are unique, having our own personal dignity, and we are at the
same time, relational. This is the core of Aquinas’ doctrine of the
person.177

1.5

An hylomorphic critique of 20th century currents in philosophy of mind.

In this section I argue for the legitimacy of an hylomorphic approach to philosophy
of mind. In the light of the preceding understanding of the human person, it is
possible now to offer a critique of 20th century currents in philosophy of mind and
to argue that a philosophy of mind founded upon an hylomorphic notion of the
human person offers distinct advantages.

By offering an understanding of how the material and non-material can coexist
and interact as properties of a single substance, hylomorphism provides a robust
foundation for a philosophy of mind and a framework for criticism of other
approaches to brain and mind, and of freedom and virtue.178 The integration of
material and non-material properties offered by hylomorphism stands in constrast
to one-or-the-other understandings of the material and mental offered by what
176
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can be seen as the three basic approaches to philosophy of mind: dualism,
reductionism, and eliminativism.179

John Haldane’s writings on the advantages of an hylomorphic approach to
philosophy of mind emphasize the necessity for a metaphysics that permits
material and non-material properties to be integrated. He argues that beneath
thought and action we must discern the acting person: “A correct account of the
nature of persons will include, as essential aspects, accounts of the nature of
thought and of action, since these are the primary modes of activity of those
beings whose nature is that of persons.”180 His work in this field offers an
approach and credibility for the hylomorphic underpinnings of this study.

Hylomorphism offers a number of advantages over competing ontologies utilised
in philosophy of mind debate.
i.

Progress on the knotty mind-body question is possible once we accept the
hylomorphic premise that “do follows be”, that actions follow upon the
nature of the entity. Hylomorphism offers an understanding of the nature
of persons, and of the metaphysical priority of person over thought and
action.181

ii. The perennial difficulty for philosophers of mind to explain how mental
phenomena could possibly cause physical events appears overcome using
an hylomorphic framework.182
179

Georges Rey, Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. (Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 1997).
Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind”, 49.
181
The application of the concept of person to philosophy of mind has some history. In 1958 P.F.
Strawson argued that the concept of person is more basic than that of a person’s mind or body,
observing, “We routinely attribute to the very same thing, persons, both material and mental
properties: I walk, and sleep, as well as think and feel.” (For reference see: Kirk Ludwig, “The MindBody Problem: An Overview” in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, eds. Stephen P Stich
and Ted A Warfield (Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 2003), 17.
182
Descartes proposed matter and spirit, body and mind, to be irreconcilable realities, separate
substances, though causally interacting. On the other hand hylomorphism proposes that matter
and spirit differ in degree not in kind; Aquinas says they differ in their degree of perfection of
being, and that they are properties of the substance, not substances in themselves. Although D. M.
Armstrong argues that the “considerable difficulty and confusion which surrounds the
philosophical theory of properties” poses a challenge for the “one substance view” which includes
hylomorphism, nevertheless the one substance view of hylomorphism is not only rigorously
articulated but is consistent with the facts of human experience. See D. M. Armstrong, “Mind body
180
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iii. A further nagging problem for philosophers of mind has been to offer an
explanation for mental responses to the environment. Hylomorphic
philosophers argue that it is that we possess the object itself in our
intellect, a conformity of mind to thing; we do not “perceive visual
experiences, we have them” as Putnam says in the Dewey lectures.183
Haldane too recognises the fertile ground here for hylomorphism to offer a
clear understanding of the intersection of mental and physical.184
iv. Causality, since Descartes, has been a central issue in the mind-body
problem. Again hylomorphism offers a way forward with its rich
understanding of causality and the distinction it offers between efficient
and formal causation.185
v. Haldane argues that an hylomorphic understanding of substance permits
an effective critique of both dualism and materialism as flawed
philosophical notions.186 (See also 6.4.2)
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problem: philosophical theory,” in Oxford Companion to the Mind, 2 ed., ed. Richard L Gregory
(Oxford: OUP, 2004).
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Hilary Putnam, “Sense, Nonsense and the Senses: An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human
Mind,” Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994): 445-517 at 453-4.
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Haldane argues that a well articulated hylomorphic account protects realism from falling into
conceptual relativism because it offers an understanding of how perceptions are grasped
objectively. He draws on the hylomorphic notion of form, that which “makes something to be what
it is”, “informing” of the kind of thing something is. Form is act; the hylomorphic notion of prime
matter is pure potentiality. Matter makes individuals of the same form distinct; where there is
universality there is no matter. Concepts in the intellect are particular types of forms. Concept and
substantial form “though distinct in the modes of their actualisation, in esse naturale as opposed
to in esse intentionale, are specifically alike.” Haldane argues that thought is intrinsically related to
its object because it shares the same form.
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Haldane argues that formal causation in knowing must not be confused with efficient causation,
which is the pathway for material causation. Yes there is efficient causality acting on the organ of
sense but the result is a formal change. We take in formal causes under the material conditions of
changes of sense and therefore with particularised qualities. See below: 6.4.2.2.
186
In discussing current attribute dualists who suggest that the higher region of the brain is a
physical substance “with some non-physical properties”, Haldane argues that “a proper
understanding of substantiality should lead one to reject the idea that a wholly physical particular
could be the bearer of intrinsic attributes that are non-physical. The error of the Cartesian is to
suppose that non-physical attributes imply an exclusively incorporeal substance as bearer.”
Hylomorphism is equally effective against the fundamental tenets of materialism whether it takes
the form of eliminative materialism, behaviourism, identity theory, central state materialism,
functionalism, anomalous monism or any of the other forms of non reductive materialisms. “If
thought is a non physical activity as I have argued that it is, then the intellectual powers are not
physical; nor, therefore, can the substance to whose nature the powers belong.” Haldane, “A
return to form in the philosophy of mind,” 58.
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vi. An hylomorphic analysis urges a radical departure from philosophy of
mind’s dead-end preoccupation in recent years with consciousness and the
notion of qualia. It is not the way we feel about reality that gives us a non
physical dimension, it is a reflection of our nature itself. An hylomorphic
analysis permits a return to being away from both epistemological and
metaphysical idealism.187
vii. The hylomorphic ontology is very much in keeping with, and provides an
explanation for, our intuitions of being, our observations of human
freedom, of human action and causation, and of teleological motivation.188
The hylomorphic approach is in keeping with the widespread acceptance
of human freedom. Without an understanding of substance that
integrates the material and non-material as properties, neural
explanations for consciousness, intentionality and qualia must remain as
mechanistic and deterministic. It is time for a radical return to the
ontological basis of subjective experience.

Table 1.1 An hylomorphic critique of 20th century currents in philosophy of
mind (in endpapers) classes the principal currents of philosophy of mind according
to categories of irrealism, conceptual reductionism, conceptual anti-reductionism,
and ontological antireductionism. These categories, adapted from Ludwig, provide
a convenient framework for analysis on a spectrum of physicalism:189 from radical
physicalist, through reductive and non reductive materialism, to ontological
solutions. Hylomorphism, described by Haldane as “non physicalist, non dualist,
dual aspect” theory is situated in the last of the four categories. 190The
subcategorisations are substantially my own. In the right hand column I offer a
187

“Contemporary philosophers of mind confirm the persistence of Cartesianism in their
preoccupation with the status of qualia. I remain agnostic about the possibility of a naturalistic
account of qualia.” Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind,” 57.
188
It appears that some accept substance dualism, a dualism of the classical property or event
variety, in order to uphold teleological motivation. Yet, “the dual aspect monism... of
hylomorphism will offer the same advantages.” John Bickle, “Philosophy of Mind and the
Neurosciences” in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, ed. Stephen P Stich and Ted A
Warfield (Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 2003), 333.
189
Malo describes physicalism as the theory whereby everything supervenes in the physical realm.
Antonio Malo, “Three theories about freedom” pre publication manuscript, 145.
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Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 21.
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brief hylomorphic critique for the various lines of thought. For the purposes of
refutation, the various subcategories tend to group into recurring themes, broadly
though not exclusively: eliminativist, behaviourist and functionalist, reductive and
non-reductive emergent, and dualist. If hylomorphism is correct, then we have a
solution to the major objection to my thesis: that it cannot relate propositions
about the brain to propositions about choice and virtue.

Also by this approach I wish to suggest the incisive potential for an hylomorphic
contribution to philosophy of mind and to further justify the position adopted by
this current study. It is beyond my scope to offer more a more detailed critique
but I do wish to demonstrate that hylomorphism exposes significant weaknesses
of irrealism, conceptual reductionism, and conceptual anti-reductionism, and of
dualistic forms of ontological antireductionism.

Also in the endpapers is found Appendix 1. A Response to the Claims of Emergent
Rationality by Non-reductive Materialism. The paradigm of emergent rationality
requires a more detailed philosophical response. I argue that acceptance of this
position, popularised by both neuroscientists and philosophers, reveals an
incorrectly framed inquiry from the start, and that acceptance must lead to a
denial of the eudaimonic dimension of virtue.

1.6

Situating this study in current approaches to ethics.

The Aristotelian-Thomistic view of human moral development proposes that
human personality, if it is to flourish, requires the development of intrinsic
qualities of self management. This study proposes that these qualities, in ways
essentially described by Aristotle and Thomas, have a neural substrate.

As the field of the morality of acts, moral behaviour and moral character is broadly
described as moral philosophy or ethics, it is appropriate that I briefly situate this
study in the spectrum of current approaches to ethics.

69

During the early period of the second half of the 20th century, the prevailing view
was that ethics classified conveniently into two broad groups: 191
i.

Consequentialist ethical theories developed from the utilitarian doctrines
of Bentham and Mill. These are essentially teleological approaches in
which the ethical nature of an action is derived from the contribution of
the action to the well being of human beings. 192

ii.

Deontological (duty based) theories, including ethical systems where moral
obligation is primarily derived from a religious or from a purely rational
framework. Many of these theories take Kant as their philosophical
founder. Kant argued, captured in his “Categorical Imperative”, that ethics
derives from “a universal and impartial law of rationality”.

Many commentators now add virtue ethics as a third fundamental category; it is
increasingly regarded as a “serious rival” for traditional moral theories of
utilitarianism and deontology. 193

This study, seeking out the neuroscientific aspects of the development and
practice of virtue, is situated in the field of virtue ethics.

1.6.1 Some reasons for the growing stature of virtue ethics.

The legitimisation of virtue ethics as an alternative ethical approach is the result of
a number of factors. A 1958 paper by Elizabeth Anscombe’s is regarded as the
forerunner of this philosophical revival. 194 Her call for a return to the notion of
human flourishing founded on the development of virtue was a turning point. She
argued forcefully that without a clear psychological understanding, ethics must be
unproductive, that we must “stop doing moral philosophy until we get our
191

A view reflected in G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy” in Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger
Crisp and Michael Slote (Oxford: OUP, 1997), 26-44, and articulated in J. Rawls A Theory of Justice
(Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971.)
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Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, “Introduction” in Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp and Michael
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Daniel Statman, “Introduction to Virtue Ethics,” in Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader, ed. Daniel
Statman (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 1997), 2.
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psychology straight”. 195 Anscombe also took specific issue with modern moral
ethicists in the utilitarian tradition for allowing worthy ends to justify means that
are unjust.196

In the decades since Anscombe’s paper, virtue ethicists have argued that virtue
ethics offers distinct and inherent advantages over deontological and
consequentialist approaches.

i.

It has been argued that virtue ethics holds “explanatory primacy”, that
deontological or teleological ethical systems focusing on moral analysis of
actions beg investigation into the qualities of character that give rise to
such actions. One virtue ethicist, Gary Watson, sums up this view, “Action
appraisal is derivative from appraisal of character... .Basic moral facts are
about quality of character.” 197 198

ii. Virtue based approaches have gained ground for their positivity and
flexibility, and for their ability to offer solutions in the myriad of ethical
195

Anscombe wrote of “... (the current ) huge gap, at present unfillable as far as we are concerned,
which needs to be filled by an account of human nature, human action, the type of characteristic a
virtue is, and, above all, of human “flourishing”. And it is the last concept that appears the most
doubtful. For it is a bit much to swallow that a man in pain and hunger and poor and friendless, is
flourishing, as Aristotle himself admitted.”
Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, 44
196
Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, 44
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Gary Watson, “On the primacy of character,” in Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader, ed. Daniel
Statman (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 1997), 58.
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This conviction builds on the Aristotelian principle introduced above: “do follows be”. At the
core of this issue is what Statman calls the “meta-ethical” ethical difference between deontological
and virtue ethics. Virtue theory refers to the ethical approach in which “the basic judgements in
ethics are judgements about character”. Virtue ethicists insist that being is prior to behaviour. The
primacy of character view is well illustrated by Swanton’s reference to a passage in CS Lewis
emphasising the integrative function of virtue: “What is the good of telling... ships how to steer so
as to avoid collisions if, in fact, they are such crazy old tubs that they cannot be steered at all?
What is the good of drawing up, on paper, rules for social behaviour, if we know that, in fact, our
greed, cowardice, ill temper, and self-conceit are going to prevent us from keeping them? I do not
mean for a moment that we ought not to think, and to think hard, about improvements in our
social and economic system. What I do mean is that all that thinking will be mere moonshine
unless we realise that nothing but the courage and unselfishness of individuals is ever going to
make any system work properly. It is easy enough to remove the particular kinds of graft or
bullying that go on under the present system: but as long as men are twisters or bullies they will
find some new way of carrying on the old game under the new system. You cannot make men
good by law: and without good men you cannot have a good society. That is why we must go on to
think... of morality inside the individual.” C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (London: Fontana, 1955),
68-9. Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Oxford: OUP, 2003).
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dilemmas that can occur in real life. According to Macintyre, Aristotle sees
virtues as effective and explanatory of outcomes in the real world. 199
Swanton praises virtue ethics for “taking seriously the richness of the
moral domain, its sensitivity to context and situation, its scepticism about
the codifiability of ethics”.200 201
iii. It is argued that virtue ethics is more compatible with the dignity of the
human person. The inability of both duty based and consequentialist
systems to offer approaches that accommodate the dignity of human
autonomy has also been pointed out, in that there is an manifest gulf, a
schizophrenia, between justification and motivation. It is argued that we
are diminished as human beings if we take external principles as our
motivation.
iv. Reflecting human dignity, virtue ethics is oriented towards personal
relationships. It is argued that in deontological and consequentialist
approaches the person disappears under the tyranny of principles; genuine
relationships become impossible.202
v. Christine Swanton argues that virtue ethics provides an enriched account
of automony, an automony that even allows an agent to act apparently
sub-optimally, yet, satisficing rationality, in such a way that such behaviour
can be a legitimate expression of one’s character. (Swanton picks up the
economics term originally coined by Herbert Simon denoting a rational
approach that stops looking for alternatives once one that is “good

199

Alasdair Macintyre, “The Nature of the Virtues,” in Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp and Michael
Slote (Oxford: OUP, 1997), 136.
200
Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, 9.
201
Virtue ethicists argue that utilitarianism and deontology share an obsession with principles as
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an agent based ethical system.
202
See discussion with reference to the views of Stocker and Toulmin, in Statman, “Introduction to
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enough” is found.203) Results and consequences are avoided as the
ultimate measure for the rightness or goodness of an action.204
vi. Beyond simple effectiveness in understanding human behaviours, it is
argued that virtues are constitutive elements of human wellbeing.205 Slote
argues that in duty based ethics, the agent’s actions are directed to the
well being of others but not of self. He argues that this reduces agents to
the status of tools to help others, and that this ultimately devalues the
moral agent and undermines the Kantian principle that every individual is
of intrinsic and equal value. 206
vii. Virtue ethics provides a view of ethical activity that is perfectly integrated
with a naturalistic view of man. 207
viii. It is argued that virtue based approaches are superior to rule or end based
approaches in the way they can accommodate an ethic of care. Carol
Gilligan, Nell Noddings, and Annette Baier have developed a “relational
ethics” that sits well with virtue ethics.208
ix. An ethic of virtue is also most compatible with a rich human psychology
that recognizes the contribution of positive human emotion in human
decision making and action. Aristotle viewed virtue as “a disposition in
which both reason and emotion are well ordered”. 209 Anscombe had
drawn attention to the “lack of an adequate philosophy of psychology” in
Kant and Hume.210 Cottingham argues:
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“one of the key insights of virtue theory is that the good life consists
in a structured pattern of living... whose fundamentals have to be
rooted in a civic culture, a culture in which the right pathways of
emotion and action have been laid down in infancy and fostered by
long habits of training and upbringing.”211
The bottom line is that virtue ethics appears more compatible with
reflections on aspects of character such as emotion, subjectivity and
human relations. 212 Furthermore, as will be seen, in this study I am
arguing that virtue ethics is not only compatible with the psychology of
emotion, but shares common ground with the neuroscience of effective
self management and emotional control.
x. Virtue ethics seems to offer a better understanding of principles of
education founded on human psychology. For example, the core of moral
motivation is not rules, nor do rules play a key role in moral education.
“According to virtue ethics, education through moral exemplars is more
effective than education focussed on principles and obligations, because it
is far more concrete.”213 (See 6.5.)

However, when all is said and done virtue ethics resists direct comparison with
alternative approaches to ethics. Gary Watson argues:
To think that an ethic of virtue ... is opposed to duty is a
category mistake. Duties and obligations are simply factors to
which certain values, for example, fidelity and justice, are
responsive. They do not compete with virtue for moral
attention... . One’s virtues may enable one to endorse,
apprehend, correctly apply, or disregard some principle of
action. 214
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The ten reasons above will be further validated by a successful description of the
biological bases of virtue. In this study I am arguing not only that neural
development harmonises with the development of virtue, but also that virtue
ethics constitutes an ethical account that is more attuned to human nature than
are the more theoretical accounts of Western ethics.

1.6.2 Within virtue ethics there exists a spectrum of significantly contrasting
approaches.

We have looked briefly at advantages offered by virtue ethics as an ethical system.
Now we look at the range of approaches within virtue ethics, a field in which there
are numerous approaches but one nevertheless in which “... the similarities
between species of virtue ethics are more important than their differences.” 215

Various historical approaches to the notion of virtue.
Contrasting understandings of the notion of virtue are not a new phenomenon.
Macintyre writes of three contrasting historical attitudes towards virtue. He
suggests that: Homer understood virtues as means to empower a person to fulfil a
social role; Aristotle and Aquinas focused on virtue as “a quality the exercise of
which leads to the achievement of the human telos”; and, Franklin offered a
utilitarian account of the virtues as keys to earthly and heavenly success.216
According to an alternative view:217 Socrates, Cicero and Kant share a stoic
emphasis on the dignity of virtue, with emphases on piety and courage; Aristotle
and Aquinas offer a rich and realistic understanding of virtues as psychological
habits; and, Hume transforms virtue into a useful tool to achieve social-political
ends.

Divisions according to judgements about character.
215
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As we have seen above, virtue ethicists will all agree that aretaic judgements
(judgements about character) are prior to judgements about rightness or
wrongness of actions. Again there is a spectrum of approaches.

The moderate view is some actions are always abhorrent, and hence that
character need not be prior to action. Slote argues “the ethical status of acts is not
entirely derivative from that of traits, motives or individuals....”218 Alderman and
Soloman present a more unitary view, either reducing deontic concepts to aretaic
concepts, or with Anscombe and Williams, arguing that deontic concepts should
be ignored completely. There is also the moral worth view proposed by Audi,
whereby virtue “is the sole ground of moral goodness, even though it is not the
ground of moral rightness or of obligatory conduct.”219 Similarly, Hursthouse
argues that an action is right if it is carried out by a virtuous character. 220

Divisions according to universality.
Universality provides another lens for assessment of the various contemporary
approaches to virtue ethics. Aristotle conceives virtues as human excellences
contributing towards a form of flourishing that is perfective of human nature.
Aristotle’s vision of the rational life is embraced by some contemporary virtue
ethicists, such as Foot, Hursthouse, Taylor and Nussbaum; others seek to shrug off
Aristotelian metaphysics.221 Originally MacIntyre claimed virtues are culture
specific, but later adopted the Aristotelian position.222

Divisions of virtue ethics according to deontological and consequentialist
considerations.
The relationship of the various contemporary approaches of virtue ethics to
deontology and to consequentialism is complex.
218
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Virtue ethicists adopt either a teleological view, that virtues permit human
flourishing, or a non teleological account, that virtues are worthy in themselves.
Rawls understands virtues to be “strong and normally effective desires to act on
the basic principles of right”,223 yet virtue ethics stands against this conventional
wisdom that would align virtue ethics with deontology. Velazco y Trianosky
argues that, in fact, an ethics of virtue and an ethics of duty are radically different
approaches to ethical questions, yet each may be either in a teleological or non
teleological (deontological) form.224 Furthermore, these teleological accounts may
also be considered from the perspective of consequentialist principles. Trianosky
argues that as many virtue ethicists maintain a form of utilitarianism when they
argue for the usefulness of the virtues, they are thus teleological in orientation.225

Typical of this approach is that adopted by Von Wright: “Virtues... are needed in
the service of the good of man. This usefulness of theirs is their meaning and
(natural) purpose”. 226 Julia Driver also adopts a consequentialist view, viewing a
moral virtue as “a character trait (a disposition or cluster of dispositions) which,
generally speaking, produces good consequences for others.”227 Other virtue
ethicists while teleological may give more importance to intention rather than
causality.

Watson suggests that we should consider an ethics of virtue as at once
teleological and nonconsequentialist.228 He points out that Aristotle is regarded by
Rawls as teleological, yet he may just as readily be seen as deontological, opposed
to consequentialism. He suggests that following Socrates who regarded virtue as
the primary constituent of human flourishing, Aristotle saw virtue, human
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excellence, as constitutive of, not instrumental to, human flourishing. 229 This is an
important distinction.

It is in this sense that Anscombe, too, is non teleological, while seeking to retain a
close connection between virtue and human good. 230 Swanton defends the non
utilitarian character of virtue ethics comparing it, for this purpose, with
deontological ethics. 231 She too maintains a strong connection between virtue
and human flourishing. Others, like Slote, are of a radical non-teleological
orientation and prefer not to link virtues to wellbeing. Slote consciously adopts an
agent based ethics that regards virtues as admirable traits not tied to the
promotion of further good, 232 arguing that it is the intrinsic features of virtue that
make it attractive, and even that the “contribution” of virtues to an agent’s
wellbeing should be disregarded.233

Alasdair Macintyre, although adopting a teleological position, offers a meeting
point for teleological and non teleological approaches. He insists that virtue is not
a means to enjoyment, rather fulfilment and enjoyment are integral to the very
exercise of virtue. 234

Virtue empowers from within and cannot be understood as a means to be utilized
in the pursuit of happiness. Macintyre’s understanding is that virtue empowers us
to do things which will bring in themselves fulfilment.
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and
exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods
which are internal (the outcome of which is a good for the
229
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whole community) to practices and the lack of which effectively
prevents us from achieving any such goods.235

1.6.3 This study is situated under the umbrella of eudaimonist virtue ethics.

The current study subscribes to a moderate Aristotelian eudaimonist approach in
which virtues, acquired and exercised for their own sake, are constitutive
elements of human flourishing and wellbeing, denoted sometimes by the
Aristotelian term eudaimonia.

While, as we have seen, virtue ethicists adopt either a teleological view, that
virtues enable human flourishing, or a non teleological account, that virtues are
worthy in themselves, Aristotle adopts the teleological position. According to
Aristotle, it is the promotion of human flourishing, eudaimonism, that makes a
trait a virtue. In line with Aristotle, Statman asks, “If the virtues are not derived
from the notion of flourishing, where are they derived from?”236 He argues that
Aristotle takes for granted the virtues really are virtues and that the goods they
promote are really worth having. Rejecting the extremes that a non teleological
approach imposes, Statman argues that Aristotle held “to quite a moderate
version of virtue ethics (if at all)”.237

Within the range of positions adopted by teleological virtue ethicists with respect
to end, Rosalind Hursthouse and Christine Swanton offer finely nuanced accounts
illustrating the richness of current scholarship. Of the two, the approach of
Hursthouse is the more Aristotelian. She combines eudaimonism with
“naturalism, the view that what makes a trait of character a virtue is its being
partially constitutive of non-defectiveness in human beings”. She sees virtue as a
trait “that makes a human good qua human”, serving also the flourishing of the
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species. Hursthouse sums up, “A virtue is a character trait that a human being
needs for eudaimonia, to flourish and live well.”238

Swanton argues that Aristotle fails to make a satisfactory link between the
demands of the world and the flourishing of the virtuous person. She suggests
that he insufficiently develops an account of flourishing. “We do not, in Aristotle,
understand virtues via an account of flourishing - we understand flourishing via an
account of the virtues.”239

Each however provides an effective answer to The Thesis of Non Aretaic Value,
the assertion that the base level goods of flourishing are prior to virtue and that
therefore virtue is derivative. Swanton does so explicitly, herself drawing on
Aristotle, arguing that the base level goods of flourishing must be considered
more broadly than goods as such. She argues that Aristotle regarded the field of
virtues as pertaining to pleasures, friends and small details, not necessarily good
or evil in themselves, etc, in other words “being”, itself.

Ultimately Swanton argues that virtue is a responsiveness to being, that the
appropriate responsiveness of a human being is virtuous, and that it is human
nature that imparts to the goods of flourishing their value; hence their value is
intrinsically related, but not prior, to virtue itself. 240 Ultimately, she says, the
complexity of virtue is derived from the complexity of human nature itself. 241

These views sit most comfortably with the notion that virtues are a flourishing at
both the organic and personal levels, the approach that this study has taken.
These explorations into a biophysical basis for eudaimonia will be taken up again
in 6.2.

1.7 An overview of the potential benefits of this study.
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The object of this study is the accord between the acquisition of moral virtues,
understood as good habits enabling human flourishing, and neuroscientific
knowledge of how the human being develops. This study argues that virtue
development is fitting and proper to the development of mature human beings.
As such it brings together ethics and neuroscience with a view to drawing
practical, albeit brief, conclusions in the field of moral education.

It is hoped that outcomes from this study will include the following.

Contributions to medical science.
i.

This review of mechanisms of plasticity and learning, of goal election, habit
formation, cognitive processing, moral activity and emotional regulation,
cross referenced to physically identifiable characteristics of virtue, will
draw conclusions at the macro level about the systems, mechanisms,
processes and brain structures underpinning virtue.

ii.

Among various conclusions, new insights will be offered into the role of
deep cortical structures, such as the basal ganglia (BG), in the operation of
the virtues. The view will be offered that the operation of virtue should be
considered as a “macro” system within the brain.

Contributions to ethics.
i.

This endorsement of a virtue based approach to living has the potential to
contribute to the debate evaluating the contrasting approaches to ethics.

ii.

In particular, this understanding at the biological level of the operation
and development of virtues promises to emphasise the necessity for
virtue, and therefore virtue ethics, for effective moral education and
human flourishing.

Contributions to philosophy of mind.
i.

Insights into neuroscience in the light of an hylomorphic approach to
philosophy of mind offer the possibility of effective critiques of other
current writing on the topic.
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ii.

In particular it is hoped that this study contributes to effective responses
to non-reductive and reductive physicalist approaches, and to dualistic
understandings of one form or another.

Contributions to Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy.
i.

The attempt to reconcile Aristotelian-Thomistic understandings with
current neuroscientific knowledge has the potential not only to enrich
neuroscience by offering it a coherent template for human nature and
activity, but also to enrich and contemporize this philosophical tradition.

ii.

Among other conclusions, it is hoped that discussion about the nature of
various cardinal virtues yields insights into the unity of the virtues, ie the
integration of the four cardinal virtues in each human action.

iii.

Furthermore it is hoped that this investigation into the nature of virtue, in
the light both of neuroscience and the Aristotelian/Thomistic tradition,
assists in clarifying the relationship between rationality and virtue, and
therefore in delineating what could be termed “the biological dimension”
of virtue.

Contributions to education.
i.

The discussion of neuroscientific development will lead to numerous
conclusions about optimum pedagogical methods.

ii.

Brief and practical conclusions will be drawn with respect to parenting.

1.8 Conclusion

This study investigates the neural bases for moral virtue in the AristotelianThomistic understanding, and whether or not this neural basis is integral to the
notion of fulfilment or eudaimonia.

My starting point in this chapter has been to establish a prima facie case for the
profound integration of the physical and the rational in the human person. I have
noted the effectiveness of an hylomorphic psychology in reconciling these realms
and the contribution that hylomorphism has the potential to make to philosophy
of mind. Having situated this study in the spectrum of contemporary approaches
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to philosophy of mind, I then apply an hylomorphic critique to contemporary
philosophy of mind in order to demonstrate the explanatory power of such an
approach. I respond to the notion of “emergent rationality” that is prevalent in
contemporary philosophy of mind.

I then consider the place of this study within current approaches to ethics. The
comparative advantages offered by virtue ethics are noted and I situate this study
within the spectrum of approaches to virtue ethics itself, placing it under the
broad heading of eudaimonist virtue ethics. Finally I offer an overview of expected
outcomes to arise from this study.
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Chapter 2

Neural Mechanisms and Systems.

I saw the hideous phantasm of a man stretched out, and then, on the working of some powerful
engine, show signs of life, and stir with an uneasy, half vital motion. Frightful must it be;
for SUPREMELY frightful would be the effect of any human endeavour to mock the stupendous
mechanism of the Creator of the world.
Preface to the 1831 Edition
Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus
Mary Shelley

2.1 Overview.

In this chapter I focus on particular areas of current neuroscientific research
which, I suggest, are most relevant to the biological structures underpinning
virtue.

I focus first on the umbrella category of mechanisms underpinning brain plasticity,
the anatomical restructuring of the brain in the process of learning, through the
impact of environment or as a result of passive or freely elected experience.
Plasticity is of central interest in this study because virtue is a manifestation of
conscious experiential learning. I review the numerous cellular, molecular and
genetic systems and mechanisms of neuronal structural plasticity, and suggest
that mechanisms of structural plasticity underpin the formation of virtue,
understood as good habits. “Neuroplasticity is the key bridging process” for
learning. 242 Plastic anatomical changes are at the neuronal basis of a range of
phenomena, including habitual actions,243 and the attention, motivation and goal
election required in conscious learning.

I then present current research into learning and memory. It is argued that, as
virtue development is a form of memory and learning, mechanisms of plasticity
242

Pontifical Council for the Sciences. Working Group on Neuroplasticity and Education. Final
Statement. October 2010. http://www.casinapioiv.va/content/dam/accademia/pdf/sv117.pdf.
(accessed 2 November 2012).
243
Typical of the literature: Graybiel, “Habits, Rituals, and the Evaluative Brain,” 359-87.
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such as long term potentiation (LTP) and other processes for synaptic
strengthening, as well as other mechanisms such as myelination that serve to
consolidate pathways, will be involved. Recently identified mechanisms for
imitation associated with what are known as mirror neurons, discovered by Italian
researchers in the early 1990s, are outlined as field that promises significant
insights into forms of imitative learning that occur in the early stages of virtue
development.

Then I review studies representative of major themes of current neuroscientific
research in a number of areas. My focus is on the brain’s capacity to develop
establish or consolidate pathways for behaviours and for the cognitive-emotional
regulation of those behaviours. Mechanisms of plasticity accord a degree of
permanence to the neurobiological changes in each of these areas and hence to
the behaviours supported by those neural bases.


Currents of contemporary research into the role of the BG are reviewed.
The BG have been understood for decades as having a role in the
formation of motor habits, but now also their contribution to decision
making and motivation is recognised.



I then consider the neural bases for emotional control. Emotional control is
central to a life of virtue. Virtue, as will be seen below, was understood by
Aristotle and Aquinas to empower us to manage our emotional lives.



Then the focus moves to current research into goal directed behaviours
and reward activation. Virtue consists not just any habitual action, but in
consciously elected good habits. Reward pathways provide a key
mechanism for positive goal election which is a necessary aspect of the
process of the development of virtue.



The final section in this chapter will review strands of current research in
the vast field of cognition and executive function. I will consider neural
bases for cognition and executive function including consideration of
consequences, planning, goal election and executive direction. Virtue, as
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understood by Aristotle and Aquinas, is a characteristic of rational life, and
therefore it is essential that any proposal for the neural bases of virtue
encompass conscious executive direction, decision making, planning,
assessment of consequences, all in the light of the underpinning
Aristotelian anthropology discussed in Chapter 1.

This selection of areas of focus has been progressively refined at the draft stage of
writing in the light of the analysis I develop in Chapter 5.

Figure 2.1 Gross anatomy of the human brain.
Source: Moore, K.L.et al. Clinically oriented anatomy. Philadelphia: Wolters Kluwer, 2010. 879.
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Specific neuroscientific content essential to the argument of the thesis is included
within this study proper. Familiarity with the fundamentals of contemporary
neuroscience is treated as assumed knowledge so I recommend that readers with
a non scientific background refer to Appendix 2. A Brief Introduction to
Neuroscientific Concepts and Terminology.244

2.1.1 Rationale for the structure adopted.

In this section my selection of the above areas of investigation is discussed and
justified.

My argument is summarised as follows. New imaging techniques and a
consequent increasing weight of studies argue that it is possible to identify
specific areas, pathways, systems and mechanisms in the brain that, at the neural
level, support behaviour. Moreover the Templeton grants provide a rule-of-thumb
confirmation that areas of investigation in this study are consistent with the
contemporary attempts of others. Furthermore a simple analysis of the human
act identifies a number of key systems that one would expect to find implicated in
habitual behaviours. Finally, several arguments are proposed with a view to
justifying the inclusion of the BG as an important area of investigation in this
study.

2.1.1.1 Imaging the brain.

Although there is no literature detailing the neural substrates for virtue, rigorously
defined, it is a fortuitous time to be attempting such a task. A wealth of data and
enriched understanding of brain structure and function have come to light in the
past two decades directly as a result of new imaging techniques. Neuroscientist
Antonio Damasio wrote in 2005, “More may have been learned about the brain
and the mind in the 1990s, than during the entire previous history of psychology
244

My more detailed and broader review of fundamental neuroscience, prepared as introductory
work on this thesis, is also available on request.
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and neuroscience.”245 These imaging techniques not only permit high resolution
studies of brain activation in real time, but they offer insights into previously
unrecognised contributions of deep brain regions, and the data may be applied to
an understanding of virtue as good habit, simplistically speaking.

Figure 2.2 Examples of high resolution magnetic resonance images. These are T2 weighted
images in which white matter (myelination) appears darker than grey matter.
Source: Nolte, John. The human brain. An introduction to its functional anatomy. 6th ed. Philadelphia:
Mosby, 2009. 116. Obtained by courtesy of Dr Joachim F. Seeger, University of Arizona College of Medicine.

The implications for a greater understanding of human behaviour are far reaching.
Pontifical Academy of the Sciences gathering of experts in Human Neuroplasticity
and Education in October 2010 concluded:
The methods of brain and cognitive sciences have reached a
stage such that we can now objectively monitor the
developmental trajectory of the child’s brain and document
how this trajectory is being shaped by parenting, education,
and other environmental influences.246
245

Quoted in: David Rock, “Recent insights on the brain that change everything”, Quiet leadership:
Help people think better, don’t tell them what to do, prepublication draft (New York: Harper
Business, 2006).
246
Pontifical Council for the Sciences. Working Group on Neuroplasticity and Education. Final
Statement. October 2010.
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These imaging advances have allowed more precise temporal and spatial
identification of brain areas implicated in specific function and processes than has
ever been possible before, and have led to a surge in understanding of plasticity in
the brain, of localised functionalities, of connectivities, and of the scale of cortical
networking.

See 2.1.3.e. for caveats regarding neuroimaging. Principal neuroimaging
technologies in use are summarised in Appendix 3 Neuroimaging Technologies.

Figure 2.3

An example of the use of combined PET and MRI imagery to detect areas of
increased cortical activity in specified tasks. Imaging demonstrates changes in
blood flow on the lateral surface of the occipital lobe as subjects attend to
moving visual (as opposed to stationary) stimuli. The four images in each row
15
are of the same subject. PET scanning after intravenous injection of H 2 O
mapped blood flow, and T1-weighted MRI scans permitted reconstruction of the
surface of each brain. Data was then coregistered. Source: Watson, J.D.G. et al.
Cerebral Cortex 3:79 (1993). Cited in Nolte, John. The human brain. An introduction to its functional
anatomy. 6th ed. Philadelphia: Mosby, 2009. 136.
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2.1.1.2 Prima facie confirmation for the broad direction of this investigation:
Projects recognised in the 2009 Templeton Positive Neuroscience
Awards.

In 2009 the Templeton Foundation fund offered substantial grants, the Positive
Neuroscience Awards, for research into the neural bases for virtue. 247 Impelled
by this support there has been an explosion of research focussing explicitly on the
neural bases of virtue. Topics of the projects chosen by the recipients of the first
round of grants are broad and disparate:


The effect of specific genes on the neurotransmitter dopamine (DA) which
is understood to be a factor in resilience.



The neural processing of attention in schizophrenics and meditators.



The relationship between social support and genetic action.



The effects of meditation on the structure and function of the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), hippocampus, and amygdala,
brain regions part of the neural circuit critical for deactivating conditioned
fears.



Neural connectivity in musicians.



Whether heroically altruistic people show greatest sensitivity to fearful
expressions, more amygdala activation, and enhanced amygdalaprefrontal connectivity.



The neural bases of trained resilience following intense stress.



Activity in the reward areas of the brain when subjects share the positive
emotions of others.



The relationship between the activity of nerve fibres transmitting gentle
touch, empathy and bonding.

247

Templeton Report; News from the Templeton Foundation, http://www.templeton.org
(accessed 8 July 2009) The Templeton Positive Neuroscience Award, funding “methodological
rigorous projects that apply the tools of neuroscience” in four categories. One category of grants is
for research identifying “the neural bases of the cognitive and affective capacities that enable
virtues such as discipline, persistence, honesty, compassion, love, curiosity, social and practical
intelligence, courage, creativity and optimism”.
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Brain regions for empathy and altruism.



A study of the impact of genotype, and hormonal, and neural differences
in nurturing behaviour of fathers.



The relation of reward systems of the brain to intrinsic reward.



A study of the possibilities of altering the response of one’s amygdala.



A study of the neural processes supporting positive thought and affiliation
to others.



A study of the cooperation of various neural regions in the processing of
emotion.

The areas of interest in these projects are broadly in accord with those selected in
this chapter. However it is noticeable that Templeton projects appear to lack a
rich understanding of virtue that could assist in directing their search. The work of
Chapters 3 and 4 will directly focus on provision of a coherent underlying
definition of virtue to assist in identification of neural bases.

Several observations are relevant:


The Templeton list provides insights into current thinking about the neural
bases of virtue. There is agreement that the neural bases of virtue are
identifiable and that they are multifaceted.



All subheading themes which are the focus of Chapter 2 are represented in
this current list, except, tellingly that of 2.4 focussing on the role of the BG.
It is possible this is so because the classic definition of virtue as good habit
has been overlooked. It is proposed that an Aristotelian-Thomistic
anthropology and definition of virtue can greatly assist the search for the
neural bases of virtue.



Furthermore without an Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of the
intrinsic relationship of virtue to human flourishing, the neural features of
virtue may well remain elusive for they will have lost a connection with
biological development. This current study proposes that the neural bases
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of virtue, in the light of Aristotelian thought, denote not only the holistic
but also the biological flourishing of the organism.

It is hoped that his current study seeking neural bases consistent both with
rational psychology and the neuroscience will add substantially to the endeavour
of identifying the neural bases of virtue.

2.1.1.3 The human act provides insight into the function of virtue.

A further key to this task is the enriched understanding of the human act offered
by Aristotle and Aquinas. In a simplified model of any human act, there are four
steps leading to rational action: desire, emotion, reason, and choice/action. Such a
division provides a starting point for productive analysis with the purpose of
identifying neural correlates. Virtue must essentially be understood as the stable
disposition to act well, ie to carry out these four steps well. (See 3.1.3 for
elaboration of these points.)


Desire corresponds to the motivation underpinning acts. Aristotle argues
that, when a creature acts virtuously, it is motivated by the desire of acting
for its own natural good. Aquinas writes similarly, “a good habit is one
which disposes to an act suitable to the agent’s nature”.248 Hence the
motivational pathways, the pathways of reward activation, appear
implicated in our search for the neural bases of virtue. A further feature at
this point may be the pleasure that Aristotle argues accompanies the
exercise of virtue.249



A second key to understanding the neuroscience of virtue is to understand
the neuroscience of emotion. A classical understanding of virtue is that it
assists us to manage our emotional lives; hence, the neural bases for
emotion, and for the cortical regulation of emotional pathways, appear
implicated.

248
249

ST, Ia, Q.54, Art.3.
NE, 1104b.
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Next we apply the understanding that human acts, and hence virtuous acts
as a subset of human acts, must be guided by reason. Aquinas wrote, “the
habits of the moral virtues are caused in the appetitive powers, according
as they are moved by the reason”.250 The various pathways of the brain
that contribute to planning, memory, logic and cognition, are relevant
here.



Furthermore all human acts require the exercise of choice. The coconstituent of man’s rationality is the will, man’s capacity for choice.251 In
fact, Aristotle proposed that virtue is the “habit of choosing”. The neural
bases of executive action, goal election and attentional systems appear
implicated in the neuroscience of virtue.

Add to these constituent steps of the human act, the understanding that virtue is
a stable and easily repeated behaviour. So, it is necessary to investigate the
neuroscience of habit formation. Further, it will be argued in Chapters 3 and 4
that the four cardinal virtues have distinctive roles each with specific neural basis.
Hence distinction at the neural level, of the four cardinal virtues, will be also
require discussion.

2.1.1.4 Insights into the basal ganglia.

The brain regions and pathways associated with the BG, linking habit formation
and volition, appear to offer a significant key to understanding the neural bases of
virtue. Research into the BG sheds light on procedural memory and habit learning,
and recent studies of cortical plasticity and the role of BG-thalamo-cortical loops
with their widespread cognitive-emotional interaction offer understanding of
processes of planning, goal selection, self regulation, attention and motivation.

250

ST, Ia-IIae, Q.51, Art.3.
The term “co-constituent” is used a number of times in the course of this thesis, denoting the
relationship to virtue of both rationality and biophysical processes.
251
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a) Pathological insights into dysfunctional basal ganglia: Huntington disease,
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, Parkinson disease, and Encephalitis Lethargica.

Pathological studies into Huntington disease, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
(OCD), Parkinson disease, and Encephalitis Lethargica (EL), assisted by new
imaging technologies, argue for an expanded role attributable to the BG.
Consistent with this view, this study presents the BG as an important player in the
complex interplay of multiple brain regions active in reward and emotion
processing, motor instruction, and goal election. Prior to this study there appears
to be no literature identifying a decisive role of the BG in the formation and
exercise of virtue.

An important source of knowledge about the brain, and particularly about
subcortical structures is obtained through autopsy seeking causes for abnormal
behaviours in the years preceding death. A number of conditions are linked to
diseases of the BG. Although loss of motor control is the most obvious
manifestation in each case, behaviour change associated with the illness provides
insight into the breadth of function of the BG. In many cases dysfunction in the BG
has been associated with a significant loss of emotional regulation, executive
capacity, and capacity to read social cues.252

In The Exceptional Brain, Robert Kaplan, a clinical professor of psychiatry,
documents the trajectory of BG diseases of the BG on Woody Guthrie (Huntington
Disease), Howard Hughes (OCD), and Adolf Hitler (Parkinson Disease). His broad
brush conclusions throw into relief the cognitive contribution of the BG, thereby
adding weight to the view that the BG play an integral role not only in motor
function but also in the development of conscious and volitional habits.

The most significant conclusions may be summarized:

252

Robert M. Kaplan, The Exceptional Brain (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2011).
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Huntington disease is characterised by uncontrolled movements, not
uncommonly accompanied by symptoms of psychological dysfunction:
increased moodiness, anger, loss of self control, depression, substance
abuse, absence of personal hygiene and loss of sexual inhibition. Psychoses
are evident in up to 12% of cases. 253 Huntington disease is caused by
neural degeneration in the BG as a result of a gene mutation. Huntington is
characterised by severe degeneration of the putamen and caudate in the
BG and of the frontal cerebral cortex, and is associated with an excess of,
or supersensitivity to, DA in the substantia nigra (SN).254 That Huntington is
associated with changes in personality and psychological health argues for
a broader attribution to the BG than that of movement control.



OCD is associated with obsessional behaviours. Untreated OCD can
develop a psychiatric or psychotic dimension, a loss of touch with reality.
OCD is caused by dysfunction in the caudate nucleus and irregularities in
the BG (with some frontal cortex contribution) of DA and 5hydroxytryptamine (5-HT) more commonly known as serotonin. The
repetitive nature of activity appears caused by excessive DA release.
Anxiety manifests as a comorbidity when this compulsivity is associated
with lack of 5-HT control over DA release. 255 Kaplan describes OCD as “an
anxiety disorder”. That this disease of the BG may often be successfully
treated by cognitive therapies,256 possibly suggests that the caudate
possesses plasticity, and that the caudate has a cognitive role. 257 In any
case, intractable cases of OCD can be successfully resolved by operating to
disconnect the pathway between the thalamus and the prefrontal cortex
(PFC), the striato-thalamocortical pathway. That OCD is associated with
changes in personality and psychological health argues for a broader
attribution to the BG than that of the mediation of repetitive behaviours.

253

Kaplan, The Exceptional Brain.
th
Kathryn L. McCance and Sue E. Huether, Pathophysiology, 6 ed. (Missouri: Mosby Elsevier,
2010), 568, 570.
255
McCance and Huether, Pathophysiology, 662.
256
As documented by Schwartz and Begley, The Mind and the Brain.Schwartz is a recognised
authority on OCD therapies.
257
Kaplan, The Exceptional Brain, 253-256.
254
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Parkinson disease is a common movement disorder resulting from
degeneration of the BG. Some 50% of sufferers of Parkinson disease also
show cortical and executive function deficits in addition. Parkinson can also
be associated with the development of OCD. Both these comorbidities
attest to the cognitive contribution of the BG. When the DA inhibitory
influence in the BG is diminished, the tremors of Parkinson disease
develop. 258 259

Furthermore, encephalitis lethargica (EL) the mysterious sleepy sickness epidemic
early in the 20th century, appears to have been a disease of the BG. Amongst the
alarming effects were a loss of will, and at times an insensitivity to situations
requiring will power.260

b) A role for the basal ganglia in volitional habits.

The pathways and mechanisms of addition (2.6.6) and insights into the cognitive
consequences of diseases of the BG provide important insights into the
development of volitional habits. The fact that addictions develop not only from
the intake of substances (for example, nicotine and alcohol), but also from
behaviours (for example morally negative behaviours such as viewing
pornography, and morally neutral behaviours such as computer gaming and
distance running). A subject may find himself addicted against his will because of
ignorance of addictive behaviours (video gaming, for example), but an addiction
258

McCance and Huether, Pathophysiology, 569, 572; Carol Mattson Porth, Essentials of
rd
Pathophysiology, 3 ed. (Philadelphia: Wolters Kluwer, 2011), 912.
259
Often Parkinsonian patients manifest the disease on one side only. Kaplan points out that Hitler
demonstrated a dominance of the right hemisphere long before his Parkinson became obvious in
the last years of the war. Any exaggerated dominance of one hemisphere brings with it clear
deficits. Hitler manifested extreme emotional reactions in keeping with right hemispheric
dominance of affectivity. This is further in keeping with underdeveloped left hemisphere, a poorly
developed capacity to step back and reflect, or to appreciate timing (consider the debacle
following the German invasion of Russia). It is clear that the greater the integration of the various
neural areas the greater the capacity to flourish. That Parkinson is associated with changes in
personality, psychological health and emotional regulation argues for a broader attribution to the
BG than that of motor control. See Kaplan, The Exceptional Brain, 253-256.
260
Paul Foley, “The Encephalitis Lethargica Patient as a Window on the Soul” in The Neurological
Patient in History ed. L. Stephen Jacyna and Stephen T. Casper (Rochester, NY: U of Rochester
Press, 2012), 184-214.
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may also result from the subject knowingly indulging in an activity that he knows
will become harder and harder to resist. This raises the distinct likelihood that
positive behaviours may also be pursued with intention that such behaviours
become facilitated.

Of course not all activities become addictive; no amount of washing up or making
our beds will give us an addiction to washing up or making our beds. Yet it is
universal human experience that activities frequently performed in childhood
induce not only a capacity to perform that activity in adult life, but also a tendency
to do so (to make one’s bed on rising, to wash glasses rather than leave them in
the sink, etc). Such tendencies are not addictions, but are rather what we could
call volitional habits.

It is possible to propose that these volitional habits may be mediated by plasticity
in the upper cortex but this explanation in isolation appears less than adequate. It
fails to take into account the demonstrated role of the BG in mediating repetitive
behaviours arising from addiction, OCD, Tourette Syndrome, and in its
demonstrated contribution to consciously directed movement, a role that has
become dysfunctional in Huntington, Parkinson and EL. There is a very strong case
to be made that the BG are integrally involved in the development of volitional
habits (2.4):


We know that, without dependency on the PFC, the BG are integral to
non-volitional habits, addiction and compulsions (OCD, Tourette
Syndrome, etc). It does not logically follow that just because the BG are
integral to non-volitional habits that they are not also implicated in
volitional habits. In fact, given recent knowledge of pathways,
interdependence, and the cognitive contribution of lower cortical
structures, I suggest the weight of evidence has dramatically shifted
towards this latter view.



The role of the BG is now increasingly understood in both cognitive
operations, and in reward based activity, and therefore in emotional
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management and goal setting. The role of the BG in instructing cortical
areas, in clarifying motor and reward messages to cortical areas, is now
also better understood. (See especially 2.4 and 2.6 for references.)


We now know that reward representations in the cortex, in the
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and PFC (see 2.6.5) are linked to the reward
representations in the BG. Horvitz, for example, draws attention to the
sustained activity in cells of the striatum in anticipation of reward as a
mirror of reward coding in the OFC.261 Such cortical management of
striatally based behaviour patterns is consistent with the action of virtue.



We also know that these volitional, reward based responses are mediated
in the ventral striatum, and that in time these transform to reward
independent, overlearned experiences mediated in the dorsal striatum.262
Sustained volitional behaviour in the face of a lessened significance of
reward is consistent with the action of virtue.

A mechanism for volitional habits appears present here. This appears to be a
neural pathway integral to the support of virtues in the brain. It remains to be
demonstrated whether the BG be implicated in the full range of habitual
behaviours that arise through virtue, or only in simpler procedural, but volitional
and virtuous, behaviours, such as habitual routines of work and courtesy, respect,
and positive self talk.

In conclusion, it may be seen that there is prima facie evidence for the selection of
the key subheadings of Chapter 2: mechanisms of plasticity, mechanisms of
learning, memory and imitation, understandings of particular neural structures
with a particular focus on the BG, neural bases for emotional control, goal
directed behaviours and reward activation, and cognition and executive function.

261

Jon C. Horvitz, “Stimulus-response and response outcome learning mechanisms in the
striatum,” in Behavioural Brain Research 199 (2009): 133.
262
Lovinger offers an excellent overview of current knowledge of plasticity in the dorsal striatum.
David M. Lovinger, “Neurotransmitter Roles in Synaptic Modulation, Plasticity and Learning in the
Dorsal Striatum,” Neuropharmacology. 58(7) 2010: 951–961.
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2.1.2 Search information.

Information about my search for relevant neuroscientific studies is set out in
Table 2.1 in the endpapers. My focus was to obtain studies representative of
current knowledge. By preference I sought recent studies and recent, review
studies. Of the studies yielded by these literature searches, I deemed many
inappropriate for selection because they were irrelevant to this project, too
narrow in scope, anecdotal and pertaining to limited samples, or superseded by
later studies. I obtained a number of other studies first identified as references in
studies that I had selected in the search process. In addition material was
obtained from numerous recently published texts and monographs. Several
prominent authors in the fields of plasticity were contacted in an effort to locate
all relevant studies. In my final stage of writing and editing, I checked for new
information and included content from some 25-30 new studies.

Consequently material obtained from close study of some 110 papers and
approximately 30 recently published texts and monographs has been integrated
into the discussion of this chapter.

2.1.3 This neuroscientific investigation carries some caveats.

Although the goal of associating complex psychological phenomenon with neural
substrate is still very much a field in its infancy, this study draws on a growing
tradition of highly credentialed contemporary literature which links function with
specific processes, mechanisms, pathways and areas of the brain.

Much about neural processes remains currently undescribed so it is necessary to
be somewhat measured in conclusions. While likely biological mechanisms have
been identified, the basis of the interface between biological molecular processes
and conscious learning and memory is still conjectural. For example it is not
understood how modifications of neuronal connections form a representation of
reality to the person. What has become clear is that the brain operates as a highly
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complex network, with sophisticated, concurrent signalling and reciprocal
interactions between multiple brain regions and systems, attuned to the
orchestration of outputs at the service of the acting person.

As is evident in Chapters 2, 3 and 5 this approach aligns with the methodology of
much contemporary neuroscientific research in seeking to identify brain regions
and pathways which are actively implicated in specific activities (eg executive,
cognitive, attentional, limbic, sensory regions and pathways). While it is true that
rigid localisation theories of the brain have given way to a broader focus on
pathways, on integrated and flexibly acting brain regions, and on some
appreciation of the complexity of networking in brain, it is also clear that specific
areas and pathways demonstrate direct and at times critical involvement in
particular functions.

There are contrasting schools of thought with reference to the anatomofunctional model, a form of localisation, that has arisen as a consequence of more
precise imaging. Desmurget et al. propose that their data calls into question what
they see as a fashion of functional localisation that has penetrated even our most
complex human faculties. (See also 2.2.6.) They cite an extensive list of papers
that they argue have taken the concept of localisation to an unwarranted degree,
including the work of Anderson et al. in 1999 who placed our moral sense in the
PFC, Azari et al. who argued that religious experience is built into our nervous
system within a restricted fronto-parietal network, and Bartel’s and Zeki’s thesis
that romantic and maternal love engages the medial insula and the anterior
cingulated cortex. They argue that the brain is not “a rigid mosaic of
independently encapsulated modules.” 263

Furthermore, philosopher Martha Nussbaum uses the very notion of plasticity to
argue against precise localisation of function, and to oppose the view that we
“include a particular physiological process as a necessary element in a definition of
263

M. Desmurget et al. “Contrasting acute and slow growing lesions: a new door to brain plasticity
(Review),” Brain 130 (2007): 898-914.
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a given emotion type”.264 Yet she uses the word plasticity in a slightly unusual
manner in relation to the vast contemporary literature on physiology of the brain,
suggesting that plasticity is opposed to a view that specific processes, pathways
and locations may be identified with any certainty in the brain.

These are however the dissenting voices. Although “functional localisation” is by
no means a universally accepted position, a judicious acceptance of the notion of
“localisation” may be found in the vast majority of relevant current studies.
Certainly the old localisation theories are now discredited but new imaging
approaches and advances in molecular biology are helping us identify when
information about processes, pathways and locations is reliable or when greater
caution should be applied.

a) The brain is constantly in a state of change.

The brain changes physically and constantly in response to input from within and
outside the body. In addition to this passive process, the individual has the
capacity to self-manage change. In other words every choice we make, wherever
we direct our attention, every move we make, every word we speak, in short,
every input from our environment, works change in our brains on a functional and
often structural basis.

This study takes the position, aligned with a great majority of current
neuroscientific studies seeking neural bases for processes, that this state of
constant change does not preclude the possibility of detecting patterns of neural
activation.

b) Our appreciation of the complexity of brain networking is at a rudimentary
level.
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Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001),
115.
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The complexity of the human brain is a result not only of the vast numbers of
neurons and glial cells (some 100 billion neurons and perhaps twice that number
of glial cells), nor simply of the number of synaptic interconnections between
neurons (estimated at an average of several thousand per neuron), but also of the
pathways and networking that integrate the various brain regions. For example,
the significance of certain subcortical areas reciprocally connected to the cortex is
being increasingly understood. Sub-cortical areas that had been thought, only two
decades ago, to be mere relay stations for motor commands are now understood
to play integral roles in cognitive function. The complex contribution of the
cortico-striatal-thalamocortical pathways, as a further example, have been a rich
field of research in recent years.

As scanning technologies have improved, localisation theories of the brain have
given way to an understanding of the flexibility, complexity and integration of
neural networking. In 5.3 I will be discussing the extension of neural networking
and collaboration of systems in the brain. Within this context much contemporary
neuroscientific research seeks identify brain regions which are actively implicated
in specific function.265 It remains clear that specific areas demonstrate direct and
at times critical involvement in particular functions. Conclusions in this study will
be required to respect principles of functional integration and of specific function.

c) The basis of the interface between molecular processes and conscious
processes, such as learning and memory, is still conjectural.
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A corollary of this point is that there is a lack of universal agreement about language and
terminology from one author/researcher to another. This seems to arise principally because
knowledge in this field is expanding faster than the conventions of discussion. By the term
“consolidation” of pathways I will refer to changes in the anatomical characteristics of the neurons
with the result that neuronal activity is facilitated; by “hard wiring” I will understand the
anatomical structures of neurons, the subunits of all nerve pathways, a meaning is often found in
the literature. Note however, there is no universal agreement on this usage. Some authors use the
term to refer to neurons established before birth, or in critical stages of development, others
distinguish “hard wired” by which they mean not experience dependent, from what they call “soft
265
wiring”, by which they refer to experience dependent . In a similar way, “hardwired” is
sometimes opposed to “plastic”. Note usage in Doidge, The brain that changes itself, 95.
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Although various convincing hypotheses (eg LTP) are proposed for the molecular
mechanisms of memory with the support of a growing body of evidence, and
while the manner by which networked neurons may mediate memory and
learning is supported by plausible computer modelling, the actual processes are
not described. Currently there is no neuroscientific understanding of the
relationship between neural mechanisms and mental representations.266 The
position of this study, based on the integrity of rational and the biological in man
according to Aristotle and Aquinas, is that mental and biological events are
coincident manifestations of the one phenomenon. (Refer to Chapter 1
discussion.)

In line with the abundant current research into plasticity, memory and learning,
we will seek to identify processes, mechanisms and pathways that are implicated
and, at times critically so, in the functioning of the person.

d) Our experimental knowledge of brain function is derived from animal as well
as human studies.

It is necessary to be cautious in transferring conclusions in animal studies to the
human domain. Nevertheless “clinical findings strikingly parallel animal
experimentation data,” indicating that function and structure can be highly
phylogenetically conserved.267

e) Our capacity to study neuronal activity in real time and with precision is
uneven and still developing.

The “voodoo correlations” and “neurotrash” line of criticism popularised by
Raymond Tallis, in rubbishing practically every attempt to relate localised brain
function to human behaviour, goes beyond what is broadly acceptable in the
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Daniel J. Siegel, Neurobiology of We, (Sounds True Audio Lectures, 2008).
See for example discussion in A. V. Kalueff, “Neurobiology of memory and anxiety From genes
to behaviour. (Review) “Neural Plasticity,” Hindawi Publishing Corporation (2007): ID 78171, 6.
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neuroscience community.268 Of more weight however are the tightly argued
criticisms of Edward Vul et al.269

Neuroimaging has definite limitations. Educator and neuroscientist John Geake
comments: 270


We must always bear in mind that brain structure is extremely complex,
and function, non linear.



The vast functional interconnectivity of the brain means that mappings of
structure to function, the neural bases of specific tasks,271 are not straight
forward activities.



The data is limited by the imaging method chosen.



Neuroimaging data is a statistical comparison of indicators of neural
activation against a baseline that has been set by the researcher, and that,
as “most of the brain is involved in any cognitive task”, changes in
statistical parameters will change the apparent results. Imaging data
defining areas of heightened neural activity in a given task certainly must
not be interpreted to mean that other areas of the brain may not be
implicated in that activity.272



The mere fact that an area of the brain is implicated in a given activity does
not provide direct insight into the contribution that area makes.

Johnson et al. reflect this wariness. They argue that imaging depends upon choices
of the researcher: “thickness of brain slices, level of clarity and detail, techniques
for filtering signal from noise, and choice of individuals to be sampled”; and they
caution that there is rarely a 1:1 correspondence between region and function.
268

See above, 1.5.
Edward Vul et al. “Puzzlingly high correlations in fMRI studies of emotion, personality and social
cognition” Perspectives on Psychological Science 4, No 3 (2009).
270
Geake criticizes some forms of “educational neuroscience” seeing it fraught with dangers of
oversimplification, and typified by the fads such as brain gym exercises and neuromyths of left
brain and right brain thinking that overlook the abundant interconnection between the
hemispheres. Nevertheless, despite this balanced skepticism, he concludes that neuroscience can
do much to inform our understanding of learning.
John G. Geake, The Brain at School (Berkshire: McGraw Hill, 2009).
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They cite a celebrated misuse of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
study of swinging voters prior to USA presidential elections to illustrate the
problem of reverse inference and that because brain regions may be activated by
many different processes, it may not be possible to draw conclusions about
specific mental states, motivations and cognitive processes.273

f) Cross disciplinary studies involving neuroscience are uneven in quality.

New fields such as neuroethics,274 and even neurotheology, have flourished, along
with some intelligent to absolutely shonky writings and therapies blending brain
science with educational, business and even entertainment.275 Usma Goswami has
offered a telling review of “brain based” learning packages, too many of which,
the author argues, are “scientifically spurious applications”.276

A growing number of commentators in this field focus on fulfilment through
relationships, finding evidence for this position in the neuroscience itself. For
example, neuroscientist Daniel Siegel pioneers a field he calls “interpersonal
neurobiology”, or the “neurobiology of we”.277 Despite the jargon, Siegel’s
approach broadly accords with cognitive management of emotion, and with the
view that attention and plasticity are linked. Unfortunately, and this is a common
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S. B. Johnson et al. “Adolescent maturity and the brain: The promise and pitfalls of
neuroscience research in adolescent health policy,” Journal of Adolescent Health 45, (2009): 216221.
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Daniel J. Siegel, Mindsight (Melbourne: Scribe, 2009), 267.
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A sample of recent books: Andrew Newberg and Mark R. Waldman, Born to Believe (NY: Free
Press, 2006); Bob Garrett, Brain and Behaviour (Los Angeles: Sage, 2011). Note also the spread of
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Usma Goswami, “Neuroscience and education: from research to practice?” Nature Reviews
Neuroscience (on line 12 April, 2006), 7.
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In Mindsight Siegel advocates “mindsight”, the capacity to reflect on the internal workings of
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empathetic; relationships are necessary to sculpt a brain. Daniel J. Siegel, Mindsight (Melbourne:
Scribe, 2009).
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problem faced by intuitive approaches, an impoverished anthropology fails to
offer sure guidance to the applications of science.

…

My investigation will respect these caveats. My intention is to propose, by means
of an integrative analysis of current research into brain function, a highly plausible
model for the biological bases of virtue, the accuracy of which could be laboratory
tested in the future. By highlighting the expansive trend in plasticity studies, and
by making cross disciplinary links, I hope to stimulate interest in what I see as an
important field for further exploration.

2.2 Plasticity.

Neuroplasticity refers to the ability of neurons to change their function, chemical
profile (amount and types of neurotransmitters produced), or structure in
response to learning, environment or experience.278

The phenomenon of plasticity is of particular interest in this study because it is
widely accepted that it provides the underlying mechanisms for learning and
memory. Processes of learning and memory, in turn are central to the
development of virtue, particularly habit formation, of ready attention, and of the
associated goal directed behaviours that underpin purposeful action.

Plasticity may be categorised as functional or structural. It is also described as
developmental, or activity/environmentally dependent plasticity. Note that these
categories are not exclusive of each other. Much developmental plasticity is
driven by timely environmental inputs, and structural change is perhaps always
accompanied by functional change.

278

Definition taken from: Clifford J. Woolf and Michael W. Salter, “Neuronal Plasticity: Increasing
the Gain in Pain,” Science, (June 2000): 1765-1768.
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Figure 2.4

The astonishing capacity for structural change in the brain, for reengineering
connectivities and function. Pre- and post-operative T1-weighted MRI show removal
of total glioma and resection of right paralimbic system. Despite post-surgical
hemiparesia, within three months the patient had completely recovered.
Source: Desmurget, M. et al. “Contrasting acute and slow growing lesions: a new door to brain plasticity
(Review).” Brain, 130 (2007). 903.

2.2.1 Historical considerations.

Plasticity, as a term in neuroscience, was first used by William James in 1890 in
reference to the potential for humans to modify their behaviour. Remarkably, he
linked plasticity to habitual behaviours. He wrote:
Plasticity [. . .] means the possession of a structure weak
enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not to yield
all at once. Each relatively stable phase of equilibrium in such a
structure is marked by what we may call a new set of habits.
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Organic matter, especially nervous tissue, seems endowed with
a very extraordinary degree of plasticity of this sort; so that we
may without hesitation lay down as our first proposition the
following, that the phenomena of habit in living beings are due
to the plasticity.279

In 1895 the great Spanish neuroscientist Ramon y Cajal offered the hypothesis
that learning could be based on the selective strengthening of synapses, now
recognised as a central mechanism for plasticity. He predicted both experienceinduced, plastic change to neuronal pathways and also genetically-driven,
developmental plasticity,280 and that association learning might involve
morphological and functional changes at the synapse. He wrote in 1904 of “the
formation of new pathways through ramification and progressive growth of the
dendritic arborization and the nervous terminals.”281 He argued, “The organ of
thought is, within certain limits, malleable and perfectible by will-directed, mental
exercise” and that “mental practice” must strengthen neuronal connections and
create new ones.282

At the heart of plasticity is the distinction, described by Jerzy Konorski in 1948,
between, on the one hand, the neuronal reaction to an incoming impulse, in other
words the neuron’s excitability, and, on the other, the permanent functional
transformations and the corresponding anatomical changes, plastic changes that
arise in particular systems of neurons as a result of appropriate stimuli.283

The following year Donald Hebb, another giant in the field of neuroscience,
described what has become known as the Hebbian principle: “Cells that fire
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Santiago Ramón y Cajal, Textura del Sistema Nervioso del Hombre y de los Vertebrados, 2 vols.
(Madrid Moya, 1899 and 1904), 296.
282
From Doidge, The Brain that changes itself, 202.
283
From Kandel, Principles of Neural Science, 340.
280

108

together wire together”284 and its corollary “Cells that fire out of sync lose their
link”.285 Hebb postulated conditions under which synapses change on the basis of
activation: “When an axon of cell A is near enough to excite a cell B and
repeatedly or persistently takes part in firing it, some growth process or metabolic
change takes place in one or both cells such that A’s efficiency, as one of the cells
firing B, is increased.”286

With repeated firing, nerve cells become firmly connected. In this way, neuronal
pathways are self reinforcing. Furthermore whichever cell is triggered first,
connected neurons tend to fire in concert, as one unit. Donald Hebb had
successfully described the principle underpinning activity-dependent plasticity:
that changes in synaptic strength correspond to changes in neuronal morphology.

Arden and Linford explain, “On the macro level: the more often we do something,
the more likely we are to do it again.”287 This principle is at the basis of much
experience dependent plasticity whereby cells that excite other cells cause those
cells to become linked in their firing characteristics. This study proposes that
experience dependent plasticity at the neuronal level as the fundamental
mechanism for reinforcement of behaviours through repetition.

When we speak of activity dependent plasticity, we are referring first of all to
electrical activity within the neuron. “Structural plasticity in the mature brain is
guided by neuronal activity.”288 Synaptogenesis, neurite outgrowth and other
forms of structural change are driven by electro-chemical processes associated
with neuronal activity.
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Plasticity was first documented by Timothy Bliss and Terje Lomo in their 1973
discovery of LTP as a stable modification of synaptic strength. That dendritic
length and branching complexity could be altered by experience was documented
in the late 70s by Fiala et al. and by Pysh and Weiss. Later Eric Kandel was
awarded the 2004 Nobel Prize for his identification in the 1960s and 70s of the
Hebbian mechanism as a basis of memory and learning in the sea slug Aplysia.289
It is now accepted that plasticity is present in all parts of the mature brain.290
Pioneer in plasticity studies, Alvaro Pascual-Leone, writes: “Plasticity is an
obligatory consequence of all neural activity (even mental practice), and
environmental pressures, functional significance, and experience are critical
factors.”291

Lashley had suggested in 1950 that the brain is equipotent, able to compensate
for any lesion, and yet, while this view is not borne out empirically, in the last two
decades there has been a growing recognition of the enormous plasticity of the
brain.292 “Synaptic plasticity may be the rule throughout the brain, rather than the
exception,” comments one study. 293 294 Norman Doidge, psychiatrist and popular
science writer, calls plasticity “one of the most extraordinary discoveries of the
twentieth century”.295

2.2.2 Plasticity is categorised as functional or structural.
289
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Functional plasticity is essentially any change in the transmission characteristics of
a neuron without change to the anatomical connection between neurons. Usually
this term is used in contrast to structural plasticity, even though structural
changes themselves will normally lead to detectable changes in function.
Functional plasticity usually takes place through temporary changes to synaptic
strength. This may be for example, owing to a change in number and availability of
post synaptic receptors, alteration to presynaptic release of neurotransmitter, and
alteration of the thickness of synapse. This short term synaptic plasticity is a
virtually ubiquitous form of plasticity in the brain. Another example would be the
phenomenon whereby in certain conditions the frequency of firing patterns can
up-regulate response thresholds in particular cells, habituating the neuronal
response.

Structural plasticity is the anatomical remodelling of neural pathways. Typically it
may involve changes to numbers of synapses and neurons, or changes to
branching and connectivity patterns. As noted above structural changes bring
about an altered function.

Sometimes, but not always, structural change may also be a consequence of
functional changes. For example, genetically induced structural changes may
themselves be triggered by certain firing patterns. Structural changes are always
mediated by intracellular chemical signalling and often lead on to changes in extra
cellular signalling at the synapse.

Note however that the distinction between functional and structural changes is
increasingly blurred. Neuronally associated functional change often implies
structural changes in some form or other. For example, we can now witness and
measure in actu the rapid growth or retractions of dendritic spines, and the
discharge of single neurons. These phenomena bring about not only molecular but
also morphological changes at the synapse, changes such as synaptogenesis,
vesicle transport and receptor mobility.
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Plasticity may also be subtractive, when neurons or synapses are eliminated. It
may be reactive (after pharmacological intervention or surgery) or spontaneous
(experience dependent). It is competitive, as demonstrated in countless studies;
for example, visual topographic representations, rerouted to the auditory cortex,
will compete for neural “real estate” at that location even when auditory input is
present.296

The brain’s capacity to lock in new behaviour has been dubbed, “the forgotten
fourth aspect of plasticity”.297 William James’s linkage of habit with plasticity has
already been noted. As this study is of the habits of virtue, durable changes
established in character, I will focus principally on structural plasticities. It is highly
consistent with an Aristotelian-Thomistic, ensouled-body anthropology that
changes in our very character should be thus reflected in our biological
constitution. Recall too that James emphasised the “stability” of the new state,
the potential for us to be in a new way. This sits most comfortably with
Aristotelian descriptor of virtue, to be seen in Chapter 3, as “that which makes us
who we are”.

2.2.3 The big picture: synaptic strengthening as the net result of structural
plasticity.

At their essence, all structural plasticities involve modifications to neural pathways
either directly (direct modifications of neuronal pathways or adjustments to the
anatomy of the neuron itself) or indirectly (through changes to the amount and
types of neurotransmitter or neuromodulator produced).
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Neuronal function in almost all its aspects is dependent on intracellular signalling
initiated at the cell surface. The cell’s response to neurotransmitters, growth
factors and other signalling molecules depends on receptors and pathways that
relay messages to intracellular compartments, and to the enzymes, ion channels
and proteins in the cytoskeleton that mediate the effects of transmitters. The
variety of ion channels and the flexibility of mechanisms regulating these
channels, such as G-proteins, 298 second messengers, and cognate protein kinases
that phosphorylate ion channels,299 greatly enhance the scope for modulating
neuronal function. Responses are further modified through localisation and
concentration of signal activity and by history of prior activity. It is believed that
protein phosphorylation and the regulation of gene expression by intracellular
signals are the most important mechanisms for neuronal plasticity.300

Ultimately, synaptic strengthening will be the net result of both direct and indirect
forms of modification of pathways. These permanent anatomic changes are
mediated through gene expression.301
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G-protein linked signals are of particular interest to plasticity studies for they offer rich
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Figure 2.5 Signal Transmission at the chemical synapse. 1.Nerve impulse arrives at synaptic knob.
2+
2+
2. Voltage gated Ca enters cell. 3. Ca triggers exocytosis of synaptic vesicles. 4.
Neurotransmitter suffuses across synaptic gap. 5. Neurotransmitters bind to ligand
+
gated channels allowing Na to flow into post synaptic neuron. 6. Postsynaptic
potential develops.7. Action potential triggered in axon on post synaptic neuron.
Source: Tortora, Gerard J. and Derrickson, Bryan. Principles of Anatomy and Physiology, 12th ed. New
Jersey: Wiley, 2009. 442

2.2.4 Developmental plasticity.302
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Critical to nuclear transcription is the role of the catalytic subunit of PKA that phosphorylates the
activator protein CREB on entering the nucleus. Evidence is growing that some forms of long term
memory require new gene expression. Intracellular signalling also affects nuclear gene expression.
Schulman and Roberts, “Intracellular signaling.”
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Many developing neural circuits demonstrate periods of development, known as
sensitive or critical periods when their ability to adjust to experience is
heightened; they are refined by means of changes in synaptic connectivity. 304
Critical periods or sensitive periods are those finite windows of opportunity for
the development of specific sensorimotor faculties.305 The term is less precisely
used for broadly indicative times of greater responsiveness in the development of
neuronal systems, for example the window of opportunity for the development of
the prefrontal cortical pathways, understood to extend to the early 20s in males.

In critical periods a failure to experience appropriate inputs can lead to
permanent impairment of perception or behaviour. Studies of the temperament
of rats, for example, provide useful insights into this form of plasticity: attentive
mothering is conducive to important behaviour changes that are increasingly
understood at the cellular level. The interactions that a newborn rat experiences
with its mother in the first week after birth profoundly influence its response to
stress as an adult.306

In sensitive periods changes are far more readily induced than in maturity; for
example, a new language may still be learned as an adult although more
arduously and only with focused attention. For other changes the opportunity is
lost; for example the window for imprinting may open and close within space of
hours. Circuit changes occurring in sensitive periods differ from those in
adulthood in magnitude, persistence, and behavioural conditions upon which
changes are dependent.
304
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the hippocampus. Attentive mothering causes a demethylation of a GR gene, thereby a stable
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thereby made capable of tighter regulation of hormonal release in response to stressors. This leads
the animal to be calm, adventurous and able to react without anxiety and fear to stressors. Rats
that, in these first two weeks, were groomed extensively and where the mother facilitated access
to milk are less fearful and less reactive to stressors even as adults. Cross fostering shows the
source of these traits to be experiential.
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2.2.4.1 Sensitive periods in humans.

Appropriate and adequate environmental inputs are crucial for sound
development.307 308 This is true for affective and sensory development.309
Sensitive periods can intersect with the development of moral behaviour. We
have seen above the importance of attentive mothering. Positive modifications of
an infant’s behaviour effected by sound parenting practices, arguably lay the
foundations for later virtuous self-directed behaviours.

Rene Spitz broke new ground with his 1945 studies of deprived children suffering
from what he called “hospitalism”. He found that these children, often with only
one carer for eight or more children, were affectively impaired.310 In the 1990s
various researchers followed the longitudinal progress of Romanian orphans
raised with little affection and sensory stimulation whilst in orphanages in their
early infancy. On leaving the orphanages, the children were found to be impaired
in all domains. Despite making up physical size relatively quickly, infants who had
been in the orphanages past six months of age were found to have lasting
cognitive deficits. Those adopted after the age of two suffered profound deficits.
Further studies link postpartum depression in mothers with affective deficits
expressed neurobiologically and behaviourally. Infants of depressed mothers tend
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Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 701.
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 15. This text also contains a
table overview of major brain and functional changes in the period between birth and eight years
on page 17. Experience in early life is decisive in fundamental human capacities such as
stereoscopic vision, visual acuity, and binocular coordination; and high level capabilities such as
social behaviour, language (the most studied sensitive period in humans), ability to perceive forms
and faces. These sensitive periods are subject to the same principles at work in other animals.
Development of the brain proceeds “in phylogenic order”, with the development of the senses
themselves preceding the higher processing pathways for these senses.
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For an overview of the dynamics of attachment, and neural development of the affective
potential in infancy: A N. Schore, “Effects of a secure attachment relationship on right brain
development, affect regulation and infant mental health” Infant Mental Health Journal 22, Nos 1-2
(2001):7-66.
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Dennis Coon, Essentials of psychology, 7 ed. (Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole , 1997), 115.
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to show a overactivation of areas of the right frontal lobe, and underactivation of
the left, in comparison with the norm.311

The apt times for development of the child and adolescent brain may also be
understood as arguably a “sensitive period”. Human grey matter reaches a
maximum at 10-12 years of age in parietal lobe, 11-12 in frontal lobe, and 16-17 in
temporal lobe. White matter maturation continues throughout childhood and
adolescence and within the association areas of the neo cortex has been noted to
continue to myelinate through the third and into the fourth decade of life.
Myelination the subicular and presubicular regions, and volume of the
hippocampus to which these regions connect, continue to grow even into
adulthood.312 When habits of self control, respect and reflection are not acquired
in these formative years it can be a steeper road in adulthood to motivate oneself
to develop, for example, a habit of study, or a habit of getting up early. If, instead
of positive behaviours, the maturing person develops negative traits such as
laziness or a habit of venting anger, the challenge of substituting new behaviours
can be daunting and all-too-difficult.

For summary, refer to Table 2.2 Systems for sensitive periods of development in
endpapers.

2.2.4.2 Mechanisms of developmental phases.
The period of early development involves, on a grand scale, plastic change in
particular systems of neurons during as a result of appropriate stimuli. An
understanding of the mechanisms at work in these early stages is helpful.

311

Schore, “Effects of a secure attachment relationship on right brain development, affect
regulation and infant mental health” 7-66.
312
F. M. Benes et al. “Myelination of a key relay zone in the hippocampal formation occurs in the
human brain during childhood, adolescence and adulthood,” in Arch. Gen. Psychiatr. 51 (1994):
477-484.
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Figure 2.6

The developing cortex. The images are generated from a longitudinal MRI study of
13 children scanned biennially over an 8-10 year period. Predominance of blue
corresponds to grey matter loss, and increasing myelination, commencing in primary
sensorimotor areas and spreading to PFC and lastly to temporal cortex. Source: Gogtay,
N. et al. “Dynamic mapping of human cortical development during childhood through early adulthood.”
Procedings of the National Academiy of Science, USA, 101 (2004): 8174–8179. Citation in Blakemore,
Sarah-Jayne. “The social brain in adolescence.” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9 (2008): 267-277.

a) Experience tuned development.

Developmental plasticity typically involves axonal overdevelopment, activity
dependent synaptic pruning, and staged synaptic reorganisation. Experience tunes
both excitatory and inhibitory connections in a largely non reversible manner and
according to Hebbian principles.313 It seems that the same mechanisms controlling

313

The opening of critical and sensitive periods depends on pathway maturation. Information
involved (from lower circuits) must already be sufficiently reliable, circuit connectivity sufficiently
mature, and mechanisms enabling plasticity must be active: for remodelling of axons and
dendrites, elaboration of new synapses, adjustment of synapse performance, changes in gene
expression.
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synaptogenesis during circuit development also underpin circuit remodelling and
the establishment of new synapses. For example, neurotrophins such as brain
derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) can also play an essential role in anatomical
remodelling. LTP and long term depression (LTD) have a role in developmental
learning and N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptors are integral to the
mechanisms of plasticity at work. (See 2.2.5.1) When appropriate experience is
received and brain circuitry commits to specific linkages, the sensitive period
ends. Importantly, once a specific circuit is formed it is much more difficult for
altered experience to induce new connections.314

b) The role of axons.

The growth cones of neurons, christened by Ramon y Cajal as “soft battering
rams”, are the axonal tips that grow towards target synapses.315 316 Since his work
detailing the growth and connectivity of major classes of nerve cells, much insight
has been gained into the mechanisms for axonal guidance and for achieving
specificity in neuronal connections. Growth cones are actively guided.317 Sperry
from the 1940s showed that there is a highly specific targeting mechanism. In the
vicinity of the target field axon development is very accurate, with selection of
target cell very precise. Programming in neurons seems to be for specific targets;
it has been shown that surgically transferred motorneurons still reached their
target. Formation of connections with target cells depends on three factors: the
directed growth of axons to the target fields, the selection of target cells, and
importantly for the purposes of this study, electrical activity.
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See Knudson, “Early experience and sensitive periods,” 530.
Marianne Bronner-Fraser and Mary E Hatten, “Neurogenesis and migration,” in Larry Squire et
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al. Fundamental Neuroscience, 3 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008), 351.
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Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 699 and Alex L, Kolodkin and Marc Tessier-LaVigne,
rd
“Growth cones and axon pathfinding,” in Larry Squire et al. Fundamental Neuroscience, 3 ed.
(Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008).
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Accurate axonal guidance depends on various mechanisms such as scaffolding on other axons,
use of other extracellular matrices and guidepost cells. The growth cone of the axon, both a
sensory and a motor structure, responds to the received guidance cues from outside the cell in the
form of large soluble molecules such as netrins, semaphorins, laminins, and cadherins. Four types
of guidance mechanisms seem to operate: contact attraction, chemoattraction, contact repulsion,
and chemorepulsion.
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c)

Synapse formation and elimination.

Synapse formation and elimination is a core developmental process. 318 The
development of the nervous system is directed by the expression of particular
genes at specific times and in specific places but external factors such as nutrients,
sensory stimuli and social experience also play a major role in development.
Mechanisms exist for neuronal differentiation, for axonal targeting of destination
cells, and for regulation of synaptic formation. It is known too that deprivation of
normal environmental conditions has profound repercussions on maturation of
the nervous system and on behaviour. Of particular interest in this study is the
role that physical and social interaction with the environment, and subsequent
electrical activity, play in modifying or reinforcing the neural structures once they
are formed.

In the human frontal cortex, maximum synaptic density is reached at one year
with the numbers coming down to adult levels at approximately 16 years of
age.319 While programmed cell death, in contrast to the case for other animals,
plays a lesser role in human brain development, synaptic elimination seems to be
more prevalent in humans and primates. 320 The gradual decline in synaptic
density proceeds into late adolescence suggesting substantial changes to
connectivity up to age 20. DA is believed to play a key role in cortical information
processing around puberty.321 The changing neuromodulatory effects of DA
appear to impact on refinement of excitatory and inhibitory inputs of layer III
pyramidal neurons during adolescence.
318

Although the features in common between synapse formation and synaptic plasticity are not
well described it is evident that synaptic connectivity in the CNS is plastic in response to
environmental inputs. “Neuronal activity is also important for certain aspects of synapse
formation, but exactly how it participates and whether it employs mechanisms shared with those
governing synaptic plasticity remain intriguing questions.” Steven J. Burden, Dennis D. M. O’Leary
and Peter Scheiffele, “Target selection, topographic maps and synapse formation,” in Larry Squire
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et al. Fundamental Neuroscience, 3 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008), 433.
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One recent study shows that children’s plasticity of brain seems attributable to a
number of mechanisms: neuronal overproduction and programmed cell death
(apoptosis) of excessive neurons; overproduction of synapses (approximately
twice adult levels in the cortex at age 2) and deletion of immature synapses; and
from activity dependent processes that allow for ongoing stabilisation and
modification of synapses. By means of these forms of plasticity, children are
enabled to learn new skills quickly or recover from brain injury. Synaptic
proliferation and pruning are controlled by intrinsic mechanisms and
environmental factors.322 Developmental plasticity is evident through
adolescence. Neuroimaging evidence suggests that elimination of synapses has a
causal role for changes in social cognitive processing in the PFC, particularly for
decreased activity during adolescence in the medial PFC (mPFC) and post central
gyrus (pSTS), a process in which the anterior cingulated cortex (ACC), the inferior
frontal gyrus, the amygdala and the anterior insula also play a role.323

Synapse elimination is a normal aspect of development of the organism and may
be viewed as a fundamental process for plasticity. 324 Synapse elimination is
essentially a response of the organism to environment. Lichtman and Colman
have argued that synapse elimination allows the organism to be more adapted to
its specific environment.325
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Butz, et al. “Activity dependent structural plasticity,” 287-305.
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Fundamental Neuroscience, 3 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008), 469-491. Lichtman writes,
“This process may tune the nervous systems of higher animals to the particular environment of
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each individual animal.” They proposed that the loss of connections is due to the greatly
duplicated neurons present in mammalian and vertebrate nervous systems. Noting that vertebrate
neuromuscular junctions (NMJs) initially contain large numbers of fan-in (multiple innervation of
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innervation of target cells to a situation of multiple unique connections: generating non redundant
circuits from a situation of much less specific innervation initially.
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Rather than ridding the nervous system of connectivity “mistakes”, synapse
elimination appears to sharpen specificity based on the cues that promote
selective synapse formation. The number of axons converging on postsynaptic
cells, and number of postsynaptic cells contacted per axon decreases. There is a
removal of inputs due to branch trimming. Remaining inputs compensate, adding
in part new synapses. Although innervation from multiple sources is eliminated
there is an increase in the number of presynaptic terminals linking the surviving
axon to the target. Trophic substances appear to contribute to this process. 326
The end result is that new structures more than compensate for the loss. There is
no net weakening of synaptic input to target cells. Such synapse elimination is
now understood to be central to the maturing CNS through adolescence and into
adulthood. Clarification of pathways appears associated with this period of
increasing self control.

Typically in neonatal vertebrates axons of neurons fan out to many target cells
and connect weakly. In adulthood, axons disconnect from many target cells, there
is a lessening of fanning out, and numbers of synapses on each target can
increase. Some two thirds of axonal branches in the corpus callosum of newborn
monkeys are eliminated in this way, and a similar process has been shown to take
place in the human corpus callosum, and in cortico-spinal axons also. This process
is linked to experience, and hence is a mechanism of plasticity. 327

Synapse elimination may play a role also in memory. Bailey and Chen
demonstrated that long term habituation of the gill withdrawal reflex also
features synaptic elimination. Habituated animals exhibited a pruning of synaptic
terminals associated with long term habituation, with a 35% reduction on average
from 1300 per neuron to 800 per neuron.328 It has been suggested that “the most
important form of adult plasticity must certainly be memory.” 329 It is possible
326
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that learning may involve selection of synaptic pathways already in existence
rather than construction of new circuits. Plasticity can be both in elimination of
some circuits and an alteration of the strengths of existing connections.

Plastic change is not simply about maintaining adaptability, it is also concerned
with locking in changes. Hence, synaptic elimination seems closely associated with
critical periods and also with the durability of memory. Tapia and Lichtman argue
that input elimination provides an answer both for the inability for change after a
certain point in critical periods, and also for the indelibility of memory. “Input
elimination is an attractive means of assuring indelibility because by eliminating
competing (ie asynchronously firing) inputs, a circuit becomes sheltered from
disruption by different activity patterns.” 330With respect to memory, the authors
note that “the permanent loss of axonal input is an attractive mechanism for
information storage.” 331
2.2.5 Other synaptic factors.332

There is a growing understanding of homeostasis of the neuron, the maintenance
of the overall synaptic weight in the neuron by means of plastic changes and of
the associated phenomena of homo-and heterosynapic changes. Butz et al. argue
that forms of structural plasticity, rather than following Hebbian or anti-Hebbian
principles, 333 contribute to the homeostasis of the neuronal network.
Homeostatic neural plasticity refers to the capacity of neurons to compensate for
330
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Material in these paragraphs draws on: M. Chistiakova and M. Volgushev, “Heterosynaptic
plasticity in the neocortex (Review),” in Experimental Brain Research 199,3-4 (2009):377-90; and
Butz, “Activity dependent structural plasticity,” 287-305. Chistiakova and Volgushev have focused
on homosynaptic and heterosynaptic complementarity. They argue that homosynaptic changes are
synaptic changes of transmission as a result of the specific induction related to learning. Changes
at other synapses on a given neuron that are non involved in the original induction related to
learning are called heterosynaptic changes. The authors argue that evidence suggests that these
changes are complementary processes. Further they suggest that heterosynaptic plasticity may
assist in synaptic homeostasis, the maintenance of the overall synaptic weight of a neuron, and in
ensuring that certain memories are given greater permanence.
333
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network activity by regulating their own excitability. This is a neuron centric view
in which synaptic remodelling, involving an interdependent complex of functional
and structural plastic changes, maintains desired levels of neural activity. Wolff
and Wagner noted in 1983 that activity dependent plasticity restores neural
homeostasis.

Chistiakova and Volgushev explain that nonassociative, or heterosynaptic,
plasticity of specific synapses may result in a neuron as a result of back
propagation, where other synapses in the same neuron have experienced
Hebbian-type associative, or homosynaptic plasticity by well understood
processes of Ca2+ influx (fast large amplitude influx leading to LTP; slower low
amplitude to LTD) in response to intracellular tetanization. (See 2.2.5.4.)

2.2.5.1 NMDAR and AMPAR mediated plasticities.

a) NMDA plasticities.

NMDA mediated plasticities, associated with LTP and LTD, are a burgeoning area
of current research. The NMDA receptor is one type of ionotropic glutamate
receptor.334 It was first described by Moriyoshi in 1990. Significantly, this
pathway seems linked to development, learning, and memory, and to neuronal
recovery from injury.335
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See discussion in M. Neal Waxham, “Neurotransmitter receptors” in Larry Squire et al.
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Enzymes triggered by this process then sensitize the cell to subsequent stimuli through both
retrograde signalling and modification of post synaptic proteins, as well as triggering genetic
manufacture of new synaptic proteins through the second messenger CREB in association with
BDNF. Some hallucinogenic compounds block the NMDA ion channel, but require it open to work,
hence are called open channel blockers. NMDA receptors are dependent for opening on both
2+
appropriate binding of glutamate and on depolarization of the membrane (having a Mg
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dependent block at resting potential), and they permit Ca permeability. Normally these receptors
prevent calcium entry, but the arrival of an action potential at the synapse leads to glutamate
binding that allows calcium influx and depolarises the cell.
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NMDA receptors are implicated in LTP and LTD processes and numerous variations
this category of plasticity are now identified: “many forms of activity dependent
regulation of synapses demonstrated both in vitro and in vivo require activation of
NMDA-type glutamate receptors. These receptors are among the first molecules
to accumulate at the sites of nascent synapses where NMDARs become stable
synaptic components.” 336

LTP results, described as “an experience dependent, long lasting increase in
chemical strength of neurotransmission that is a crucial mechanism in learning
and memory”.337 The precise timing of neuronal plasticity in response to diverse
environmental stimuli seems to be a function of the interaction of
neurotransmitter and growth factor-signalling pathways. In most structural
synaptic plasticities intracellular calcium and gene expression appear implicated.
Calcium influx is understood to be a trigger for LTP.338

Corlew et al. (2008) suggests that postsynaptic NMDARs trigger classical forms of
LTP and LTD, and that presynaptic NMDARs (preNMDARs) mediate spike timingdependent LTD (tLTD) at some synapses with some evidence also of LTP.
“NMDARs were first discovered as postsynaptic receptors at glutamatergic
synapses, and have since been shown to be involved in many aspects of synaptic
transmission, dendritic integration, synaptic and neuronal maturation, and
plasticity throughout the brain.” 339 Corlew et al. place emphasis on preNMDAR
regulation of probability for presynaptic release and short-term plasticity.
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Another focus for current research in this field is the role of NMDARs in the
stabilisation of glutamatergic synapses.340 Alvarez et al. note that NMDARs
perform a regulatory function in the neuron via various pathways and at many
levels and that NMDAR presence is essential for spine density and regulation of
the number of active excitatory synapses. The authors find that “through
ionotropic and structural signalling, NMDARs regulate the rapid dynamics of spine
morphology.”341

Studies by Markram and Sakmann at the Max Planck Institute have demonstrated
NMDA related plasticity as a result of pre and post synaptic interaction: precise
timing of backpropagating post synaptic potential (PSP) following excitatory
postsynaptic potential (EPSP) leads to a strong depolarisation. This leads to
glutamate ejection from NMDA receptors, thus allowing Ca2+ influx, a cascade of
intracellular messaging, and release of growth signalling factors associated with
structural plasticity and consequent LTP.342

b) Interplay with AMPARs.

Studies are unveiling the role of presynaptic NMDARs and their interplay with αamino-3-hydroxyl-5-methyl-4-isoxazole-propionate receptors (AMPARs),
establishing necessary conditions for plasticity.343 NMDARs have been found at
“silent synapses”, immature synapses lacking AMPARs but with the potential to
acquire them by means of NMDAR mediated LTP. 344 Although LTP and LTD are
340
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regulated by many mechanisms, AMPA receptor trafficking, the insertion or
removal of the AMPA receptor (AMPAR) at the synapse, on the basis of evidence
from animal studies linking AMPAR trafficking in the rodent barrel cortex to
experience dependent plasticity, and AMPAR trafficking to fear conditioning in
hippocampus, appears to account for postsynaptic expression involved in LTP and
LTD.345 Kessels and Malinow argue that AMPA trafficking is the mechanism
underlying the formation of neuronal pathways, and behaviour modification
itself.346

Blundon and Zakharenko reviewed the evolution of understanding of LTP and its
cellular locus. They described this as an unresolved area for understandings of
plasticity. New imaging demonstrates that LTP has both pre- and post- synaptic
components although most current studies focus on post-synaptic contributions.
“LTP is not a unitary phenomenon, even at a single synapse, but rather is a group
of plasticities.” 347 NMDA-LTP develops rapidly, is expressed postsynaptically, and
is needed for short term memory retention.

The role of zinc at the cortical synapse, and on NMDARs and AMPARs has also
become a field of active investigation.348 That zinc seems to play a role in cortical
plasticity is suggested by animal studies showing that rats on zinc deficient diets
are more aggressive and have poorer memories at maturity, and monkeys raised
by mothers on zinc deficient diets manifest poorer memories and learning. Zinc
deprivation during development appears to have a negative effect on DNA
345
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synthesis. Although the exact function of zinc in the cortex is not clear, vesicular
zinc (about 20% of the zinc present in the CNS) has a wide ranging impact on
postsynaptic function. A consensus of numerous studies is that zinc can inhibit LTP
in specific neural locations. At postsynaptic locations zinc has various potential
effects including inhibition of NMDA, kainite and -Aminobutyric Acid (GABA)
receptors, potentiation of AMPA receptors, increasing glutamate present in the
synapse via mechanisms involving glial cells, modulation of internal cell signalling
thus also affecting protein synthesis and plasticity.

2.2.5.2 DA and the GPCR receptor.

Of particular interest in this study is the mechanism of DA mediated plasticity, the
neurotransmitter most directly associated with the reward systems in the brain.
DA, as well as most neuropeptide transmitters, binds only to the G-proteincoupled-receptor (GPCR) metabolic receptor. Second messenger pathways are
established which may trigger gene transcription. This is one reason why DA is an
effective mediator of plasticity. 349 Neuroleptic drugs used in the treatment of
neuropsychiatric disorders block DA receptors creating imbalances in the
dopaminergic system.

Evidence links NMDARs and D1 Dopamine receptors as critical in certain
plasticities.350 Scott and Aperia show that striatal culture exposure to NMDA
promoted recruitment of D1 receptors to the plasma cell membrane via vesicular
transport and also by lateral movement in the membrane. An imbalance of D1 and
D2 receptors leads to glutamatergic imbalance altering behaviour. For example,
hypofunction of the glutamatergic system appears to lead to schizophrenia.
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Metabotropic receptors are also associated with electrical-signalling-induced
plasticities. The study of post synaptic potentials (PSPs) reveals a mechanism for
long term plastic changes in neuronal and synaptic structure. 351 352 Slow PSPs are
the indirect effect of transmitter binding to metabotropic receptors.353
2.2.5.3 Neurotrophic factors.354

The presence or absence of neurotrophic factors (NTFs) or neurotransmitters can
promote neural growth. 355 Following groundbreaking work, from the 1930s, by
Viktor Hamburger and Rita Levi-Montalcini into into programmed cell death (PCD)
or apoptosis, came the identification of NTFs.356 This led in turn to the
neurotrophic hypothesis: “Neurons compete for limiting amounts of target
derived survival promoting (trophic) agents during development.”357

The presence or absence of NTFs can play a decisive role in a number of
mechanisms in the nervous system including the fate of cells, axons, neurite
growth and branching, dendrite development, synapse development and
regulation, stabilization and plasticity, in LTP, and in learning and memory. Poo
and his team discovered that neurotrophins can have a regulatory function in
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synaptic plasticity through the neurotrophins BDNF and NT-3 that have fast and
major effects on the strength of synapses.358 In 2003 Chao noted that:
Neurotrophins and other NTFs also play a role in modulating
long term changes in functional and anatomical plasticity in the
developing and mature brain by altering long term
potentiation, synaptic connectivity, and responses to stress,
inflammation and trauma.359

There are multiple families of NTFs:


CNTF and LIF of the neuropoietic cytokine family possess widespread
neurotrophic acivity.



The GDNF family (GDNF, neurturin, artemin, and persephin) relate to the
TGF gene family impacting on enteric, dopaminergic and motor neurons.



fibroblast growth factors (FGFs) may have role in injury.



And NTFs themselves, which have a role in determination of stem cells,
neuronal migration and survival, axonal growth and regulation of synaptic
competition and plasticity, LTP, response to injury, regeneration and adult
neurogenesis.

NTFs interact with two major classes of receptors:


the trk (tyrosine receptor kinase) family of receptors;360



the receptor p75NTR.

It is believed that interaction between neurotransmitter and growth factorsignalling pathways plays an important role in neural plasticity in response to
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diverse environmental stimuli. 361 BDNF is an important mediator of plastic
change. It is active in synaptogenesis, 362 and appears to play a role in converting
short term memories to long term memories; blocking of BDNF during exercise
prevents exercise induced increase in cAMP response-element binding protein
(CREB) mRNA levels. CREB activation, via cyclic AMP (cAMP) pathways,

363

leads to

expression of cFos and Jun which in turn effect the expression of genes bringing
about LTP and long term memory. Some studies suggest that self-perpetuating
loops are established.364

2.2.5.4 Other chemical signalling systems.
a) Ca2+.
Ca2+ plays a key role in the mechanisms of plasticity.365 Calcium channels are found
in all neurons. Ca2+ is an important second messenger in neurons influencing
neurotransmitter release, synaptic plasticity, neurite outgrowth during
development and gene expression. The variety of ion channels and ionic
mechanisms make possible complex patterns of action potentials within single
neurons as well as complex synaptic computations. 366

361

Oppenheim and Von Bartheld, “Programmed cell death and neurotrophic factors,” 452.
“Secretion of neurotrophins requires activity dependent stimulation patterns that may specifically
strengthen active synapses.”
362
S. Vaynman and F. Gomez-Pinilla, “Licence to run. Exercise impacts functional plasticity in the
intact and injured central nervous system by using neurotrophins,” Neurorehabilitation and Neural
Repair 19, No 4, (2005): 283-95. BNDF affects the action of synapsin I, the protein by which
synaptic vesicles are tethered to the actin cytoskeleton. In the event of high frequency stimulation
a ready availability of vesicles sustains synaptic transmission but when synapsin I is inhibited
neurotransmitter release is reduced and transmission may be breakdown. Studies linking genetic
compromise of the synapsin I gene to learning difficulties suggest that presynaptic molecules such
as synapsin I contribute to the phenomenon of perforated synapses (believed through their
multiple dendritic contacts to enhance transmission), and suggest that synapsin I regulates
neuronal formation including neurite development, axonal elongation and synaptogenesis.
363
AMP is agonist for AMPA channels.
364
Vaynman and Gomez-Pinilla, “Licence to run. Exercise impacts functional plasticity in the intact
and injured central nervous system by using neurotrophins,” 283-95.
365
Schwartz, “Release of neurotransmitters,” 160.
366
2+
Ca processes affect short term synaptic plasticity. We speak of dependent plasticity whereby
the performance of synapses varies according to frequency of stimulation and record of prior
activity. Usually, repetitive high frequency stimulation (known as a tetanus) is initially dominated
by a growth in successive PSP amplitudes. This is a process known as synaptic facilitation (or

131

Ca2+ can be associated with memory and learning. Significantly, excess Ca2+ is toxic
to the neuron, a feature linked to neurodegenerative disorders and to cell death
in hypoxic brain injury. The glutamate receptor, mGluR1, has been linked to long
term synaptic plasticity at many sites in brain especially LTP in hippocampus, and
LTD in cerebellum.

b) ACh.

ACh is the agent of plasticity in the neuromuscular synapse. Initially various motor
neurons may input a single muscle fibre, but stimulation accelerates the pruning
of inputs to one source. AChR elimination precedes loss of the synapse as the first
step in the process. The presynaptic terminal then disassembles and the axon
retracts. It has been shown that when bungarotoxin blocks some of the ACh
receptors the process is triggered. 367 ACh has been described as “a brain
chemical essential for learning”.368 Nicotinic ACh is the major neurotransmitter
acting at neuromuscular junctions in the peripheral nervous system (PNS) and is a
mediator of memory in this pathway. ACh at muscarinic receptors plays a role in
neuromodulation in the CNS, specifically in selection of objects of attention, and is
thus an important contributory factor for learning and thus plasticity. 369 Aspartate
and glutamate, the biogenic amines, and neuropeptides also have significant links
to pathways of plasticity. There are numerous other currents of investigation. 370
synaptic depression where the second stimulus is lessened the closer it is to the first as a result of a
depletion of available vesicles; autoinhibition, or receptor desensitization). By paired pulse
facilitation the second pulse can be twice the amplitude of the first as registered across the
synapse, typically within a second. Augmentation over seconds replaces facilitation. Potentiation is
a third phase of growth in amplitude, evident over minutes (also concept of post-tetanic
2+
potentiation). Residual Ca seems to lead to facilitation, augmentation and potentiation. It seems
this is not simply due to residual Ca in active zones but possibly to an overloading of the Ca
removal processes. For more detail: David A. McCormick, “Membrane potential and action
rd
potential” in Larry Squire, et al. Fundamental Neuroscience, 3 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier,
2008), 125.
367
Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 707.
368
Doidge, “The brain that changes itself,” 43.
369
rd
Lundy Ekman, Laurie. Neuroscience Fundamentals for Rehabilitation. 3 ed. St Louis: Elsevier,
2007. p60
370
Kessels and Malinow, “Synaptic AMPA Receptor Plasticity and Behaviour,” 344. It is suggested
also that release of NE following emotional arousal may promote synaptic plasticity.
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c) Other chemical signalling.

Other chemical signalling is also conducive of plasticity. As we have seen above,
certain chemical signalling, most commonly in the forms of neurotransmitters,
neuromodulators such as enkephalins, and growth factors, affect function at the
synapse and are candidates to mediate plasticity. Endocannabinoid (EC), DA and
calcium signalling mediate plasticity in the form of LTD and LTP as revealed in the
corticostriatal pathway. Wickens explains that DA “plays a crucial role in
determining the magnitude and direction of plasticity.” He notes that EC signalling
and spike timing dependent plasticities (STDP) are also significant in mediating
presynaptic LTD.371

d) Desensitization.

Desensitization, a simple mechanism of plasticity, is common in the GPCR
receptors. There are two known mechanisms for desensitisation. The first is rapid,
from seconds to minutes, and involves receptor phosphorylation. The second may
take either minutes or hours, and involves the physical removal of receptors, a
process that involves endocytosis. As a down-regulating mechanism it may be
either reversible or irreversible.

2.2.5.5 Astrocytes at the synapse.

In a 2008 review, Stevens looked at the emerging understanding of the complex
role of astrocytes in mediating synaptogenesis, synaptic elimination, and
structural plasticity using chemical and physical signals. Advances in imaging
provide graphic insights into the speed of spine and synapse formation, and the
morphology of the astrocytes themselves. Astrocyte envelopment of a synaptic
terminal, a dendritic spine, is shown to take place over some 12 minutes; single

371

Wickens, “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia,”119-128.
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astrocytes may associate with multiple neurons and over 100,000 synapses,
actively signalling and providing stability to each.372 Releasing trophic factors and
“gliotransmitters”, exhibiting rapid reaction to environmental cues, and
expressing many of the same surface molecules, receptors and channels as do
neurons, astrocytes are now seen as critical in developing neural pathways in the
brain.

2.2.5.6 Structural considerations.
a) Dendritic spines. 373

Dendritic development provides important insights into experience based
plasticity. Rapid changes in arbor development are possible in response to
synaptic inputs or growth factors. Slower changes link to gene transcription.
Dendritic growth and branching is influenced by a variety of extra cellular signals.
NTFs (eg NGF, BDNF, NT-3, NT-4) act through Trk receptors in regulating
arborisation, increasing length, branching, and the number of primary
dendrites.374

Synaptic inputs, by increasing calcium influx rapidly, may enhance rates of branch
addition and stabilization. Slower phase calcium signals may signal the nucleus for
gene transcription. Such activity induced genes can then have profound effects on
dendritic arbor structure and function. This dynamic morphological remodelling
allows individual neurons to constantly adapt and respond to external stimuli.
372

Stevens, “Neuron-astrocyte signalling in the development and plasticity of neural circuits,” 278288. It seems that Ephrin/Eph signalling plays a role in regulating the morphology of spines,
possibly in stabilising immature filipodia into mature spines.
373
For the mechanisms and process of dendritic arbor development: Hollis Cline, et al. “Dendritic
rd
development,” in Larry Squire, et al. Fundamental Neuroscience, 3 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier,
2008), 1141.
374
L. Ciani and P. C. Salinas, “Signalling in neural development: WNTS in the vertebrate nervous
system: From patterning to neural connectivity,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 6 (2005): 351-362.
Authors note that Notch signalling activates gene transcription and can restrict length of dendrite,
positively promote branching and increase dendritic complexity. The Slit guidance proteins and the
Robo receptor are also involved in signalling. Ciani and Salinas documented the role of WNT
signalling (secreted proteins with a role in neuronal cytoskeleton. Cadherins and
catenin also
seem to be important mediators of dendritic morphogenesis.
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Bestman et al. (2008) demonstrated that processes of selective stabilization and
elaboration of branches toward appropriate target areas, leading to circuit
refinement, are present in developmental stages and also underlie the
refinements occurring in the mature nervous system.375

Synaptic strength and dendritic development are interrelated. Synaptic and
structural plasticity seems to be a result of signals received by the dendrite. Work
by Luo in 2002 suggests that synaptic strength and dendritic arbor development
share the same molecular regulatory pathways.376 Synaptic inputs and
neurotransmitters actively play a significant role in controlling dendritic arbor
development. NMDA and AMPA receptor function is linked to dendritic branch
specialisation: hence synaptic strengthening and structural stability seem linked.
Engert and Bonhoeffer (1999) showed that LTP inducing stimuli increase both
synaptic strength and spine formation.377 As it does for synaptic strengthening,
sensory input has striking effects on dendritic development.378 In a calcium
dependent process, afferent input through AMPA receptors stabilizes synapses
and increases arborisation. There is evidence that waves of calcium in the
developmental stages of neurons may underpin normal brain development and
plasticity.379 Calcium/calmodulin dependent protein kinases (CaMKs) and MAPKs
appear to be mediators of calcium dependent dendritic growth.380 381
375

J. Bestman, et al. “Dendrite Development,” in Dendrites, ed. Stuart, Spruston, Hauser (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008).
376
L. Luo, “Actin cytoskeleton regulation in neuronal morphogenesis and structural plasticity,”
Annual Review of Cellular Developmental Biology 18 (2002): 601-635. Cited in Cline, et al.
“Dendritic development.”
377
F. Engert and T. Bonhoeffer, “Dendritic spine changes associated with hippocampal long term
synaptic plasticity,” Nature 399 (1999): 66-70. Cited in Cline, et al. “Dendritic development.”
378
W. C. Sin, et al. “Dendrite growth increased by visual activity requires NMDA receptor and Rho
GTPases,” Nature 419 (2002): 475-480. Cited in Cline, et al. “Dendritic development.”
379
S. I. Firth, et al. “Retinal waves: mechanisms and function in visual system development,” Cell
Calcium 37 (2005): 425-432. Cited in Cline, et al. “Dendritic development.”
380
Different types of neurons all have characteristic arborisation. Dendritic trees also vary
according to spatial extent and type of afferent input. The orderly arrangement of dendrites is
governed by three factors: self avoidance (no overlapping with dendrites of own neuron) leading
to maximal dispersion and unambiguous signal processing; tiling (no overlap of dendrites of
neurons of same type); co-existence (overlap of dendritic tress of different types of neurons). In
development, dendrites interact with other neurons and glia and this affects arbor development in
both extent and timescale. It is evident that dendrites have mechanisms whereby they recognise
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b) Dendritic processing facilitates plasticity and cortical control.

The phenomenon of retrograde impulse spread into dendrites, whereby action
potential actively back propagates into dendrites, can have many functions and
effects. 382 Importantly for this study, it creates conditions for synaptic plasticity by
depolarising spines. Permanent changes at the spine in response to stimuli greatly
enhance the potential for plasticity in the neuron. It is the synaptic regions of
dendritic areas of the neuron that exhibit the plastic changes involved in learning
and memory. 383 “Spines add a dimension of local computation to dendritic
function that is especially relevant to mechanisms for learning and memory.” 384

c) The speed of morphological change.

neighbouring dendrites. Many of these signals remain to be identified, although Downs Syndrome
cell adhesion molecule (Dscam), originally identified as an axon guidance receptor, provides
insights into Drosophila dendrite self avoidance. Drosophila studies give insight into mechanisms of
dendrite development, revealing for example, the genetic basis for characteristic arborizations. For
example, Lohmann et al (2005) documented that synaptic inputs, by increasing calcium influx
rapidly may enhance rates of branch addition and stabilization. Dendro-dendritic interactions
regulate the shape and organisation of dendritic fields. Dendrite development involves both
growth and retraction. See C. Lohmann, et al. “Local calcium transients regulate the spontaneous
motility of dendritic filopodia,” Nature Neuroscience 8 (2005): 305-312. Cited in Cline, et al.
“Dendritic development.”
381
Additional source for this section: Cline, et al. “Dendritic development.”
382
For example, dendritic information processing can enhance the signal to noise ratio, enable the
neuron to enter into oscillatory activity, and can provide parallel processing pathways. The net
result is that in the dendritic tree various modes of information processing are evident: logic
operations, motion and coincidence detection, oscillatory activity, lateral inhibition, network
control of sensory processing involving attenuation, filtering, amplification, and segregation, and
motor control. Standing oscillatory activity along neural pathways has been associated with neural
mechanisms offering improved cortical control.
383
Gordon M. Shepherd, “Complex information processing in dendrites,” in Larry Squire, et al.
rd
Fundamental Neuroscience, 3 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008), 267. The apical dendrite of the
CA1 pyramidal neuron: “Most of the input to the oblique dendrites is believed to be involved in the
generation of LTP, a candidate model for learning and memory.”
384
A decrease in stem diameter increases input resistence of spine head and therefore the
necessary EPSP amplitude affecting subsequent response and also degrading connectivity to
parent dendrite. Spines themselves may also have active properties because of either voltage
gated channels or voltage dependent synaptic receptors such as for NMDA. Information processing
based on coincidence detection and response implies simple logic operations are inherent at the
level of the dendrite and spine suggesting the possibility of cognitive contributory role. Shepherd,
“Complex information processing in dendrites,” 267.
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Tiny dendritic spines seem related to cognitive function: studies of mental
retardation and different hormonal exposures show that spine morphology is
greatly altered in cortical neurons. The dimensions of the spine stem determine
quality of the connection to dendritic branch, thereby providing a mechanism for
learning and memory. 385
The time required for a synapse to develop is remarkably short. 386 It is calculated
that the presynaptic terminal forms in 10-20 minutes, and that the complete
process from initial contact to a functional synapse requires only one to two
hours. Once the target is reached, cell adhesion molecules bring the cells together
at the synapse in a rapid process. This data is of significance in studies of plastic
change.

Yasumatsu et al. (2008), with ongoing physical measurement of cultured rat
hippocampal CA1 pyramidal dendritic spines via two photon imaging over the
space of several days, demonstrated that generation and elimination of spines
took place more frequently than had been previously believed, and that this took
place both with and without synaptic activity. The authors suggested that
enlargement of a spine, being a virtually instantaneous process unlike the 20 mins
required for spine generation, can provide a mechanism for short term memory.
They note that large spines with long necks, found more often in the cortex than
the hippocampus, are resistant to activity dependent shrinkage and they suggest
that this supports the current view that the neocortex is responsible for longer
lasting memories.387

385

Shepherd, “Complex information processing in dendrites,” 267.
th
Elaine N. Marieb and Katja Hoehn, Human anatomy and physiology, 8 ed. (San Francisco:
Pearson, 2010).
p424
387
N. Yasumatsu, et al. “Principles of Long-Term Dynamics of Dendritic Spines,” Journal of
Neuroscience 28(50) (2008): 13592-13608. The study showed that spines demonstrate a native
instability but that statistically spine volume correlates to age and life expectancy. Close analysis
showed also that dendritic filipodia are constantly emerging. They find a correlation between the
“savings function” quantified by Ebbinghous in 1885 to model retention of memories, and the
curve of volume decay for small spines.
386
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Further corroboration is found in the studies by Conde and Caceres highlighted
the extremely dynamic internal structures of axons and dendrites and speed with
which change plastic structural change occurs.388 (See 2.2.5.6. e) They showed
that microtubules grow and disassemble rapidly, especially at times of
synaptogenesis and that growth cone motility may be regulated by microtubuleassociated-protein 1B (MAP1B). In a 2003 study of mice genetically engineered to
express differently fluorescing proteins, Walsh and Lichman were able to obtain
images of retraction of the axon from one motor neuron and replacement by
another over the space of four days. The dramatic substitution of one axonal tip
for the other appears to takes place in less than a day.389

d) Plasticity as a consequence of neurogenesis.

Neurons in the human organism are normally established at birth, yet in adult
humans neural stem cells persist in regions near ventricular layers, including
hippocampus, regarded as a key region for memory and learning.390 The signals
triggering development of neural stem cells are not yet clear but environment
may well play a key role. For example, rats raised in enriched environments show
more proliferation and survival of hippocampal stem cells. Conversely, stress
seems to inhibit stem cell proliferation and viability in the hippocampus.
Hippocampal stem cells appear to play a significant role in permitting the plasticity
inherent in memory processes.

e) Microtubule assembly.

Another recent line of research focuses on the contribution of microtubules to
structural plasticity. Conde and Caceres reviewed understanding of the regulation
of microtubule assembly, organisation and dynamics in axons and dendrites, and
388

Cecilia Conde and Alfredo Caceres, “Microtubule assembly, organisation and dynamics in axons
and dendrites (Review),” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 10, (May 2009): 319-332.
389
M. K. Walsh and J. W. Lichtman, “In vivo time-lapse imaging of synaptic takeover associated
with naturally occurring synapse elimination,” Neuron 37, (2003):67.
390
Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 693.
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supported the view that microtubules are “key determinants of neuronal polarity”
391

with a potential contribution to plasticity. Their very dynamic instability, an

ability to grow and disassemble rapidly, lends weight to this view. Assembled as
dense parallel arrays, bundles, microtubules have been shown to play a key
structural role, required for both growth and maintenance, in both dendrites and
axons.392 The regulated assembly of microtubules is evident at synaptogenesis.
The authors suggest that this process and also the regulation of growth cone
motility may be managed by microtubule-associated-protein 1B (MAP1B).393

2.2.6 Use-induced plasticities.

The projects of Michael Merzenich continue to demonstrate the vast possibilities
for plastic change in the brain induced by activated pathways. 394 For example his
work with ferrets has demonstrated the capacity for the auditory cortex A1 to
wire for visual cues in the same way that V1 normally establishes a rectinotopy (a
topographic map of the neuronal inputs from the retina) and what are called
“orientation columns” with pinwheels of groups of specific neurons.
Acknowledging the insights of Aristotle, he says “This is an important extension of
issues addressed by Aristotle, John Locke, Charles Bell, Johannes Muller and
others. Each of these added a progressively more convincing and more complete
argument that the sources of input signals to the brain, and the activations of
specific brain regions by those signals, underlie sensory qualities and functions.”395

The well known London taxi driver study revealed that the human hippocampus is
capable of responding to experience/environment by mechanisms of plasticity.
London taxi drivers are required to master what is commonly known as “The
Knowledge”, a police city navigation test that requires typically two years of study.
391

Conde and Caceres, “Microtubule assembly, organisation and dynamics in axons and dendrites
(Review),” 319.
392
Conde and Caceres, “Microtubule assembly, organisation and dynamics in axons and dendrites
(Review),” 321.
393
Conde and Caceres, “Microtubule assembly, organisation and dynamics in axons and
dendrites,” 329.
394
Merzenich, “Seeing in the sound zone,” 820-821.
395
Merzenich, “Seeing in the sound zone,” 820-821.
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The volumes of the posterior hippocampi of 16 experienced (mean of 14.3 years
driving) London taxi drivers were shown not only to be significantly larger than
those of control subjects but also to be correspondingly larger in proportion to the
amount of years of taxi driving although the increasing volume was only reflected
in the right hippocampus suggesting that the left and right hippocampi have
differing roles in spatial navigation. This study suggests that this posterior
hippocampal region is utilised to store spatial representation of the environment,
and that the hippocampus is capable of plastic change in response to the demands
of experience.396 This is in line with current understanding of the hippocampus;
that it codes for the storage of explicit memory.

Somewhat analogously a 2005 study by Lazar et al. demonstrated that meditation
influences experience dependent cortical plasticity. Cortical thickness in brain
regions for attention and sensory processing were thicker than matched controls
for the twenty participants in the study with extensive meditation experience,
mediation understood as cultivated attention to present moment stimuli without
cognitive elaboration. Thicker cortical regions included the PFC and right anterior
insula, mostly in the right hemisphere, that responsible for sustaining attention.
The study did not reveal the source of the greater thickness. Possibilities included
enhanced dendritic arborisation, glial volume or increased vasculature but all
would support increased neuronal function.397

The 2007 study by Desmurget et al. highlights the swiftness and comprehensive
extension of plastic response after trauma. The authors review the literature on
recovery from stroke and from low grade glioma (LGG), a slow growing tumour.
They note that LGG recovery after surgery is in most cases complete within a year
and that tumour invasions cause the brain to initiate a major reorganisation of the
396

E. A. Maguire, et al. “Navigation-related structural change in the hippocampi of taxi drivers,” in
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 97, 8 (2000): 4398-403. Two different
independent analysis techniques were used, one utilising voxel based morphometry (VBM) in
structural MRI scans of the whole brain, and a second involving an established pixel counting
approach focusing on the hippocampus itself. The non drivers manifested a larger anterior
hippocampal region.
397
S. W. Lazar et al. “Mediation experience is associated with increased cortical thickness,”
NeuroReport 16, (2005) 1893-1897.

140

neural functions, hence most LGG patients present as normal or only slightly
impaired despite substantial tumours.

They also record the phenomenon of acute functional remapping, the cause of
which is unclear. They demonstrate that function control can transfer within 1560 mins of the resection to other adjacent regions, perhaps taking up “latent
intracortical connections”.398 They suggest that a gradual learning process
mediates brain plasticity, with the soon to be eclipsed areas instructing intact
regions via indirect and direct pathways. This theory would account for
remarkable adjustments as slow growing lesions develop and also for subsequent
recovery after resection.399

2.2.7 Exercise induced plasticity.

A form of use-induced plasticity is exercise induced plasticity. It also appears to
follow pathways mediated by chemical signalling. Energy intake and expenditure
serve to co-regulate plasticity in the adult hippocampus, which, along with the
temporal lobe structures, is a brain area essential in learning, memory and mood
regulation. 400 It has been shown in animal studies that “enhancement of somatic
metabolism by wheel running or caloric restriction improves central
neuroplasticity,”401 and that in contrast, a high caloric diet, excessive energy
intake, serves to reduce plastic and learning in the hippocampus by reducing the
presence of BDNF. 402

398

Desmurget, et al. “Contrasting acute and slow growing lesions: a new door to brain plasticity,”
908.
399
Desmurget et al. “Contrasting acute and slow growing lesions: a new door to brain plasticity,”
898-914.
400
Alexis M. Stranahan and Mark P. Mattson, “Impact of Energy Intake and Expenditure on
Neuronal Plasticity,” Neuromolecular Medicine 10, 4 (2008): 209-218.
401
Stranahan and Mattson, “Impact of Energy Intake and Expenditure on Neuronal Plasticity,” 209.
402
Stranahan and Mattson, “Impact of Energy Intake and Expenditure on Neuronal Plasticity,”
209.-218. The words of the Roman lyric poet Horace appear prophetic: “Clogged with yesterday’s
excess, the body drags the mind down with it.”
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BDNF, including exercise induced transcription of BDNF, is seen as a facilitator of
neuronal excitability and function at the synapse. Vaynman and Gomez-Pinilla
have reviewed the literature on exercise induced up-regulation of BDNF
promoting repair and neurotrophic support. Exercise studies draw attention to the
increase in levels of molecules such as the insulin-like growth factor (IGF),
fibroblast growth factor 2 (FGF-2) and BDNF in regions of the brain, most
particularly the hippocampus. “Exercise can activate specific neural circuits to
modify the way that information is transmitted across cells at the synapse….”403
The authors demonstrate that exercise raises neurotrophic factor levels in regions
of the adult brain improving learning and memory.404

Animal studies have shown repeatedly that exercise improves cognitive function
especially in tasks dependent on the hippocampus. Studies also show that BDNF is
also exercise induced in the cerebral cortex, the cerebellum and the spinal cord.
BDNF is known to mediate synaptic plasticity, and facilitate learning and memory
mechanisms.405

2.2.8 Plasticity induced by transcranial stimulation.

There is considerable current focus on the various techniques of transcranial
stimulation and the resultant plasticities that are evident. A leader in these fields
is Alvaro Pascual Leone.

403

Vaynman and Gomez-Pinilla, “Licence to run. Exercise impacts functional plasticity in the intact
and injured central nervous system by using neurotrophins,” 283.
404
Vaynman and Gomez-Pinilla, “Licence to run. Exercise impacts functional plasticity in the intact
and injured central nervous system by using neurotrophins,” 283. Hippocampal culture studies
show that depolarising activity leads to the overexpression of mRNAs for the pro-BDNF and other
precursor protein. BDNF, however, is the growth factor that shows greatest induction in the
hippocampus. Levels of BDNF present in the hippocampus correlate directly to learning efficiency
and memory with BDNF blocked rats showing no exercise induced improvement in performance
on the Morris water maze task and rats with laboratory reduced BDNF levels in the hippocampus
demonstrating impaired spatial learning and memory.
405
Vaynman and Gomez-Pinilla, “Licence to run. Exercise impacts functional plasticity in the intact
and injured central nervous system by using neurotrophins,” 283.
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A recent study co-authored by Pascual Leone reviews the current knowledge of
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) making the observation that studies
demonstrate that tDCS is responsible for long term synaptic change brought about
by protein synthesis, and that these changes are reversible and feature similarities
to LTP and LTD. The authors suggest that tDCS is distinct from other transcranial
electrical stimulation and transcranial magnetic stimulation in that it will not
produce the rapid depolarisation and hence action potentials in neurons. It is
likened to a neuromodulatory intervention.406

A further study focuses on non invasive repetitive transcranial magnetic
stimulation (rTMS) and the manner in which it has been applied to induct changes
in neuronal response and short term primary motor cortex (M1) plasticity at the
synapse. rTMS creates a sustained excitation of neurons after the original burst of
TMS has stopped. That LTP and LTD longer term effects are present is not clear.
On the other hand paired associative stimulation (PAS) protocols are shown to
induce LTP and LTD like effects in the human M1. PAS induced plasticity is
enhanced if attention is paid to the area under stimulation, and the paper
suggests that this is possibly through attention-dependent activation of the
ascending cholinergic pathways. It is suggested that PAS induced plasticity shares
common circuitry with motor learning. 407

Summaries of the numerous systems and mechanisms of plasticity operating at
the cellular and molecular level are offered in Table 2.3 and Table 2.15. 408

2.3. Neural bases for learning and memory.

406

M. A. Nitsche, et al. “Transcranial direct current stimulation: State of the art 2008,” Brain
Stimulation 1, 3 (2008): 206-23.
407
U. Ziemann, et al., “Consensus: Motor cortex plasticity protocols,” Brain Stimulation 1, 3 (2008):
164-182.
408
Arguably plasticity involves both systems and mechanisms. Systems involve coordination of
various brain areas (eg VTA release of DA to striatum effecting cortical regulation) and cellular
mechanisms (eg second messenger plasticities).

143

Learning and memory are the key processes by which environment and
experience alter behaviour. Learning is the process of acquiring knowledge about
environment or experience. Memory is the process of storage and retrieval of that
knowledge leading into some form of response: subconscious, conscious but
impulsive, or conscious and deliberate.

While some authors distinguish between mechanisms of learning and memory, at
other times the words are used synonymously. They form two overlapping
categories: habituation, sensitisation and conditioning leading to increase or
decrease in the strength and efficacy of synapses; and activity-dependent
regulation of gene expression leading to physical changes at the synapse bringing
about pre and post synaptic alterations in membrane potential (the mechanisms
accounting for the long term synaptic plasticity of the various forms of LTP and
LTD).

It is of specific interest to this study that implicit and explicit memory makes
possible the learning of perceived behaviours. Alvarez et al. write, “The formation
of memories and the acquisition of new behaviours are thought to occur through
the activity-dependent regulation of synaptic connections in the brain.”409

Both the ease of practice that is associated with virtue, and the motivational
rewards inherent in the practice of virtue, argue for the implication of
mechanisms of non-declarative memory. (See also 2.3.6.1.b.) Furthermore it is
reasonable to propose that during the process of acquisition of virtue when effort
is more conscious, that declarative memory plays a more significant role. (See
below 2.3.5 Skill related learning for brief discussion of the progression from
declarative to non-declarative memory during skill acquisition, a process having
common features with virtue acquisition to the extent that both involve
automatisation of behaviours.)

409

Alvarez, et al. “Distinct Structural and Ionotropic Roles of NMDA Receptors in Controlling Spine
and Synapse Stability,” 7365-7376.
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In this section, I focus also on imitation, as one of the core processes for learning
from the environment and from the example of others. The neural bases for this
are now increasingly well described. This provides some explanation for the ease
of acquisition of virtuous behaviours by children, and also for the human capacity
for empathy.

Tables 2.4 Systems for learning, 2.5 Memory systems, and 2.6 Systems for
imitation and empathy capture the complexity of learning, memory and imitation
and summarise a prima facie association with the development and exercise of
virtue. Higher brain function is supported by complex systemic interaction
distributed across multiple brain areas.

2.3.1 Learning and memory.

a) Learning.

Learning may be subclassified as associative and nonassociative learning.

Associative learning is a broad category of learning that involves formation of
associations. It subdivides into:
i.

classical (Pavlovian) conditioning, also known as reward conditioning, or
appetitive classical conditioning. It was first described by Ivan Pavlov and it
involves a conditioned stimulus (eg a bell) associated with an
unconditioned stimulus (eg food) provoking a response (eg salivation). The
response will continue after a time of conditioning by the conditioned
stimulus even if no longer accompanied by the unconditioned stimulus. In
a similar way, a shock to the foot eliciting limb withdrawal will produce
aversive conditioning.

ii.

The second type of associative learning is known as instrumental, or
operant, conditioning by which an organism associates consequences with
its own behaviour, and over time thereby alters the probability that a
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certain behaviour will be expressed. (See 2.6.4 Reinforcement in basal
ganglia learning.)

Nonassociative learning comes in three broad forms:
i.

habituation whereby when a stimulus is delivered repeatedly, there is a
reduction in response to it;

ii.

dishabituation which is the restoration or recovery of a response that had
been habituated owing to the presentation of another, typically strong,
stimulus;

iii.

finally there is sensitization, the enhancement of a response evoked by a
strong stimulus.

b) Memory.410

The various forms of memory and the brain areas implicated in each may be
classified in the following way:
i.

Working memory resides in the neocortex. One theory is that immediate
memory, the memory that holds information in the brain for a few
seconds, for example allowing us to maintain the flow when we read, is
based on reverberating circuits.411

ii.

Long term memory may be either declarative or nondeclarative.


Declarative memory (explicit memory). The median temporal lobe and
the medial diencephalon are involved in both forms of declarative
memory. Explicit memory may be either
o Episodic (narrative event memory)
o Semantic (factual)



There are three forms of non declarative memory (implicit
memory):412

410

Unless otherwise noted the source for this section is: Byrne, “Learning and memory: basic
mechanisms”.
411
th
Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology, 5 ed., 473.
412
th
Marieb and Hoehn, Human anatomy and physiology, 8 ed., 458-459.
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o procedural: skills and habits dependent upon the BG in
conjunction with cerebellum and neocortex (riding a bike,
playing an instrument)
o emotional memory: emotional associations dependent
upon the amygdala (the association of rewards or
punishment with particular cues).
o motor memory: conditioned reflexes drawing upon the
cerebellum. 413
2.3.2 The five major memory regions of the brain.414

The major memory regions of the brain are the hippocampus, amygdala, striatum,
cerebellum, and cerebral cortex. Each contributes in a unique way to memory;
each has its own memory system, the capacity to benefit from experience that is
presented to it in its specific role in the brain. We know too that each of these
regions is the foundation for and is integrated with a much larger network of
diverse brain areas with which it cooperates in the processes of memory.

Behaviour is typically the product of the contributions of multiple memory
systems. For example, the declarative memory of sporting coach’s instructions,
modulated in the hippocampus, is complemented by repetition learning of motor
skills founded in the striatum. In turn, other memory systems may operate in
parallel: the amygdala could modulate hippocampal and striatal memory systems
when sporting emotional arousal becomes involved. Systems can influence
plasticity in other areas. For example, it is thought that amygdalar projections
promote synaptic plasticity in linked areas such as the hippocampus,
parahippocampal region, and certain cortical areas. There are examples too of
collaboration between cerebellar and hippocampal systems.
413

th

John Nolte, The human brain. An introduction to its functional anatomy, 6 ed. (Philadelphia:
Mosby, 2009), 617.
414
For distinct forms of memory systems and the story of their discovery, the principal source of
material that follows: Joseph R. Manns, and Howard Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain
rd
systems,” in Larry Squire, et al. Fundamental Neuroscience, 3 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008),
488.
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a) The hippocampus supports declarative memory, the conscious recollection
of events and facts. It is believed that the hippocampus initially acts as a
retrieval system for information in widespread areas of neocortex. Scoville
and Milner in 1957 documented the case of H.M., suffering seizures from
the age of 10, and treated in 1953 with major removal of tissue from
medial temporal lobe, leading to profound memory impairment with
practically no capacity for new learning. His case demonstrated how the
hippocampus codes for long term explicit memory.415 416 417 A current
hypothesis is that the hippocampus codes explicit memory and that if, for
some reason, the action of the hippocampus is impaired or blocked, there
will be no coherent recall of the episode.418

b) The amygdala is associated with emotional memory. While the amygdala
as a whole has a general role in memory modulation for emotion laden
content, the basolateral amygdala complex (BLA) and central nucleus of
the amygdala (CEA) have significantly different roles. 419 The BLA includes
the lateral, basolateral, and basomedial nuclei, and draws input from
widespread cortical areas, and from the sensory nuclei of the thalamus.
There are reciprocal connections to hippocampal and striatal memory
systems. The amygdala seems able to mediate the creation and
consolidation of memories that are made more vivid, accurate and longer
lasting by emotional overlay. Many studies show that BLA mediates a
system for coding memory strength by importance measured from a
subjective position. 420 We remember important events more than trivial

415

Cited in Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 3.
For the role of LTP in hippocampus see: H. Eichenbaum et al. “The medial temporal lobe and
recognition memory,” Annual Review of Neuroscience 30 (2007): 123-152.
417
Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 693.
418
Siegel, Neurobiology of We.
419
J E. LeDoux, “Emotion circuits in the brain,” Annual Review of Neuroscience 23 (2000): 155-184.
420
J. L. McGaugh, “The amygdala modulates the consolidation of memories of emotionally
arousing experiences,” Annual Review of Neuroscience 27, (2004): 1-28. Such events cause release
of epinephrine (Epi) and glucocorticoids by adrenal glands leading onto release of norepinephine in
amygdala, increasing its activity and thereby consolidating memory in other parts of the brain
416
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events. This region is seen as important in tagging memories with
emotional “markers”, but not in maintenance or call up of memories,
which perhaps is more the work of the hippocampus.
Memory of facts is improved when facts are learned in connection with
an emotion, unless intense arousal is involved.421 422

c) The striatum, a major constituent of BG, plays a role in reward and
motivation, motor control. It organises somatosensory and motor
representations in a topographic manner, and connects also to other
regions of the BG and also thalamus (projecting back to premotor and
motor cortex and prefrontal association cortex). It draws cortical inputs
from many areas of cerebral cortex. There are few projections to brain
stem motor nuclei and none to the spinal motor apparatus “which
suggests the system operates mainly to modify cortical motor
representations rather than control behaviour through direct motor
inputs”.423 The dorsal striatum lays down memory for motor habits, actions
and outcomes, playing a key role in much stimulus-response (S-R) habit
learning. 424 425

d) The cerebellum receives direct input from spinal cord and brain stem and
indirect sensory and motor input from various areas in cerebral cortex via
(direct by connections to striatum, hippocampus or cortex; and indirect by connections with
nucleus basalis which innervates much of cortex).
421
A Bechara, et al., Emotion, Decision Making and the Orbitofrontal Cortex. Cerebral Cortex
March 2000: 10: 295-307. See L. Cahill et al.“The amygdala and emotional memory,” Nature 377,
(1995): 295-296. The authors demonstrated that not only is decision making and working memory
distinct in the PFC but that the emotional mechanism by which emotion can bias decisions is
different from the mechanism whereby emotion enhances memory.
422
Furthermore, the cognitive contribution of sleep has been demonstrated. Memories are
consolidated by both Hebbian and non-Hebbian synaptic strengthening. Sidarta Ribeiro, “Sleep and
plasticity,” Pflugers Archiv 463, 1 (2012): 111–120.
423
Manns and Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain systems,” 1165.
424
M. G. Packard and J. L. McGaugh, “Inactivation of hippocampus or caudate nucleus with
lidocaine differentially affects expression of place and response learning,” in Neurobiology of
Learning and Memory 65, (1996): 65-72.
425
Further studies reviewed and providing insight into the mechanisms of memory: A. Pasupathy
and E. K. Miller, “Different time courses of learning related activity in the prefrontal cortex and
striatum,” Nature 433, (2005): 873-876. B. J. Knowlton, et al. “A neostriatal habit learning system in
humans” in Science 273 (1996): 1399-1401.
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pontine nuclei in brain stem. It projects to spinal cord, brain stem,
hypothalamus, and thalamus, the thalamic targets in turn projecting onto
cortical motor and non motor areas especially in the frontal lobe.
Cerebellar memory is involved not only in motor reflex learning, but also in
mental processing involving precise timing.

e) The cerebral cortex contains motor and sensory areas, association areas,
integrative centres such as the PFC with its focus on motor planning,
higher order cognition, and working memory, the general interpretive area
and the speech centre. The cortex plays a role in many forms of memory.
The networks of the major learning systems include cerebral cortex,
although certain forms of learning can bypass cerebral cortex, for example,
eyeblink conditioning mediated by the cerebellum whereby eye blink is
associated with another conditioning stimulus. An engram or memory
trace is the location or physical representation of memory in the brain:
“The sum total of changes in the brain that first encoded an experience
and that then constitute a record of that experience”.426 Various brain
regions are involved in the representation of even a single event.427
2.3.3 Mechanisms of memory. 428

In both implicit and explicit memory, memory follows three stages:


Learning or acquisition



Short term memory (with associated rapid decay of the neural
response)

426

Larry Squire and Eric R. Kandel, Memory: From Mind to Molecules (NY: HPHLP, 1999), 73.
Lashley’s pioneering studies in the 1920s failed in their attempt to prove that all areas of the
cortex contribute to memory, but he did add to the understanding that memories are distributed.
In 1949, Hebb suggested that engram could be distributed in the brain, and that the neurons
involved in sensation could be also be implicated in representation. Hebb suggested that engrams
based on one modality would be represented in that modality. Animal studies verify this. See also
Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 733 and 751.
427
Squire and Kandel, Memory: From Mind to Molecules, 73.
428
Source in this section unless otherwise cited: Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 738-745.
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And finally intermediate term memory (ITM) converting to long term
memory (LTM) after persistent repetition. In contrast to earlier phases,
this final phase features protein synthesis. 429

These stages are underpinned by distinct neural regions and processes.
In summary, vertebrate and invertebrate studies reveal the following principles. 430
It is commonly acknowledged that forms of activity induced plasticity are at the
core of memory. Memory operates through cellular and molecular mechanisms
that alter membrane excitability and synaptic strength ultimately at the level of
the individual neuron, and in complex interconnected circuits of large numbers of
neurons. There are changes in existing neural circuits for both short and long term
forms of learning and memory, mediated possibly by multiple cellular mechanisms
within individual neurons. Cellular changes are mediated to some extent by
second-messenger systems. Learning and memory often correlate to changes in
membrane channels. New protein synthesis is involved in long term memory but
not in short term memory. LTP and LTD are forebrain mechanisms for or
associated with memory storage and are regarded as evidence for plasticity.431

2.3.3.1 Declarative memory storage.

The current understanding is that the hippocampus acts as a retrieval system for
information in widespread areas of neocortex. It is widely held that the temporal
neocortex is the site of long term memory storage. The hippocampus has links to
the medial temporal lobe. Temporal lobe association areas (the source of highly
processed sensory information) project to the parahippocampal and rhinal cortex,
then to the hippocampus, and then, via the fornix, to the thalamus and
hypothalamus. These medial temporal structures are regarded as critical for
declarative memory consolidation. There is the possibility that memories are
temporarily stored locally here before transfer to the neocortex.
429

Tully, Tim et al. “Targetting the CREB pathway for memory enhancers.” In Nature Reviews Drug
Discovery. (2 April 2003): 267-277.
430
Byrne, “Learning and memory: basic mechanisms,” 1132.
431
Byrne, “Learning and memory: basic mechanisms,” 1132.
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There is evidence that specific memories can be widely distributed in the brain.
For example, memories formerly evoked by a stimulation of a later removed
section of the temporal cortex have been shown to be evoked, after excision, by
electrical stimulation of a third location. A further example: human fMRI studies
show that extrastriate cortical area is implicated in attentive memory of material
for which the subject has a fascination, eg cars for car buffs.432

Memory in the cortex supports perceptual learning and repetition priming and is
regarded as “highly plastic in that its representations can be altered after
experience”433 as a result of alterations in synaptic connectivity and membrane
excitability. Lynch writes, “There is no doubt that consolidation of memory
requires some form of synaptic remodelling.”434 Butz et al. accord with this view,
and referring most of all to long term memory, states that this remodelling is
structural and that the strengthening of existing synapses occurs in the Hebbian
sense during memory formation.435

2.3.3.2 Non-declarative, or procedural memory storage.

The striatum is the seat of habit learning and procedural memory, forms of nondeclarative memory. That H.M. could learn new habits despite loss of declarative
memory demonstrates that the bases for these memories are distinct. Monkeys
with striatal lesions exhibit impaired procedural memory. Striatal disease in
432

Macaque monkey studies show that high order visual areas such as the inferotemporal cortex
(IT) provide storage for certain declarative memory. Well documented cases of cerebral
impairment demonstrate that the diencephalon and medial temporal lobe, and thalamus are
interconnected serving memory consolidation. Much of our knowledge of the role of hippocampus
in memory from the study of rats. It is shown to be important in spatial memory by studies
involving the Morris water maze. O’Keefe proposed that the hippocampus creates a topographic
map of the environment. Others suggest hippocampus is associated with working memory. Cohen
et al developed a model of the role of the hippocampus in “relational memory”, linking spatial
representation to things happening at the time of the experience. Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring
the Brain, 738-745.
433
Manns and Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain systems,” 1174.
434
M. A. Lynch, “Long term potentiation and memory,” Physiological Review 84, (2004): 117. The
word “consolidation” suggests the author is referring to long term memory.
435
Butz, et al., “Activity dependent structural plasticity,” 295.
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humans, for example Huntington disease, exhibits analogous manifestations.
Parkinsonian patients, with degeneration of SN, also exhibit impaired procedural
memory. 436

2.3.3.3 Working memory, a form of short term memory, storage.

Working memory is different from both declarative and procedural memory. It is
used for holding information required for an immediate need (eg shorter term
recollection of a phone number). Working memory is now shown to be linked to
planning and problem solving, as demonstrated by the Wisconsin card test. 437

Many areas of the brain, besides the hippocampus, appear implicated in working
memory. The PFC is closely interconnected to medial temporal and to
hippocampus and seems implicated in working memory. Monkey performance on
delayed response tasks (lifting lid on container previously demonstrated to
contain food) in 1930s first demonstrated PFC implication in working memory.
Nevertheless, working memory also seems linked to cortical areas outside PFC.
The lateral intraparietal cortex (area LIP) for example seems implicated in guiding
eye movements requiring some vision specific working memory.

It is believed that working memory involves some form of synaptic facilitation,
perhaps accompanied by tetanic stimulation, rapid repetition of signals at the
synapse resulting in an accumulation of Ca2+ at the synaptic knob. This increases
the likelihood of further neurotransmitter release and action potential in the
neuron across the synapse. Forms of working memory over longer timeframes
may involve post-tetanic stimulation, whereby release of neurotransmitter
remains facilitated when there has been a recent history of neuronal stimulation.
The resulting Ca2+ build up lowers the thresholds for subsequent action
potentials.438

436

Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 753.
Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 755.
438
th
Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology, 5 ed., 473.
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2.3.4 LTP as an underpinning mechanism for memory. 439

LTP leads to persistent, long lasting changes in the strength of synaptic
connections, as measured by the amplitude of the EPSP in immediate downstream
neuron. We have seen above that LTP was first identified in 1973 by Bliss and
Lomo in the hippocampus of the rabbit. LTP is a form of plasticity linked to
information storage in several regions of brain; Hebbian LTP with its quality of
associativity seems clearly linked to retrieval of information. There is a large and
increasing body of evidence that LTP is indeed the substrate for some forms of
learning.

LTP is found in the hippocampus, cerebellum, neocortical regions, and also in
subcortical centres such as the amygdala. It is present in at least 17 pathways in
the brain, not from the hippocampus to other brain areas, but also, not involving
the hippocampus, in cortico-cortical pathways and from various areas of the
cortex, the thalamus, the amygdala, the subiculum, the dentate gyrus, and the
striatum. It seems reasonable to expect that plasticity in the hippocampus
facilitating encoding for explicit memory, in the striatum for reward and
procedural activities, in amygdala coding for emotional experiences, and in the
cortex associated with long term memory and cognitive regulation of behaviour
play a significant role at the developmental stage of virtue

LTP is present in a variety of neural synapses and even in the same synapse under
different conditions it may utilise different pathways. Often but not always, 440 LTP
is linked with Donald Hebb’s classic dictum of plasticity, that the synaptic strength
of existing synapses joining cells will increase as those cells are active.

439

Source in this section unless otherwise cited: Lynch, “Long term potentiation and memory,” 87136.
440
An example of non Hebbian LTP: in the synapse at the mossy fibre CA3 junction in the
hippocampus, and at the parallel fibre-Purkinje synapse in the cerebellum.
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All forms of LTP seem suited to rapid learning but the localised nature of synaptic
changes makes LTP hard to detect in situ. It has been possible to show that
synaptic enhancement is linked to memory in studies of amygdala circuits that
mediate fear. Saturation or blocking the mechanisms of LTP has demonstrated
that learning itself has been blocked. Whitlock has shown that learning in rats
does induce hippocampal LTP.441 Pastalkova has also shown that inhibition of
PKMz in hippocampus distrupts LTP maintenance and eliminates spatial
learning.442 Learning may involve weakening of synaptic strength also.

As the explanation for memory consolidation the case for LTP has not been
proven to the satisfaction of all. 443 While some studies show that saturation of
LTP impairs spatial learning, others have not been so conclusive.444 In a recent
study of conscious cats, the CA1 neurons exhibited persistent reversal of
previously induced LTP when exploring a novel and non-stressful environment. In
other words, the links between LTP and memory were not completely clear. It is
suggested that close linkages may be present between LTP and spatial learning in
some but not all synaptic connections where one or the other is present. 445 In
general there is an apparent inconsistency in at least some of the data from
various research centres, raising the question, Lynch suggests, as to whether
experimentation requiring genetic manipulation is entirely reproducible.446 447
441

J. R. Whitlock, et al. “Learning induced long-term potentiation in the hippocampus,” Science
313(2006): 1093-1097.
442
E. Pastalkova et al. “Storage of spatial information by the maintenance mechanism of LTP,”
Science. 313 (2006): 1141-1144.
443
Since the mid 1990s there has been great progress over the previous decade in understanding
the mechanisms of memory and learning, and in particular of the afferent pathways of the
hippocampus. Advances in research instruments (development of techniques for knockout and
overexpression of particular genes, and of probes for analysis of cell signalling and gene
transcription) have contributed to this progress.
444
Lynch, “Long term potentiation and memory,” 87-136.
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Lynch, “Long term potentiation and memory,” 120.
446
Lynch, “Long term potentiation and memory,” 117.
447
There appear to be multiple mechanisms and multiple second messenger pathways operating
for the induction, expression, and maintenance of LTP. The mechanisms have highly conserved
across species. There is agreement that LTP induction depends on increase in cellular
2+
concentration of ions in pre and/or post synaptic cells, but the exact role of Ca varies. Numerous
2+
pathways seem to modulate or control Ca . For example, calcium influx occurs through ionotropic
GluRs, expecially the N-methyl-D-aspartarte receptor (NMDAR) as well as through voltage gated
2+
2+
calcium channels (VGCCs). The Ca phosphatases pathway leads to LTD but the Ca protein
kinases pathway leads to LTP. Since the 1980s much work has been invested in identifying the
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Nevertheless there is now much evidence that forms of memory stimulate
synaptic activity linked to LTP. It has been shown too that when LTP is inhibited,
some forms of memory are inhibited by the same agents. However, the multiple
pathways in the brain, and the multiple forms of memory, suggest that to consider
LTP as the exclusive pathway for memory is simplistic.448 Butz et al. find
considerable evidence that synaptogenesis is found in the close vicinity of
synapses characterised by LTP but that “due to methodological limitations
experimental data directly indicating that structural plasticity is involved in
learning are rare”. 449

LTP and LTD are closely associated mechanisms of plasticity. Butz et al. affirm that
LTP promotes spine maturation and stabilisation while LTD leads to the weakening
of spines and synapses. The evidence suggests that learning and memory are a
result of the complementary actions of functional plasticities and of the structural
changes that hardwire them. Furthermore, while there is constant synaptic
rewiring in limbic areas, this is less evident in sensory and motor areas although,
significantly for this study, there is evidence also of synaptogenesis in motor skill
learning.450 Recent research is focusing on the detailed workings of LTP and LTD
through studies of gene transcription associated with enhanced spatial memory
.451 Other research is exploring the relationship of LTP and LTD to homeostasis,
signalling cascades that lead to expression of LTP and consolidation of memory. Both are seen as
dependent on calcium, CaMKII, and protein synthesis. Recently the recycling of AMPA receptors
has become an area of study. Further studies reviewed and providing insight into the mechanisms
of memory and in particular for the role of LTP and LTD: L. Stenho-Bittelet al. “Calcium release
from the nucleus by InsP3 receptor channels,” Neuron 14, (1995): 163-167; M. Fisher et al. “Rapid
actin-based plasticity in dendritic spines” Neuron 20, (1998): 847-854; M. Ito, “Cerebellar long
term depression: Characterisation, signal transduction, and functional roles,” in Physiology Review
81.3 (2001): 1143-1195. R. Malenka and M. F. Bear, “LTP and LTD: an embarrassment of riches,”
Neuron 44, (2004): 5-12.
448
Lynch, “Long term potentiation and memory,” 119.
449
Butz, et al., “Activity dependent structural plasticity,” 295.
450
Butz, et al., “Activity dependent structural plasticity,” 293.
451
M. Costa-Mattioli, “Switching memories on and off,” Science 322, 5903 (2008): 874-875. The
author demonstrates the key role that a reduction of the translation initiation factor elF2x plays in
laying down long term memories and in converting short term memories to long term memories.
elF2x has been shown to suppress protein synthesis yet stimulate synthesis of CREB2. He
+/S51A
demonstrates that mice in which the activity of elF2x had been reduced genetically (elF2x
mice) show conversion of short term memory to long term memory. The studies showed that
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and to homosynaptic/heterosynaptic change, in relation to the mechanisms of
learning. Homosynaptic changes are the synaptic changes of transmission as a
result of the specific induction related to learning, and heterosynaptic changes are
changes at other synapses (on the same neuron) non involved in the original
induction related to learning. 452

2.3.4.1 Further factors for the synaptic facilitation involved in memory.

Other current work is detailing the mechanisms underlying the cortical
representations of the environment in the in the sensory cortex. Fromke,
Merzenich and Schreiner demonstrate by means of in vivo whole cell recording
that plastic changes to the receptive field of the auditory cortex are effected by
means of electrical stimulation of the nucleus basalis in conjunction with auditory
stimulation of the adult rat primary auditory cortex. They suggest this
neuromodulation of the auditory cortex by the cholinergic nucleus basalis may be
a key mechanism for receptive field plasticity, and in particular for heightened
attention to novel or meaningful stimuli.453

The work of Yasumatsu et al. (2008) indicates structural plasticity among dendritic
spines as an additional mechanism for learning. 454 Spinogenesis and LTP are
closely linked; LTP correlates to shrinkage of hippocampal spines.

It has been shown by Leuner et al. (2006) that hippocampal dentate gyrus neurons
undergo ongoing replacement; this has been suggested as a further mechanism
+/S51A

elF2x
mice in water mazes showed superior ability, indicating enhanced spatial memory, and
also in memory of auditory and visual stimuli on behavioural tests involving prediction of foot
+/S51A
shocks and nausea. Hippocampal slices from elF2x
mice showed long lasting LTP, in contrast
with the normally expected short lasting changes (not gene based, protein mediated).
452
Chistiakova and Volgushev, “Heterosynaptic plasticity in the neocortex (Review).” Chistiakova
and Volgushev find that nonassociative, or heterosynaptic, plasticity of specific synapses may
result in a neuron as a result of back propagation, where other synapses in the same neuron have
experienced Hebbian-type associative, or homosynaptic plasticity by well understood processes of
2+
Ca influx (fast large amplitude influx leads to LTP; slower low amplitude to LTD) in response to
intracellular tetanization.
453
Robert C. Froemke, Michael M. Merzenich, and Christoph E. Schreiner, “A synaptic memory
trace for cortical receptive field plasticity,” Nature 450 (2007): 425-429.
454
Yasumatsu, et al., “Principles of Long-Term Dynamics of Dendritic Spines,” 13592-13608.
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for learning and memory. The rich expression of BDNF in the hippocampus, a
factor in neurogenesis, has already been noted above. The significance, for virtue
development, of mechanisms of plasticity in the hippocampus has been noted
above. Fascinatingly also, it has been noted that newly integrated neurons pass
through a process of changing neurotransmitter excitation, from GABA to
glutamatergic, with evidence that plasticity is most pronounced in the first four
months after mitosis.455

2.3.4.2. The neuroscience of memory enhancement.

Mechanisms of memory enhancement have also been documented. Tully et al.
(2003) review the literature on what they call a “chemistry of brain plasticity”
identifying gene targets for memory enhancement. Most drugs of this nature
involve both the cholinergic system and neurohumoral signalling, a slower form of
signalling that takes place between the CNS and peripheral tissue influencing
motivation and emotion. This form of signalling contrasts with the fast action of
neurotransmitters. 456

2.3.5 Skill related learning.

Skills, to the extent they are intentionally acquired sequences of actions, share
common ground with voluntarily acquired habits. Skill studies demonstrate
consistently that automaticity brings efficiency. This efficiency is one of the major
benefits offered by the development of good habits. For example, Romero et al.
(2008), in a study typical of this field, investigated changes in EEG in 10 subjects
aged 19-22 learning a pseudo-arithmetic task.457 Subjects responded faster with

455

Stranahan and Mattson, “Impact of Energy Intake and Expenditure on Neuronal Plasticity,”
209.-218.
456
T. Tully et al., “Targetting the CREB pathway for memory enhancers,” Nature Reviews Drug
Discoveries 2, 4 (2003): 267-77.267-277.
457
EEGs offer greater temporal specificity, at some loss, with respect to fMRI, of spatial resolution.
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practice. The data suggest that there was a shift in method of processing from
mechanical counting towards reliance on memory.458

In addition to conclusions about the efficiency of habit formation, I will discuss the
possibilities for retention of voluntary deliberation within a paradigm of habit
development. In 2.4 I will discuss the neural bases of habits as forms of learning.
And I will be discussing the development of automaticity through the modification
of action-outcome (A-O) learning to S-R learning (2.4.7.2).

2.3.6 Neural systems of imitation and learning.

A further area of significant current research involves the neural bases of imitation
and empathy. These insights offer an understanding of the remarkable facility
whereby infants effortlessly imitate parents possibly in behaviours and attitudes
as well as in simple facial expressions, and bear out the sad truth of Jefferson’s
observation: “Man is an imitative animal.”459

Meltzoff and Moore (1977) found that within an hour of birth imitation of facial
expression is apparent.460 It is suggested that these processes of imitation provide
a neural account for the ease by which external example, for example by parents,
is adopted during sensitive periods. Hence it is a field of research clearly of
interest in a study that seeks the neural bases for training in virtue.
458

Stephen G. Romero, et al. “Electrophysiological markers of skill-related neuroplasticity,”
Biological Psychology 78 (2008): 221-230. The authors also discussed theories of stages of learning
with respect to skill acquisition within the paradigm of the Adapted Control of Thought Theory, a
theory of skill acquisition which moves from facts that must be rehearsed, the declarative stage,
the “what” of knowledge, to a “how to”, the procedural stage, in which strategies are refined and
focused for the specific task. They contrasted this model with Logan’s Instance Theory of
Automatisation and Rickard’s Component Power-Law Theory of Automatisation that hold there to
be a strategic switch between methods of processing, from a multi-step algorithm, to streamlined
processes relying on memory recall.
459
Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the Stateof Virginia, Ch 18.
http://xroads.virginia.edu/~hyper/jefferson/ch18.html; accessed 17.12.12. The context: “The
whole commerce between master and slave is a perpetual exercise of the most boisterous
passions, the most unremitting despotism on the one part, and degrading submissions on the
other. Our children see this, and learn to imitate it; for man is an imitative animal.”
460
A. Meltzoff and M. Moore, “Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates,”
Science 198 (1977): 75-78.
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The discovery of mirror neurons led to an understanding of the underlying
mechanisms. Pellegrino et al. (1992), Gallese et al. (1996), and Rizzolatti et al.
(1996) documented mirror neurons in the premotor cortex of macaque monkeys.
Mirror neurons which are associated with particular actions trigger when those
actions are observed in others and also when the actions are performed by the
subject. I will look here at several representative studies in this burgeoning field.

Iacoboni et al. (1999) tested by means of fMRI imaging whether these mirror
neurons could be found in human subjects. The authors tested the theory that
imitation occurs through a mechanism, “the direct matching hypothesis”,
whereby an observed action is directly mapped to the motor cortex in a study in
which human subjects were asked to observe finger movements. In data matching
results already obtained in monkey studies, they found that the imitation
mechanism was present in the left frontal operculum area (Broca’s area) and the
right anterior parietal cortex. The result was also compatible with the fact that
Broca’s area is the motor area for speech, and imitation is critical in the
development of speech. The mechanism was noted as apparently present mostly
in the right hemisphere.461

Researchers were soon turning their attention to a complex derivative of simple
imitation, the development of empathy. A study by Carr et al. (2003) tested the
ideas of Theodore Lipps, who had suggested that “inner imitation” played a critical
role in the development of empathy, against the developing knowledge of mirror
neurons.

From the starting point that the fronto-parietal network in conjunction with the
superior temporal cortex is critical for human action representation and imitation,
the authors wished to investigate whether the limbic system also received action
representations to allow emotional processing, and hence empathy, to take place.
461

M. Iacoboni et al. “Cortical Mechanisms of Human Imitation,” Science 286, 5449 (1999): 25262528.
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The study showed that the amygdala and insula were also actively involved but
the authors suggested that explicit representational content might not be present,
and that it might be important to differentiate between the various brain regions
implicated in the various emotions, eg disgust in the anterior insula and fear in the
amygdala.462 Following this view there are two principal mirror networks: the
parietal lobe and premotor cortices, and that of the insula and ACC.

Hurley (2008) incorporated the provocative word “mind-reading” into the title of
a study that sought to develop a model for perception, action and cognition: “a
model of subpersonal architecture for control, mirroring and simulation, above
the neural, but below the conscious.”463 This approach was not atypical of the
cross disciplinary psychology/cognitive neuroscientific explorations into the
function of mirror neurons. Hurley argued, “Human mirror systems may be part of
the mechanisms for understanding observed actions and intersubjective
empathy” and that “direct resonance... provides a fundamental similarity between
yourself and other agents that enables the understanding of another’s actions as
instrumentally structured.” ... a “plausible neural basis” for understanding
others.464

Casebeer linked mirror neurons and Theory of Mind (TOM), by which
neuroscientists refer to our ability to understand the thoughts of others in order
to assess consequences of our actions. He suggested an integral role for mirror

462

L. Carr, M. Iacoboni, et al. “Neural mechanisms of empathy in humans: a relay from neural
systems for imitation to limbic areas,” PNAS 100, 9 (2003): 5497-5502.
463
S. Hurley, “The shared circuits model (SCM): How control, mirroring, and simulation can enable
imitation, deliberation, and mindreading,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2008): 1-58. The
proposed model seeks to explain, imitation, deliberation and mindreading via five layers: 1.
Sensorimotor feedback and motor control; 2. Predictions of sensory feedback from motor control,
thus improving control and adding to perception of the world; 2+4 Predictions interact with
monitored inhibition of output; 3. Mirrroring that generates inputs, enabling imitative learning,
among other benefits; 3+4. Mirroring and inhibition allowing for management of one’s own acts; 5.
Consideration of possible observed action, and the development of hypotheses about acts possible
towards others.
464
Hurley, “The shared circuits model (SCM): How control, mirroring, and simulation can enable
imitation, deliberation, and mindreading,” 9. See reference for quotation.
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neurons in moral behaviour: “Mirror neurons might bootstrap full-blown TOM
into existence through an inner simulation of the behaviour of others.”465

Rizzolati et al. (2009) reflected on this role of mirror neurons as direct, noncognitive media for grasping the intentions of others. 466 As we know our own
reasons for action, we can infer information about the action observed and about
the actor. Mirror mechanisms are also active in relation to visceromotor emotionrelated behaviours. Rizzolati writes, “The role of the mirror mechanism is to
provide a direct understanding of the actions and emotions of others.”467 This
carries profound implications for the capacity of an infant to absorb emotional
responses for better or for worse from its parents.

I find these ideas most powerful and compatible with the view that I will present
of mirror neurons as core mechanisms in the capacity for infants and children to
grasp their parents example of appetitive responses.

2.3.6.1 Neural systems for affective feelings.

Affection also plays a role in empathy. The OFC which is at the apex of a limbic
circuit connecting the VMPFC, AC gyrus, amygdala and temporal pole, plays a
major role processing appreciation of moral consequences of behaviour and the
“interpersonal signals necessary for the initiation of social interactions
betweenindividuals”.468 469 Activation of the OFC produces warm and loving
feelings.470 The OFC can overwhelm consciousness with these feelings.471

465

William D. Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural constituents,” Nature Reviews
Neuroscience 4 (2003): 844.
466
G Rizzolatti et al., “Mirror neurons and their clinical relevance,” Nature Clinical Practice
Neurology 5, 1 (2009): 24-34.
467
G Rizzolatti et al., “Mirror neurons and their clinical relevance,” 33.
468
Schore, “Effects of a secure attachment relationship on right brain development, affect
regulation and infant mental health,” 7-66.
469
S. D. Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience
with developmental approaches to psychopathology,”Development and Psychopathology 17,
(2005): 747.
470
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 103.
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Left and right OFC appear to differ in function: the right decodes mental states of
others and is associated with empathy with others; the left reasons about mental
states. The right OFC and right anterior insula cortex are components of a
pathway that integrates bodily responses with attentional and emotional
states.472

Balbernie suggests that limbic circuits require use-dependent stabilisation directly
reflecting the infant’s social environment.473 He suggests that the right limbic
system is key to complex attachment dynamics and interpersonal coping. 474 Right
brain development in early childhood is shaped by the dynamics of attachment.
Mother to child, and child to mother attachment relationships are now known
also to be critical in the infant’s development of self regulatory pathways during
the first three years when right brain development is dominant. 475

The work of Schore (2001) highlights developmental aspects of the OFC areas. He
linked attachment and positive maternal affect to initial reward stimulation in the
infant’s brain. Once these initial pathways are established, they appear to
contribute to mechanisms for mature affect regulation. For example, during
positive interactions, mother-infant facial communication generated DA mediated
arousal and elation in the right brain of the infant. DA inputs mediated reward and
emotional response. These DA inputs established a pattern of “burst firing” as

471

J. B. Nitschke et al., “Orbitofrontal cortex tracks positive mood in mothers’ viewing pictures of
their newborn infants,” NeuroImage 21 (2003): 583-592.
472
Schore, “Effects of a secure attachment relationship on right brain development, affect
regulation and infant mental health,” 7—66. Schore cited the work of Critchley.
473
In a review of literature concerning the significance of caregiver input during the first three
years, years of “optimal plasticity”, Balbernie focused on the role of the OFC, the area he
suggested governs attachment. He argued that the OFC is a “zone of convergence between cortex
and subcortex” governing “the ability to generate self awareness and personal identity”. R.
Balbernie, “Circuits and circumstances. The neurobiological consequences of early relationship
experiences and how they shape later behavior,” Journal of Child Psychotherapy 27, 3 (2001): 237255.
474
Balbernie, “Circuits and circumstances. The neurobiological consequences of early relationship
experiences and how they shape later behavior,” 237-255.
475
Allan N. Schore, “Attachment, Affect Regulation, and the Developing right Brain: Linking
Developmental Neuroscience to Pediatrics,” Pediatrics in Review 26, No. 6 (2005): 205.
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opposed to “pacemaker like firing”. 476 Schore called this “caregiver induced
organisation of the infant’s brain.” 477 There is a sequential maturing and function
of the various limbic and orbitofrontal areas. Schore noted that the limbic circuit
comprising OFC, AC gyrus, amygdala and temporal pole was described by Brothers
in 1997. Schore described the OFC as the “hierarchical apex of the limbic system”,
crucial in control of behaviour in relation to emotion, and with a major role in
processing “interpersonal signals necessary for the initiation of social interactions
between individuals”.478

2.3.6.2 Neuropeptides and mechanisms of trust.

Trust studies have demonstrated the role of oxytocin in promoting plasticity. The
role of trust in attachment, as well as in economic transactions, has been studied.
Kosfeld et al. (2005) focused on the role of oxytocin in the development of trust,
in a search for possible biological bases of trust between human beings. Their
study, in line with the view that oxytocin increases affiliation and social
attachment in non-humans, demonstrated that the neuropeptide was shown to
increase trust and social benefit also in humans. A single dose of oxytocin was
nasally administered in a double blind study involving 194 male students
participating in a trust game. 479

2.4

Habit formation and the role of the basal ganglia.

For summary table of the integrated contribution of the basal gangia with respect
to habit formation refer to Table 2.7 Systems for habit formation.

476

Schore, “Effects of a secure attachment relationship on right brain development, affect
regulation and infant mental health,” 23. This corresponds to the observation of Leknes and Tracey
with respect to the effects of phasic DA signaling. S. Leknes and I. Tracey, “A common neurobiology
for pain and pleasure,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 9, (2008): 314-320.
477
Schore, “Effects of a secure attachment relationship on right brain development, affect
regulation and infant mental health,” 24.
478
Schore, “Effects of a secure attachment relationship on right brain development, affect
regulation and infant mental health,” 7-66.
479
M. Kosfeld et al., “Oxytocin increases trust in humans,” Nature 435 (2005) 673-676. Oxytocin
receptors are found in various regions of the human brain including the amygdala.
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2.4.1 The basal ganglia and related structures.

The basal ganglia (BG) are the largest nuclei of the brain. They occupy a
considerable volume of the cerebrum.480 These cerebral nuclei lie buried deep
within the telencephalon, which in its origin is the secondary brain vesicle in the
embryo which will later develop into the cerebral hemispheres. These bilateral
nuclei consist of grey matter and are found lateral to the thalamus and above the
midbrain. The BG are also known, more correctly, as the basal nuclei.481 At times
one finds that the striatum (the input nucleus of the BG also known as the
neostriatum) is also used synonymously with BG.482

Following Da Cunha, a typical division of the BG is:


dorsal striatum483
o caudate nucleus
o putamen



ventral striatum alternatively known as the nucleus accumbens (NAc)



globus pallidus (GP)
o internal segment (GPi)
o external segment (GPe)
o ventral pallidum (VP).484

480

Rod R. Seeley, et al., Anatomy and Physiology (NY: McGraw Hill, 2008), 455.
Gerard J. Tortora and Bryan Derrickson, Principles of Anatomy and Physiology, 11th ed. (New
Jersey: Wiley, 2006), 493. Authors suggest that basal nuclei is a more accurate terminology as
ganglion properly refers to neural feature of the PNS.
482
rd
John H. Martin, Neuroanatomy: Text and Atlas, 3 ed., (NY: McGraw, 2003), 327.
483
Henry H. Yin and Barbara J. Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation
(Review),” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 7 (2006) point out that the heterogeneous structure of
the dorsal striatum suggests regions may be functionally specialised. Caudate is an area of the
“associative striatum” receiving inputs from association cortices. Yet putamen is of the
sensorimotor striatum. These areas in rodents, respectively dorsomedial striatum (DMS) and
dorsolateral striatum (DLS) are functionally dissimilar, and it has been suggested that the DMS is
functionally linked to hippocampus (perhaps more A-O linked, with DLS more S-R linked).
484
Claudio Da Cunha, et al. “Learning processing in the basal ganglia: a mosaic of broken mirrors,”
Behavioural Brain Research 199 (2009), 158.
481
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Nomenclature in this area can be a little confusing.485 The GP and putamen
together form the lentiform nucleus, with together with the caudate nucleus
forms the corpus striatum486.

Neuroanatomists are not in definitive agreement about which brain centres to
include within the BG.487 There is broad agreement that at least the caudate
nucleus, the putamen and the GP should be included in the BG proper. 488 At times
the associated motor nuclei of diencephalon (especially within the thalamus) and
mesencephalon, the midbrain, are included within the BG.489
The BG are functionally linked to the nearby SN (which sends axons to caudate
nucleus and midbrain) in midbrain, and to the subthalamic nuclei (STN) which
interconnect with the GP.490 Associated BG structures include:


Substantia nigra (SN)
o Substantia nigra pars compacta (SNpc)
o Substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr)



Ventral tegmental area (VTA) (closely associated with the NAc)



STN.491

Table 2.7 summarises the brain areas, pathways and mechanisms associated with
habit formation and the association of habit formation with the development and
exercise of virtue.

485

rd

Squire et al., Fundamental Neuroscience. 3 ed., lists as intrinsic nuclei of the BG: GPe, STN,
SNpc, and VTA.
486
Tortora and Derrickson, Principles of Anatomy and Physiology, 11th ed. 493.
487
For example, some authors consider that the striatum is composed of caudate nucleus and
putamen, others include within the corpus striatum what is known as the lentiform (the GP
together with the putamen) and the caudate nuclei.
488
th
Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology, 5 ed., 534.
489
th
Frederic H. Martini, Fundamentals of Anatomy and Physiology, 6 ed., (San Francisco: Pearson,
2004), 486.
490
Tortora and Derrickson, Principles of Anatomy and Physiology, 11th ed., 493-494.
491
Da Cunha, “Learning processing in the basal ganglia: a mosaic of broken mirrors,” 158.
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Figure 2.7

Location of the basal ganglia. A 3D construction of the striatum and GP within a
translucent CNS. Note proximity to OFC and MPFC.
Source: Nolte, John. The human brain. An introduction to its functional anatomy. 6th ed.
Philadelphia: Mosby, 2009. 478.

2.4.1.1 A key functional division of the basal ganglia.

a) The ventral pars
The ventral pars, a psychic area,492 is constituted by the NAc and the VTA. The
NAc receives afferents from the limbic domain and DA from VTA. It is known to
participate in emotions.493 The ventral pars is a key component of “mesolimbic”
pathway which is active in reward situations playing a major role in motivation. 494

492

Nomenclature adopted by Nicola Beretta, et al. “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia: A
similar code for physiological and pathological conditions,” Progress in Neurobiology 84 (2008):
345-346.
493
rd
Martin, Neuroanatomy: Text and Atlas, 3 ed., 329.
494
M. Di Filippo et al., “Short term and long-term plasticity at corticostriatal synapses: implications
for learning and memory,” Behavioural Brain Research 199, 1 (2009): 108-18.110.
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In a ground breaking human study, MJ Keopp et al. (1998) used a radioligand Clabelled raclopride, binding to D2 receptors and therefore evident through [ 11C]
RAC-PET imaging,495 to demonstrate DA release in the ventral striatum correlating
with performance level in playing a video game. Eight subjects played a game
where they were required to navigate a tank receiving a monetary incentive. DA
release was then compared with baseline levels determined by viewing a blank
screen revealing at least a two fold increase in extra cellular levels of DA present
in the ventral striatum. DA release in this situation was interpreted as the
equivalent to that in animal studies in relation to anticipatory or appetitive phases
of motivated behaviour where DA release assists in learning predictors for
rewarding outcomes.496

b) The dorsal pars.
The dorsal pars, a motor area, is made up of dorsal striatum and SN. 497 This
region receives afferents from associative and sensorimotor domains. The caudate
nucleus receives information from cortical sensory, motor and integrative
areas498. Caudate is an area of the “associative striatum” and receives inputs from
association cortices. The putamen is regarded as an area of the sensorimotor
striatum. 499 DA neuromodulation inputs to this region from the SNpc. This region
is involved in learning and movement initiation. Putamen neurons are active in
anticipation of body movements, neurons of the caudate nucleus are active prior
to eye movements, and the GP plays a role in regulation of muscle tone. 500

495

PET imaging using the radioligand C-labelled raclopride which binds to D2 receptors.
M. J. Keopp, et al., “Evidence for striatal dopamine release during a video game.” Nature 393
(1998) 266-268.
497
Nicola Berretta et al. “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia: a similar code for physiological and
pathological conditions,” 343-62.
498
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499
Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 468.
500
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The dorsal striatum lays down memory for motor habits, actions and outcomes,
playing a key role in much S-R habit learning.501

Monkey studies by Pasupathy and Miller (2005) found that memory in the
striatum may instruct the PFC with respect to S-R situations.502 Human studies in
1996 reported by Knowlton et al. showed that early Parkinson patients who
suffered degeneration of neurons in SN and consequent loss of input to striatum,
suffered loss of probabilistic classification learning. Their loss of declarative
memory was impaired rather by hippocampal and diencephalic impairment.503

2.4.2 An overview of the contribution of the basal ganglia.

Understanding of the role of the BG has progressed dramatically in the past two
decades.

Until recent years, the sub-cortical location of the BG had greatly impeded
effective studies of its function. Studies, for example those that have shown that
damage to the BG leads to tremor, muscle rigidity and involuntary movements,
relied on pathological examination. Initially the role of the BG was considered to
be that of a relay station, facilitating unconscious actions such as arm swings or
laughter, or inhibiting muscular activity. 504 505 The role of the BG was seen less of
initiating movement but rather of providing the pattern and rhythm for muscular
501

rd

Squire et al., Fundamental Neuroscience, 3 ed. Studies of the rat in a T maze by Packard and
McGaugh in 1996 showed that initially rats seek reward using “place” strategies, guided by
surrounds using the hippocampus, but overlearning replaced this with a response strategy based
on the striatum. Suppression of striatum returns the rat to use of place strategies.
502
rd
Squire et al., Fundamental Neuroscience, 3 ed.
503
rd
Squire et al., Fundamental Neuroscience, 3 ed. The Richfield et al. study in 1987 demonstrates
the close linkage between these functions with respect to reward, motivation and habitual
behaviours. The authors documented a striking case of bilateral damage to the caudate nucleus,
an integral part of the dorsal striatum, to a 25 year old woman, resulting in similar manifestations
to those caused by prefrontal trauma. Her resulting personality change involved alterations in
“affect, motivation, cognition, and self-care”. Behaviour included “vulgarity, impulsiveness, easy
frustration, violent outbursts… hypersexuality and minor criminal behaviours.” Treatments seemed
ineffective. The formation of replacement positive habitual behaviours did not occur.
504
Tortora and Derrickson, Principles of Anatomy and Physiology, 11th ed., 493-494.
505
rd
Alexander P. Spence and Elliott B. Mason, Human anatomy and physiology, 3 ed. (Menlo Park:
Benjamin/Cummings, 1987), 345.
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movement.506 In conjunction with limbic system, the BG was known to play a role
in regulation of emotional responses and in initiation and termination of
attention, memory.507

The work of Middleton and Strick (1994) provided decisive evidence of the nonmotor contribution of the BG to higher cortical activity by the identification of
efferent pathways from the BG to the PFC, providing evidence of an integral role
for the BG in higher cortical activity.

An elegant series of experiments in 1994 was successful in documenting the
neural pathways between the BG and the PFC. Using three cebus monkeys,
Middleton and Strick effected transneuronal retrograde transport of the
McIntyre-B strain of the herpes simplex virus type 1 (HSV1) from area 46 of the
PFC to the GP and to the dentate nucleus of the cerebellum, and so were able to
conclude that neurons in these subcortical areas project to the PFC, and that they
were distinct from neurons projecting from motor areas of the cerebral cortex. 508
The authors chose area 46 of the PFC, an area implicated in spatial working
memory, in the direction of behaviour, and also in planning of future behaviour.509

In this way they were able to demonstrate that outputs from both the BG and the
cerebellum have a role in higher cognitive function. In contrast to the theory that
the role of the BG was merely to funnel widespread cortical outputs to the
primary motor cortex, the authors proposed the existence of non-motor loops
through the BG, parallel to motor loops, but with a cognitive function.510
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higher cognitive function,” 460. This study provided experimental evidence for the proposal in
1986, by Alexander et al., of the existence of distinct non-motor loops that influence higher order
function. Middleton and Strick identified pathways from the BG via the thalamus to the DLPFC, to
the lateral OFC and the ACC. They argued that the implication of the BG in higher cortical activity is
supported by evidence of cognitive deficits as well as motor difficulties associated with BG
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The role of the BG in procedural learning and the implicit learning (learning not
consciously recognised) that is present in stimulus response (S-R) associations, as
well in the development of habits and addictions is well documented.511 Yin and
Knowlton have argued that the distinct networks of the BG “are the neural
implementations of actions and habits, and that an understanding of these
networks can illuminate findings from different levels of analysis, from the cellular
and molecular mechanisms of synaptic plasticity to the conditions that favour
habit formation and the development of compulsivity in various clinical
disorders.”512

However the role of the BG in cognitive processes has become increasingly better
understood. It is now clear that the BG play an important role in regulation of the
function of the cerebral cortex, with all regions of the cortex projecting to the BG
and via the thalamus projecting back to the cortex. 513 It seems that the BG play a
major role in selection of patterns of cortical activity, and ultimately of selection
and reinforcement of chosen motor programs.514 There is now recognition that
the BG play a significant role not only in “starting, stopping, and monitoring the
intensity of movements executed by the cortex”515 but in cognition, in direction of
attention, in planning, and in motivation. Furthermore the BG are acknowledged
to have a key role in control and modulation of social behaviours and may be
integral to a progressive evaluation process of behaviours.516 It is now argued that
the BG play a key role in control of “voluntary behaviour”517, perhaps in overlaying
deliberate cognitive agendas onto habituated actions.

dysfunction in Parkinson’s and Huntington’s diseases. They also made reference to the work of R.L.
Sturb in 1989, and J.L.Cummings in 1993, showing that focal lesions of the GPi led to reduced
performance of working memory and rule based learning, normally indicators of dysfunction of the
frontal lobe.
511
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512
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Wickens (2009) states that, by that time “It is increasingly recognised that the
basal ganglia contribution to movement is in some way secondary (italics mine) to
a contribution to intentional behaviour, learning and decision making”.518
Furthermore, the implication of the BG in complex drug seeking behaviours is now
increasingly understood. This role suggests that habits and behaviours mediated
in the BG are not be limited to simple motor sequences, but that BG pathways are
likely to be integral to the pursuit of complex, purposeful, behaviour patterns. 519

It is now recognised that the BG are the region of the brain with major
involvement in skeletal motor management, for example with a key role in motor
activity controlling motor coordination and steadiness. 520 521 522Unlike the motor
cortex (connecting directly to motor neurons) the BG act on descending pathways
in a fashion similar to the cerebellum in subconscious facilitation of habits, and
automatic actions utilising procedural memory, but also, and this is significant,
with deliberate attention, and limbic modulation of cognition and action. 523 It is an
area critical for learning, cognition and behavioural control. It is suggested that
the BG play a significant role in key areas of interest in this current study of the
neural correlates for virtues understood, at the simplest level, as good habitual
behaviours.

2.4.3 Connectivity to the basal ganglia.

This section summarises inputs and outputs of the BG. Gradually the contributions
of specific areas in and pathways involving the BG have been identified.524
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a) Inputs

Afferent pathways, input pathways to the BG, are from all regions of the cortex,
from the VTA, the intralaminar nuclei (ILN) of the thalamus, and the SNpc.


The striatum is a key target of excitatory major projections from the entire
cortex, and is “constantly informed about most aspects of cortical
function”.525 The ventral striatum is the target of inputs from the limbic
cortex, the hippocampus and the amygdala.526 Processing of motor
commands takes place here and in the GP, with output across to thalamus
and then back to cortical motor areas.527



The putamen receives input from motor and somatosensory cortical areas.
528



The caudate nucleus receives information primarily from the association
cortex.



The close association of the BG to the thalamus is most significant.
Principal input to the BG is glutamatergic from cortex and thalamus. It
should be noted that the BG and the thalamus are intimately
interconnected by these major neural highways. Almost all sensory input
to the cerebral cortex passes through the thalamus. The thalamus also
features sensory nuclei. Also the thalamus assists in maintenance of
consciousness.529 The thalamus is also known to play a key role in focusing
attention, a process involving the ILN receiving input from the frontal
cortex, as well as brain stem, and projecting back to the BG. It has been
noted that lesions of the ILN eliminate awareness.530 It must be
understood that the thalamus is not a simple relay station but itself, along
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with the BG, is a centre for integration of subcortical motor inputs and
feedback from the motor cortex.531

The BG are a region of great biochemical diversity, exhibiting almost all the
neuroactive agents.532 Neuromodulatory inputs include:533


DA from VTA and SNpc



Serotonergic from the raphe



GABAergic from GP and SN



ACh, EC, nitric oxide (NO), and adenosine.534

SNpc DA afferents target associative cortex connections in the caudate. VTA DA
afferents in a similar way target projections to the ventral striatum.

As DA is a principal moderator of plasticity, DA release in the striatum and BG is
evidence of inhibitory limbic plastic modification of BG activity.

b) Outputs

Efferent pathways project from output nuclei of the BG: the GPi, the VP, and the
SNr.


Projections are inhibitory and target the thalamic nuclei (including the
ventrolateral nucleus (VL), ventral anterior nucleus, medial dorsal nucleus).



The BG-thalamocortical loop. Neuromodulation effects a decisive
modulatory effect back on the cortex via these pathways. Hence the BG
exert a major modulatory effect on glutamatergic cortical outputs.535
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Projections of striatum, GP and SNr are GABAergic are inhibitory. 95% of
neurons in striatum are GABAergic medium spiny neurons (MSNs)536. Note
that the BG contain inhibitory GABAergic neurons, spiny in the striatum
and aspiny in the pallidum, requiring strong and coherent excitatory
cortical inputs from almost all cortical areas to become active. 537 Basal
forebrain projections also innervate the hippocampus and amygdala, also
in an inhibitory manner.



Outputs of the BG directly impact on motor control by affecting activity of
motor areas in the cortex538. BG components involved in motor control are
the GP and the SN.539



The ventral striatum organises somatosensory and motor representations
in a topographic manner, and outputs to the GP which in turn outputs to
the VLo in the thalamus, a part of the VL. The VLo in turn outputs to the
premotor and motor cortices and to the supplementary motor area (SMA)
in the cortex.540 There are few projections to brain stem motor nuclei and
none to the spinal motor apparatus. Again, this is very significant and
“suggests the system operates mainly to modify cortical motor
representations (my italics) rather than control behaviour through direct
motor inputs”.541



Some projections to brainstem motor structures such as the
pedunculopontine nucleus exercising control over locomotion542, and to
the superior collicus controlling neck and eye movements.543
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Jon H. Kaas and Iwona Stepniewska, “Motor cortex” in Encyclopedia of the Human Brain, Vol 3,
ed. V. S. Ramachandran (San Diego: Academic Press, 2002), 159.
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Figure 2.8

The main connections of the BG. The direct pathways from the striatum are
associated with disinhibition on the cortex, and the indirect with inhibition. Note
that this is a simplification of the limbic, associative, sensory and motor
functionalities of the basal ganglia. All pathway loops however follow the corticostriatal-GP-thalamic sequence. Source: Yin, Henry H. and Knowlton, Barbara J. “The role of the
basal ganglia in habit formation (Review).” Nature Reviews Neuroscience , 7 (2006): 465.

2.4.4 Loops.

Through the major cortical-BG loops incorporating the thalamus, rich
neuromodulation of the BG especially by DA reward circuitry, in turn modulates
cortical activity. This activity further reflects the integral role of the BG in cortical,
goal elective and reward focused activities and its involvement in habit formation
and motor management.

Loops are extensive neural pathways bridging and connecting distinctive areas of
the brain. Multiple parallel anatomical loops link the basal ganglia, thalamus, and
cortex. There are four categories of functional loops involving the BG: the
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skeletomotor, the oculomotor, the PFC loop, and the limbic loop.544 There are
multiple versions of cortico-BG-cortical loop: most prominent are the cortical
association areas-caudate loop, the putamen-sensorimotor cortex, and the limbicNAc loops.545 These loops define the function of the various areas of the BG. It is
the caudate that is mainly implicated in modulation of cognitive cortical
function.546 There are also loops involving the ILN of the thalamus connecting with
the BG but little is yet known of their function.547

The cerebral cortex and BG appear to be essential components in the cognitive
processes of generating anticipatory behaviour. 548 The skeletomotor loop and the
oculomotor loop also appear to facilitate programming and effecting specific goal
directed behaviours. BG pathways are also important for motor skill learning. 549
Only a small proportion of the BG loops appear to have a motor management
function.550 Under certain conditions plastic change occurs in these pathways. 551
The most direct motor loop involves excitatory inputs to putamen from cortex,
and may serve to “funnel the activation of widespread cortical areas” onto the
SMA.552 One recent study finds, “Increased corticostriatal transmission leads to
increased thalamocortical activity, and an increased likelihood of behavioural
response expression.”553 Neurons of the “indirect” pathway, inhibited by DA,

544

rd

Martin, Neuroanatomy: Text and Atlas, 3 ed., 330 and 347. The limbic loop involves the BG in
regulation of emotional responses in conjunction with limbic system. This loop begins both in the
cortical limbic association area and in the hippocampal formation, thence to the ventral striatum
into the VP and medial dorsal nucleus of the thalamus. The cortical target for the limbic loop is the
anterior cingulate gyrus and orbitofrontal gyrus.
545
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Nolte, The human brain. An introduction to its functional anatomy, 5 ed., 468.
546
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A. Floyer-Lea and P. M. Matthews, “Distinguishable Brain Activation Networks for Short- and
Long-Term Motor Skill Learning,” Journal of Neurophysiology 94 (2005): 516.
549
Floyer-Lea and Matthews, “Distinguishable Brain Activation Networks for Short- and Long-Term
Motor Skill Learning,” 516.
550
Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 464. Motor loops are both excitatory and inhibitory.
551
Horvitz, “Stimulus-response and response outcome learning mechanisms in the striatum,” 131.
In the case of tonic, not phasic, DA output, LTD is likely to result in these cells.
552
In this “direct” pathway, excitatory cortical inputs to the putamen link by inhibitory connections
to the GP. Unsignalled neurons in the GP are spontaneously active and therefore inhibitory on the
thalamus. These now inhibited GP neurons then refrain from inhibitory action on the thalamus.
The end result of this process is that excitatory thalamus neurons increase activity in the SMA.
Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 466.
553
Horvitz, “Stimulus-response and response outcome learning mechanisms in the striatum,” 131.
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project to the GPe, and thence via strong excitatory outputs to the SNr and the
GPi output nuclei.554

BG research is increasingly focusing on the interaction between the loops, such as
limbic loop mediation of the motor loops, and on possible mechanisms. For
example it is shown that dendrites connect the loops with all loops projecting
back to SNpc, possibly converging on DA neurons in this area.555 In addition during
the past decade significant further pathways connecting the BG and other brain
centres have been identified. Cerebellar-BG connections have now been
established, as have the hippocampal-BG pathways mentioned above.556 Haber et
al. (2000) documented their discovery of abundant connections between striatum
and midbrain.

2.4.4.1 Frontal lobe-basal ganglia loops provide a key to complex goal directed
behaviours.

Various regions of the cerebral cortex have closed loops (loops which finish back
in the brain area where they began): lateralPFC, orbitalPFC, and the premotor
cortex. These closed loops allow recursive feedback. Daw et al. (2005) suggested
that it is by means of this recursive processing that the PFC is able to link complex
anticipated behaviours with rewards and then “cache” chunked steps to achieve
desired outcomes in the rapid plasticities of the striatum in a “caching
reinforcement learning system”.557 Koch explains the interaction of the BG and
the PFC in this process: “the BG learns each fork in the road whereas the PFC puts
together the whole route.”558
554

Di Filippo et al., “Short term and long-term plasticity at corticostriatal synapses: implications for
learning and memory,” 109. The indirect pathway thereby reinforces inhibition as thalamic
neurons in the frontal cortex are excitatory unless inhibited by GPi and SNr.
555
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Martin, Neuroanatomy: Text and Atlas, 3 ed., 330. Note also that Joel and Weiner have
proposed interaction between parallel circuits.
556
Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 470.
557
N. D. Daw et al., “Uncertainty based competition between prefrontal and dorsolateral striatal
systems for behavioural control,” Nature Neuroscience 8, (2005): 1704-1711. Cited in Christopher
rd
Koch, “Consciousness” in Larry Squire, et al., Fundamental Neuroscience, 3 ed. (Burlington, MA:
Elsevier, 2008), Chapter 53.
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Koch, “Consciousness”, 1220.
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The fact that representations of habits in the BG are not goal dependent,
empowers the PFC to pursue complex (my italics) goal directed behaviours
utilising these habits. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of Pasupathy
and Miller (2005) who noted in that changes in activity in the lateral PFC during
visuomotor rule learning induce immediate changes in the dorsal striatum,
whereas reflection of changes in the opposite direction were much slower. It is
suggested that this allows the PFC, which holds the complete model of an
anticipated activity, to capture quick “reward related snapshots” of anticipated
actions. 559

2.4.5 The role of the basal ganglia in motor learning.

a) Motor learning as a form of memory.

Motor learning may be understood as a form of memory. There are multiple
memory functions performed by areas of the striatum. The striatum organises
somatosensory and motor representations in a topographic manner; the dorsal
striatum lays down memory for motor habits, actions and outcomes, playing a key
role in much S-R learning; also emotional memory is also interconnected with the
BG (via limbic pathway) and is believed to further modulate the basal-cortical
motor management processes.

As we have seen above in 2.3.2 there are multiple memory systems and brain sites
involved in memory. Memory representations are understood to depend on
cellular and molecular processes that alter synaptic strength; protein synthesis
and gene translation are involved in long term memory. The view that the BG is
identified with implicit procedural memory has been increasingly modified over
the past two decades.560

559

Koch, “Consciousness,” 1220.
We have seen that memories are commonly classified as non declarative (or implicit) for more
or less unconscious procedural, motor or emotional memories, or declarative (or explicit) for
560
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There is no question that the striatum plays a key role in mediating the procedural
memories underpinning behavioural habits.561 When implicit learning is
emphasised in a probabilistic learning task, the striatum is more active, but for
explicit learning, the medial temporal lobe is more active. 562 Since early 1990s,
PET and fMRI studies have demonstrated that the striatum is critical in encoding
motor programs. 563 This is confirmed by studies of impairments as a result of
striatal dysfunction. Although the cerebellum seems involved in early stages of
motor sequence learning, the striatum seems critical for retention of sequences.
Implicit knowledge is now believed to be stored in the motor cortex and
associated parts of the BG along with cerebellum. 564

However the traditional division of multiple memory systems between
hippocampal dependent learning and striatum dependent learning is regarded as
no longer fully satisfactory. Poldrack and Packard argued that hippocampus
(place) and dorsal striatum (response learning) are two competing learning
systems (corresponding, in human studies, to declarative learning mediated in
medial temporal lobe, and non-declarative learning in the striatum). But other
results suggest that the hippocampus and the striatum cooperate (my emphasis)
in a functional circuit, contrary to the former view that they compete.565 It
appears that the implicit and explicit are not totally independent systems of
learning, in line with recent findings that the hippocampus is closely coordinated
with the striatum, despite its involvement in flexible, non-repetitive activity. 566 All
this is consistent with a greater involvement of the BG in explicit cognitive activity

conscious memories, for example of facts and episodes. There has been a growing realisation that
storage of these different forms of memory not only takes place in different parts of the brain but
memory and learning processes are highly interconnected and interdependent between various
regions.
561
Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 751.
562
Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 470.
563
Julien Doyon, et al., “Contributions of the basal ganglia and functionally related brain structures
to motor learning,” Behavioural Brain Research 199, (2009): 62-63.
564
Stephen Wise and Reza Shadmehr, “Motor control” in Encyclopedia of the Human Brain, Vol 3,
ed. V. S. Ramachandran (San Diego: Academic Press, 2002), 137-157.
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Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 470.
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than had previously been thought and of a model of brain function where discrete
areas and systems are more comprehensively integrated than had previously been
thought.

The implication of the PFC in motor memory is also now apparent. As studies
unveil the underlying processes of motor learning, higher levels of cortical
involvement, of the significance of various regions of the BG at various stages in
the process, and the role of cortical-BG interconnections, are all apparent. Motor
learning principally involves the cortico-basal-thalamic pathways mediated by
plasticity in the BG synapses, the cortico-cerebellar loop through the dentate
nucleus and ventral-posterior lateral nucleus of the thalamus, the hippocampus in
early stages of learning, and the “functional interplay... between cortico-striatal,
cortico-cerebellar, and limbic systems in this form of learning” 567

For a long time it was thought that the BG and the cerebellum played the principal
roles in procedural motor memories, memories that either retained reflex
responses, or explicit sequences that had become automatised: the cerebellum
had been understood to play a role in the reflex responses to stimuli that
characterise classical conditioning, and the oldest hypothesis involving the BG was
that implicit memory resided in the BG, and explicit in the medial temporal lobe
(MTL).568 This view has been modified in recent years. It is now believed that long
term storage of explicit motor knowledge is in the PFC and associated parts of the
BG, while storage of intermediate term explicit motor knowledge is in the MTL. 569

b) The learning process: from the explicit to the automatized.

The BG are implicated in goal directed motor activity, and in those same motor
activities after they are automatized. During the period of acquisition, both
567

Doyon, et al., “Contributions of the basal ganglia and functionally related brain structures to
motor learning,” 62.
568
Recent evidence for the importance of the cerebellum in motor learning has been provided in
both lesion (Baizer et al. 1999; Doyon et al. 1997, 1998) and imaging (Doyon et al. 2003) studies.
569
Stephen Wise and Reza Shadmehr, “Motor control” in Encyclopedia of the Human Brain, Vol 3,
ed. V. S. Ramachandran (San Diego: Academic Press, 2002), 137-157.
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implicit procedural habits and virtue facilitated behaviours move from the explicit
to the automatised. Both are acquired by a process initially involving attentive,
voluntary and repetitive action and explicit knowledge.

Procedural memories are learned gradually by a process that relies on
reinforcement; this can be the foundation for habits after further overtraining.
Once acquired these habits show great resistance to change. The BG become
increasingly involved in the process of learning as actions become more
automatic. In the early stages of learning, attention to action and to the requisite
explicit knowledge is required. Predictably, as new skills are being learned PET
studies show increased blood flow indicating greater synaptic activity in the PFC.
As a skill becomes learned and unconscious, the posterior parts of the cerebellum,
570

the non primary motor cortex, and the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) are most

involved.

Note that the BG are involved in both early stages and in completed procedural
learning. Wise and Shadmehr state that the findings of these PET studies “support
the hypothesis that prefrontal cortex-basal ganglionic modules subserve voluntary
movement, whereas the motor cortex-basal ganglionic modules (along with
cerebellum and PPC) underlie the more automatic movements of the same
kind.”571

c)

The comparative roles of the cerebellum and the basal ganglia.

There are four essential components to the motor systems controlling skeletal
muscles: the cortical and subcortical nuclei (primary motor and premotor cortices,
and the brain stem) with their descending pathways, the motor neurons
570

Floyer-Lea and Matthews, “Distinguishable Brain Activation Networks for Short- and Long-Term
Motor Skill Learning,” 517. The authors note the mechanisms of motor skill learning. Doyon and
Ungerleider (2002) documented the role of the striatum in the long-term storage of well-learned
movement sequences. Hoshi et al.(2005) documented input from the cerebellum to the putamen
(posterior striatum) via the cerebello-thalamo-striatal pathway showing that these two areas are
far more interconnected, and therefore interactive, than has been long thought.
571
Wise and Shadmehr, “Motor control,” 153.
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themselves and the interneurons, the BG, and the cerebellum. These last two
input to the thalamus that in turn inputs the primary and premotor cortices. 572 In
other words, all executive muscular commands are modulated by the BG and the
cerebellum. The work of Doyon et al. (2009) into the neural substrates of
procedural memories further demonstrated an extended role for the BG both
before and after automatisation.

The authors draw a distinction between motor sequence learning (MSL) and motor
adaptation (MA) by which we change our behaviours to compensate for changes
in the environment.573 MSL requires a learned sequence of movements, which,
among other methods of acquisition, may be “learned implicitly through repeated
practice”.574 Acquisition of skills follows several phases: fast learning stage, a slow
stage, through to the automatized stage when movements are effortless and
carried out with much reduced attention. It is shown that motor sequence
learning requires repetition but then “continues to develop over time after
training has ended”.575 The authors suggest that the striatum is not necessary for
retention and execution of MA tasks, and that the cerebellum and BG play
inversely complementary roles in MSL and MA tasks.576

These results are consistent with the view that the cerebellum is active in
establishing new patterns of behaviour but that once these patterns are
committed to memory, it becomes inactive. On the other hand, the BG continue
to mediate the representation for the behaviour. 577
572

Martin, Neuroanatomy: Text and Atlas, 230.
Doyon, et al., “Contributions of the basal ganglia and functionally related brain structures to
motor learning,” 61-75.
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Doyon, et al., “Contributions of the basal ganglia and functionally related brain structures to
motor learning,” 62.
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Doyon, et al., “Contributions of the basal ganglia and functionally related brain structures to
motor learning,” 67.
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Doyon, et al., “Contributions of the basal ganglia and functionally related brain structures to
motor learning,” 70. Interestingly the authors note that sleep appears to play a significant, and
perhaps necessary, role in consolidation of some forms of memory.
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Doyon, et al., “Contributions of the basal ganglia and functionally related brain structures to
motor learning,” 67,69, 70. Doyon et al document a dual task paradigm to investigate the relative
roles of the BG and cerebellum. In a fascinating knitting experiment, eight experienced knitters
were scanned as they performed a familiar knitting action, a new “Continental” method, and a
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d) Numerous brain areas are implicated at both acquisition and completion
stages of this learning process.

Motor skill learning is a highly complex neural process involving plastic change in
very many brain areas and pathways.578 Procedural learning pathways involve
sensorimotor messaging to the association cortex and thence to BG and on to
thalamus and premotor cortex. The premotor cortex has a key role in the
acquisition of motor skills involving repetition and patterns of activity,
coordinating the muscles involved via the primary motor cortex. One author
describes the premotor cortex as “the memory bank for skilled motor activities.”
579

Memory formation in this region is triggered by ACh release from the basal

forebrain. The premotor cortex has involvement also in planning complex
voluntary actions that require fine coordination.

The work of Floyer-Lea and Matthews (2005) confirmed this remarkably complex
interplay of brain areas in both short and long term learning. They sought to study
the distinct brain networks mediating fast, short-term and slow, long-term motor
learning of the same motor task.580 Their research found that short-term motor
skill learning was associated with some plasticity in the cortical network specific

control movement of knitting needles. fMRI imaging demonstrated that the cerebellum and BG
were initially involved in learning the new method, but that once learned, the cerebellum became
inactive with the long lasting representation of the behaviour involving only the BG and associated
motor cortical regions.
578
While it is totally incorrect to equate motor skill learning to the acquisition of virtue, it is
suggested that the behaviours automatized in various simple potentially virtuous actions, for
example of greeting others courteously, or of coughing into a handkerchief, rely in part, for the
neural basis on such motor learning. I write of these actions “potentially virtuous” for the habitual
intention with which the action is performed is also highly relevant.
579
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Marieb and Hoehn, Human anatomy and physiology, 8 ed. 437.
580
The authors designed an experiment for the performance of a finger pressure sequence
learning task carried out by twenty two right handed subjects (subdivided into a short term and
long term group; each almost equally divided between men and women; with age range, 20–34
years.) fMRI results of initial training session after exposure to the exercise, were compared with
results after the second training session after exposure, and with results over a three week training
period. Their results reflected the 1995 findings of Karni et al. who had suggested distinct plasticity
mechanisms for altered brain motor representations with short- and long-term learning. FloyerLea and Matthews, “Distinguishable Brain Activation Networks for Short- and Long-Term Motor
Skill Learning,” 512-518.
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for the learned movements. They suggested that increased traffic in a subcortical
circuit (cerebellar dentate, thalamus, and putamen) could be a critical element in
development of greater movement automaticity with short-term learning. They
confirmed the implication of the putamen in processing movement timing, and
suggested that the motor cortex–putamen circuit could be crucial in encoding
movement sequences. 581

They found that long-term learning involved pronounced plasticity in the primary
somatosensory and motor cortex and increased activation in the loop between
motor cortex and basal ganglia “after a motor sequence is practised
extensively.”582

e) Emotion and procedural memory.

Further evidence of the highly integrated nature of brain systems is apparent in
studies which demonstrate that procedural memory consolidation appears
associated with the reward systems of the brain. DA release from the SN is
believed to trigger memory formation in the BG. Monkey studies, documented by
Romo and Schultz (1990) and Montague et al. (1996) confirmed that striatal
neurons are conditioned by DA (reward) signalling. 583
Doyon et al. note evidence for emotional facilitation of memory in the BG.584
Processes of cellular consolidation of limbic dependent memory traces, also
appear to consolidate motor memories. They note the synthesis of proteins in the
581

Floyer-Lea and Matthews, “Distinguishable Brain Activation Networks for Short- and Long-Term
Motor Skill Learning,” 512-518.
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Floyer-Lea and Matthews, “Distinguishable Brain Activation Networks for Short- and Long-Term
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automaticity study by Poldrack which showed the association loop decreased in activity with shift
to sensorimotor-cortico-BG networks.
583
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is then sent to the medial temporal lobe, including the hippocampus and proximate temporal
cortical areas that link to the PFC and the thalamus. ACh from the basal forebrain released into the
PFC and the medial temporal lobe is believed to trigger memory formation.
584
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motor cortex after training enables motor skill learning. This seems to indicate
that processes of system consolidation, as demonstrated in the corticohippocampal circuit, are also applicable to the circuitry for motor sequence
learning.585

2.4.6 Habit formation, a particular form of learning.

Against this review of procedural learning, it is enlightening to look in more detail
at habit formation.

By way of introduction to this section, a parenthesis about the nature and
features of habits in their relationship to the BG is warranted. Habits are well
characterised: they are learned, (ie a result of mechanisms of experience
dependent plasticity), they are robust after they are fixed by repetition, there can
be a lack of behavioural flexibility, they allow for virtually unconscious
performance, they demonstrate insensitivity to outcome devaluation and
contingency degradation, they tend to manifest as an ordered sequence elicited
by a specific context or stimulus, and may be either cognitive or motor.586 Habits
have similar features to, but are distinct from, fixed action patterns (FAPs) in
animals; symptoms of Tourette syndrome, and OCD.587 One OCD circuit has been
documented. Not surprisingly it is a cortico-subcortical pathway and is implicated
also in drug addiction. The focal nature of tics suggests an origin in specific sites in
the striatum and in specific cortico-basal ganglia subcircuitry. In general habits are
recognised now as systems with distinct brain substrates. Computational
approaches, pioneered by Sutton and Barto in the 90s, have added a powerful
instrument to studies in this area.

585

Doyon, et al., “Contributions of the basal ganglia and functionally related brain structures to
motor learning,” 68.
586
For this list of characteristics I have drawn on a number of sources including: Yin and Knowlton,
“The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 475.
587
Unless otherwise indicated, content in this section attributed to: Graybiel, “Habits, Rituals, and
the Evaluative Brain,” 359-87.
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Classically habits have been seen to fall in the domain of procedural learning as
opposed to declarative learning. Compulsive habits manifest similar neural
programs of development to addictions (2.6.6). They may be acquired either by
behavioural routines and rituals that have been learned, through innate
mechanisms, or though neurological or neuropsychiatric illness or addiction. The
skilled procedural actions of a morning routine, or of driving to work, also have
much in common with habits as such.

Graybiel points out that proceduralisation, movement sequences, can occur in
both cortical and subcortical, widely distributed brain regions where they exhibit
many neural parallels to habit learning, most significantly:


dynamic involvement of neocortex and striatum,



shift from anterior/ventral regions of striatum to caudal zones as the
proceduralisation is acquired,



with a corresponding shift from anterior/ventral cortical regions to more
posterior zones.

The line between compulsive habit formation and a cortically integrated facility
for behaviour is indistinct.

Graybiel argues that BG-mediated habits fall somewhat ambiguously between
voluntary, conscious, higher-order, deliberative behavioural control, and lowerorder control almost inaccessible to consciousness.588 She suggests that habits
affect not only behaviours but cognitive activity. In taking the above position, she
seeks to resist what she sees as a narrowing of the definition of habit.589

588

Graybiel’s work sits comfortably with Schwartz’s work on management of OCD by cognitive
therapies and is effectively a call for greater recognition of the close interdependence of habit and
cognitive processes. Schwartz and Begley, The Mind and the Brain.
589
Graybiel refers to increasing evidence that habitual behaviours involve pathways connecting the
neocortex with the striatum and related areas of the BG, and that this circuitry in the BG underpins
disorders where repetitive thoughts and behaviours surface. She argues that this circuitry “can
iteratively evaluate contexts and select actions and can then form chunked representations of
action sequences that can influence both cortical and subcortical brain structures.” It is this shift
from evaluation to performance, she says, that characterises acquisition of habits.
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In keeping with this broadened understanding, Tang et al. (2007) document a
significant contribution that habit formation makes to the wellbeing of the
organism. They studied the striatal neuronal output in 26 rats during the
formation of a motor habit. Rats were surgically implanted with 12 microwires,
each for single neuron recording. The aim of the study was to observe changes in
output by striatal neurons related to vertical head movement during the process
of motor habit acquisition.590 They were able to demonstrate a growing efficiency
of neuronal activity in the course of learning: “Our data suggest that the striatum
may shift from facilitating acquisition of efficient movement with a large
population of neurons early in training to modulating or maintaining habitual
movement with stronger firing by fewer neurons after overtraining, consistent
with evidence that lesions of the striatum impaired formation (Yin et al., 2004)
and expression (Packard and McGaugh, 1996) of a habit.”591

In other words, habit learning provides the organism with a way of producing
movement that is more efficient at the neuronal level, and therefore conducive to
the flourishing of the organism. (See 6.2.1.2.)

2.4.7 Plasticity in the basal ganglia and related structures.

It is appropriate, having reviewed the anatomy and role of the BG, that we now
turn our attention specifically to plasticity in this region. Within the argument of
this study is that various mechanisms of plasticity constitute the material
underpinnings for learning, including habit formation, in the brain. It is activity
dependent plasticity, the “long lasting change in the functional efficacy of synaptic
connections that is induced by certain patterns of brain stimulation”592 that most
interests us; and this is totally consistent the view that repeated behaviours assist
in the formation of both habits and virtue itself.

590

Chengke Tang et al., “Changes in activity of the striatum during formation of a motor habit,”
European Journal of Neuroscience 25, (2007): 1212.
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Although an understanding of the internal workings of the BG is very much a work
in progress, 593 nevertheless, much progress has been made in unravelling the
complexities of BG plasticity, and in identifying component regions and their role
in facilitating implicit learning.

There are numerous and distinct forms of plasticity that underpin learning and
cognitive processes mediated by the striatum when specific behavioural tasks are
being learned. These forms include LTP, LTD, shorter forms of intrinsic plasticity
(such as lateral inhibition and modification of neuronal membrane properties) and
STDP, which “encodes salient information in neuronal networks”.594
2.4.7.1 Forms of basal ganglia plasticity.595

i)

The reward signal DA is believed to be the principal mediator of striatal
plasticity. DA has been shown to strengthen synapses in the striatum

593

As recently as 2006 one research team wrote: “At present we remain ignorant of the detailed
mechanisms that underlie habit formation at all levels of analysis.... We do not yet understand
how synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia alters the outputs of the networks, and we do not have
direct evidence linking such plasticity to well-defined learning.” Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the
basal ganglia in habit formation,” 475. Furthermore, Di Filippo et al. write, “The integrative
significance of the intrastriatal networks is still far from being completely elucidated.” Di Filippo et
al., “Short term and long-term plasticity at corticostriatal synapses: implications for learning and
memory,”109.
594
STDP in the striatum seems to operate in reverse to other brain areas. It has been
demonstrated that in most cases, if where STDP is present, LTP is a consequence if the EPSP
2+
follows the presynaptic response (brief high Ca influx owing to activation of NMDA receptors);
2+
LTD is produced if the presynaptic response follows the EPSP (low level Ca influx). The
importance of this form of the plasticity in the striatum has been recognized for some two
decades. Di Filippo et al., “Short term and long-term plasticity at corticostriatal synapses:
implications for learning and memory,”114.
595
Beretta et al. summarise the significance of plasticity in the BG and associated pathways: “It is
well known that the cortico-striatal network controls functionally heterogeneous decision making
processes, including goal directed actions, susceptible to reward feedback, and stimulus linked
actions, largely automatic or habitual.” They go on to argue that these processes hinge on “distinct
learning rules and, accordingly, distinct forms of plasticity”, and that it is variations in synaptic
plasticity and at times the absence of synaptic modification in the dorsal striatum that are
implicated in procedural learning, stimulus response association, habit formation and motor
control. Beretta et al., “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia: A similar code for physiological and
pathological conditions,” 349.
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that are currently active, producing synaptic strengthening shown to
relate to operant learning. 596
ii)

In ventral pars, 597 LTD and LTP plasticities are present in various forms,
by specifically different induction mechanisms, featuring changes both
pre- and post-synaptically, and even on the same synapse mediated by
different receptors. ACh, DA, EC, GABA, glutamate, opioid, and
nicotinic plasticity are all present, some in a wide variety of forms.
“LTD/LTP induced modification of firing discharge (change from single
spike to burst) could control alertness, volition, responses to natural
rewards, and drugs sensitisation.” 598
It is possible that the striatum plays a key role in reward related
memory.599 Two classes of striatal neurons have been identified in
signalling reward related events, in each case utilising DA, but it should
be recognised that the mechanisms underlying “striatal neuroplasticity
and reward-related behaviours and learning are still far from being
elucidated.”600
Plasticity in the form of LTD and LTD, “probably the two main forms of
synaptic plasticity”,601 is found at corticostriatal-MSN synapses. 602 MS
neurons seem much more susceptible to LTD than LTP owing to their
very negative resting membrane potential.603 Now “almost all forms of
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Horvitz, “Stimulus-response and response outcome learning mechanisms in the striatum,” 129140.
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Hebbian plasticity have been demonstrated at excitatory coticostriatal
synapses onto striatal projecting neurons and some seem to be
expressed by striatal interneurons”.604
Intrinsic plasticity has been observed in striatal MSNs: “Synaptic output
can also be modulated by enduring changes in neuronal intrinsic
excitability resulting from changes in voltage gated ion channels
function.”605 The result is an amplification or attenuation of the EPSP
amplitude. This form of plasticity changes the probability of PSP and
duration, and secondly mediates metaplasticity, the capacity to induce
consequent plasticity at the synapse. Thirdly it may be involved in
efficient tuning of output in relation to repeated synaptic inputs. The
complexities of intrinsic plasticity are under current study.606
Plasticity in the NAc reinforces spatial memory, consolidates links
between emotion and context cues in relation to planning in the PFC
and motor behaviours, plays an underlying role in natural reward
processes, and also provides the neural basis for craving after drugs of
abuse. 607 Note that the link to drug seeking shows that habits in the
BG need not be simple motor sequences, but may involve the pursuit
of complex purposeful behaviour patterns. Limbic DA inputs are from
the VTA.
Plasticity in the VTA establishes a reward memory with respect to
behaviours caused by natural incentives (food, water, sex) or
dysfunctional processes such as those caused by drugs of abuse
(craving, sensitisation, dependence).
iii)

The dorsal pars features links to associative and sensorimotor cortical
areas especially in medial and lateral areas. Activity in the dorsal region
is modulated by DA from SNpc. The role of LTP and LTD in movement
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initiation and learning in this area have been well described. 608 In the
dorsal pars LTD is the dominant form of plasticity in the cortico-striatal
pathway, in various forms, at D2 receptors.609
Plasticity is evident in the SN. Postsynaptic LTD in SNpc has been
identified. This is independent of NMDAR but dependent on Ca2+
intracellular signalling. Tetanic stimulation of subthalamus has been
shown to lead to LTP in SNpc, suggesting that the subthalamus can
thus play a role in motor activity. The relationship between movement
and plasticity in SN DA neurons has not yet been described.
Plasticity in STN appears significant in motivation for natural rewards
and for craving for drugs. Plasticity in this nucleus has a major role in
motor function control.

2.4.7.2 DA: principal mediator of plasticity in the basal ganglia.

DA was initially hypothesised to mediate reinforced learning by strengthening
synaptic connections in the striatum in the presence of a reward. In complement
to information in the preceding section, the following mechanisms associated with
DA are apparent.


In the early 80s Schultz and colleagues demonstrated that rewards elicited
phasic DA midbrain responses by strengthening synaptic connections in
the striatum. Later electrophysiological response to reward stimuli of DA
cells in the SN and the VTA was documented, and DA-invoked plasticity in
the striatum detected in vitro.



Recent experimental data shows that the rapid onset of phasic activity
seems to be a key mechanism of DA mediated plasticity and seems to be
present in both stimulus-outcome (S-O) and A-O learning.610 Sustained
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reverbatory loops appear to facilitate appropriate motor action by
maintaining activity in the cortical movement related cells. It is suggested
that DA mediated binding assists in establishing behavioural sequences. 611


LTD and LTP both are mediated and triggered by DA release, although LTP
is inhibited by activation of D2 receptors (mainly present in the indirect
pathway). Hence DA release is more likely to lead to LTP in direct pathway
and LTD in indirect. Higher levels of DA favour induction of LTP.612



Cannabinoid and adenosine receptors also play a part in striatal LTD.613
Wickens notes that DA and EC signalling mediate plasticity in the form of
LTD and LTP, with intracellular calcium signalling also significant. DA “plays
a crucial role in determining the magnitude and direction of plasticity”614.



Learning in the striatum is driven by novelty.615 Schultz and others suggest
that phasic DA release is triggered by rewards that are unpredicted. It has
been shown that there is a steady tonic low level of DA release “to run the
motor programs already set up”; phasic DA release seems to be a “learning
signal” 616 that induces plasticity. The phasic release of DA appears
implicated in instrumental learning, Pavlovian conditioning, and various
forms of associative and reinforcement learning.617.

of milliseconds beyond responses to salient non reward events. Note that Horvitz refers to A-O
goal directed learning as R-O.
611
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Reynolds. D1 receptor blockade has been shown to prevent self stimulation of the SN in rats. DA is
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“Depotentiation”, the reversal of an LTP that has already been established,
has been identified as a further form of synaptic plasticity. It is now
believed too that DA mediated binding may assist in establishing
behavioural sequences, and that sustained reverbatory loops appear to
facilitate appropriate motor action by maintaining activity in the cortical
movement related cells. 618.



DA timing is significant. Precisely timed pulses of DA “coinciding with the
time of pre-synaptic stimulation and post synaptic depolarisation of the
striatal cell-corticostriatal synapses show potentiation rather than
depression” that would normally be the case with high frequency
stimulation.619 Furthermore, DA mediated corticostriatal synaptic
strengthening seems to work to maintain the movement direction coding
in the frontal cortex until the trigger stimulus occurs.620



DA synapses are normally found on the neck of spines with the excitatory
synapse on the head of the same spine. 621

2.4.7.3 Insights from plasticity within the hippocampus

Hippocampal studies of plasticity shed further light on the nature of plasticity in
the BG. Beretta et al. note the differences of plasticity between the BG and and
the hippocampus.622 Hippocampal plasticity is dependent upon synaptically
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released glutamate, whereas striatal plasticity involves DA activity, release of ECs
and ACh.623

Beretta et al. note that the groundwork for synaptic plasticity studies in BG, and in
all vertebrate CNS, was laid by Bliss and Lomo, who, as we have seen, detected in
vivo LTP in the hippocampus following on repetitive excitation. “Activity
dependent synaptic potentiation occurs within milliseconds, can persist for hours
or days and is expressed as a persistent increase in the size of the synaptic
component of the evoked response, recorded either from individual neurons or
from a larger cell population.”624 Bliss and Lomo’s work was complemented by
Schwartzkroin and Wester (1975) who used brain slice preparations to
demonstrate LTP under controlled in vitro conditions. Plasticity in both areas
obeys the Artola-Brocher-Singer rule: “induction of LTP or LTD depends on the
ability of the postsynaptic membrane to reach different sequential threshold for
LTD and LTP induction.” This observation possibly reflects progressively higher
levels of postsynaptic free calcium.

2.4.8 Initial reflections on the possible role of the basal ganglia in virtue
acquisition.

With cortical, limbic and motor interconnections providing a capacity for reflective
action, reward based goal reinforcement, and the development of habitual action,
the BG, noted by Di Filippo as the “brain centre for habit formation”,625 appear
highly implicated in the neural underpinnings of virtue.

The neuronal processes of habit formation are of relevance to this study. Habits,
acquired in the BG, are the result of experience driven plasticity in basal ganglia-
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based circuits.626 The pathways that facilitate habitual behaviours, highly
interconnected with limbic and cognitive areas of the brain, would seem to have
much in common with pathways related to the development of good habits,
virtues. Both begin with simple goal-oriented behaviours, both are experience
acquired, requiring consolidation by repetitive action, both require
interconnection to motor, motivational, cognitive and executive areas. During
acquisition there is a movement from attentive explicit behaviour to the
automatised. Both show great resistance to change once acquired.

Not only are the implicated limbic, cortical and basal-thalamic regions, (brain
regions supporting motivation, automatisation of action, and executive goal
direction) functionally required for both habit and virtue formation, but the
efficient interconnection of these brain regions is shown to be present in the
brain.

The BG with their thalamic pathways to both the limbic system and the cortex are
a crucial piece in the puzzle, and it is only in little more than the last decade that
the complex involvement of the BG in cognitive and motivational processes has
become apparent. The cognitive connection is particularly important in the case of
virtue. As will be seen in Chapters 3 and 4, motivation in virtuous action is a
complex interplay of initial reward incentives (for example in the case of a child
developing a virtue), previously established pathways for patterns of behaviour,
and what we could call a cognitive evaluation of goal. In particular, Graybiel’s
reflections on habit, described above, emphasize that this evaluative component
is potentially present via pathways involving the BG.

Di Filippo writes, “It is widely accepted that animals, including humans, shape
their behaviour on the basis of experience and that motivation is characterised by
action, either to increase the probability of an outcome (appetitive motivation), or
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to reduce it (aversive motivation)” 627 These motivations shape our actions via the
mediation of the BG pathways. Reward and motivation will be discussed below
(2.6).628

At the heart of the capacity of the brain to wire for habit and ultimately virtue are
mechanisms of plasticity. Beretta writes, “It is widely accepted that the complexity
and adaptability of neuronal communication, which is necessary for integrative
and higher functions of the brain, is amply represented by plastic changes
occurring at the synaptic level. Therefore long term modifications of synaptic
efficacy between neurons have been considered the cellular basis of learning and
memory.”629

Virtues, it will be seen are stable capacities for habitual action... they empower
the owner to act in the world effectively. Da Cunha captures this notion: “Since
the output of the basal ganglia is almost exclusively to frontal cortex and
brainstem motor nuclei, the memories encoded by this system must be expressed
as actions. This explains the procedural nature of these memories.”630

2.5

Neural bases for emotional control.

In this section we overview representative current research into emotional selfregulation. This will shed further light on role of the cortico-limbic connections of
the BG, and on the possibilities for pathways of the emotional self-regulation that
characterises virtue in the Aristotelian vision.

Since the 1930s the cerebral cortex has been acknowledged to play an inhibitory
influence on emotional behaviour. In the last fifteen years much has been written
627
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about the pathways of emotional control, in particular distinguishing the cognitive
pathways allowing cortical modification of limbic responses, and the direct
cognitive-bypass routes, the “quick and dirty” routes, that manifest impulsive
reactions of rage, flight, etc.631

2.5.1 Theories of emotion.

An initial overview of emotion, drawn principally from psychology, is
appropriate.632

According to the James-Lange theory of emotion, from the start of the twentieth
century, the physiological changes are the emotion... we feel sad because we cry,
for example. If we remove the physiological changes, we remove the emotion.
Although this seems counter intuitive, it does place emphasis on the integration of
mind and body, and recent studies have, in fact, shown that faking emotions can
produce emotion. For example, Strack, Martin, and Stepper documented in 1988
that most people rate cartoons funnier if they hold a pen in their teeth, thus
forcing a smile, rather reading the cartoon while holding the pen in their lips and
preventing a smile.

Walter Cannon in 1927 and Philip Bard proposed a more subtle model, known as
the Cannon-Bard theory, whereby emotional experience is understood to be able
to occur independently of bodily changes.633 Cannon proposed a special role for
the thalamus. According to the Cannon-Bard theory the thalamus and
hypothalamus, possibly inhibited by the cerebral cortex, are responsible for
emotional responses to stimuli. Subsequently it is apparent that these areas and
the sympathetic nervous system do have involvement in certain aspects of
emotional response and control.
631
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Other more recent theories have modified, and continue to modify these two
fundamental attitudes towards emotion.

In the 1930s Papez proposed a circuit responsible for emotion, with emotion
governed by the hypothalamus. The circuit involved a circular loop connecting
hypothalamus to thalamus, to ACC to hippocampus. He proposed that the ACC is
responsible for emotional experience. Links to the neocortex provide for a rich
emotional life. The hippocampus is no longer given the prominence in emotion
accorded to it by Papez. Nor does it seem that there is a single system responsible
for emotion. 634

The Schachter-Singer theory allows for self-knowledge of the degree of one’s
emotional arousal through observation of one’s own physiological changes. 635 In
1999, Antonio Damasio, aided by these direct insights into the emotional brain,
proposed a model to distinguish between observable behaviours, the emotions,
and the private experiences of feelings.636

2.5.2 Emotion and memory.
Context and emotional state are known to modify memory.637 Memory
reciprocally affects emotional state. Joseph LeDoux, a pioneer in the neural bases
of emotion, says, “My work is as much about memory and plasticity as
emotion.”638
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Recent studies have further explored the area of the interconnection of emotion
and memory. 639 Kalueff has reviewed the literature on the interplay between
memory and anxiety, and mechanisms of plasticity linked to anxiety, focussing
especially on the role of neurotransmitter systems and neuropeptides in
regulation of memory and anxiety processes.640

The author notes that brain synaptic plasticity is now known to be modulated by
both neurons and glial cells with glial Ca-binding protein S100B, and PACAP
(pituitary adenylate cyclase-activating polypeptide), noted as regulators of
synaptic plasticity. The connection of the latter with the expression of
neurotrophins is noted.641

LeDoux studies the area of the amygdala involved in the storage of emotional
memories, the lateral nucleus. Importantly he has described how subcortical
sensory inputs to the amygdala can drive emotional responses that precede
cortical awareness.642 We can react emotionally before rationally assessing the
situation.

2.5.3 Human brain areas associated with regulation of emotion.
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Figure 2.9 a.

Areas associated with the limbic system. Source: Saladin, Kenneth S. Anatomy and
Physiology. 6th ed. NY: McGraw Hill, 2012. 537.

Figure 2.9b

Location of key limbic areas. A 3D construction of the hippocampus, fornix
and amygdala within a translucent CNS. Source: Nolte, John. The human brain. An
introduction to its functional anatomy. 6th ed. Philadelphia: Mosby, 2009. 595.
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Emotion is processed in the brain primarily in regions including several parts of
the PFC, namely dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), ventromedial PFC
(VMPFC), OFC, as well as the amygdala, hippocampus, ACC, and insular cortex. 643.
The limbic cortex is found “on the medial brain surface, in the cingulate gyrus and
medial frontal lobe, and on the orbital surface of the frontal lobe”.644

Neuroimaging (see Appendix 3) shows that distinct subregions of the PFC have
specific function in relation to emotion regulation. fMRI imaging, which detects
brain activity with resolution down to 1mm3, can show areas that are active but
not necessarily all areas necessarily involved. The limbic cortical areas, those areas
of the cortex adjacent to the limbic area, have been identified as the DLPFC, the
VMPFC, and the OFC. These areas now believed to be a “cerebral association area
for the control of behaviour”.645

It appears that there are brain circuits for specific emotions, for example,
implicating the insula in disgust, the amygdala in fear, and the PFC in conscious
representations of emotion. The hypothalamus also carries out a number of
functions associated with emotion, the basic drives for thirst and feeding. It
directs motor patterns associated with various emotional responses such as pain,
pleasure, sexual arousal, and rage and it has a role in coordination of autonomic
functions affected by emotional arousal. It also coordinates release of a number of
hormones such as oxytocin.646

The amygdala plays a key role in particular emotional experience. The nuclei of
the amygdala “mediate the effects of sensory stimuli on emotional behaviour”;
“through interconnections with other cortical and subcortical structures it
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controls emotional expression and behaviour.”647 The amygdala is particularly
active in mediating early attachment relationships, and reaction to stress and non
conscious emotional memories.648 Building on studies by Jerome Kagan who had
demonstrated that traits such as timidity and shyness persisted from childhood
into adulthood, Schwartz et al. (2003) conducted fMRI scans of some of these
inhibited babies, now in early adulthood. The scans showed that the amygdala of
this group tended to be overactive, reflecting fear and anxiety, in the presence of
novelty.649

The interconnections between the limbic cortical areas and the limbic areas
themselves are becoming increasingly well defined. The amygdala is now known
to receive neuronal signals from all limbic cortical areas, and from the temporal,
parietal and occipital cortex (most especially the auditory and visual association
areas).650 Efferent connections return to these cortical areas as well as to the
hippocampus, the septum, the thalamus and the hypothalamus. The anterior
cingulate gyrus has anterior connections to the amygdala and posterior
connections to the hippocampus.651

Of the neurotransmitters in the brain, the amines - DA, 5-HT and norepinephrine
(NE) - have been shown to play a role in modulating the individual’s emotional
responses.652 These are critical to the brain’s excitatory and inhibitory
mechanisms of control: NE from the locus ceruleus is usually excitatory, DA
(inhibitory in the BG, and possibly excitatory elsewhere in the cortex) is critical in
the body’s reward systems (see 2.6.1), 5-HT from the raphe nuclei released in the
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hypothalamus and limbic structures is known to inhibit aggression, and ACh from
the gigantocellular neurons of the reticular excitatory area is excitatory.653

654

2.5.3.1 Involvement of prefrontal cortex in emotional regulation.655

Here we look at the implication of the cortical areas in management, or more
properly, inhibition of emotion.656 Pollak points out that most emotion studies
take a top down approach because of the fact that damage to PFC leads to poor
emotional regulation.657

Nevertheless, recent studies in emotion regulation do note the interdependence
of brain areas and integration of systems. For example, Salzman and Fusi found in
2010 that the “functional and the electrophysiological characteristics of the
amygdala and the PFC overlap and intimately depend on each other. Thus, the
neural circuits mediating cognitive, emotional, physiological, and behavioural
responses may not truly be separable and instead are inextricably linked.” 658
Furthermore Ray and Zald (2012) argue that PFC-limbic interaction is more
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reciprocal than the conventional top-down models would suggest,659 as the
ventral and dorsal PFC are in rich reciprocal communication with the amygdala.660

The complexity of pathways implicated in emotional regulation is being
progressively revealed. A major magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study of 1900
14 year old teenagers noted seven cortical and subcortical networks implicated in
inhibition of activity and six networks implicated in failed inhibitions.661

There has been a growing body of knowledge about the role that the PFC, and its
constituent implicated areas, play in managing emotion. Specific areas of the PFC
implicated in emotional processing have been identified, with specialised roles
attributed to them. Barbas and Zikopoulos noted, “The three distinct prefrontal
sectors, namely the lateral, orbitofrontal and medial, are interconnected, and
provide the basis for interaction of pathways underlying cognitive and emotional
processes.” 662

Davidson explains that the PFC "represents emotion in the absence of
immediately present elicitor, playing an important role in assessing affective
consequences of actions, and in persistence of emotion.” 663 Particular sections of
the PFC seem to play a major role in regulation of the duration of emotion, and
the suppression of negative emotion once elicited, essentially an affective working
memory. These areas work together to generate information and behaviour
related to emotion.
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He states that individual affective and regulatory differences are attributable to
“asymmetries” in the PFC and in the contribution of the amygdala.664 As a general
rule, the left hemisphere appears to play a greater role than the right in cortical
regulation of emotion. Pronounced right frontal asymmetry in young adults,
evident in electroencephalography (EEG) scans showing disproportionate activity
of right over left against controls, is associated with negativity and withdrawing
behaviours. Even sad and crying infants show greater EEG activity in the right
hemisphere. Happy infants show more left frontal EEG activity. 665 Left and right
side damage to the PFC areas reveals the differing function of these areas. Left
side damage leads to greater incidence of depressive symptoms, as it normally
plays a role in positive affect. 666 The right hemisphere of the brain tends to favour
the immediate, limbic response prior to cerebral modification. 667

The VMPFC appears to play a key role in predicting positive and negative affective
consequences.668 Both the experience of pain and witnessing the pain of others
leads to activation of the mPFC and the insula, as well as the lateral cerebellum. 669
Morgan and colleagues in 1994 documented a study of 36 rats designed to
evaluate the role of the mPFC in the phenomenon of fear extinction by means of
classical fear conditioning. The mPFC is a region commonly understood to play a
role in emotional reactivity and autonomic regulation. The study demonstrated
that the mPFC plays a significant role for fear extinction in rats.670
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664

Davidson, “Affective style, psychopathology, and resilience: Brain mechanisms and plasticity,”
1196-1214.
665
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 220-221. See also Schore,
“Effects of a secure attachment relationship on right brain development, affect regulation and
infant mental health,” 7-66.
666
Davidson, “Affective style, psychopathology, and resilience: Brain mechanisms and plasticity,”
1196-1214.
667
Davidson, “Affective style, psychopathology, and resilience: Brain mechanisms and plasticity,”
1196-1214.
668
Davidson, “Affective style, psychopathology, and resilience: Brain mechanisms and plasticity,”
1196-1214.
669
th
Nolte, The human brain. An introduction to its functional anatomy, 6 ed., 605.
670
Maria A. Morgan, Lizabeth M. Romanski and Joseph E. LeDoux, “Extinction of emotional
learning: contribution of the medial prefrontal cortex,” Neuroscience Letters 163, 1 (1993): 109113.
The study showed that rats with lesions in the mPFC (created by insertion of electrode and current
to the specific brain area) took on average some 80% longer period than control rats to return to
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The ACC, within the mPFC, has been called the “major outflow of the limbic
system, also involved in evaluating pain and distress vocalisation” 672 The ACC also
plays a role in directing attention, inhibited impulsive behaviours, and in
generating goal-directed behaviours.673 It appears to play a role in analysing
conflicting options.674

The OFC is the limbic gateway to the cortex. Balbernie suggests that it is through
the OFC that the limbic system and the cortex interact. This view is now widely
accepted and as such the OFC plays a central role in cortical regulation of
emotion,675 and is activated when we are making decisions on the basis of
emotion laden information.676 Brain imaging studies have also shown that the
OFC plays a role in the brain’s reward systems, 677 consistent with the view that
OFC functions pertain to the emotional component underlying and individual’s
reaction to events in the environment.678 Imaging studies of orphans (See 2.2.4.1)
revealed abnormalities consistent with the behaviours that appear to follow upon
being raised in environments of social deprivation, in particular, the manifestation
of an underactive OFC in comparison with normal children.679

The PFC, and especially the OFC, receives inputs related to emotion from various
brain locations including amygdala, thalamus, VTA, and olfactory system. Major
connections from the OFC include to the hippocampus, the amygdala and the
established criteria for fear extinction to the conditioned stimulus, demonstrating that the mPFC
plays a significant role for fear extinction in rats.
671
Morgan et al., “Extinction of emotional learning: contribution of the medial prefrontal cortex,”
109-113.
672
M. I. Posner and M. K. Rothbart, “Developing mechanisms of self regulation,” Development and
Psychopathology 12, (2000): 429.
673
Markowitsch, H, et al., “Brain circuits for the retrieval of sad and happy autobiographic
episodes,” Cortex 39, (2003): 643-665.
674
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 88.
675
Balbernie, “Circuits and circumstances. The neurobiological consequences of early relationship
experiences and how they shape later behavior,” 237-255.
676
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 226.
677
Wagner and Silber, Physiological Psychology, 193.
678
M. Roesch and G. Schoenbaum, “OFC as gateway,” in The Orbitofrontal Cortex, ed. David H. Zald
and Scott L. Rauch (Oxford: OUP, 2006), 202.
679
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 8.
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hypothalamus. Damage to the left OFC of Phineas Gage, appears to have been a
significant factor in his reduced inhibition and heightened irresponsibility.680

Arden and Linford described clinical therapies for neuroplastic remodelling of the
frontal lobes. They reported that as affect regulation in the PFC improves, the OFC
can effectively inhibit activation of subcortical areas such as the amygdala.681

Conscious regulation of emotion utilizes both the DLPFC and VMPFC. It is believed
that the DLPFC recruits input from the VMPFC (which includes the OFC) when
there are conflicting emotional situations.682 It has been shown that the DLPFC,
interacting with ventrolateral PFC (VLPFC) and ACC, is active in choosing not to
follow “prepotent behaviour” or in choosing a novel behaviour. 683 Studies to
determine volitional control of behaviour have found that impairment in monkeys
is analogous to that in humans. Monkeys seeking reward by moving a joystick in a
particular way in specific response to a visual cue are shown to be greatly
impaired if there be damage to the VLPFC and orbital PFC. 684

Recent papers analysing regulation dysfunction by Bennett (2011), and
Heatherton and Wagner (2011), offer insights into pathways for cortical regulation
of emotion. Both studies confirm the role of DA induced cortical plasticities in
cortical regulation and the contribution of cortico-striatal circuits. Bennett reports
that modulation of the prefrontal-limbic network (including ACC, amygdala and
hippocampus) is principally through the hypothalamus, BG and midbrain.
680

Phineas Gage, in 1848, suffered the loss of much of his medial PFC. His behaviour changed,
becoming irreverent and profane, socially inappropriate, and unable to plan. Frontal damage leads
to disinhibition, emotional impairment, difficulty in planning, and impaired working memory.
681
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 31-40.
682
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 88.
683
Tatia M. C. Lee, et al., “Regulation of human behaviours (Review),” Future Neurology 2, 2
(2007): 190. The lateral PFC is activated by cognitive tasks, the VLPFC by tasks requiring
information in working memory, and the DLPFC when information must be manipulated. Anterior
areas of PFC may have a role in information transfer between these other areas.
684
Tomita et al., showed that disconnecting the PFC from temporal cortex prevented in monkeys
the activation of stored memories.Although there is a need for some caution in drawing direct
parallels between monkey and human PFC function some limited conclusions are possible: that
monkeys with PFC damage are impaired on conditional learning tasks, show emotional
impairment, and are impaired at object recognition. H. Tomita, et al. “Top down signal from
prefrontal cortex in executive control of memory retrieval” Nature 401, (1999): 699-703.
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Dysregulation of this network gives rise to major depression disorders.685
Dysregulation tends to follow one of three pathways: the hypothalamic-pituitaryadrenal (HPA) axis, through the BG, and consequent to modulatory change in the
midbrain VT and Raphe nucleus.

The high levels of cortisol evident in adolescent suicidal patients are attributable
to failure of the glutocorticoid receptor inhibiting release of corticotrophin
releasing factor and adrenocorticotrophic hormone. Epigenetic causes
attributable to abuse lead to decrease in the glutocorticoid receptor. Suicidal
patients are also characterised by reduced grey matter in the ACC and increased
grey matter in the amygdala linked directly to reduced or increased formation of
synaptic spines.

Later life depressive mood appears related to dysfunction in the caudate that
disrupts the DLPFC-subcortical connectivity normally involved in goal election and
suppression of negative thoughts. Furthermore another loop (the OFC, subgenual
ACC, ventralmedial striatum and amygdala) normally associated with goal directed
behaviour, is disrupted by hyper activity most probably as a result of
hyperintensities in the caudate. In schizophrenia reduced levels of DA in the PFC
(and high activity in the amygdala) are associated with depression and increased
levels in the striatum are associated with positive affect.686

Heatherton and Wagner found two independent pathways mediating frontal
regulation of emotion: a more successful frontal-striatal pathway, and a frontalamygdalic pathway that was less successful in regulation.687

Another recent area of investigation into cognitive control has involved self
regulation of amygdalic activation. Twenty-eight right-handed, medically- and
685

M. R. Bennett, “The prefrontal-limbic network in depression: Modulation by hypothalamus,
basal ganglia and midbrain,” Progress in Neurobiology 93, (2011): 483.
686
M. R. Bennett, “The prefrontal-limbic network in depression: Modulation by hypothalamus,
basal ganglia and midbrain,” 470.
687
Todd F. Heatherton and Dylan D. Wagner, “Cognitive Neuroscience of Self-Regulation Failure,”
Trends in Cognitive Science 15, 3 (2011): 132–139.
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psychiatrically-healthy male volunteers (age 28.0±9.0 years), were used.
Participants were given real-time fMRI neurofeedback and demonstrated most
clearly the capacity to downregulate activity in the left amygdala while
contemplating positive autobiographical memories.688

Attentional processes in the brain predispose for emotional self regulation. A 2001
study by Beauregard et al. had 10 young adult males with an average age of 23.5
years watch erotic films but in contrasting scenarios. In the first they were asked
to watch naturally, in the second, they were asked to suppress sexual responses.
In the first, fMRI imaging detected increased activity in right temporal pole, right
amygdala and hypothalamus. In the second, no increased activity was detected in
these areas but in the DLPFC and ACC.689 Posner and Rothbart state, “Top down
mechanisms, such as attention, may serve as models of how neural activity may
be increased or decreased in networks to establish processing priorities”.690
Beyond the PFC areas already mentioned (DLPFC, VMPFC, ACC, the insular cortex,
and the OFC) Pollak and Eslinger note that the integrated systems of emotional
control further involve the cognitive management of areas for attention, memory,
and action. 691 Posner notes that executive attention is associated with activity in
the midline frontal areas in the anterior cingulated gyrus. 692 (See 2.5.5.)

These views with respect to cognitive management of fear responses are
consistent with recent findings of Hartley and Phelps.693 They find, “Many
different cognitive strategies can be used to regulate emotion, including
688

Vadim Zotev et al., “Self-Regulation of Amygdala Activation Using Real-Time fMRI
Neurofeedback,” PLoS One 6, 9 (2011).
689
Mario Beauregard, et al., “Neural correlates of Conscious Self-Regulation of Emotion,” The
Journal of Neuroscience 21, (2001): 1-6.
690
Posner and Rothbart, “Developing mechanisms of self regulation” 427-441.
691
Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with
developmental approaches to psychopathology,” 747.
692
Posner and Rothbart, “Developing mechanisms of self regulation,” 429.
693
Catherine A. Hartley and Elizabeth A. Phelps, “Changing Fear: The Neurocircuitry of Emotion
Regulation,” Neuropsychopharmacology 35, 1 (2010): 136–146. Hartley and Phelps describe neural
bases for four techniques of emotional regulation successful in management of fear: extinction,
cognitive regulation, active coping, and reconsolidation. Reconsolidation notes the linkage
between memory and fear, and refers to the capacity to reconsolidate and reconstruct memories
more positively. Again these techniques can be taught. They note the role of the striatum in active
coping strategies.
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reappraisal,694 selective attention, and suppression,” noting that regulation
strategies can be learned through cognitive therapy. Significantly with respect to
this study, they note that, “once habitual (my emphasis), these strategies become
easier to easier to enact over time.” Cognitive regulation relies on DLPFC
projections to the VMPFC inhibiting amygdalic acitivity. Ochsner discusses the
various pathways involved in reappraisal mediated by DMPFC and VLPFC
downregulation of the amygdala.

Figure 2.10

Phineas Gage and the role of the medial PFC in emotion regulation. A
reconstruction of the injury suffered by Phineas Gage indicating extensive
damage to the VLPFC. It appears the DLPFC was largely untouched.
Source: Damasio, H. et al. Science 264 (1994): 1102. Cited in Nolte, John. The human brain. An
introduction to its functional anatomy. 6th ed. Philadelphia: Mosby, 2009. 136.

2.5.4 Plasticity in the mechanisms of emotional regulation.

The various mechanisms of plasticity underpin the patterns of emotional
expression and regulation that develop in the individual.695 Pollak says that “the

694

Reappraisal involves “reinterpreting the meaning of a stimulus, including one’s personal
connection to it, to change one’s emotional response.” Kevin N. Ochsner, et al., “Functional
imaging studies of emotion regulation:a synthetic review and evolving model of the cognitive
control of emotion,” Annals Of The New York Academy Of Sciences 1251, (2012): E1–E24. Ochsner
et al. offer a current comprehensive review of emotion regulation.
695
Davidson, “Affective style, psychopathology, and resilience: Brain mechanisms and plasticity,”
1196-1214. Animal studies attest to the pronounced plasticity of emotional circuitry, showing that
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heuristic of plasticity refers to how experience leads to changes in these affective
neural networks, including the efficiency, activation thresholds, and time courses
of those activations.” 696 He argues, in alignment with Goldman-Rakic et al. (1997),
that dopaminergic and serotonergic induced, experience-based, changes take
place in the neural pathways involved in emotional regulation. 697

He identifies the following features of plasticity in the affective pathways:


The VMPFC and OFC are needed for associating incoming information with
existing response contingencies, linking information to motivational
importance, and for working memory... plasticity in these areas is
necessary for object reward association memory, and contextual fear
conditioning.



In primate studies, the amygdala has been shown to project directly to
medial thalamic nucleus and thence to VMPFC, facilitating involvement in
processing social information requiring plasticity dependent learning and
memory.



He argues that although complex social behaviours are unlikely to be
centred in one place, the amygdala seems to be critical in stimulusreinforcement conditioning, whereby “neural cues acquire positive and
negative incentive status and emotional meaning.” 698

He notes the contribution of DA induced plasticity in the emotional pathways, and
highlights associations with attentional mechanisms: 699

early experience exercises extraordinary role in determining the final characteristics of the nervous
system.
696
Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with
developmental approaches to psychopathology,”735.
697
Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with
developmental approaches to psychopathology,”747.
698
Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with
developmental approaches to psychopathology,”742. Hence lesions to the amygdala impair
performance on associative learning tasks involving emotional expressions. This is also relevant to
the next section focusing on reward pathways.
699
Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with
developmental approaches to psychopathology,”735. Pollak also draws conclusions the role that
mechanisms of attention play.
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The mPFC, especially the ACC, has abundant links to the limbic system via
the hippocampus, the shell region of the NAc and the amygdala. There is a
likely contribution of this pathway to DA and 5-HT modulation of cortical
socioemotional areas.



He notes that release of DA, as we have seen a recognised mediator of
plasticity, is triggered by corticolimbic afferents. He notes that repeated
stressful experiences seem to alter the balance of both excitatory and
inhibitory inputs from the limbic system and that the basolateral amygdala
system may receive stress messaging from the VTA facilitating learning
through DA neurons within the VTA, NAc and other areas.



He notes the work of Passetti et al. suggesting that DA in the mPFC
facilitates attention. And he suggests that the mPFC provides goal directed
motor plans informed by context from the hippocampus.



Following the work of Schultz in 1998 he argues that the DA system acts as
a learning signal for behavioural reinforcement but also may well be
involved in attention and motivation before all important events, both
positive and negative. He notes also the work of Pruessner et al. (2004) on
DA release in humans caused by psychological stress, and of Mayberg who
insists that loops of brain activity need to be understood as part of the
mechanism.

Systems for emotional management are summarised in Table 2.8.

2.5.5 Development of attentional mechanisms.
Attention facilitates cognitive regulation of emotion.700The psychology of
attention goes back to William James at the end of the 19 th century. He drew
together the notions of attention and choice: “Volition is nothing but attention”

700

Ironically training for mindfulness seeks to reduce habitual evaluative processing down the PFC
midline, and direct attention to limbic in-the-moment sensory pathways. Norman A. S. Farb et al.,
“The Mindful Brain and Emotion Regulation in Mood Disorders” Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 57,
2 (2012): 70–77.
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and that “effort of attention is the essential phenomenon of will”.701 He defined
attention as “the taking possession of the mind in clear and vivid form of one out
of what seem several simultaneous objects or trains of thought.” 702 Attention may
be seen on the one hand as a neural mechanism, albeit at the higher end of
cognitive activity, for selection of stimuli or tasks. 703 It is also linked to
consciousness and a facilitator of free choice.

Posner reviews the evidence that the development of attentional mechanisms
constitutes the essential feature of affect regulation; “Within cognitive
psychology, the mechanisms thought to be involved in self-control are collectively
called attention.” 704 He notes particularly the work of Broadbent in the late 50s
who first proposed that we have the ability to filter unwanted inputs so as to
attend. He notes six forms of attentional plasticity are discussed, principally from
the neurosystems level, dealing with mechanisms related to voluntary control of
thought. 705

701

Quoted in Schwartz and Begley, The Mind and the Brain, 317.
Quoted in Schwartz and Begley, The Mind and the Brain, 325. William James argued that the
essential achievement of the will was to fix the attention on a stimulus or thought and hold it fast
before the mind, and that “Volition acts through attention – which magnifies, stabilizes, clarifies,
one thought out of many. The essential achievement of the will is to hold one thought/attend to
one object and hold it clear and strong before the mind, letting all others – its rivals for attention
and all subsequent action – fade.”
703
For overview of attentional mechanism see: John H. Reynolds, et al. “Attention” in Larry Squire,
rd
et al. Fundamental Neuroscience, 3 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008).
704
Posner and Rothbart, “Developing mechanisms of self regulation,” 428. This view is based on
the observation that parenting involves teaching children to pay attention to specific desirable
behaviours and to be aware when personal behaviours become undesirable is looks on attentional
networks, themselves affected by the social environment, as a key to developing regulation.
705
Posner and Rothbart, “Developing mechanisms of self regulation,” 429. First, effortful control of
attention means that we attend and amplify “the amount of neural activity within the area
performing the calculation.” The second mechanism of plasticity is priming, whereby we are able
to retune our attention in another direction because of a trigger event or word. Priming may occur
independently of previous attention. Third, practice consolidates pathways to material which is
already known. Fourth, new connections are established when new associations are being made.
Fifth, are strategies of chunking, decoding, and sounding out. Finally changes in brain structures
may develop over the early life of a person eg development of attentional structures in a young
child over the course of several years... eg orienting and development of executive control.
702
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Studies provide convergent evidence for a fronto-parietal attentional control
system. 706 Structures in the parietal, frontal and cingulated cortices at the top of
the visual system hierarchy, appear to generate signals guiding selective attention,
providing feedback signals that influence sensory processing at the more physical
level. Michael Merzenich regards the nucleus basalis, and the attention system in
which it plays a critical part, as “the modulatory control system of plasticity”.
Learning in critical periods is effortless because the nucleus basalis is always on
during these periods. Furthermore it has been shown that critical periods can be
reopened by artificially turning on the nucleus basalis. ACh from the nucleus
basalis appears to be responsible for the mediation of vivid memories. 707

NE is important in the brain’s attentional systems, with afferent distribution by
two significant pathways to the frontal lobes. The first is via the cingulate gyrus
and favours the right hemisphere, appearing to be associated with internal body
states and sense of self. The second is from the amygdala to the OFC, favouring
the left. It appears to be linked to close monitoring of behaviour.708

Certain forms of learning, and the plasticity associated with learning, are closely
linked to the exercise of attention.709 Intense concentration and full attention can
provide a “necessary condition for plastic change”.710 Developmental plasticity

706

See for example: S. Kastner, et al., “Increased activity in human visual cortex during directed
attention in the absence of visual stimulation,” Neuron 22, (1999): 751-761.
707
Observations of neuroscientist Michael Merzenich quoted in Doidge, The brain that changes
itself, 84-88. See also: Koch, “Consciousness.” Further studies reviewed and providing insight into
attentional mechanisms: C. J. McAdams and J. H. Maunsell, “Effects of attention on the reliability
of individual neurons in the monkey visual cortex,” Neuron 23, 4 (1999):765-773. J. H. Reynolds
and L. Chelazzi, “Attentional modulation of visual processing,” Annual Review of Neuroscience 27,
(2004): 611-647.
708
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 207. The EEG results are
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709
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studies reviewed and providing insight into reward mechanisms involving the PFC: R. A. Barkley,
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“Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder” in Child psychopathology, 2 ed., eds. E. J. Mash and A.
Barkley, A (NY: Guildford Press, 2006); F. X. Castellanos, et al., “Anatomic brain abnormalities in
monozygotic twins discordant for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,” American Journal of
Psychiatry 160 (2003): 1693-1696; J. N. Giedd, et al., “Anatomic brain imaging studies of normal
and abnormal brain development in children and adolescence” in Development psychopathology,
Vol 2, eds. D. Cicchett and D. Cohen (New Jersey: Wiley, 2006).
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N Doidge (2008) The Brain that changes itself. Melbourne: Scribe p249.
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studies in the developing mechanisms of attention in children offer further
insights. Children develop both reactive and self-regulatory mechanisms,
balancing self-expression and conformity with basic social norms. There are
various proposals why attention is necessary: to avoid bottlenecks, and avoid that
several objects in a given spatial field activate the same neuron.

Executive attention is associated with activity in the midline frontal areas in the
anterior cingulated gyrus. Nevertheless, even though hypnosis had been used to
lessen anterior cingulate activity and the perception of pain without reducing the
activity in the somatosensory cortex, when subjects were subjected to heat
stimuli,711 emotional regulation was not simply about learning not to pay
attention. Genetic studies have shown Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD) genetic trait affecting the DA4 receptor expressed in Layer 4 of the
cingulate. There is reciprocal interplay between affect and attention; studies show
that anterior cingulate attention mechanisms automatically turn on as sadness
heightens. 712

Furthermore there are striking contrasts between universal trajectories of
development and those of the individual child. Of particularly interest is the work
of Kochanska et al. linking development of conscience to temperamental
differences in effortful control. 713 Eigsti et al. note the ability to direct attention
away from rewarding stimuli during a delay of gratification task in toddlers
predicts cognitive control later in life.714
711

Posner and Rothbart, “Developing mechanisms of self regulation,” 427-441.
Posner and Rothbart, “Developing mechanisms of self regulation,” 427-441.
713
Posner and Rothbart, “Developing mechanisms of self regulation,” 427-441, for discussion of
Kochanska’s work. They documented in 2000 that obedience at nine months predicts effortful
control at 22 months. It seems that temperament and self regulation (including control of
emotion) each follow a remarkably stable developmental trajectory in the first three years. Based
on his studies of conflict resolution in children below 3 years using a modified Stroop test, Posner
documents rapid gains in executive attention and executive control at about 30 months allowing
the child to exercise inhibitory control over behaviour on his own. Yet in subsequent years, there
are remarkable variations, typified perhaps most strikingly by Mischel’s marshmallow test of 1972
which successfully predicted adolescent self control on the basis of infant capacity for delayed
gratification. Mischel, et al., "Cognitive and attentional mechanisms in delay of gratification".
714
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adulthood,” Psychological Science 17, (2006): 478–484.
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In short, attentional mechanisms are amongst those neural pathways critical to
effective affect regulation.

Attentional systems are summarised in Table 2.9.

Figure 2.11

Links between attention and emotion regulation. An example of imaging
that demonstrates the underdeveloped capacity of adolescents (in
comparison with adults) to suppress fearful emotions in response to images
of fearful faces (example in a), and also to attend to non emotional stimuli.
Adolescents showed increased activation of the ACC and left OFC in
comparison with adults. When attention was to the nose (not directly
conveying emotion) only ACC showed increased activation. These results are
consistent with the view that adolescents, in general, have underdeveloped
capacities for attention and fear suppression, in comparison with adults.
Source: Monk C.S. et al. Adolescent immaturity in attention related brain engagement to
emotional facial expressions,” Neuroimage 20 (2003) 420-428. Cited in Blakemore, Sarah-Jayne.
“The social brain in adolescence.” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9 (2008): 273.

2.6

Neural bases for goal directed behaviours and reward activation.

Having reviewed current research into the neural bases for habit formation and
the role of emotions, we now turn to a closely related topic, the neural bases for
goal directed behaviours and reward activation. There are various psychological
theories accounting for motivation. The various approaches tend to reduce to
two: behaviourists think in terms of drives whereas cognitive theorists consider
goals. The anthropology of this study fits more comfortably with cognitive
suppositions about human freedom. Within this view, human motivation is
characterised by behaviours either to increase the probability of a desired result,
or to reduce it. We can call the first appetitive motivation and the second aversive
motivation. This view is broadly compatible with an Aristotelian-Thomistic
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understanding of human action: it sits most comfortably with the a recurrent
theme in Aristotle’s psychology: that we must raise children to seek pleasure in
those things that are good for them, and to endure difficulties for a worthy goal.

Neuroscience has identified various reward pathways that facilitate both goal
directed actions and reward based conditioning. DA modulation of activity in the
BG is believed to be critically involved in mediating reward activation and
associated goal directed activities. An appreciation of recent research in these
areas is particularly important to this study if we consider that virtue is not simple
habit but the acquisition of habits that during acquisition, or at least after
acquisition (if those habits have been acquired as an infant), are the subject of
appetitive motivation.

Converging research also identifies the close alignment of the neurobiology for
pleasure and pain.715 As neural bases of reward as well as for certain aversive
events exhibit a “common currency” we gain insights into the processes of cortical
regulation, “action selection between competing pleasant and aversive events”.716

In this section I look at recent insights into forms of learning and motivation
mediated by DA, and the interplay of the cortical regions with the reward and
limbic emotional centres. I also draw some conclusions based on recent work on
addiction.

In particular I note the involvement of cortical centres and the BG in the process
whereby A-O goal oriented behaviours, with automatisation, change to S-O
actions. I suggest that this provides a model for the development of virtuous
behaviours which are resistant to reward devaluation, retain a certain intrinsic
motivation, and for which we have developed an ease of action.

715

Leknes andTracey, “A common neurobiology for pain and pleasure,” 314-320. The article
reviews current literature in the field.
716
Leknes and Tracey, “A common neurobiology for pain and pleasure,” 318.
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2.6.1 Reward pathways and motivation.

There are two chemical driven pleasure systems in the brain:


The “exciting” pleasure system which is appetitive and involves tension.
This is DA driven. Surges of DA consolidate reward associations in our
brains particularly in the cortex and in the NAc.



The “satisfying” pleasure system which is consumatory, calming, blissful
and fulfilling. This is endorphin (opiate) driven.717 Opiates are in four
categories of neuropeptides: endorphins, enkephalins, endomorphins, and
dynorphins.

These two systems are interactive. -opioid signalling is evident in pleasurable
and antinociceptive (pain-killing) mechanisms, but also is mutually reinforcing of
phasic DA release that is also associated with preparation or consummation of
pleasurable reward.718 Not only does DA facilitate goal election and emotional
control, but as an initiator of plasticity, it holds a key to the consolidation of
choices enabling future choices.

In addition the hormone oxytocin also seems to play a role upregulating mood,
signalling affirmative social connection and facilitating bonding. (See 2.3.6.2.)

There are two major dopamine systems in the brain:


one projecting from the SNpc to the caudate and the putamen in the
striatum and in a minor way to the NAc;



another, the mesocorticolimbic DA system, sometimes known as the
mesolimbic dopamine system, originating in the VTA and innervating the
NAc, the amygdala and the various parts of the cortex, particularly the PFC.
This second system is regarded as central to the brain’s reward circuit.719 It

717
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719
rd
Martin, Neuroanatomy: Text and Atlas, 3 ed., 390.
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is phasic DA signalling in this latter system that is is reciprocally reinforcing
of -opioid release. 720

The complex neuronal mechanisms of motivation have by no means been fully
documented but there is a well founded view that DA release in the NAc,
associated with specific outcomes either by anticipation or possession, is a
powerful motivator.721 This is of particular significance in this study as the NAc is a
region of the BG and well connected with other regions.

LTP and LTD at the synapse seem implicated in positive reinforcement and habit
learning. In the dorsal striatum, DA inputs especially in the medial and lateral
areas that link to associative and sensorimotor cortical areas are received from
the SNpc. The role of LTP and LTD in movement initiation and learning in this area
have been well described. In the ventral striatum, although “mechanisms
underlying the potential association between striatal neuroplasticity and rewardrelated behaviours and learning are still far from being elucidated”722 hedonic
reward has been long believed to be mediated by DA projections from the VTA of
the basal forebrain. 723 Two classes of striatal neurons have been identified in
signalling reward related events, in each case utilising DA.

DA as we have seen, along with ACh, Epi, Histamine, NE and 5-HT, constitutes the
amines, neurotransmitters which are associated with the muscular interface,
emotions, motivation and cognition. None seem to play a mediating role in the
CNS, rather all have specific modulatory roles. Animal research supports the view
that variation in a single amine can profoundly affect behaviour, and the
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functioning of neural networks. This is confirmed, for example, in studies showing
that variation in 5-HT is powerful predictor of human behavioural variation. 724

2.6.2 Classical conditioning and DA reinforcement.

As we are focused on the development of virtue as a learned behaviour, it is
appropriate for us to look at varieties of learned behaviours. We have seen that
learning can be non associative (habituation and sensitisation) or associative
(classical or operant conditioning, where reinforcement or punishment changes
the probabilities of a given behaviour in the future).

Classical conditioning was discovered by Pavlov in 1927. As we have seen, the
hippocampus is shown to be implicated in initial stages, and the cerebellum
critical, at least for intermediate retention of the learned response.725
Instrumental conditioning, a variety of operant conditioning, was first identified by
Skinner in 1938 who showed that the provision of pleasurable consequences
made it more likely that behaviours be reinforced or repeated. This reinforcement
may be positive (involving rewards) or negative (withdrawal of a reward). It is
noted that punishment is not as effective for learning as negative reinforcement.

Olds and Milner noted in 1954 that rats will self stimulate (by pressing a lever
causing an electrical stimulus to the limbic system) in a highly repetitive way (2000
presses per hour). Monkeys have been noted at 8000 presses per hour. Humans
wired for the same form of test found the stimulation pleasurable in a non specific
way.

The median forebrain bundle has been shown to provide for reliable stimulation in
humans through enhanced DA release. “The median forebrain bundle reinforces
724

Depue andCollins, “Neurobiology of the structure of personality: Dopamine, facilitation of
incentive motivation, and extraversion,” 514.
725
Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural constituents,” 844. Note that the hippocampus
appears implicated in explicit recall of memories that affect current goal setting. Roles of the
hippocampus and cerebellum were initially identified by Thompson, et al.
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the connection between the system that detects the pleasurable stimulus (eg
seeing some food) and the motor system that carries out the desired behaviour
(eg eating). In other words, this region of the brain carries the mechanism of
reinforcement.” 726

This is of relevance on two counts. First, when a baby or an animal is trained in a
good habit, there is a degree of conditioning involved. An incentive is provided.
Forms of incentive learning can be central to the way in which we train children,
and learn ourselves. We will see that this concept is of relevance to the
development of fortitude and justice. Second, we will see that incentive
conditioning can lay foundations in the striatum for habit, a critical component for
both virtues and vices; behaviours which are resilient to removal of the incentive.
The relationship between DA and impusivity is an area of active current study.727
Pine et al., for example discuss the role of disordered DA neurotransmission in
mediation of impulsiveness in behaviours that include addiction, gambling
compulsively, ADHD and dopamine dysregulation syndrome. They found that
increased sensory quality of rewards increases DA uptake leading to increased
impulsivity during decision making.

2.6.3 Goal directed plasticity in the amygdala.
It is apparent that the amygdala is involved in complex positive reward circuitry.728
The research of Tye and colleagues (2008) finds evidence linking cue-reward
learning and synaptic plasticity in the lateral amygdala (LA), and suggests that this
is a decisive mechanism underpinning goal directed behaviour.
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The LA is recognised to associate emotional and motivational values to specific
environmental cues including those associated with rewards. The authors were
able to show in studies performed on adult male Sprague-Dawley rats (250350gm) trained to self administer sucrose as a reward, that, within the space of
one training session, reward learning was proportional to cue induced firing of
amygdala neurons, and that this cue-reward learning highly correlated with
induced strengthening of AMPA thalamic synapses. They demonstrated that
NMDA receptor (NMDAR) blockade within the LA impaired these processes,
consistent with established knowledge that the activation of NMDARs leads to
increased AMPAR currents.729 (For discussion of NMDA mediated plasticities see
2.2.5.1 a)

2.6.4 Reinforcement in basal ganglia learning.

The BG are shown to be decisive in reward learning. Konorski notes that while
lesions of sensorimotor cortex impede skilled movement, and lesions of premotor
cortex “impaired the chaining of action repertoires”, lesions of the BG affected the
instrumentality of actions so that tested animals could no longer act for reward to
avert adverse outcome. 730

The two main forms of instrumental behaviour are associated with goal directed
actions (A-O behaviours), with an intended consequence, and stimulus driven
habits (S-R behaviours) essentially triggered by antecedent stimuli.731 In this
section we look more deeply at these types of instrumental behaviours, and the
evidence for each of these in the BG. Each has different neural substrates within
the BG.732

These insights are of significance in the present study for several reasons:
729

Kay M. Tye, et al., “Rapid strengthening of thalamo-amygdala synapses mediates cue-reward
learning,” Nature 453, (2008): 1253-7.
730
Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 465.
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Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation.”
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Graybiel, “Habits, Rituals, and the Evaluative Brain,” 364. Evidence suggests that learning in the
BG is a dynamic process, facilitated by highly redundant parallel pathways.
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i)

They help to explain the facility with which actions can be carried out.
A-O behaviours transform to S-R behaviours. 733 The interconnected
loci of A-O and S-R circuitry in the BG is now reasonably well mapped
both in human studies and in animal studies. “Human imaging studies
of habit learning have found that overtraining of a behaviour shifts the
cortical substrate.”734 The neural footprint during this process migrates
from ventral to dorsal regions of the striatum. Ventrally based limbic
reward becomes less significant; the dorsal striatum characterised by
habit formation and addictions becomes associated with management
pathways of actions. 735

Studies by Dickinson et al. of habit formation in animals demonstrate
that goal directed, A-O behaviours give way to S-R behaviours, with
motivation of a current or future goal replaced by relation to a
previous goal, under what is known as the reward devaluation
paradigm.

A similar process happens in human beings. Learning of new motor
responses, for example, activates the caudate and DLPFC, whereas
with well learned sequences, the site of activation shifts to the
putamen and motor cortices. When well trained participants were
asked to pay attention to their actions, the caudate and the more
ventral PFC again were activated.”736 The reward that is “devalued” is
the external reward. This process of automatisation begins with
greater cortical attention and activity, and as the S-R behaviours take
over, is associated with a reduction in cortical activity. The S-R
behaviours are carried out more by habit than by focussed attention.
This explains the ease with which we perform habits that have
733

Graybiel, “Habits, Rituals, and the Evaluative Brain,”364. Clinical studies show that frontal
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previously taken considerable effort to acquire, and also how we can
catch ourselves doing things by routine.

ii)

This process offers insights into how emotion can be better regulated,
a further process at the heart of virtuous activity. That ventrally based
limbic reward becomes less significant as habits are learned fits most
aptly with the nature of virtue that is resilient against reward
devaluation as it is consolidated. External rewards are supplanted by
intrinsic rewards.

iii)

They offer an understanding of how repetitive, automatized actions
can still be voluntary and chosen. It is a mistake to think that S-R
behaviours are necessarily less free than A-O behaviours; established SR behaviours are compatible with the free choice that underpins
virtuous action. It is well understood that parents use forms of
instrumental conditioning to train children in good habits (that are
incomplete from the perspective of virtue because they lack free
choice by the subject) but teens and adults themselves are able, of
their own volition, to commit themselves to a regime of instrumental
conditioning to build up a disposition in their own nature for behaviour
in certain ways. So, for example, a high school student may decide that
she will reward herself for the completion of three hours of study by
permitting herself time on Facebook. This reward in turn becomes an
incentive for the desired behaviour and a means to achieve the more
remote positive outcome of maximising exam performance, etc. In
other words we have the capacity to choose to condition ourselves for
an intended positive outcome.

Yin and Knowlton raise significant questions about methodology in
many studies of motivation. They argue there has been confusion as to
the meaning of instrumental learning: ignoring for the most part,
purposeful behaviour, that behaviour may be directed to a goal, the A225

O contingency.737 In summary they claim, “The pervasive influence” of
this thinking on neuroscience cannot be underestimated. “It remains
powerful in many of the implicit assumptions made by researchers who
interpret all neural activity solely as a function of antecedent stimuli
presented before the motor response.”738

In a model of the human brain where functions are highly integrated in
a web of interconnection, the idea that S-R conditioning can still be
voluntary presents no obstacle: the cortex (associated with conscious
behaviour) will be involved in every action in any case. If furthermore,
this model of the human brain is married to an Aristotelian-Thomistic
anthropology in which the person, not the brain nor a part of the brain,
acts, then all difficulties in this regard should disappear.

Further to the discussion of above (2.4.4) Yin and Knowlton have proposed a
framework whereby the loops which project to striatum are associated with
specific types of learning. Anticipation of reward is a key factor in striatal activity.
This accords with the fact that S-R cannot explain speed of learning; furthermore
the motivational compulsion of addiction is poorly explained by S-R alone.739 (See
2.6.6 for more detail.)

Table 2.10 synthesises and summarises the role of the BG in instrumental
learning.

2.6.4.1 DA modulation in striatum for goal directed action

We are considering forms of reinforcement learning, a form of operant
conditioning, which describes the way in which initially goal directed, reward
737
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seeking behaviours, are conditioned to a habitual preferential response; for
example, a rat learns to prefer a particular pathway in a maze because it has
found food in that pathway on previous occasions. This reward reinforcement is
believed to be DA dependent. The NAc-cortical reward pathway has been well
documented. DA is released into the striatum leading to limbic modification of
neural transmission. DA modulation in the BG in turn effects a decisive
modulatory effect back on the cortex via the cortical-BG-cortical pathways. The
BG modify glutamatergic cortical outputs. Hence, DA, a principal mediator of
plasticity, is decisive in development of habits of goal directed action.

Wickens writes: “There is growing evidence for the hypothesis that activity and DA
dependent plasticity at (synapses in the cortico striatal pathway) is important for
learning on the basis of reinforcement.”740 He identified the DA neurons of the
midbrain VTA and the SN as the key component, and the striatum itself as the
locus for the “cellular mechanisms of reward-related learning.”741 742

Horvitz has documented the role that DA plays in this conditioning. He refers to
the need for a conjunction of “specific movement and reward expectation
conditions” and that, “The acquisition and performance of learned movement
sequences is severely disrupted by lesions or temporary inactivation of the deep
limbic system (DLS), and by striatal DA depletion, consistent with the notion that
establishment of striatal sequence coding requires DA-mediated strengthening of
input-output connections corresponding to consecutive segments of a behavioural
sequence.” 743
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Horvitz further presents a view that DA mediated plasticity in the striatum is
instrumental in directing activity of cortical cells. 744 He notes that DA mediated
plasticity is involved in both S-R and A-O learning and that synapses in the DLS
regions are strengthened through the mediation of DA in accord with “previously
emitted movement”, contributing thus to the selection of further movement in a
behavioural sequence. DA striatal cells receive convergent inputs of reward
expectation and movement direction, and establish activity of cortical cells coding
movement direction occurs until the trigger stimulus initiates movement at which
point persistent reverbatory activity may be established.745

The complexities of this finely balanced process are only starting to be
documented. There is also evidence of retrograde signalling pathways, thalamostriatal circuits, which hold striatal neurons just below action potential thresholds.
Horvitz suggests there may be a similar mechanism acting on the cortical cells of
the pathway. 746

Da Cunha et al. (2009) suggested that DA release, triggered by the novelty of
reward stimuli, is central to the creation and reinforcement of associations and is
the condition for synaptic plasticity in the BG synapses between corticostriatal
neurons and MSNs, possibly involving reverberation in the cortico-striatal loop.747
The role of the BG in action selection and storage of non declarative memories is
mediated by convergent projections, synchronised by the timing of ACh release by
giant cholinergic aspiny neurons, which are tonically active neurons (TANs).
Projections from various locations in the striatum signal via the GPi to the SNr and

skills at an elementary or gross level, but of motor skills offering the possibility of considerable
complexity and refinement.
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thence into the thalamo-cortical pathway.748 They propose that the high
concentrations of DA, which are slower to clear from the NAc than the dorsal
striatum, explain the fact that learning in the NAc is driven by reward.749

Recent trait acquisition studies have highlighted a key role for motivational
neuromodulation by DA in the SN. 750 751 Other studies have shown that the NAc is
a major terminal area for representation of rewards modulated by VTA DA. 752

Other studies have focused on the role of the OFC (particularly area MOC13
containing abundant reciprocal connections to areas of the amygdala) in
748
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goal directed behaviours can be elicited. Central to this model was the concept of motivation and a
network of brain structures that integrates motivation.
The authors sought to define the neurobiology of behavioural facilitation. They proposed a
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integrating “the most complex level of associations of reinforcement with both
stimuli and responses…. MOC13 forms higher-level conditional representations of
sensory events by associating them with existing or newly developing responsereinforcement contingencies; more simply, MOC 13 may abstract an integrated
structure of appetitive and aversive behavioural contingencies from the
environment." 753

2.6.5 Frontal cortex and reward systems.

Theories of cognition almost all agree that the capacity to set specific goals and to
direct one’s actions to those goals is central to cognition. The PFC, which has been
called “the great integrator, a brain region that synthesises information about the
external and internal world for the purposes of producing goal directed
behaviour”754, seems to play a central role in this process of taking control of
one’s actions. The PFC takes in converging information from many brain systems
processing information from within and without the body, and targets motor
system structures that will be involved in voluntary action. The association of the
PFC with intentional action is clear. Virtue is described as “a habit of choosing”755,
and hence is closely associated with intentional behaviours.

With projections to and from the forebrain systems associated with sensory data,
voluntary motor movement, long term memory, and systems processing affect
and motivational state, the PFC is well placed to contribute to cognitive control. It
is interconnected to brain areas processing sensorimotor information as well as to
centres associated with affect, memory and reward.
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Cognitive control requires ready selection of sensory, memory or motor processes
to be activated at any one time.756 This single mindedness has advantages and
suppression of goal irrelevant issues is a part. The capacity to focus attention is
closely associated with this command capacity. Also the capacity to deal with time
delay before the achievement of the goal is necessary: some form of working
memory. Voluntary and goal directed behaviours require the capacity to interact
with experience for rapid learning and adaptability. Cognitive control systems
must be plastic and flexible, in contrast with automatic behaviours that are
typically rigid.

PFC neurons encode rewards linking behaviours to goal directed consequences.
Miller and Wallace state, “Feedback about consequences of actions is a key to
acquiring new goal-directed behaviours. A large proportion of PFC neurons
encode information about rewards.”757

758

PFC neurons appear to have the

capacity to keep a spatial or object cue “on line” during memory delay. This short
term memory function appears to depend on dopaminergic receptors which
provide a gating signal to the PFC; precise timing permits the strengthening of
current PFC representations. PFC neurons also demonstrate flexibility: the
capacity of PFC neurons to modify their properties seems linked the primates’
ability to learn behaviours.

Neural loops between PFC and BG play a role in motor control and support
decision making. They are also significant in recursive thought. Fast plasticity in
the striatum favours learning the “snapshots” of action that capture immediate
circumstances, favoured alternatives, and how to get there; slow plasticity of the
PFC favours links to other centres and creation of entire models, future scenarios,
of action.
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2.6.5.1 The role of the OFC.759
The OFC has been termed the “gatekeeper” to the PFC.760 We have seen above
(2.3.6.1) Schore described the OFC as the “hierarchical apex of the limbic
system”.761 It is not surprising to find that it is implicated in the brain’s reward
systems, 762 and in fact is one of the main reward centres of the brain, along with
the dorsal and ventral striatum, the amygdala, and the DA neurons. 763 Leknes and
Tracey summarise the accumulated evidence that the regions of appetitive and
aversive processing include the NAc, the pallidum and the amygdala in the deep
cortical regions, as well as in the OFC to which they are interconnected. 764 They
point out that DA and opioid systems are “neuroanatomically related”, and that
“they are prime candidates for systems that transmit signals relating to
motivational and hedonic aspcts of both pain and pleasure.”765 The effects of
these systems are felt by direct DA release in the OFC and other PFC regions, as
well as by cortical modulation resulting from subcortical release.

It is well documented that the OFC codes for the reward value of stimuli,
responding to anticipation of future events and so are shown to have access to
759
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representations of the external world. 766 Reward representations are observed in
the OFC and PFC, as well as amygdala.767 The OFC responds to rewards in each of
the sensory modalies but also with respect to abstract rewards such as money or
praise. Possibly the medial OFC is implicated in reward and the lateral OFC in
punishment. 768

Left and right OFC appear to differ in function: left is associated with empathy,
right with TOM. The role of the OFC in affective feelings has been discussed. 769 770
(2.3.6.1)

The OFC links to cortical areas implicated in memory.
“Connectivity often offers important clues to the critical
function of a brain region. Just as the ventral striatum is
critically positioned to serve as an interface between limbic
and motor systems (Mogenson et al. 1980), the OFC is
uniquely located to serve as the gateway between these
limbic areas, which are concerned with passively encoding
associations between cues and likely outcomes or
consequences, and the active, representational memory
systems of the prefrontal cortex.”771
The OFC is reciprocally linked to other areas of the PFC “which are involved in the
regulation of behaviour through representational memory and it sends output to
the ventral striatum.” 772 Representations of memory play a key role in all
cortically mediated conscious action, and therefore also in the development of
conscious habitual action.
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It was suggested in the 1990s that the OFC stores associations between cues and
outcomes on behalf of the amygdala and other brain areas but the contribution is
apparently more complex than this with the OFC processing expectations for likely
outcomes and allowing associative information from the amygdala to be
processed in representational memory of the PFC. 773 It would seem that the OFC
is not critical in simple cases of instrumental learning or Pavlovian conditioning,
but only when information regarding outcomes requires further processing and
integration for the generation of an appropriate response. 774 The end result of
the gateway role that the OFC appears to play allowing association information to
access representational memory is the promotion of “voluntary, cognitive, and
goal directed (not stimulus driven) behaviour and facilitating new learning.” 775

The representation of the value of anticipated events and actions is a form of
memory mediated by the OFC. Also, we have already noted the central role that
attentional mechanisms play in self regulation. (2.5.5 Development of attentional
mechanisms) The OFC is well placed to coordinate peripheral and central arousal
mechanisms.776

2.6.5.2 Close alignment between OFC and striatum.

Current research notes the close alignment between the OFC and striatum. The
architecture of the brain facilitates the close cooperation of NAc and OFC.777
These two structures are adjacent, with the NAc sitting immediately on the inside
of the OFC. The NAc, as we have seen, the area of the striatum most closely
associated with reward, receives inputs directly from the adjacent mOFC. Via the
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limbic loop this region connects back to the cortex via VP and the medial dorsal
nucleus of the thalamus to the anterior cingulate gyrus and the orbitofrontal gyrus
itself. Information in this loop is integrated in the VP with inputs from the
hippocampus and the amygdala. The OFC transfers information via the lateral
prefrontal cortices to the premotor areas for decision and action.778 Further motor
output is via the VP.779

The lateral OFC, the OFC, and mPFC are interconnected and play a critical role in
cognitive and emotional processing and in the formation of motivation for the
selection of behaviours.780 The OFC and the mPFC are distinct but interrelated
systems, with different but related functional roles. The OFC has reciprocal
connections to the limbic system and to the striatum (including via the corticobasal-thalamic loop) similar to a loop assocated with the mPFC. 781

Like the OFC the striatum is activated in association with movement for an
expected reward. 782 “Just like the OFC and the amygdala, the NAc is the site of
convergence for numerous sources of motivational information, including the BLA,
the OFC, the mPFC, and the dopaminergic VTA neurons.” 783 Note that conclusions
of interactions between the PFC, the amygdala, the striatum and the DA
modulated VTA neurons are based on rat studies.

Horvitz draws attention to the sustained activity in cells of the striatum in
anticipation of reward as a mirror of reward coding in the OFC.784 He further
argues for a close association between the striatum and the OFC by observation of
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differences between the sustained activity in striatal cells in comparison with the
hundreds of millisecond activations of DA cells of the midbrain. 785

The role of the OFC is quite specialised in these tasks. Some comparison to the
roles of the striatum with which it is closely connected is enlightening. OFC
neurons do not seem to have any direct involvement in initiation, planning or
execution of motor processes whereas the striatum is implicated in these roles
and thus facilitates OFC involvement in behavioural output mechanisms. “The
neural activities in the striatum are examples on how motivational and motor
processes can converge to produce mechanisms related to the acquisition of
rewarding goals.” 786

Reward representations in the OFC are associated with goal-directed conscious
choices of action; “In order to choose between different actions it is necessary to
maintain a representation of the likely predicted future reward associated with
each action. Such predictions need to be compared and evaluated to select the
action with the highest overall predicted reward value.” 787 Lesion studies by
Bechara et al. (1994), Rolls et al. (1995) and Hornak et al. (2004) suggest that the
OFC plays a role in action selection for reward either by maintaining
representations of the predicted rewards or by participating in the actual process
of decision making. Grace wrote that the “mPFC provides goal directed motor
plans selected within the NAc on the basis of contextual and emotional
associations from both the hippocampus and the amygdala”.788
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This relationship between the PFC and the BG appears special not only because of
the projections into the striatum, in common with much of the rest of the cortex,
but because PFC inputs to the thalamus are modulated by signals from the GPi.789

The findings of this study, with respect to reward processing and cognitive control
of reward systems, are consistent with recent findings of Buitelaar who, in a 2012
review, summarises biological mechanisms at work in risk taking, and risk
avoidance in teenagers, He finds teenage choices are assisted by the “dynamic
interaction of the cognitive control system (medial/ventral prefrontal cortex), the
reward system (nucleus accumbens), and the harm-avoidant system
(amygdala)” He says, “Increased risk taking might then be the consequence of
either a weak control system, or an easily activated and pushing reward system,
or a weak harm-avoidant system, or combinations of these.” He offers no
information directly about any biological basis for habits that could dispose for
improved rationality.790

Buitelaar notes that reward processing in striatal brain regions, if unmoderated by
cognitive control, lead to greater risk taking. He suggests the balance of evidence
is that the reward system is hyper-responsive in adolescence. He notes that
adolescents show the ability to modify risky decisions when they put themselves,
a capacity that improves on average in later adolescence. 791

Recent studies continue to demonstrate the close relationship existing between
the OFC and the striatum.


Hetherington and Wagner conclude in a recent study, “Cognitive
neuroscience research suggests that successful self-regulation is
dependent on top-down control from the prefrontal cortex over
subcortical regions involved in reward and emotion.” They develop an
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analysis of effective regulatory responses to the most common causes of
self-regulation failure: negative emotions, escalation of indulgence, cue
exposure, and impaired control.792 They review inhibition studies and show
that there is a pattern whereby intentional behaviour in addicts increases
lateral PFC activity and reduces striatal and OFC activity.


Somerville and Casey also find that cortico-striatal pathways are crucial for
successful cognitive control. However, they harness mounting evidence for
the counter intuitive position that striatal reward areas are capable of
upregulation of cognitive control to win reward. 793

2.6.6 Addiction studies offer insights into the reward systems.

Neuronal addictive processes are of relevance offering insights into how pathways
of permanently heightened motivation for action can exist. Is it possible that the
profound and life moulding changes at the striatal and cortical synapses that
underpin addiction have common features with virtue learning?

I have used the work of Robinson and Berridge in reviewing current explanations
for addiction: the hedonic view emphasizing the search for pleasure and
avoidance of the unpleasant;794 the view that addiction is brought about by
aberrant learning;795 Robinson’s and Berridge’s own incentive-sensitization view,
792

Heatherton and Wagner, “Cognitive Neuroscience of Self-Regulation Failure,” 132-139.
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The hedonic view suggests that drug use leads to DA release (required for rewards and
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amygdala to be downregulated as tolerance grows. When drug use stops, withdrawal occurs,
leading to further acute drop in DA and serotonin levels. There are grounds to think that persistent
drug use engages the stress system on the hypothalamicpituitary axis. In response to stress
corticotrophin releasing factor (CRF) is released by the hypothalamus; only small priming injections
of the drug are sufficient to set off the whole addiction cycle even after the original neural
responses are extinct.
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The aberrant learning view provides valuable insights into habit formation in the striatum. This
is the “most prominent implicit learning view of addiction”. It suggests that the automatic S-R
habit hypothesis provides a more plausible account for addiction than A-O or goal directed
processes. In this view, addiction involves a transition from explicit and cognitively guided
behaviour, such as the memory of a pleasurable drug-induced experience, to comparatively
automatic behaviour that is essentially a S-R habit, a behaviour that takes little or no account of
expected outcomes and which can play out automatically, and for which the neural substrate is
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focusing on neural sensitization as the cause for compulsion;796 the explanation
for addiction centring on a dysfunctional PFC acting in concert with impulsivity
and poor judgement.797

Several insights become apparent.


Addiction studies help us to understand the contribution of the BG and BG
pathways to complex habitual behaviours in which the subject remains
fully aware of what he is doing. These studies emphasise that drug seeking
may involve the pursuit of complex purposeful (my emphasis) behaviour
patterns: habit formation in the BG is not reducible to simple motor
sequences. 798



Addiction studies are consistent with the view that DA reward pathways,
striatal or cortical, may have a role in triggering or initial reinforcement of
virtuous behaviours.799

found in the corticostriatal loops operating through the dorsal striatum. It is argued that with
sufficient practice any task can be automatised and that over-learned habits of drug use become
so automatic that they become compulsive. Terry E. Robinson and Kent C. Berridge,
“Addiction,”Annual Review of Psychology 54, (2003):25–53
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An integral role for the BG in virtue formation is not contradicted by
addiction studies. Striatal plasticity essential to the processes of addiction
and also normal reward processing.800 Dysfunctional plastic change in the
BG leads to compulsive behaviours, impacting on cognitive capacity to
regulate emotion and reward craving.



The close relationship between reward expectation and emotional control
is emphasised. Addiction essentially involves dysfunction in the basalcognitive circuitry that would normally facilitate emotional control.
Addiction studies have uncovered substantial evidence for cognitive-basal
dysfunction when addiction is present, with abundant evidence for
“persistent drug-induced neuroadaptations” in the NAc at molecular,
cellular, and neural system levels, in other words, plasticity.”801

Table 2.11 summarises the reward and motivational systems operating and their
relevance to the development and exercise of virtue.

2.7 Cognition and executive function.

2.7.1 The PFC coordinates executive function.

As we have seen, the PFC plays a central role in complex cognitive and executive
function, involving many aspects of personality, and planning, insight and
foresight. 802 803 The PFC is one of the four functional areas of the frontal lobe: the
primary motor cortex, the premotor and supplementary motor areas, Broca’s
area, and the PFC. The PFC is extensively and directly interconnected with the
parietal, temporal, and occipital cortex via fibres in the subcortical white matter.
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The PFC, particularly the lateral PFC, is oriented towards action.804 For example, at
the cortical level, the premotor cortical regions, the association cortices, the PFC
itself, the posterior parietal cortex and the limbic cortex all play a role in
movement planning. 805 The activity of numerous cortical regions is orchestrated
and coordinated by the PFC.

The PFC interacts with other brain areas, especially posterior and subcortical
regions, in cognitive and emotional management. PFC and ACC seem to be the key
neural substrates for response regulation. “The ACC works with the frontal cortex
through the reciprocal cortico-cortical connections of the anterior cingulate cortex
and the lateral PFC to monitor human volitional mental activity.”806 807

In this section we overview significant lines of current research into cognition and
executive function which appear relevant to this study.

2.7.2 Functional studies of the PFC.

(Refer also: 2.5.3.1 Involvement of cortical areas in emotional response.)

The PFC is clearly involved in behavioural regulation via inhibition of responses.
Tatia et al. review various recent studies of response inhibition and find that
response inhibition seems to involve DLPFC, VLPFC and parietal cortex, that the
right hemisphere predominates in response inhibition along with the lateral and
medial OFC, superior temporal gyrus and ACC. It appears inhibition of impulsive
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behaviour may be localised to the right OFC. The authors note that response
regulation involves both response inhibition and the election of goal appropriate,
though as yet non-habitual, responses.

Functionally the PFC divides into DLPFC, at the top and sides of the forward lobes
and the VMPFC. The lateral and medial areas are densely interconnected.808

Tasks of executive function and working memory are mediated by DLPFC function.
The DLPFC is the “key neural substrate in the regulation of cognitive processes”.
809

The DLPFC is greatly interconnected to the parietal multimodal cortex as well

as to the somatosensory, visual and parietal association areas, and has
involvement in cognitive strategies and planning.

The DLPFC, which is one of the last brain regions to develop, plays a key role in
manipulating various sources of information for decision making. It appears to
draw together experiences, memories, anticipations, self evaluation, long and
short term planning and measurement of personal conduct against norms; a
damaged DLPFC impairs choice of behaviour, leading to disregard of context and
opting for pursuit of familiar courses of action.

The VLPFC and OFC are closely linked.The VLPFC “can exert a bidirectional topdown modulation of activity for the regulation of cognitive processes”.810

Tasks of emotional processing and social decision are mediated by VMPFC. The
VMPFC extends into the anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal areas and is closely
connected to the limbic areas. Damage to the VMPFC leads to impulsive
behaviours as well as to socially inappropriate behaviours and inappropriate
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emotional responses. 811 It was the VMPFC of Phineas Gage that was substantially
damaged.

The dorsalmedial PFC (DMPFC) links with inferior parietal cortex, the DLPFC and
the posterior cingulate. It receives limbic inputs and, with its linkages to other PFC
areas, integrates the emotional reaction and experience with cognitive processing
which is “critical in the emotional regulation and adjustment of behaviour on the
basis of emotional cues”. DMPFC also seems active in perspective taking and
“theory of mind”, when learning rules associated with goal-directed actions,
problem solving and planning. These will be stored in the lateral PFC areas.

In addition there is the OFC (see above 2.6.5.1) situated behind the eyes. It was
first believed to be involved in olfactory processing. In recent years there has been
intensified interest on this area which now seems essential in risk taking and
decision making. The OFC links the PFC to striatal and limbic areas in regulation of
motivated responses.812

Spindle cells link the OFC and the ACC. These cells have been associated with the
capacity to make quick decisions. Spindle cells display rich interconnections, high
velocity of transmission characteristics, and are well endowed with receptors for
DA, 5-HT and vasopressin. Watson and Allman (2007) note, “At the cellular level,
humans and apes are the only primates that have a type of neuron, the spindle
cell, in the anterior cingulated, and frontoinsular cortex.” The number of spindle
cell in the human cortex is one thousand fold in excess of its presence in apes and
implication of the cell in mechanisms of attention and self control are
suspected.813
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The OFC also links with the insula, the third site where spindle cells are found. This
frontal cortical area within the lateral sulcus is adjacent to both the temporal lobe
and the parietal. It appears to integrating various sensations: viscerosensations,
taste, pain, and feelings of disgust.814 The linkage is believed to facilitate rational
processing of raw emotion.

There are significant linkages between the BG and the PFC through the OFC. It is
now apparent that pathways for cognition and executive function do not reside
solely in the outer cortical layers. “Recent evidence suggests that circuits through
the BG have a role beyond motor control, including cognition, reward evaluation,
motivated behaviour, learning, and memory which may be traced to pathways
through the PFC.”815 As we have seen, interconnections with the BG via thalamus
on the return pathway, and with the limbic system itself are now recognised as
playing significant contributions. The PFC has extensive interconnections to the
dorsomedial nucleus of the thalamus, lesions in which can have the same effect
on executive function as lesions to the PFC itself. 816

The PFC, along with the other cortical areas, requires continuous electrical
stimulation from the lower brain areas for conscious activity to take place. 817
Excitatory signalling (utilising ACh), and reverbatory excitatory signalling, via the
thalamus, to almost all cortical areas, are critical in this process. 818 In addition
there are excitatory and inhibitory mechanisms of control.819 (See also 2.5.3 for
other neurotransmitter and neuromodulatory agents affecting the PFC.)

Table 2.12 summarises the domains of executive function.

2.7.3 Prefrontal plasticity.
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Only recently has the potential for plasticity in the PFC been recognised.820 Recent
studies have confirmed however that association learning leads to plastic changes
in the OFC, as well as medial and lateral PFC, and implicate both the medial and
lateral areas in executive functions such as tuning of attention, and decision
making.821

Insights are accruing into the functional differences between the lateral PFC and
the medial PFC areas. Anderson et al. (2000) described the long term sequelae for
two young adults, F.D. (female), whose head, when she was 15 months of age,
had been run over by a car tyre, and M.L. (male), who, at 3 months suffered a
resection of right frontal malignancy. Despite relatively unimpaired cognitive
function, both had exhibited intractable chronic social maladjustment from early
childhood, suggesting damage to the ventromedial area. F.D. showed little
remorse for dishonesty and theft, precocious sexual activity, insensitivity to her
infant’s needs and inappropriate emotion; M.L. exhibited poor attention,
impulsivity, difficulties interacting with others, inability to manage money, work or
independence, obesity, substance abuse, sexual irresponsibility and little remorse
for actions. The authors concluded that there may be limited plasticity in the
sectors of the PFC that link emotion and decision making. The findings are
consistent with the view that infantile damage to PFC can lead to “severe
disruption of adaptive behaviour” without noticeable effect on standard
educational and psychological testing and support the suggestion of Schwartz and
Goldman-Rakic (1990) that several aspects of PFC neuronal organisation seem
well specified in early development and not dependent on environmental
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stimulation for determination.822 Recent work also focusses on developmental
plasticity of the PFC. 823

Of great importance to this study, it is now accepted that cortical areas are vastly
more interdependent and interconnected than had been previously thought.
Moghaddam and Homayoun suggested that even apparently modular structure is
actually a manifestation of the parallel networks that underpin brain activity. Their
hypothesis was that the DLPFC, regarded as the executive regions of the PFC,
respond in parallel to the limbic and limbically connected regions such as the OFC,
and thus direct behaviour that is consistent with context and expected
outcome.824

Table 2.13 summarises systems for cognition, consideration of consequences,
planning, goal election and executive direction.
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suggested that this appeared to be the case because, at this stage of cognitive development, the
brain relies on experience to strengthen connections, in other words that forms plasticity,
"neuronal reorganisation … changes in dendritic and synaptic structure and connectivity",
occurring in this developmental stage work to minimise the long term effects of the lesion. The
study also found that residual deficits of focal lesions in early childhood were lower than those
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functional coupling during a working memory task. The two regions responded to stimuli with
opposing patterns of activation. These patterns reflect differential patterns of plasticity.
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2.7.3.1 Plasticity studies in the motor cortices.

Not within the PFC, but within the frontal lobe, the motor cortices are increasingly
seen as an important site of plasticity.825 There have been numerous studies
demonstrating plasticity in the motor cortical areas. For example Michael
Merzenich has pioneered this field with many studies into somatosensory cortical
map plasticity. Further insights are now at hand from studies of subjects with
prostheses. Hochberg et al. (2006) demonstrated that a human subject (M.N.)
with tetraplegia, three years after spinal cord injury, was capable of cortical
movement signals, and was able to effect control of neuromotor prostheses
(NMPs) via intention driven neuronal activity converted via decoders linked to a
100 electrode sensor implanted in an area of the M1, the right precentral gyrus,
into a control signal. By imagining certain hand movements M.N. was able to
successfully activate control signals allowing him to open simulated email, operate
television, and work a prosthetic hand.826

This study followed a ground breaking study, documented by Ramachandran and
Rogers-Ramachandran (1996) of three subjects who had suffered amputation and
were suffering from phantom limb pain. Subjects were exposed to virtual limb
movement. Results suggested that this exposure brought about plastic changes in
the motor cortex area pertaining to the impaired limb and that these changes had
an ameliorating effect on phantom pain. Phantom limb movements, experienced
as real by the subjects, led to significant M1 changes.

Table 2.14 reviews the brain areas, mechanisms and pathways implicated in the
execution of motor commands and the relevance of these systems to the
development and exercise of virtue.

2.8 Conclusion.
825
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This review of recent studies demonstrates that it is possible to identify
mechanisms which modify the specific regions and pathways in the brain on the
basis of conscious experience. I argue that these mechanisms, areas and pathways
are essential to the acquisition and exercise of virtue.

This chapter has developed as follows:

After an initial overview of current lines of investigation into neural plasticity, the
foundational mechanism which underpins all learning in the brain, I have
overviewed contemporary lines of research in learning and memory. I have
reviewed understanding of the BG, a subcortical structure integral to reward
processing and habit formation, and implicated also in emotion processing and
motor management. I then reviewed systems for regulation of emotion, reward
processing and executive function in the brain.

Some initial observations about the aptness of task of this study can be offered.


The development of virtue will reflect processes of experiential learning:
experience-based learning follows Hebbian principles of synaptic
strengthening and reinforcement of connections through use, or antiHebbian principles of refinement of pathways. The development of
qualities of character, virtues, are a form of experience based learning
acquired by repetition.



Structural plasticity offers an attractive explanation for the Aristotelian
principle that virtues in some way “make us who we are”. It is reasonable,
given the relative stability of the personality changes implied in virtue
acquisition, that the plastic changes involved are structural not only
functional. There are various mechanisms of structural change in the brain,
but these appear to involve gene expression mediated by second
messenger processes from the synapse. (Table 2.15 summarises the
various mechanisms for plasticity that have been throughout this chapter.
248

This table completes the discussion of 2.2 and Table 2.3 in the light of the
later sections in this chapter.)


The development of myelination in the frontal cortex and motor
pathways, offers a further mechanism of plasticity; in the first case to
assist in understanding the development of self control, and in the second
to better account for efficient action.



Virtue is understood as the capacity for self-management. Cortical
pathways for management of emotion are necessarily implicated in the
neural correlates of virtue. We find that these pathways in the BGthalamo-cortical loop already associated with habit formation and in the
limbic loop entering the cortical domain via the OFC and the ACC.



The architecture of the brain presents as a highly evolved and efficient
network of complementing functionalities manifesting the Hebbian
corollary that, where neural pathways exist, then neural communication
has been present. The adjacent location of the NAc and the OFC, and rich
connection between them consolidates a prima facie explanation of
emotional management. Not only do the BG have the capacity, on the
basis of reward representations, to modify cortical activity and motor
commands, but by reciprocal cortical loops, they are themselves modified
in their goal proposals. This offers a compelling mechanism for cortical
management of emotion. The more pathways of emotional regulation are
revisited, the more they are reinforced.



Reward processing and habit formation are interlinked systems associated
with the basal cortical pathways. This offers an explanation for the
development of habitual behaviours that are consciously elected, with the
flexibility to account for reward incentives in childhood. We have seen that
conscious and reflective behaviours may be mediated by the basal-cortical
pathways.



DA signalling facilitates goal election and emotion regulation, and, as an
initiator of plasticity, is critical in consolidation of regulation pathways
through structural changes.
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Mechanisms of habit and procedural learning appear to offer some
understanding for the phenomenon of established behaviours that remain
robust in the absence of immediate rewards. The BG-thalamo-cortical
loops with their widespread cognitive-emotional interaction offer insights
into processes of planning, goal selection, self regulation, attention and
motivation. The growth of intrinsic motivation over external reward as
virtue is carried out for its own sake, resilience against reward devaluation,
is consistent with the development of automaticity. That ventrally based
limbic reward becomes less significant as habits are learned aptly fits with
the nature of virtue.



The ease with which virtuous action is completed argues for the forms of
automatisation evidenced in habit. The ease of practice that is associated
with virtue aligns readily with the greater speed, accuracy and efficiency
associated with pathways reinforced by mechanisms of neuroplasticity.
The neural motor underpinnings of automatisation are reasonably well
described.



The function and efficient interconnection of the limbic, cortical and basalthalamic regions satisfy three pre-conditions for the presence of virtue,
that the neural bases for emotional regulation, automatisation of action,
and motivation and goal election, all integral to the expression of virtue, be
present.



An understanding of the attentional systems of the brain offers powerful
insights into mechanisms in neural support of affect management and will
power. Focussed attention permits directed plasticity in the brain: it is “the
modulatory control system of plasticity”.827



Studies of addiction reinforce the view that basal procedural function can
be conscious and volitional. In a state of wellbeing the frontal cortex and
the BG cooperate in conscious, volitional action. In an addicted state,
plastic changes in the BG and the basal-cortical pathways lead to cortical
dysfunction.

827

Observations of neuroscientist Michael Merzenich quoted in Doidge, The brain that changes
itself, 84-88.
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New insights into brain function, including new appreciation of the
functions of the BG and the OFC, offer insights into how the discrete
components of virtuous action (motivation, automatisation of action, and
executive goal direction) may be integrated into a neural network. It is
now understood that the role of the BG is far more complex than as a relay
station for motor commands. It is now understood to play a key role, in
modulating conscious motor activity, integrating planning with reward and
motivational factors. The OFC is now understood to involved with limbic
modulation.



The capacity to set specific goals, to direct one’s actions to those goals, to
reason about consequences and means, appears central not only to
cognition but to rational acts disposed by the virtue of prudence.



The links between cognition, rationality and virtue are direct. Cognition
implies a capacity for goal setting, reasoning, deliberation as to
consequences and means, and final election. That one chooses goals fitting
for one’s nature is a mark of rationality. And virtue is essentially the
habituation of this capacity. Hence the exercise of virtue requires rightness
and perfection of reason, the operations of which are perfected by the
virtues of prudence and justice.



Specialist neurons such as spindle cells that are implicated in mechanisms
of self control and cortical areas associated with appreciation of
consequences, and mirror neurons that have been associated with
imitation and empathy, appear to offer fruitful linkages to virtue theory.
Aristotle wrote of the role of example in the acquisition of virtue; there is
evidence at the neural level of mirror systems that facilitate adoption of
example. Plasticity in the systems for empathetic response appears
integral to the development of sensitivity for the rights and needs of
others, and an understanding of the consequences of one’s actions, which
appear to be are at the core of the virtue of justice.



To find pleasure in appropriate activities is the mark of virtue; appetitive
responses to pleasure, aversive responses to fear and pain, reward
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expectations, emotional responses, and conscious goal election, are all
finely tuned in the state and exercise of virtue. A habit of appropriate
reward expectation is directly linked to the development of the virtue of
temperance.


Amygdalic-cortical pathways of fear management, associated with sound
goal election, appear to support the virtue of courage.



Aristotle insisted on the ease with which children acquire virtue. This
seems to be a reference to aspects of what we now understand to be
sensitive periods for the development of qualities. Of particular interest in
the field of virtue education are sensitive periods evident in
responsiveness to affection, in the development of an affinity for the
content of early experience, in ease of imitation, and in the adoption of
new behaviours during early years. First impressions are lasting
impressions; experiences during upbringing, particularly when the stimuli
are associated with emotional significance, can be virtually indelible.



In the exercise of virtue, memory of past behaviours, of reward, of
contextual and emotional resonances, and of principles of right and wrong,
are all required. Memory systems are functionally implicit to learning, to
response to reward and emotion, to habit formation, to goal election, and
all cognitive function. Mechanisms of non-declarative memory appear to
facilitate the ease of practice and the inherent motivational rewards in
virtue, while during the more arduous process of acquisition of virtue,
declarative memory plays a significant role. A degree of explicit
emotional/aesthetic/social/moral education, sometimes in the form of
guided behaviour and sometimes through conceptual communication with
relevant concrete illustration, is required for the development of virtue.



Virtues empower action in ways tailored to the flourishing of our being.
This includes disposing us to execute movement towards worthy
objectives. Therefore the neural bases for virtue require effective
connections with motor control, even though not all virtuous activity
requires expression in motor activity.
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Habit, in providing a mechanism for the organism to act more efficiently at
the neuronal level, dedicating attention elsewhere, and absorbing fewer
cerebral resources, seems to satisfy Aristotle’s litmus test for virtue, that it
is attuned to the flourishing of the person.



There is a strong inductive case to be made that wellbeing of the organism
requires effective integration of systems of the brain. It is most reasonable
to argue that the life of virtue, manifested as the integration of the cortical
with the limbic, is an indicator of flourishing.

These correspondences between characteristics of virtue itself, and the neural
structures and processes of the brain, will be developed in greater detail in
Chapter 5. I suggest that these features present a strong inductive, empirical case
in favour of specific neural bases implicated in the development and exercise of
virtue. The weight of evidence argues that an alternative view appears
incompatible with the neuroscience.

Given the myriad manifestations of virtue across the categories of the cardinal
virtues (habits of sound judgement, of respect and responsibility, of self control,
and of resilience and fortitude in the face of difficulties) the neural expression of
virtue is likely to involve many different regions of the brain. The approach of this
study, first by considering the nature of virtue, and then by study of the likely core
neural processes at work, appears more appropriate than a methodology based
on isolated imaging experiments. It is hoped however that the generalised
findings of this study will be borne out by specific empirical investigation in due
course.
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Chapter 3

Investigating the characteristics of virtue.

“To be a great and virtuous man appeared the highest honour that can befall a
sensitive being; to be base and vicious, as many on record have been, appeared
the lowest degradation, a condition more abject than that of the blind mole or
harmless worm.”
Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus
Mary Shelley

Introduction
What did Aristotle mean by describing someone as virtuous?

To be virtuous is more than to perform, like a sports car, at one’s full design
specifications. Human beings are more than performance; they are more than
what they can do. The perfection of virtue is an intrinsic good suiting our very
nature; we are perfected in our nature as composite beings of body and soul. To
be in this state of virtue is to flourish according to our nature.
Aristotle held that to be virtuous is to be in a state of natural perfection: virtue is
that which “makes its possessor good and his work good likewise”.828 It is an
arête, an excellence of character. This state is characterized by intellect, will and
sensitive appetites - the active powers of the human person - perfected in their
biological development, and thus able to perfect intrinsically our operation as
rational beings. Perfection of rationality disposes us to, but is not subordinated to,
perfection in action.

Some elaboration is helpful here at the commencement of a chapter which
focusses on the characteristics of virtue. As the starting point of his Nicomachean
Ethics, Aristotle explained that all human actions seek goods that we deem will
fulfil or perfect us. Therefore the very task of ethics is to distinguish in these goods
what is really a good for us from the apparent. He proposed that fundamental
828

NE, 1106a15.
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desires of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain are the primary motivations in our
lives and he insisted that these basic appetites must either allow themselves to be
guided by our rational understanding of what is truly good for us, or they can and
will exert an undue influence on our choices. Habits of self indulgence come at a
price, and timidity in the pursuit of worthy goals will also leave us unfulfilled rogue desires can deprive us of freedom and happiness.

Aquinas built on foundations laid out primarily by Aristotle. He too understood
virtue as a state arising from the possession of habits perfecting the active powers
of the sensitive appetites (the concupiscible appetite attuned to pleasure and the
irascible to pursuit of arduous goals), of the intellect, and of the will. These
perfecting habits enable us to act rationally despite appetites that draw us in
contrary directions and despite external pressures seeking to turn us from our
elected goals.829 He taught that the most fundamental moral virtues are prudence
(perfecting our practical judgements about how to act) justice (the habitual
disposition of making choices that accommodate the needs and welfare of
others), fortitude (the habit in the irascible appetite) and temperance (in the
concupiscible appetite).

Aristotle argued that the highest end of a human agent lies in performing rational
activity “well”, activity that “aims at what is truly perfective of the human
agent”.830 In other words not only the external end result is good, but the human
agent is himself perfected. (1.4.2 and 1.6.3.) I argue in this study that this
perfection includes our very neuronal activity, pathways and processes, and that
this state of maturity is a natural and fitting state for human beings - when our
neuronal development falls short of a consolidation of virtues, our personal
fulfilment is compromised.

Organisation of this chapter
829

Virtues are “habits by which a person acts well.” ST, Ia-IIae, Q.55, Art.3.
Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Virtue: Quaestio disputata de virtutibus in communi and
Quaestio disputata de virtutibus cardinalibus, ed. Ralph McInerny (South Bend Indiana: St
Augustine’s Press, 1999), xii.
830
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Chapter 3 should be read in the light of earlier discussions of Aristotle’s notion of
the hylomorphic nature of reality, the introduction to the Aristotelian-Thomistic
account of virtue with a particular focus on the contribution of virtue to human
flourishing, and the arguments for the unity of the person. In Chapter 1 I noted
the need to develop a methodology by which I can identify the core characteristics
of the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of moral virtue. This methodology and this
identification are the tasks of Chapters 3 and 4.

I commence with a case study from real life, a study of an exemplary figure from
Japan living in the first half of the twentieth century, Takashi Nagai.

Recalling Elizabeth Anscombe’s advice that, before we lose ourselves in ethical
theory, we must account for the richness and complexity of real people who
manifest the tension between rationality and emotion, free and impulsive
behaviours, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and fulfilled and unfulfilled lives, 831
it is fitting to begin our discussion in the world of real people and actual
behaviours. Real life scenarios are drawn from the life and autobiographical
writings of Nagai, medical doctor and nuclear physicist who, in the years after
WWII through his writings under the most difficult circumstances, was a great
force for spiritual healing in a country gutted by the horrors of war. 832

In 3.1.4 in the light of an understanding the human act and how it is perfected by
virtue, I note features of virtuous action that are in evidence in the case studies
presented. These observations ground subsequent discussion in 3.2 and 3.3 in the
real world. In 3.2 and 3.3 I identify key characteristics of virtue, according to the
Aristotelian-Thomistic account. In these two sections the Aristotelian-Thomistic
account of virtue is dissected utilising primary texts and commentary, with some

831

Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 26-44.
Introductory texts for an understanding of Takashi Nagai’s life: Takashi Nagai, The Bells of
Nagasaki, trans. William Johnson (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1984); original title: Nagasaki no
kane (1949). Paul Glynn, A Song for Nagasaki (Hunters Hill, Sydney: Catholic Book Club, 1988).
832
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illustration from the glimpses in 3.1 into Nagai’s life and mind, and from his
approaches to fostering virtue in the lives of others including his own children.833

The goal of 3.2 will be a review of the nature of virtue and its ordination to human
flourishing. In 3.3 I review the development of virtue. My aim here will not be to
enter into nuances of interpretation nor controversies, but rather to provide an
efficient review of the principal characteristics of virtue in the AristotelianThomistic account. In the process I hope to capture something of the brilliance of
the insights that Aristotle and Thomas have placed before us noting their
applicability to real life scenarios in the life of a most admirable man.

Hence my methodology to identify the characteristics of virtue involves an
analysis of Aristotelian and Thomistic texts, in the light of the actual behaviour of
a virtuous man, and of an understanding of the human act. In Chapter 4 the initial
list of qualities identified in Chapter 3 will be further refined in the light of the
distinct roles of the cardinal virtues.

What are we looking for?
'Cheshire Cat,' she began, rather timidly...' would you tell me, please,
which way I ought to go from here?'
'That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,' said the cat.
'I don't much care where...' said Alice.
'Then it doesn't matter which way you go,' said the Cat.
Lewis Carroll
Alice in Wonderland

We need to know where we are going, what we are looking for. I have suggested
that a great challenge facing the Templeton award winners is the imperative for
them first to clarify the meaning and features of virtue. Without a well articulated,
authoritative notion of virtue successfully reconciling the respective roles of the
rational and non-rational in the development and practice of virtue, those studies
must be at serious risk of failing in their endeavours. The task of this chapter is to
833

A source for information about Nagai’s life with his children will be Takashi Nagai, Leaving my
beloved children behind, trans. M. M. Tatsuoka and T. Takai (Strathfield, NSW: St Paul’s Press,
2010); original title: Kono Ko o Nokoshite,94.
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identify characteristics of moral virtue able to be mapped against neurobiological
knowledge of the human brain. A philosophically rigorous, defensible,
understanding of virtue ordered to human flourishing, according to the
Aristotelian-Thomistic account will be described and presented as an essential
prerequisite to an identification of neural part-constituents. In the process I hope
to convey something of the magnificence of virtue theory as a superlative account
of rational behaviour and human fulfilment.

3.1

Dr Takashi Nagai (1908-1951). 834

This first section presents glimpses into the inspiring and extraordinary life of Dr
Takashi Nagai in order to demonstrate the remarkable relevance of virtue theory
in its ability to account for human behaviour. In so doing, I will seek initial insights
into the characteristics of virtue.

We will see, from his life and writings, that the nobility of Nagai’s mature,
considered actions and the richness of his emotional life typify what most would
agree to be a state of virtue. It will be argued that virtue ethics provides a far
more convincing model for the subject’s actual behaviour than is provided by
either deontological or consequentialist explanations. Whether or not the actions
of others could be better described by observance of rules or duty, or by a
preoccupation to achieve certain outcomes, it will be shown that in Nagai’s case
virtue theory stands out as a powerful explanation for his rational behaviour, for
his ability to live with peace of heart in the midst of great difficulty, and for the
richness and balance of his emotional life.
As virtue is known through its acts,835 it is also highly appropriate that we
commence with human acts demonstrating virtue. Actual scenarios of noble
action are described and analysed. This serves to anchor our discussion of virtue,
834

My sources for this section are Nagai, Leaving my beloved children behind; Nagai, The Bells of
Nagasaki; Glynn, A Song for Nagasaki; and Masao Shiotsuki, Doctor at Nagasaki (Tokyo: Kosei,
1987), original title: Hasushigoto wa Anrakusatsu data.
835
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.56, Art.2.: “Habits are known through their acts.”
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from the very start, in the real world of sensation, passion, apprehension,
deliberation, choice and action. In so doing, I hope to reinforce the conviction in
the reader that virtues are not theoretical constructs for understanding
behaviour, but manifest, objective, attributes of the person that facilitate
behaviours which are good for us as human beings.

These scenarios drawn from the life of Dr Takashi Nagai will be revisited in the
course of the current chapter in order to illustrate characteristics of virtue in a
systematic overview. In the process I distinguish between the human act itself and
that which pertains to particular virtues within the act. This will be of particular
assistance, towards the end of Chapter 5, where one scenario will be used to
illustrate the contribution of neural part-constituents to human behaviour.

Nagai’s response to the cataclysmic event of August 9, 1945 led to his subsequent
fame. His personal account of the immediate aftermath of the blast in Nagasaki
became a best seller in Japan, and the subject of movie and popular song. He
wrote some twenty books in the six years after the war.

Importantly for our purposes, Nagai demonstrated that he was a man of deep
convictions and intelligence, concern for his fellow man, austerity of life, and
courage. Greatly influenced by Pascal’s Pensées, by his wife and perhaps also by
his experiences as a doctor with the Imperial Army during its invasion of China,
Nagai had become a Christian before the war. He was a devoted father and
compassionate doctor; zealous for the advancement of medicine, he carefully
documented the effects and effective treatments of radiation illness. Through all
his suffering he manifested no bitterness towards the Americans for the bombing
that destroyed half the urban areas of Japan and millions of lives. In post war
Japan during the six years he lay dying of leukemia Nagai rose to prominence as a
national spiritual leader as much for his extraordinary writings encouraging
reconciliation and peace, as for his remarkable humility, inner peace, and absence
of bitterness. “In the postwar years Nagai became a symbol of strength and
optimism, a central figure in the spiritual and moral reconstruction of Japan. … His
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influence on the collective unconscious of Japan was very great.” He was praised
in the contemporary press as the “Gandhi of Japan”.836 He was in the common
sense of the word, and in the sense understood by Aristotle and Aquinas, a man of
virtue.

Figure 3.1 Dr Takaski Nagai

Figure 3.2 Nagai with his two children.

3.1.1 Context: August 9, 1945.

On the morning the bomb fell, Nagai was at work in his laboratory in the hospital
of Nagasaki choosing X-ray films to teach students the art of diagnosis. Without
warning, at 11.02am, there was a flash of blinding light. Nagai’s scientific training
gave us this description.
Tremendous energy was released. And this energy, a
tempestuous blast of air travelling at a rate of two thousand
meters per second, smashed, pulverised, and blew apart
anything in its path. The void created at the centre of the
explosion sucked up everything on the ground, carrying it high
in the sky, and hurled it back violently against the earth. The
heat of 9000o Fahrenheit burned the surrounding area.
Fragments of incandescent metal rained down in balls of fire
836

William Johnson in preface. Nagai, The Bells of Nagasaki, xx and xxii.
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immediately setting everything alight. It is estimated that
30,000 people lost their lives. 837

Nagai survived because, although only 500m from the epicentre, he worked in one
of the few concrete buildings in that area. 838

Everywhere there were dead and dying, convulsing, strangely swollen, skin
peeling. Soon fires were raging. Weakened by previously contracted leukemia,
and despite his own grave injuries, Nagai worked to utter exhaustion caring for
the dying and injured through the day of the blast and the days that followed. As
the hospital was gone he had to improvise everything. Only after three days did he
return to his family home finding the charred bones and melted rosary of his
beloved wife, Midori.

Nagai’s scientific training and a sensitivity to psychological experience enhanced
by his medical training are present throughout in his writing including in the
extracts which follow. His capacity to describe with precision internal states and
837

Nagai, The Bells of Nagasaki, 28. This is typical of numerous passages in his account where he
dispassionately and accurately analyses the event. Nagai’s writing is in the spirit urged by another
first-hand witness, Masao Shiotsuki: “The atomic bomb must not be elegised or sentimentalised. It
is not romantic fiction. It is not poetry. Its terrible workings and devastation it wrought must be
approached and described as scientifically as possible and viewed as a pressing concern for all
mankind.” Shiotsuki, Doctor at Nagasaki, 82. This effort to be truthful and objective will be
commented upon later. The final toll was of course much higher than 30,000. The memorial in the
Peace Park records 73,884 dead and 74,909 injured.
838
Nagai, The Bells of Nagasaki, 11. Nagai recalled his own experiences:
I immediately tried to throw myself to the ground, but before I could do so,
the glass of the windows smashed in and a frightening blast of wind swept
me off my feet into the air – my eyes wide open. Pieces of broken glass came
in like leaves blown off a tree in a whirlwind. I felt that the end had come. …
It was as though a huge invisible fist had gone wild and smashed everything
in the room. The bed, the chairs, the bookcases, my steel helmet, my shoes,
my clothes were thrown into the air, hurled around the room with a wild
clattering noise, and all piled on top of me as I lay helpless on the floor. Then
the blast of dusty dirty wind rushed in and filled my nostrils so I could
scarcely breathe. I kept my eyes open, looking always at the window. And as
I looked everything outside grew dark. There as a noise like a stormy sea,
and the air everywhere swirled round and round. My clothes, the zinc roof,
pieces of wood, and all kinds of other objects were performing a macabre
dance in that dark sky. Then it gradually became cold, as at the end of
autumn, and a strange and silent emptiness ensued. Clearly this was no
ordinary event.
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subjective responses, as well as external events, make his writing ideal for the
purposes of this study.

3.1.2

Acts of virtue.

In the four scenarios which follow I focus on incidents drawn from Nagai’s first
hand accounts, and from biographical writings based on his own accounts.

Each scenario describes his own actions which specifically, in some way or other,
could universally be acknowledged as noble and good. Each provides some
psychological insight also. Commentaries below each offer a preliminary analysis.

In the first he describes carrying out a difficult task and a subsequent moment of
insight. This experience occurred during his years as an army doctor in China. The
second and the third are of intense experiences in the immediate aftermath of the
bomb. In each of these, searing memories etch truthful vivid descriptions. The
fourth scenario deals with Nagai’s maturing attitudes in the last years of his life,
and in particular with the composition of a short poem.

These examples also flag the danger of underestimating the complexity of
virtuous actions. Bear in mind that any short real life description must necessarily
be a gross simplification of actual events. In these four scenarios convey the great
complexities possible in a moral act facilitated by virtue, as well as the difficulty in
separating what is essential to virtue from what is additional in the act.

a)

Scenario 1. Treating a prisoner.

A biographer describes a moment of enlightenment during his years in China.

Nagai remembered his inner turmoil during the 1933-34
fighting in Manchuria. Yet now, though the fighting was far
worse he enjoyed peace and freedom in his heart. He certainly
262

had changed! One night he jotted an entry in his notebook
about the exhilaration that flooded him that day when he was
washing the gangrenous foot of a Chinese soldier-prisoner
before an operation. He suddenly realised he felt the same
compassion for a wounded Chinese as for a wounded Japanese,
and wrote: “I now know I have come to China not to defeat
anybody, not to win a war. I have come to help the wounded,
Chinese as much as Japanese, civilians as much as
combatants”.839

Commentary
Nagai’s “peace and freedom in his heart”, his fulfilment as he dedicated himself
compassionately to the care of the wounded, shines brightly on the pages of his
journal. He reveals his consciousness of having grown greatly in interior peace,
overcoming “inner turmoil” despite the increasing wartime danger. The moment
described captures his flooding “exhilaration” at realising that he cares for soldiers
of either side with equal respect and compassion. This moment of insight occurs
precisely as he carries out the objectively repulsive task of washing a gangrenous
foot, with all the associated stench and aversion to the task.

It will be shown that this growth towards inner fulfilment is an important facet of
the virtuous life. Furthermore, the phenomenon of a flash of insight will be
significant in later discussion about the virtue of justice.

b)

Scenario 2. The Rising Sun.

Survivors worked frantically to assist survivors in the hours following the blast. Yet
the task was too great. Nagai writes of his profound helplessness and
discouragement. “I stood helplessly in the middle (of the wounded), doing
nothing. … It was an utterly disheartening scene.” 840 Most of his colleagues and
839
840

Glynn, A Song for Nagasaki, 78.
Nagai, The Bells of Nagasaki, 36.
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students dead, survivors losing their nerve, ten years of academic work
incinerated, Nagai collapsed, greatly weakened by loss of blood. “My knees
trembled and I felt my strength ebbing away. ‘It’s the end,’ I murmured and
collapsed.”

When he came to, despite his own dire situation, Nagai grasped the need to lift his
followers, unite them in purpose, and rally them to the task of helping others. He
called for a flag. Nothing was to be found, so he took a hospital sheet:
Taking a handful of blood that was dripping from my chin, I
traced a huge circular sun on the sheet, which now became a
Japanese flag. Attaching this “Rising Sun” to the bamboo pole,
we lifted it up and watched it flutter loudly as the hot wind
blew around.

With sleeves rolled up and a white band around his head,
young Nagai841 grasped the pole with both hands and raised the
flag high in the air. And then he moved slowly forward carrying
the bloody Rising Sun up that hill covered with black smoke.
And we all followed in solemn and silent procession. It was five
o’clock in the afternoon.842

One witness recalled long afterwards, “Suddenly we had our ‘headquarters’ to
rally around, a centre that put order back into the picture.” Another wrote, “It was
so simple an act and yet the psychological act was profound.”843 By this action
Nagai assembled the remnant of the medical staff to lead and carry survivors
away from immediate danger to a hill overlooking the burning university.

Commentary

841

Another Nagai: a student who had survived the blast.
Nagai, The Bells of Nagasaki, 42-3.
843
Glynn, A Song for Nagasaki, 101-102.
842
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Nagai overcomes his own weakness and discouragement in order to fortify his
followers, and himself, with the improvised symbol of a Japanese flag.

Note how the qualities that Nagai shows are profoundly integrated in the action
he carries out, a point carrying some significance in the discussion below in 3.4. In
this single action Nagai demonstrates prudence, fortitude, remarkable self
control, and remarkable selflessness. He presents himself with a motive to
overcome his lethargy, forms a practical plan, and launches into action. His
fortitude is inseparable from his capacity to see the needs of others and from his
own practical insight.

The insight of the witness is significant: “order” was restored by this inspirational
action, a mark of rational direction. The mere sight of the flag has a remarkable
restorative effect on all. The survivors’ own self-directed and ordered actions
follow their sight of the flag. The symbol sparked an effective response of loyalty
and responsibility, in which it seems practically no words were necessary. The
sight of the flag alone heartened them, somewhat restored peace of heart, and
they were again able to move purposefully drawing on their long cultural and
family traditions of self control and fortitude.

To further unpack the complexity of this moment: sense input, in this case the
sight of a flag charged with emotional resonance, triggers a cascade of practical
action, solidarity, self control and fortitude. Emotion laden input has imparted to
the consciousness of each member of the group a truth on the basis of which each
can act. Thus this scenario also demonstrates the complex relationship between
emotion and considered action: at times emotion can initiate considered and
virtuous action.

c)

Scenario 3. The pamphlet.

This scenario presents a contrasting moment in which it was necessary to master
emotion rather than capitalize upon it, for virtuous action.
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On the day following the blast Nagai describes a moment when the truth dawns
upon him that the destruction has been wrought by a nuclear device and
consequently Japan must be defeated:

The chief nurse came running up and handed me a sheet of paper. It was
one of the leaflets dropped by enemy planes the previous night. As I
glanced at it I shouted out spontaneously: “The atomic bomb!”

In the depth of my being I felt a tremendous shock. The atom bomb has
been perfected! Japan is defeated!

… Conflicting emotions churned in my mind and heart as I surveyed the
appalling atomic wasteland around me. … A bamboo spear lay on the
ground. I kicked it fiercely and it made a dull, hollow sound. Grasping it in
my hand, I raised it to the sky, as tears rolled down my cheeks. The
bamboo spear against the atomic bomb! What a tragic comedy this war
was! This was no longer a war. Would we Japanese be forced to stand on
our shores and be annihilated without a word of protest? These are the
words written on the leaflet:

To the People of Japan

Read carefully what is written in this leaflet. The United States has
succeeded in inventing an explosive more powerful than anything
that has existed until now. The atomic bomb now invented has a
power equal to the bomb capacity of two thousand huge B-29s. You
must reflect seriously on this terrible fact. We swear that what we say
here is the solemn truth. … The President of the United States has
already given you an outline of thirteen conditions for an honourable
surrender. We advise you to accept these conditions and to being
rebuilding a new and better peace-loving Japan. … If you do not do
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this, we are determined to use this bomb and other excellent
weapons to bring this war to a swift, irresistible conclusion.

I read the leaflet once and was stunned. I read it a second time and felt
they were making fools of us. I read it a third time and was enraged at
their impudence. But when I read it a fourth time I changed my mind and
began to think it was reasonable. After reading it a fifth time I knew that
this was not a propaganda stunt but the sober truth.844

Commentary
The emotional significance of this moment is in the thunderclap insight that the
war is inevitably lost. It is interwoven with a sense of burning shame, associated
with defeat, inculcated through Nagai’s culture since childhood. Nagai’s
description of how his passionate reaction subsides on successive readings of the
leaflet gives us a remarkable insight into how deliberation can enable mastery of
passion. What is initially less obvious is the interior battle that Nagai has to fight in
order to respond rationally to the news. Had he torn up the leaflet after the first
readings, he would not have come to the same conclusion. Unsaid is any reference
to his education and upbringing that empowered him to exhibit the self control
required to allow the news to sink in.

Acceptance of the truth about the existence of the bomb, is followed by very swift
reasoning and insight that the Japanese defenders would be powerless on
beaches against landings supported by atomic weapons. He then deliberates over
whether he should accept the demand of the leaflet. Only in his fourth reading he
“changes his mind” and finds the words “reasonable”. Grasp of one truth leads to
deliberation and reasoning that leads to the grasp of another truth. During the
period of deliberation he keeps his emotions under control sufficiently to continue
his deliberation.

844

Nagai, The Bells of Nagasaki, 52-3.
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Complexity is further added by the fact that, although it is not explicitly a factor in
his deliberations, he has an audience. He has already demonstrated that he is
finely attuned to his responsibilities to those he leads. It is reasonable to surmise
that this sense of responsibility as well as his training in scientific objectivity
assisted him in applying sufficient deliberation before committing himself to
judgement.

d)

Scenario 4. Nyokodo.

Nagai lived out his days in a humble hut that he christened Nyokodo meaning
“Love-your-neighbour-as-yourself-house”. 845 It was on the site of his former
home, close to the epicentre. It was a mark of Nagai’s fame that the Divine
Emperor himself visited Nagai in that one room hut where he studied, wrote,
meditated, and delighted in the roses he had growing, the stars above him and
the mountains visible through his window.

Nagai advised his young visitors:
Go to the mountains and meditate! If you stay in the hurly-burly of this
world, you’ll run around in circles without ever finding your way. You’ll
become the kind of person who just stamps and screams. But the blue
mountains are immovable and the white clouds come and go. I look
constantly at these mountains of Mitsuyama and continue my meditation.

A biographer remarks on the transformation of his life during these last six years:
This professor who before 1945 had written nothing but scholarly reports
with dry statistics now became a writer, a poet, an artist, a humanist, a
mystic. Lying on his sickbed with his writing pad suspended over his head,
he writes no less than twenty books before his death in 1951. He also
writes poetry. Though Japanese poetry does not translate well into English
let me refer to one.
845

For discussion of the historical and cultural significance in Japanese tradition of the humble
ascetic’s hut as a place of purity of heart and solitude see Glynn, A Song for Nagasaki, 125.
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The girls of the Junshin School died in the atomic blast chanting psalms
under the leadership of one of their Japanese nuns, just as the twenty six
martyrs of Nagasaki had died centuries before on crosses chanting psalms
under the leadership of Paul Miki. About the schoolgirls Nagai wrote:
Virgins like lilies white
Disappeared burning red
In the flames of the holocaust
Chanting psalms
To the Lord
Nagai was also a master of calligraphy. As love for peace became an all
consuming passion he would write for his visitors the characters heiwa wo,
meaning “Grant us peace!”846

Figure 3.3 Nyokodo. The hut in which Nagai lived during his last years.

846

Nagai, The Bells of Nagasaki, xvii-xviii.
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Commentary
The words of Nagai to his young visitors insist on the importance of meditation in
order to put sense into the events of life. He presents reflection as an antidote to
childish emotional tantrums, purposeless activity, and the distraction of life. It is
clear from his own example that meditation however moves from contemplation
to action. His remarkable output, during his years of illness, demonstrates this
productivity.

The short poem, especially the use of the word “holocaust” and the comparison
of the school girls with the 17th century martyrs of Nagasaki, manifests a
conviction that there can be meaning behind tragedy, that there can be reasons
that explain or help to explain difficulties, perhaps even that some pains are worth
enduring. The simple beauty of the imagery, and the conclusion of the final line,
suggest inner tension is resolved and that the poet, and also the girls themselves,
are at peace.

In total, the scenario allows us to reflect on the phenomenon of growth in virtue.
In his enlightened maturity, Nagai moves from preoccupation with the speculative
to the exercise of contemplation which he channels through art and writing into
powerful messages for his contemporary world. 847 Thereby too, he manifests his
own peace of heart. 848
3.1.3 Virtue and the human act.849

847

Excellence in these activities is a demonstration of virtue according to the Aristotelian
understanding. Aristotle describes art as the virtue of making, while effective writing and poetry
require application of the practical intellect perfected by prudence. Cf NE, 1103a, 32-33.
848
Glynn, A Song for Nagasaki, 130. In these years his calm and peaceful attitude was constantly in
evidence. Above we see this in his calligraphy and his constant concern to send visitors away with
this message of peace. Towards the end of his life he wrote for his small son and daughter, “Being
pure in spirit and pure in heart might not win you a lot of money but will give you something even
more precious, peace of heart.” Biographers describe his affection for his children, typified by such
beautiful letters full of encouragement, tenderness and tranquillity.
849
Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1961),
253.
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Each of the scenarios above has focused on a rational act, what Aquinas calls a
“human act”.850 Before I seek to discern what is common to virtue across the
various scenarios, it will be helpful to review briefly a Thomistic understanding of
the human act. (See also 3.1.4).

Our goal here, in association with the subsections immediately following, is to
identify more precisely the specific characteristics common to the state and
practice of virtue, isolating from them the many other features present in any act
of virtue which are not necessarily specific to virtue. I will comment also on the
observed role of cardinal virtues at work in these scenarios.

Table 3.1 suggests that the human act itself divides into no less than twelve
successive moments. At first this representation of the psychological steps I follow
prior to acting may appear needlessly complex, yet, this structure is derived from

As this study of a neural substrate contributing to virtue will need to account for the presence of
biological aspects and representations, we must distinguish that which is material from that which
is properly rational. For the sake of precision, the use of some terminology drawn from the rational
psychology of Aquinas (1.4.2) is helpful here. In Thomistic psychology there is no psychophysiological mechanism in the very act of knowing; the operation of the agent intellect renders
the phantasm intelligible in the possible intellect. Note that although we use the term “agent
intellect” there is only one agent, the person. “Agent intellect” refers to one function of the mind
which can be identified in order to discuss the structure of thought. The proper object of the agent
intellect is to dissociate the universal from the particular. Yet, a human act deals by necessity with
both universals and with particulars. Hence, inextricably linked with this intellection and rendering
it possible are very material processes. Furthermore, deliberation, in its duration, necessarily
involves material cooperation at what we now understand as the neural level. Where the
particular is present, the material must also be in evidence; “Human actions always have to do
with the particular and the contingent.” (Gilson, 253) Although we say that an act of the will is
“indecomposable” (Gilson, 253) we do not deny that concrete imagery in the brain requires some
material mediation. Hence we also say that the will involves “some kind of experience of the
object to which it is attaching itself”, “quasi experientiam quondam sumens de re cui inhaeret” (ST,
Ia-IIae, Q.15, Art.1). These words are significant. They indicate that the will, through the sensitive
appetite, is affected by the representations, phantasms, of the particular goods. As we have seen
briefly in Chapter 1, a phantasm is an image of a particular thing: “similitude rei particularis” (ST,
Ia, Q.84, Art.7.2). Phantasms are preserved in corporeal organs: “similitudines individuorum
existents in organis corporeis” (ST, Ia, Q.85, Art.1.3). They are individual species residing in the
imagination. Without question, phantasms associated with specific biological representations are
integral to the human act, and therefore also to the operation of virtue.
850
It is evident too, that while the action of rallying followers by an improvised flag is, in this light,
a single act, it could also be regarded as a sequence of completed acts: an urgent request to a
follower to find a proper flag, the improvisation of the sheet-flag, the communication of the action
to followers, the formation of the column heading up the hill, etc.
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observation of reality, accommodating the need for actions to be refined and
finally elected on the basis first of initial attraction, initial information, and then of
practical deliberation about alternatives and means to be employed. Furthermore
this model accommodates the need for perfections of these steps if the act itself
is to be well performed. These perfections are the virtues.

Table 3.1
851
The Human Act
Mind

Will
Intention
About ends

1.

Judgement that the end exists

2.

3.

Judgement that it can be achieved

4.

5.

About means
Deliberation about ways and means
6.
consilium

7.

Discrimination and selection

8.

proairesis

Wish or want
velle, simplex voluntas
Determination to achieve it
volition, volo, voluntas efficax
Approval
consensus
Choice
electio

Executio
9.

Practical and effective command
imperium

10. Application to deed
usus activus

11. Performance by appropriate power or powers
usus passivus
12. Fulfilment
quies

Table 3.1 illustrates that the human act is a complex reflexive process involving, as
Gilson puts it, the intellect and the will, “acting and reacting upon each other”. 852
All the steps up to 11 are completed prior to executive action, prior often to
anything apparent to the observer. Only the last steps involve manifest execution
of the task and consequent fulfilment. 853 854
851

Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1a2ae. 18-21, ed. Thomas Gilby OP (Cambridge:
Blackfriars/McGraw Hill, 1965), Volume 18, Appendix 5.
852
Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 253.
853
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1a2ae. 18-21, ed. Gilby, Appendix 5.
854
These steps are not discrete events in a chronological succession. McInerny holds that Aquinas
presents the three acts of the will in order of intention as volition, enjoyment, and intention; and
in the order of execution, as above, consent, choice and use. (Ralph McInerny, “Ethics” in
Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. Norman Kretzman and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge:
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Gilson explains that the process of the human act is initiated by “an
indecomposable movement of our will”855 (step 2 above) in the concrete
apprehension of some goal (step 1 above). This indecomposable, and therefore
non-material, enlightenment is an “intention” such as, for example, “I want to
help this person with the gangrenous foot”, “I want to communicate the
importance of peace”. ‘In wishing the end, it necessarily wills the means,
therefore the intention of the end and the willing of the means constitute but one
single act....To will a remedy in view of health is one act of willing’.856 These initial
steps pass through refining stages (steps 4 and 5).

The intellect then provides preliminary deliberation defined as counsel (step 5).
This “deliberation concludes with a judgement of the practical reason” 857
presenting several judgements with good under various aspects (step 7). For
example Nagai could consider the various merits of calligraphy, poetry or prose to
impart a message of peace.

The will is moved to what is good in each of the options (step 6). The will attaches
itself to these choices offered by deliberation in the step we call consent (step 7).
For example, in the scenarios above consent would be present just prior to the
readiness to wash the foot, at the moment the plan is settled that will result in
putting pen to paper, etc.

Finally the choice of one means to an end is made (steps 9-11). It depends “in part
upon the intellect and in part upon the will”858 which Aquinas concludes primarily

Cambridge University Press, 1993), 205-208.) It is of course not reasonable to suggest that an
action can actually be subdivided into watertight compartments. Nagai’s creation of a poem would
defy this discrete categorisation, and McInerny, to illustrate variations possible in the framework,
points out that often in real life consent and choice are in the one step.
855
Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 253.
856
Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 253.
857
Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas,) 253.
858
“appetitivus intellectus, vel appetitus intellectivus”. NE, II 5 2.
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must be an act of the will,859 because substantially this election is the movement
of the soul towards the good which it chooses.

Note the complex interplay of the intellect and will in the lead up to the actions
central to the scenarios above. Intellect, will, sensitive appetite, imagination and
memory (for example in memory of the symbol of the flag) each play clear
respective roles in the process of the human act. Let us now look specifically at
the contributions of emotion and virtue.

Where do emotions fit into the human act? Sense appetite acts upon the will
particularly at step 2 and to some extent at steps 4, 6 and 8. Undue sense
appetition can negate effective use of the intellect as we see for example in
Nagai’s original struggles to overcome his passionate reaction to the flyer. In the
exercise of a virtuous act, temperance and fortitude ‘respond to the direction of
reason’.860 Appropriate sense appetition in the form of inspiring emotional
symbolism, contributes to reason, motivating the followers of Nagai to retake
rational control of their behaviours. 861

Where do the virtues fit in to the human act? The active powers of intellect, will,
and sensitive appetite are perfected by practical reason in the intellect, justice in
the rational appetite, and the virtues of the sensitive appetite. These virtues, and
in this study I focus on the cardinal virtues, are dispositions in some way
facilitating the governance of reason. Gilson explains that when there is
insufficient formation of these appetites they can distort the reasoning process.
The person in whom concupiscence is the master judges his own
desires to be good, even when such a judgement contradicts the

859

ST, Ia, Q.83, Art.8 and Ia-IIae, Q.13, Art.1.
Aquinas, Disputed questions on virtue, xiii.
861
Understandings of the contribution of reason to rationality are a major area of interest in
philosophical psychology.
860
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universal judgement of reason. It is to neutralise such sophistries of
passion that man must be strengthened with moral habits.862

McInerny observes that prudence perfects the whole reasoning process: “This
analysis of the complete human act into its components is another look at
practical discourse as issuing in the command of prudence.”863 This overarching
involvement of prudence at the various stages of the human act will have
considerable significance in discussion in later sections of this chapter, as will
justice which perfects the will with a disposition to act always taking one’s duties
to others into account.

Virtuous acts derive from an appetite inclined easily by reason perfected by
prudence. In differing contexts they can be both cause and result of the “training
of our emotions to respond to the direction of reason… a most difficult task”. 864
McInerny clarifies that temperance and fortitude respond to the direction of
reason, but are dispositions of the sensitive appetites: “The habit or disposition in
the concupiscible appetite to respond to the direction of reason, and thus to
pursue pleasures rationally, is called temperance. The habit or disposition to react
rationally to threatened harm is called courage.”865

3.1.4

Some observations about the characteristics of virtue.

In the light of this understanding of the human act and how it is perfected by
virtue I am now in a position, by analysis of the scenarios above, to suggest a
number of features of acts of virtue and of the relationship between the virtues.
These initial observations based on common features evident in the various
scenarios will be complemented by a systematic review of the central
characteristics of virtue according to Aristotle and Aquinas in 3.2 and 3.3.
862

I have drawn in this section from the masterful overview of the Thomistic analysis of the human
act by Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas,
863
McInerny, “Ethics,” 208.
864
Aquinas, Disputed questions on virtue, xiii.
865
Aquinas, Disputed questions on virtue, xiii.
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i.

Acts of virtue may be accompanied by a deep sense of peace, fittingness,
and joy.
We see this in the exhilaration experienced by Nagai in China, by the
calming effect of the focused orderly response to Nagai’s example and to
the symbol of the flag, in the calming of Nagai’s passion as deliberation
conquered raging emotion, and most of all, in Nagai’s stable resolute
peace in the face of his impending death.

ii.

Effective action is evident in each scenario.
Each scenario presented above leads to a “successful” outcome because of
Nagai’s actions. The success of the outcome is certainly found in the
effective cleaning of an enemy’s foot, creation of an improvised flag,
comprehension of the message of a leaflet, and completion of a work of
art. The prudent election of means to perform planned actions is a
constant element in these examples.866

iii.

Due regard for the needs of others is evident in each scenario.
Preoccupation with the rights and needs of others appears to be an
abiding motivation in virtuous action. The interpersonal dimension,
arguably perfected by justice, is inseparable in each scenario: Nagai
measures and devises his own actions by their impact on others. Hence,
the cleaning of the foot is a demonstration of the conviction to serve
without discrimination. The creation of the flag has the result of unifying
and giving hope to the survivors.867

iv.

Virtues appear to operate in an integrated way, in concert, with each
other.
In the first scenario Nagai compassionately washes the enemy soldier’s
gangrenous limb, apparently moved by principles of duty and humanity.
His action brings together prudence which is reflects the practical
execution of the deed, justice which is the virtue by which he is disposed

866

Of the examples, the fourth scenario provides the best demonstration of calmly considered
actions tailored to the achievement of specific goals for a range of desired outcomes.
Nevertheless, each demonstrates the directive role of reason in execution of the task.
867
Further examples: the deliberation over the leaflet allows him to demonstrate to another the
need for calm rationality in a crisis; and the composition and publication of the poem allows him to
inform others with his refined insights.
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to fulfil what he sees as his duty towards others, and self control and
fortitude in suppression of his revulsion and his readiness to face
difficulty.868
v.

It would appear that virtue can consist not only in rational management of
emotion, but also in refined attention to one’s emotional state.
In the third scenario we see emotion and an overactive imagination
clouding reason. We see too, Nagai’s response of deliberation to manage
that emotional inflammation so that he can act rationally and nobly. In
contrast we observe in the episode with the flag that an emotion laden
symbol can trigger virtuous actions.869

vi.

Prudence and justice may involve instantaneous insights.
Although we have seen that, as in the third scenario, prudence may
contribute to protracted deliberation and reasoning, at other times there
is evidence of instantaneous flashes of conviction, of recognition of truth.
For example Nagai himself describes the moment, while bathing a putrid
foot, that the dignity of his calling to all without exception dawned upon
him. Such instantaneous comprehensions of truth are consistent with the
Aristotelian/Thomistic account of rational operations perfected by
prudence and justice.870

vii.

Acts of virtue appear to arise from and lead to refined sentiments of self
sacrifice, beauty and nobility.
Note for example his generous self sacrifice as Nagai feels the conviction of
serving the enemy wounded. Later in the conflict he would risk his very life
and career, disobeying explicit orders, to save the lives of prisoners. We

868

Three further examples. In the second scenario, Nagai’s sense of duty and concern for his
colleagues lead to an act of great fortitude. His followers are in turn overcome their disorder and
lack of self control by the symbolic reminder of needs greater than their own. Again we see all the
virtues operating in an integrated manner. In the third, Nagai overcomes a response of great
passion through great will power and determination to deliberate before passing judgement. It is
evident that prudence and justice cooperate in the effective direction of emotion. Finally, in the
fourth, Nagai’s habitual self control and fortitude provide a platform for calm reflection. From that
calm reflection comes an abundance of acts of service to his fellow man.
869
Similarly in the fourth scenario Nagai’s simple poem can evoke in us as we read it our own inner
acts of compassion, essentially acts of love of fellow man, akin to justice.
870
Similarly the mere glimpse of the flag, with its inherent truth of patriotism and solidarity,
moved Nagai’s companions.
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also witness the refined love of country that underpins Nagai’s
inspirational action with the flag, and his love of humanity that drives him
to insist tirelessly on peace after the war.871
viii.

The state of virtue appears to culminate in a higher, more refined capacity
to act well.
The last six years of Nagai’s life are marked by prodigious industry under
the most difficult circumstances, conducted in a spirit of deep humanity
and cultural sensitivity, amidst personal austerity, and all the while
maintaining mastery over wayward emotions of anger, revenge and
bitterness, and manifesting a deep peace of heart to all despite personal
and national tragedy. In total these portray a man who is a paragon of
established, stable, personal qualities.

ix.

A life of virtue may find its culmination in a refined capacity to love others
with deeds.
It appears that Nagai, in his maturity, successfully channelled his energies
into effective love of others.872 Nagai’s constant example through his
illness, to his children, to visitors and to readers, was of loving concern.
Such a disposition requires effective judgement, a highly refined capacity
to measure one’s actions against the needs of others, and the self control
and tenacity necessary for the achievement of the goal. These final years
of Nagai’s biography suggest the capacity to love others with deeds to be
the very crowning of the virtuous life.

3.1.5 The superiority of virtue ethics in accounting for noble human behaviour.

I have presented some detailed glimpses into the life of Takashi Nagai. His own
account of actual behaviour appears to be reflective of the Aristotelian-Thomistic
871

Furthermore, Nagai appears to draw strength from natural beauty: flowers, stars, and
mountains. He is drawn to artistic expression to better communicate the refined sentiments that
occupy his mind.
872
It is reasonable to expect that such a selfless disposition has a prior history. Such selflessness is
evident even the four scenarios: profound respect for others evident in his actions during the
Chinese war; tireless attention to the victims of the bomb; and solicitude to provide effective
leadership by example. These things demonstrate his dedication to others in years preceding his
final illness.
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understanding of virtue and the human act, from initial deliberation, through
choice, to execution. It seems clear that the doctrine of virtue accounts effectively
for the interplay of rationality with appetite and emotion, and thus offers an
accurate understanding of human action.

In 1.6 it was noted that contemporary accounts of moral philosophy fall broadly
into three groups: consequentialist ethical theories, deontological (duty based)
theories, and virtue ethics. It is most interesting to compare these theories against
Nagai’s own moral decision making and his moral worldview.

If we study the four scenarios as test cases, examining them for whether Nagai
acts out of an observance of rules or with an eye to bringing about a determined
outcome, neither approach fits well with his behaviour without doing violence to
the facts.

There was obviously no rule book for Nagai to follow to act well. For example, he
explains that his treatment of the enemy soldier was prior to a realisation that he
was observing any rule for his own behaviour. Similarly, the spontaneous action of
improvising a flag could not be scripted; the unprompted conception of the action
defies any explanation based on “duty” as an overriding motivation. Nor may
Nagai’s deliberation over the leaflet be interpreted as acting out of duty or
observance of rules. It is clear that the various actions described arose from
qualities in his character based on previously established behaviours, and from
well formed convictions upon which he could draw.873

It is also clear that Nagai regarded his actions as intrinsically important, rather
than as a simple means to an end. The creation of the flag was noble in itself, and
integral to any positive outcome; it was not instrumentalised for some other
consequence. His deliberation over the leaflet was prior to any goal setting. The
873

There are of course literally infinite possibilities for individual moral acts: they may or may not
be complex; they may be virtually instantaneous, or of considerable duration, and it is apparent
that a virtue based ethical system allows flexibility in its response to moral dilemmas, to act well
regardless of context.
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prodigious output of Nagai’s final years cannot be explained alone by a utilitarian
framework; just as his literary and artistic endeavours and his advice for visitors
transcend results. His very serenity is evidence that they are fulfilling in
themselves. His dedication for the wounded without discrimination, his concern
for those he was leading, and his love for his children and fellow countrymen,
were all actions intrinsically important to Nagai, neither reducible to a sense of
duty, nor to the expectation of a positive outcome. The love for others shown in
these actions goes far beyond the strict reciprocity of some narrow conception of
justice, highlighting the deficiencies of duty and consequence based measures in
accounting for truly noble behaviour.

The concordance we have been seeing between these real scenarios and virtue
theory demonstrate that an understanding of virtue is not an arbitrary or out-ofdate framework which struggles to describe complex behaviours arising from
either rational deliberation or emotional reaction. In fact, it would appear, prima
facie, that it is virtuous character, not rule articulation nor outcome calculation,
that is the well spring of spontaneous noble behaviours.

This ability for virtue ethics to account for noble behaviour and for the
characteristics of noble personality in the real world is striking:

i.

Nagai himself has adopted the view that moral behaviour is a consequence
of character, the essence of a virtue ethics based approach. He advises the
young men who come to see him that they should meditate, to change
themselves, lest they become “the type of person” who stamps and
screams. It is clear that moral behaviour, in Nagai’s conception, is a
consequence of character. Also, it is impressive to note that, even some 15
years before in China, his biographer noted his delight in realising the
“change” in his personality, taking delight equally in treating allies and
enemies. Nagai’s own words reflect this discovery.

ii.

Nagai’s very qualities of character stand out as the most psychologically
attuned explanation for Nagai’s freely chosen behaviours, within a broader
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understanding of human nature. This approach adequately accommodates
rationality, free choice, motivation, and human fulfilment.
iii.

Finally, Nagai’s character based worldview of ethical behaviour was
formulated not because of training in western classical philosophy but
intuitively in a culture so different to that of the West. Nagai was a man of
his times and nation, patriotic with what we might call a stoicism or even
fatalism in handling difficulty typical of the nurture of a Japanese
upbringing, and he still regarded moral decision making as an extension of
character. This suggests that a virtue based view of human personality
satisfies something deeply attuned to our nature; this is absent or less
evident in a consequentialist or duty-observant paradigm for assessment
of behaviour.

On any reasonable measure, Nagai is indisputably a noble and admirable human
being: this study demonstrates that virtue ethics is well able to account for the
moral growth, for the the decision-making and actions, for the stable qualities of
character, and for personal fulfilment in maturity, of such a person. The study
suggests that consequentialist and deontological approaches may be less effective
in accounting for behaviour, character and fulfilment in such people.

In the balance of the current chapter the matter of these scenarios will also be
used in illustration of characteristics of virtue. In Chapter 5 I will return to one of
these scenarios to illustrate the neural bases of virtue in actu, and in Chapter 6 I
will revisit the comparative evaluation of ethical paradigms.

3.2

The state of virtue.

In 3.2 and 3.3 I apply texts from Aristotle and Aquinas concerning the nature of
virtue to these reflections about Takashi Nagai. First some contextual insights:

We know more about the man Alexander the Great than about his tutor Aristotle,
but of course Aristotle’s fame does not hinge on the achievements of a
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hyperactive pupil. As the Britannica puts it, Aristotle “perhaps more than any
other thinker has characterised the orientation and content of all that is termed
Western Civilisation”. His Nicomachean Ethics is one of the great texts of
civilization. In it Aristotle gave us the first systematic vision of virtues as the basis
for perfection of the human character, a view that has prevailed in all but the
most recent decades of western civilisation, a view too that many have argued is
universal to human experience.874

Some say the book was composed for Nicomachus, Aristotle’s son, others that the
son was the editor; but how attractive it is to think that the great Philosopher may
have written this beautiful account of human fulfilment for his own son. The
argument of the work hinges on crucial linkages: between habit and virtue –
“Moral virtue comes about as a result of habit”875 - Aristotle goes to lengths to
explain that virtues are deeply rooted habits of action, not just “values”, or nice
sentiments; and between virtue and happiness – “Happiness is the reward of
virtue”.876 Aristotle realised too that fostering virtue requires personal effort, and
if they are to be formed in a young person, parental expertise and example are
important. He emphasised the importance of building these good habits in the
early years of a child’s life. 877

There are many beautiful passages in this work: close analyses of the various
moral virtues, an insistence on intellectual virtues, a whole section dedicated to
explaining the link between true friendship and happiness. And in culmination, the
meaning of happiness, eudaimonia, itself is studied. The ten books of the work
commenced with an inquiry into the meaning of happiness and they conclude by
drawing the distinction between pleasure and happiness. Joseph Pieper saw this

874

See discussion in section immediately above with reference to Nagai. Martin Seligman and
Christopher Peterson, Character Strengths and Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and
C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (1943);
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/augustine/arch/lewis/abolition1.htm#1 (accessed 6 November,
2012).
875
NE, 1103a.
876
NE, 1099b16.
877
NE, 1103b.
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discovery and articulation of virtues as a turning point in civilised
consciousness.878

The Nicomachean Ethics is more than just another book on a dusty classics shelf!
Surely we disregard such a heritage at our own peril.

In forming my views for the sections that follow, in addition to the primary texts
of Aristotle and Thomas, I have drawn from a range of commentators, including
Sherman, Irwin, Broadie, Hutchinson, Pieper, Porter and McInerny. My intention
has been to steer clear of controversial matters providing a systematic, succinct
review. I rely on key source passages in order to identify essential characteristics
that will be a focus for the task of Chapter 5.

Essential characteristics for the state of virtue are identified below in 3.2, and
features associated with the development of virtue in 3.3. Then, in the light of a
discussion of the cardinal virtues in Chapter 4, my aim will be to distill from this
list the characteristics of virtue that we may reasonably understand to have a
biophysical basis.

3.2.1

Virtues dispose the appetites, the source of all human acts, to
rationality.879

In Scenario 3 we witnessed Nagai’s emotional response to the leaflet calling for
Japanese surrender. He described his repeated efforts to consider the American
demand and he described his unwillingness to accept what he was reading. Finally
only on the fourth and fifth readings did he accept the truth of what he was
878

J. Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press,
1966). “This particular intellectual framework, the formula which is called the “doctrine of virtue,”
was one of the great discoveries in the history of man’s self-understanding, and has continued to
be part and parcel of the European mind. It has become a basic component of the European
consciousness, and the result of centuries of persistent intellectual endeavour by all the creative
elements of the emerging West, both the Greeks (Plato, Aristotle) and the Romans (Cicero,
Seneca), both Judaism (Philo), and Christianity (Clement of Alexandria, Augustine).”
879
Emotions are neither good nor bad in themselves but we must manage them. Aquinas wrote:
“Passion, to Aristotle, is something to which we must choose to react.” (ST, Ia-IIae, Q.59, Art.2)
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reading. This effort to confront something deeply unpalatable bespeaks qualities
of character, and a habitual restraint that withholds final judgement and
continues deliberation without committing to an unbridled emotional response
until a matter has been thoroughly considered. It illustrates well the capacity for
trained passion to accept the guidance of reason, albeit with initial reluctance. In a
similar way Nagai controlled his revulsion towards the gangrenous state of the
enemy soldier’s foot, and overcame his severe weakness to inspire his fellow
workers by means of the improvised flag.

In these examples we are witnessing the habitual dispositions first of all in Nagai’s
sensitive appetites to respond to his direction, and also in his rational appetite, his
capacity for make well deliberated choices responsive to the rights of others.

For clarification, let us return briefly to the model of the human act and to the
notion of motivation. Whenever we act, we act for some purpose, we move
toward something that we find appealing for some reason. Aristotle and Aquinas
suggest that our appetites, both sensible and rational, themselves need to have
been trained if a person is to possess such restraint and self control as we see in
Nagai.

At the foundation of all good human activity is self management of the passions
by temperance and fortitude. For this reason too, the will, or rational appetite,
also “needs to be disposed to its operations by means of habits”.880 Aristotle had
taught that it was by these habits, by the moral virtues, that “We are directed well
or ill in reference to the passions.”881 Justice is a disposition of the rational
appetite, the will, whereas fortitude and temperance are of the sensitive appetite.
As we have seen in the overview of the human act, virtuous acts are commanded
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ST, Ia-IIae, Q.49, Art.4.1.
NE, ii 4
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by the rational appetite disposed by justice in concert with the intellect disposed
by prudence.882

Habitual dispositions of these powers of the sensitive and rational appetites are
the key to living well, to living according to reasoned choices.883 “Knowing what is
right does not make a wise man.”884 But, “Habits are necessary in order to act
well.”885 Further Aquinas explains, “Human virtue is an operative habit, a good
habit, productive of good works”. 886 Aquinas explains that the particular type of
habit that is virtue is “a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind of
habit.”887 This differentiates it from a passion which is “a movement of the
sensitive appetite”. In other words, virtues in the sensitive appetites are
dispositions in our passionate reactions.

In the two subsections which follow I examine the nature of the dispositions first
of the sensitive appetites, and then of the rational appetite.

3.2.1.1

The virtues of the sensitive appetite refine our habitual dispositions
to pain and pleasure.

In his final years, having suffered the loss of his wife, friends and colleagues,
having seen the accomplishments of years of research vaporise before his eyes, as
his life ebbs away through the inroads of leukemia, and in the midst of national
humiliation and tragedy, Nagai demonstrates the most remarkable capacity to
transcend his circumstances. We have read how, in the fourth scenario, he
maintains his equanimity and a prodigious output of work in the service of his

882

Aristotle described virtue as the “habit of choosing the rational mean as a prudent man would
discern it.” NE, 1106b36.
883
Nagai’s self mastery includes not only articulated convictions of respect for fellow man, and his
medical expertise, but also his mastery of his disgust at the unpleasantness of his task: actions in
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887
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countrymen in a great work of national healing and reconciliation. He exemplifies
the refined emotional life that Aristotle suggests is central to human wellbeing.

Virtue consists in rejoicing and hating and loving aright, there is
clearly nothing we are so much concerned to acquire and to
cultivate as the power of forming right judgements, and of
taking delight in good dispositions and noble actions.888

What exactly is this “hating and loving aright”? Aristotle insists that human
motivation reduces to seeking pleasure and avoiding pain: “What affirmation and
negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire.” 889 He reflects on the
danger of poor choices when “we choose the pleasant as a good, and avoid pain
as an evil.”890

That man has control over pleasure and pain differentiates him from the
animals.891 Aristotle argues that the capacity to control appetite is the mark of
rationality. We see this in Nagai’s self discipline, both in the face of a natural
distaste for washing a putrid wound, and in maintaining equanimity in the face of
his illness and separation from his children.

Pleasure and pain are universal in human experience… but it is how we react to
them, and how we direct them that leads to peace or frustration. 892 893
...every passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure
and pain....it is by reason of pleasures and pains that men
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Aristotle, Politics, 1340a18.
NE, 1139a18-26.
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neither the pleasant nor the painful.”
892
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893
NE, 1104b11. “...moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account of the
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become bad by pursuing (the wrong pleasures) or avoiding
(worthy pains)...894

It is in how we manage these experiences that virtue resides, “Virtues and vices
are dispositions to find certain things pleasant and certain other things
unpleasant. ... virtue is good taste in practical matters.” 895 And ultimately,
therefore, this is the making of character, “Character is good or bad by pursuing
and avoiding certain pleasures and pains”.896

3.2.1.2

Virtue is a habit of choosing.

Time and again, Aristotle insists that virtue is a habit of choosing, “a prohairetic
state”.897 He says, “The virtues are choices or they involve choice”898 and, that
“virtue is a habit of choosing the rational mean as a prudent man would discern
it.”899 It is choice in accordance with right reason, orthos logos.900 901Aquinas
echoes this: “The principal act of virtue is choice.” 902

Choice is principally an act of the rational appetite, the will.
Choice is substantially not an act of reason but of the will: for
choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the soul
toward the good which is chosen. Consequently it is evidently
an act of the appetitive power.’903
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In short, virtuous action is characterised by well informed, right desires. The
glimpses into Nagai’s life illustrate some important clarifications about choice.
Note, for example in the Chinese field hospital, the series of choices that make
possible Nagai’s powerful and articulated conviction that he is now a doctor for
both friend and enemy. He chooses to carry out a repulsive task in the treatment
of an enemy, he chooses to focus not on the disagreeable nature of what he is
doing or a natural fear in treating an enemy, and instead he chooses to broaden
this isolated incident into rule for his general behaviour; finally he chooses to
write about the moment that night further reinforcing the conviction about what
he has done and will do in future.

Sherman comments extensively on the complexity of the range of tasks and operations
associated with choice. She holds that all have a role to play in virtuous action: correct
perception, consideration of all issues, comparison of compelling ends, 904 sound
deliberation about means905, choice of actions “for their own sakes”,906 sensitivity to
ethical salience.907 She writes,
Virtuous action will combine a judgement of circumstances,
reactive emotions, and some level of decision about how to act.
(Virtuous action may involve the following) emulated models...
general precepts and rules of thumb. ... (Also required will be)
cognitive skills, imagination, sensitivity...(Furthermore being)
sensitive to the circumstances in which action is called for as
well as flexible in one’s conception of the requirements of a
precept is all part of practising virtuous action.908

Ultimately, this habit of choosing requires rectitude in the sensitive appetites, in
the rational appetite and in the intellect: “Since moral virtue is a state of character
concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the
904

Sherman, The Fabric of Character (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 174.
NE, 1113a14.
906
Sherman, The Fabric of Character, 175.
907
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reasoning must be good and the desire right, if the choice is to be good. Desire
must pursue just what the reason asserts.”909

3.2.2

Virtue lies in choice of the mean.

Virtue lies at the intermediate point, between excess and defect in relation to
passions and actions.
To feel (passions) at the right times, with reference to the right
objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in
the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is
characteristic of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of mean.910

We see this exemplified in the circumstances of Nagai’s fabrication of the flag, an
act of soundly considered fortitude. He accepts help from others and allows
someone else to lead with the flag, but he sufficiently overcomes his own life
threatening weakness to carry out the decisive actions required to restore hope to
his shattered friends. Although, given his very great blood loss, the exertion is life
threatening, the risk is warranted because the circumstances are dire.
Nevertheless where he can step back and pass the responsibility to others he does
so.

Aristotle argues that it is of particular importance to note that the mean is
understood in relation to the particular person and his circumstances, and is
dependent upon the correct deliberation and evaluation of the subject acting.
Virtue then is a state of character concerned with choice, lying
in a mean, that is the mean relative to us (my italics), this being
determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by
which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.911
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In Nagai’s situation, it was essential for him to assess his own physical state,
judging the extent to which he needed to rely on others to sustain his own
capacity to lead, yet provide the effective leadership required.

3.2.3

The motivation of virtue: “Virtuous actions are done for the sake of the
noble.”912

Motivation is the end to which we aim in an action. Gilson explains the need we
have for fortitude and temperance perfecting the sensitive appetite, and of justice
in our rational appetite, at the commencement of the human act:
Ends are, in human acts, what principles are in the speculative
sciences. To will the fitting end depends on a moral virtue. Once
the end is willed, it is an intellectual virtue which will deliberate
and choose the means suitable to the end. This virtue is
prudence.913

In the scenario involving the flag, Nagai envisages his goal and the important
impact it will have. He then he sets about fabricating a flag when an actual flag
cannot be found. Prudence perfects the practical intellect in its deliberation and
election of means.
Aristotle holds that virtuous actions are carried out “for their own sakes”914, but
this expression needs to be understood correctly. We must reconcile this with the
understanding, time and again in Aristotle, that virtuous actions are carried out
for noble reasons: “Virtuous actions are noble and done for the sake of the
noble.”915
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NE, 1120a23.
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A brave man will face death, “as the rule directs, for honour’s
sake… it is for a noble end that the brave man endures and acts
as courage directs.916 917

Aristotle makes clear that noble reasons are not extrinsic optional goods such as
fame and wealth, but intrinsic goods such as one’s own true welfare, and service
to others. Virtuous actions are carried out “for their own sake”, for intrinsically
good reasons, whereby the very action of the virtue brings about the good
outcome intrinsic to the action. Such intrinsic goods are manifestly present
underpinning Nagais’ actions: his very service to another in washing his foot, the
very action manifesting remarkable dedication to duty and self control, is the end
of his action. Intrinsic to this action also is the good respect for fellow man,
perfected by justice. Therefore actions can be virtuous, “even if these actions do
not ultimately achieve their planned goals.”918

3.2.4

Virtues bring about states of character.919

Our character is the sum total of our behaviours arising from our habits. Virtue
characterises who we are. An isolated action, perhaps an anomalous deed, does
not define our character but habituations towards certain actions do. From their
actions we know what things are. 920 921

Aristotle argues that virtues are a fundamental feature of soul:
916

NE, 1115b12, 23-34.
NE, 1116a15. Whereas to face death for an ignoble end is not courage: “To die to escape from
poverty or love, or anything painful, is not the mark of a brave man, but rather of a coward.... it is
softness to fly from what is troublesome, and such a man endures death not because it is noble
but to fly from evil.”
918
Sherman, The Fabric of Character, 176. We see this in Nagai’s commitment to noble activity
regardless of outcome. Noble actions enrich us regardless of the outcome. In this the human
flourishing engendered by virtuous action is evident. Nagai has no control over whether or not
message to his young visitors to go and meditate away from the pressures of daily existence will be
put into effect, but by giving the message in all good will, he himself is perfected.
919
In the expression “states of character” I offer a plural of “character”. I am not suggesting two
distinct concepts.
920
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Things that are found in the soul are of three kinds – passions,
faculties, states of character, virtue must be one of these..... by
states of character (I mean) the things in virtue of which we
stand well or badly with reference to the passions eg with
reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too
weakly, and well if we feel it moderately; and similarly with
reference to the other passions.922
Virtues are distinct from faculties: “We are not made good or bad by nature.”923 Nor are
they passions. “We feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are modes of
choice or involve choice.”924 Rather “a virtue is a state (hexis)”925 being neither a faculty
nor a passion.

A virtuous character may be understood as a person habitually with desires in
accord with his good. Following discussion of just acts, courageous or cowardly
acts, and temperate or self indulgent or irascible acts, Aristotle writes: “States of
character arise out of like activities... this is why the activities we exhibit must be
of a certain kind”.926 Consistency is required to build qualities of character. 927

In a real sense our choices that make us who we are: “Choice is closely bound up
with virtue and discriminates characters better than actions do.”928
Virtues are… means, states of character, tending by their own
nature to the doing of acts by which they are produced, and
they are in our power and voluntary, and act as right rule
prescribes.929
922

NE, 1105b20.
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Although in particular situations a man may act under the compulsion of
unregulated passion, if he was responsible for the choices that led to this state,
there is an argument that the subsequent state of compulsion is freely chosen:
“By their slack lives (they are) responsible for becoming men of that kind, and men
make themselves responsible for being unjust or self indulgent.”930

Of relevance here is a comment from one of Nagai’s biographers, Glynn, who
points out that at a point in the early 1930s Nagai stopped drinking heavily. He
accepted responsibility for character and therefore modified his actions to bring
about a different habitual state with respect to temperance and, in his last years,
a most remarkable self control. By this action he would win praise from Aristotle.
Not to know that it is from the exercise of activities on
particular objects that states of character are produced is the
mark of a thoroughly senseless person.931

3.2.5

Virtues accord with the natural perfecting of the person.

We have seen that the capacity to act habitually in accord with right reason is the
hallmark of goodness, hence, the virtuous man is good: “It is impossible to be
practically wise without being good.”932 Aristotle understood a virtue as an
excellence of character, making “its possessor good and his work good
likewise”.933

He argues that the development of virtue is a perfection according to nature,
represented, for example, by Nagai in his maturity, who presents as the “true and
finished man of character”.934
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Virtue implies directly a disposition whereby the subject is well
disposed according to the mode of its nature: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Physics vii, 17) that “virtue is a disposition of
a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect I mean that
which is disposed according to its nature”.935
By inclining us to “that which accords with reason”, 936 virtues order the organism
to self management, and are therefore a natural perfection of the person.937 Note
that Aquinas quotes Aristotle’s insistence that virtue involves not only good
actions, but that the agent be perfect in itself, a rational being must not act below
itself.

There is an increasing amount of literature linking ethical behaviour, self control,
comprehension of consequences, empathy with others, and so on, to brain
activity, and in a similar way, a growing literature linking anti social behaviours to
other distinctive characteristics of brain activity. But this study goes two steps
further than this.


I argue that the development of a virtuous character itself has stable and
predictable neuronal concomitants.



Second, I argue that this rational creature is fulfilled by the perfected
development of his rationality through changes in neurobiological
activities, processes, and pathways and that this development of virtuous
character is the natural and fitting trajectory for human development.
Therefore persons who fail to develop in this way, have, in a real sense,
failed to flourish.

3.2.5.1

Virtue is pleasant.938

935

ST, Ia-IIae, Q.71, Art.1.
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.71, Art.2.1.
937
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.71, Art.1.
938
For an understanding of the meaning of pleasure in virtue, see Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 9095.
936

294

In the following sections we review the Aristotelian notion that virtuous action
brings pleasure and ease of action in the short term, and in the longer term a
stable disposition towards rational action, deep peace, and natural fulfilment in
the perfection of the body itself.

There is a pleasure that arises simply because we pursue what we love and this
pleasure results for all choices, virtuous or otherwise. All choices are accompanied
by a certain pleasure. We choose according to what is noble, advantageous, and
pleasant… most of all, pleasant, “for pleasure accompanies all objects of choice;
for even the noble and advantageous appear pleasant.” 939 In contrast, Aristotle
urges us to appropriate pleasure and pain, the characteristics of virtue. “It is the
mark of virtue both to be pleased and to be pained at the right objects and in the
right way.”940
The pleasure of virtue must be understood correctly.941 Irwin explains further that
virtuous people “take pleasure in facing the dangers that brave people have to
face, and in avoiding misguided pleasures that intemperate people avoid. This is
an important difference between virtue and mere continence.”942 The virtuous
person has effectively come to a reassessment of what is pleasurable.

Broadie holds that this pleasure is distinct from the pleasures of enjoyment of an
activity. She says that the virtuous person acts “freely, unreluctantly,
ungrudgingly... taking satisfaction” in the activity:
The virtuous person takes pleasure in his virtuous acts because
they do not go against the grain; and because they express his
moral stature which is metaphysically anxious (so to speak) to
be expressed in action.943
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This refined ability for pleasure and pain is more pleasurable, in the Aristotelian
account, than the pleasures of non virtuous activities. The greater pleasure
accompanying virtuous action is attributable to “increasingly fine powers of
discernment”.944 Sherman writes,
The pleasure which arises from virtuous activity945 is the
pleasure of realising a virtuous state without either internal
impediments (ie insufficient or conflicting motivation) or
external obstacles. In this way, the pleasure of virtue falls under
the general account of the pleasure of excellent activity.946

She notes Aristotle’s view that virtue leads to more complete actualisation in an
activity with therefore greater pleasure forthcoming, although “even the learner
gains pleasure from the exercise of his abilities”.947

Ultimately, in a state of highest virtue, “that which is virtuous is pleasant or free
from pain.”948 The hallmark of exquisitely virtuous action is that it is effortless and
intrinsically rewarded.
Lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by
nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these
are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. Their
life has... pleasure in itself.949

This intrinsic reward is seen in the joy that Nagai exhibits in treating the enemy
soldier and most of all in the calm he communicates despite his illness. We also
see in evidence a pleasure derived from the effortlessness of the action, the
absence of internal impediment. Hence the energy that Nagai applies to his
fabrication of the Rising Sun belies, is virtually oblivious to, his precarious physical
state.
944
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3.2.5.2

“Happiness is the reward of virtue”.950

Ultimately however, not even the heightened pleasure of virtuous activity
necessarily brings happiness. “Aristotle agreed with Plato’s claim that pleasure is
insufficient for happiness. ... The goodness of pleasures must be measured by
standards other than pleasure and pain.”951

In this section I look at the subjective peace of soul that virtue bestows. In the
following section, at the objective perfection of the organism. Both enjoy a
relationship to rationality and self management.952

The happiness of virtue may be understood at a richer level beyond pleasure. In in
1.6.3, we have seen that, according to the Aristotelian-Thomistic view, human
flourishing requires the development of intrinsic qualities of self management.
Virtues are seen as constitutive elements of human wellbeing. Virtues enable man
to be self directing,953 and to reach his full potential in this life:954 “The happy life
is the life according to virtue lived without impediment.”955 Ultimately virtue is
ordained to flourishing.956

Because a virtue is essentially the facility for carrying out with ease a chosen
action, virtues free us to act: releasing us from external pressures and also from
debilitating bad habits, or vices. Virtues enable us to be self directing in life…
education in virtue gives us the freedom to chart our own course in life. Baring
misfortune, virtue allows the fulfilment of potential, self directed activity
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governed by right reason, and the choice and attainment of real goods:
“Happiness depends on ourselves.”957 Virtue brings a certain self sufficiency,
desirable in itself and conducive to peace of soul.

On this broad canvas, virtue is a decisive factor in human flourishing. Aristotle
wrote, “Happiness is an expression of the soul in considered actions.”958 The
Aristotelian notion of happiness requires activity, not merely potential for action.
Aristotle pointed out that happiness is not found in being in a particular state, but
rather in activities that are made possible by being in that state. 959 “Happiness lies
... in virtuous activities.”960 This may be understood not simply as the pleasure
intrinsic to a virtuous action, but as the sum happiness accruing in a life of virtue.

This is the long term view, transcending the simple pleasure of an isolated activity,
but finding habitual fulfilment in the activities of virtue. Virtue empowers us to be
happy in the long run:
For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day;
and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man
blessed and happy.961
Nevertheless, Aristotle argued that the life of virtue cannot guarantee external
goods and so happiness is still unstable and subject to good fortune. 962

In the Rhetoric, Aristotle listed constituent parts of happiness: good birth,
numerous good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old age,
bodily excellences such as health, beauty, strength and athletic powers, large
stature, fame, honour, good luck, and virtue.963 Apart from those that are natural
endowments such as stature and health, these constituent parts, most particularly
friendships, good children and honour, derive from character itself.
957
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However, Aristotle added the significant proviso that the virtuous person, as he
will never act in a base or hateful way, cannot be unhappy. 964 He summed up:
“We have practically defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action.”965

This deep seated, subjective happiness, even despite external circumstances is
exemplified in Nagai’s habitual peace of soul in his last years. His capacity for self
management, although ultimately taken from him by physical deterioration,
appears largely unhindered by fears or by the pursuit of illusory pleasures. He
shows, on the contrary, an astounding capacity for the energetic pursuit of
demanding goals.966

3.2.5.3

Virtue brings about human fulfilment.

Nagai’s mature years demonstrate the objective flourishing integral to the life of
virtue. The Aristotelian and Thomistic view is not only that the development of
virtue empowers us to act freely and therefore take control of our lives, but also
that this development is fitting for the nature of the organism itself; the virtuous
life is a state of maturity, at both organic and personal levels.

We witness that Nagai, his character perfected by the dispositions of virtue, is
empowered to act freely and knowingly in ways that further enrich him as a
person. Jean Porter insists:
The human person’s capacity to act well will be a component,
and not merely a disposable means, of her attainment of
perfection as a human being. Thus virtue … enables the human
964

Irwin, Classical Philosophy, 329.
Aristotle argued elsewhere that happiness is in some form of contemplation, made possible in
turn by virtue. Cf NE, 1098b20.
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person to act well, that is to say, in accordance with her specific
nature as a rational animal.967

It is suggested that the attainment of human goodness requires not only
intellectual grasp of the human good, but this mastery must also reach into the
passions and will in addition to intellect. Human goodness is both attainment of
“an external standard of rationality or perfection and intrinsically consists in the
perfection of the human capacities which are exercised in act”.968

Nagai’s state of virtue entails not only acts that are objectively good, but acts
carried out with highly developed individual powers of action. Nagai’s incisive and
practical intellect and his will, which is finely attuned towards the rights and needs
of his fellow man, operate within the context of an enriched and enriching
emotional life. His life therefore accurately reflects the understanding that in
virtuous activity it is insufficient that the right things be done, but they must also
be done well, ie “out of well formed passions, a good will, and intelligent
judgement”.969 Not only the external act must be good, but its execution will be a
“manifestation of the perfection of the individual’s powers of action.” 970 There
are, then, complementary outcomes accompanying a state of virtue: that the
actions be good, and that virtuous activity make the agent good, formed as nature
intended.
As the soul united to the body “perfects the soul”,971 it is reasonable to argue that
virtue, in its biological and rational elements, perfects the person. Aquinas tells us
that the development of virtue, in all its bodily implications, is for the perfection
of the person:
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Virtue implies not only a perfection of power, the principle of
action; but also the due disposition of its subject.972

“Due disposition” implies a disposition suited by nature, a flourishing of the
organism at the biological level, hence the teaching of Aquinas is that virtue
implies a material biological ordering of the matter that is in keeping with nature,
in keeping with the way it is meant to develop. This suggests a further dimension
to the notion of flourishing when applied to virtue. Virtue permits man to develop
in the way that he is meant to.

We find insights into this term “due disposition” in Aquinas’ speculation about the
presence of virtue after the resurrection of the body. He holds the virtues of
fortitude and temperance to be compatible with man’s perfection, arguing that in
the resurrected state,
...the irrational powers will be in the bodily organs, just as they
are now. Hence it will be possible for fortitude to be in the
irascible, and temperance in the concupiscible part, in so far as
each power will be perfectly disposed to obey reason.973

Hence, in Thomas’ vision of the perfected man, virtue has an integral role to play
for it is none other than a rightly ordered management of the body. He writes,
...the function of virtue (is)... to make (the sensitive appetite)
execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper
acts. Whereby just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due
external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its
proper regulated movement.974 975
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Acquisition of virtue.976

3.3

Aristotle refers with frequency to children and to the process whereby they
acquire virtue. By nature, the child’s deliberative capacities are “in an
underdeveloped form”,977 and so the child lacks the reflective capacities for choice
and action that characterise the adult. 978 As a consequence children pursue
pleasures “not unqualifiedly good”.979 Therefore a child requires external reason
to guide him or her.980 The virtue of the child is “relative”981 to the one in
authority over him.

Of course it is not only children who are able to learn virtue. All of us can develop
new behaviours and eliminate previous behaviours. Nevertheless the process of
raising a child in virtue, involving as it does, not reformation of bad habits, but
formation from a state of absence of habit, the state of childhood is naturally prior

b.

At the more immediate level, by rational actions the person is able to modify his organism
in a way that the execution of future acts of the same type are facilitated. In this second
sense, the person acting rationally, orders what Thomistic philosophers have
called”secondary matter”.
c. A third implicit consequence makes clearer the relationship of this ordination to human
flourishing. Virtue orders passion. Just as the role of virtue is to bring about right order in
bodily actions, fortitude and temperance, facilitated by acts of prudence and justice, give
rise to passionate acts of the corresponding virtue. This right ordering includes “ordinate
975
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to that of an adult. Fittingly the formation of children in virtue receives much
attention from Aristotle.

The points which follow are not intrinsic to virtue, but contextual factors, in most
cases, necessary contextual factors for the development of virtue. They are
inherently associated with the development of virtue and represent, in most
cases, the normal trajectory for its development. As such they reveal to us
characteristics of virtue itself.

In many cases illustrations from the life of Nagai for a point in question
immediately spring to mind. A source in this section is Nagai’s most beautiful
writing left for his children, published posthumously under the title Leaving my
beloved children.982 Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s understanding of the process of the
acquisition of virtue are reflected in Nagai’s life and writing; these parallels further
strengthen the case for the doctrine of virtue as a model of human development.

3.3.1 Both “training” and “education” are needed to build virtue.

Aristotle explains that virtues develop as a result of training, understood as
habituation, and education, moral tuition.983 This is true in adults and children
alike although a time of training is particularly appropriate in laying foundations
for virtues. Habituation and teaching are presented as both necessary and
complementary. A correct understanding of the distinction between habituation
and teaching is important.
Intellectual virtue in the main owes its birth and its growth to
teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time),
while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit.984
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In total, Aristotle’s vision of moral education is of an education which “involves
the rational understanding and appropriate training of one’s emotions.”985

Habituation is primarily associated with the moral virtues; teaching, with the
development of prudence, and to some extent justice. Aristotle relates these tasks
respectively to training and education. Within training he includes the role of
parents and tutors in habituating certain behaviours, he includes compliance with
demands placed by laws and family culture and affection, and he includes the
virtually subconscious role of imitation and example.

Education is the process of developing the mind of one’s charge, of nurturing fine
and noble ways of seeing and responding to the world, of giving criteria. Broadie
holds that this education does not lie in a teaching “which is a business of words,
reason and explanations, but by a process called ethismos, the inculcation of ĕthe
understood as habits or customs.”986 In turn ĕthe is the building material of ēthe,
moral qualities. Hence education also employs strategies of habituation.

These features are found in the approach Nagai takes with his own children. He
forms his children (his fellow survivors, visitors to his hut, and readers of his
works, as well) in refined emotional responses: to difficulties, to self indulgence,
and to the needs of others. He insists that they think their way through difficulties.
He strives to provide example, teachings, affection, inspiring goals and
experiences that will reinforce the formation he offers.

3.3.2 An emphasis on the early years assists in fostering virtue.

Nagai is dedicated to the training and education of his own children even in their
youngest years.987 This approach is certainly in keeping with Aristotle’s insistence
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that the habits underlying virtue are more easily learned in younger years and that
the opportunity must not be missed.
It makes no small difference, then whether we form habits of
one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very
great difference, or rather all the difference.988

Aristotle argues that children are particularly suited for education in virtue. There
are a number of reasons for this: the affection and attentive care of parents
assists in the process; children are disposed to imitate; and the practice of
obedience is training for obedience to one’s reason. Furthermore the very fear of
dishonour, which he calls shame, is more prevalent in youth (at least in those of
ancient Athens) curbing excesses.
Young people ... live by feeling and therefore commit many
errors, but are restrained by shame; and we praise young
people who are prone to this feeling.989

Early training then has the aim of fostering self regulation and independence of
thought. It should be carried out with an eye on the future: “with a view towards
the next stages”,990 looking forward to the day when this person possesses the
intrinsic and extrinsic goods necessary for happiness.991 Texts also suggest that
early impressions are virtually indelible and that these first impressions must be
well managed.992

The earliest years are years where training must take place if the process is to be
most successful. Aristotle draws a distinction between virtues of intellect which
require time and experience, and virtues of character, for which “no time should
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be lost before inculcation begins”. 993 Sherman is also quick to point out that the
pre-rational years of childhood are also a rich period for moral attitudes, the
development of refined attitudes towards others which will play such a part in
later prudential assessment of situations.
3.3.3. Imitation can assist the formation of virtue.994

Nagai’s consciousness of the importance of imitation shows in his example to his
followers in the tragic days following the bomb. He is careful to model bravery,
calm deliberation, self control, and loyalty and patriotism. With his own children
we see that he reinforced explanations with his own abiding serenity.

That children are impressionable and superb imitators was lost neither on Nagai
nor on Aristotle. Aristotle noted how life experiences play such a great part in the
training for virtue that is required in the young. He wrote of how natural it is for us
all to derive joy from the perception and discrimination of sight.
Imitating is natural to humankind from childhood up and
human beings differ from animals in this, that they are the most
imitative of creatures and learn first through imitation....
learning is the greatest of pleasures... we delight in seeing
representations... 995

We see an echo of this in Nagai’s encouragement to young visitors to find peace in
natural beauty. Aristotle linked the joy in natural discovery found in children to
their propensity for imitation, “this discriminatory activity will often take the form
of mimesis.”996 He noted that first impressions are often the strongest. He noted
that experiences can also dispose to vice.
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We always like best whatever comes first… and therefore youth
should be kept strangers to all that is bad, and especially to
things which suggest vice or hate.997

Note Nagai’s warning to his young visitors that unless they take deliberate action
to manage their emotion, there will come a point where their emotions will
manage them, they will become the type of persons who just “stamp and
scream”.998

Aristotle insisted on the corrupting effect of bad example.
Banish indecent speech, and indecent pictures and speech from
the stage, from the sight and hearing of the young. The
Legislator should not allow youth to be spectators of iambi or of
comedy until old enough to sit at the public tables and drink
strong wine; by that time education will have armed them
against the evil influences of such representations. 999

This impressionability requires great responsibility on the part of those
responsible for the child, whether they be family or in civil roles. He stressed the
role that example can play in teaching adult responsibilities.
The Directors of Education, as they are termed, should be
careful what tales or stories the children hear, for all such
things should be designed to prepare the way for the business
of later life, and should be for the most part imitations of the
occupations they will pursue in earnest.1000

We see Nagai’s preoccupation to publish, to influence national culture in the
crucial years after the war. He realised that if calm reconciliation did not prevail,
anger and bitterness would exact a further terrible toll on his people.
997
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3.3.4

Virtues are acquired by repeated acts.1001

In Nagai’s life there is abundant evidence that steady application to particular
tasks is required to consolidate behaviours. He shows, from his reading and
rereading the leaflet, that he had developed a facility for staying with a task until
mastered. We know too from his biographers that he that treated wounded
enemy soldiers consistently in an even handed, compassionate manner. We know
too that he asked of his children what he demanded of himself: he encouraged his
children to be persistent. 1002

These are examples of the process of habituation described by Aristotle. We have
seen that moral education consists of habituation and education. Habituation is
possible because behaviour builds a greater facility for subsequent behaviours of
the same type. “We get the virtues by first exercising them.”1003

We become just by performing just actions, temperate by
performing temperate actions, brave by performing brave
actions.1004
Children, most of all, learn by doing.1005 Children, although not understanding all
the reasons can still perform correct behaviours... to share, to wait patiently, to be
satisfied with what one has eaten. 1006 All these behaviours are the stuff of habit,
which in turn is the stuff of virtue. Children do not have the maturity to analyse
what a situation requires, desire right action and enjoy its accomplishment.
Instead we train them to behave correctly according to situations.1007
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This habituation in the concupiscible and irascible appetites is central to the
acquisition of moral virtue, and, in a sense, to the development of virtuous
character, being in the state of virtue.
Character, being as its name indicates, is something that grows
by habit. That which is under guidance other than innate is
trained to a habit by frequent movement of a particular kind...
in things inanimate we do not see this..... Consider, then,
character to be this: a quality in accordance with governing
reason belonging to the irrational part of the soul which is yet
able to obey the reason.1008

A further dimension of ethical habituation is discussed by Broadie, that of the
child’s growing awareness of the need to manage impulses. Broadie explains that
getting a small child to act in a certain way out of obedience teaches a vital lesson.
(The child) becomes aware that his own not anyway wanting to
do it is not a consideration for the parent.... we learn that
things are good in a way which belongs to a world beyond the
world of impulse.1009
Critical practice is required.1010 So for example, we are told it is not just a question
of playing the lyre but of measuring our performance against real expertise, and in
the same way moral excellence is attained. This guided experience is crucial. Life
experience of particular cases is for the development of practical wisdom.1011
There is no short cut to virtue.

3.3.5

Obedience to others empowers for obedience to one’s own reason.
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As we have seen, children are directed by the reason of their parents and minders.
Through obedience in childhood, Aristotle’s argument is that they develop the
facility to obey their own reason later on.

He writes on the necessity of the habit of obedience.
The rich find it hard to follow the rational principle, being
neither willing nor able to submit to authority. The evil begins
at home; for when they are boys by reason of the luxury in
which they are brought up they never learn, even at school the
habit of obedience.1012
Training for the rationality of desire is a “kind of obedience”1013 to a separate and
higher power “as a child listens to his father”.1014 The father’s bonds of affection
with a child assist his son in obeying.
As in cities, laws and prevailing types of character have force, so
in households do the injunctions and the habits of the father,
and these have even more because of the tie of blood and
benefits he confers; for the children start with a natural
affection and disposition to obey.1015

The rule of a father over his children is ‘royal’, for he rules by virtue both of love
and of the respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. His authority is
moral as well as social. But he is called to moral virtue in perfection. Aristotle tells
us,
Homer has appropriately called Zeus “Father of Gods and men”.
If the ruler is intemperate and unjust, how can he rule well?1016
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Habituated obedience would appear to have a clear biological dimension that is
analogous to that of a dog trained to obey its master.

A dog develops by training the capacity for obeying the command of another to sit
at the kerb, etc. Children are like dogs, in that they too are trained to obey the
reason of others, of their parents; the difference is that they will, unlike Fido,
develop as they grow the capacity to rule from within. Before reason is
developed, in either the dog or the child, only the biological is present, albeit in a
state of developing also. The dog and the child are only capable of exercising, of
the cardinal virtues, temperance and fortitude. With developing reason, the child
will develop the capacity for justice and prudence, to take others into account and
to rationally self manage.

The suggestion that obedience habituated in a pre-rational child lays foundations
for the rule of reason over desire for pleasure and aversion to pain is of great
interest to us in this study and we will return to this.

3.3.6

Affection assists in fomenting virtue.

We gain a glimpse of Nagai’s affection for his children in the short extract above in
commentary on Scenario 4, but some of his writings are motivated almost
exclusively by his love for them. In Leaving my beloved children behind Nagai
wrote a personal message to his children in the face of his approaching death. He
seeks to pass on to his son and daughter his main discoveries about life. He
describes, in a typical understated manner, the encompassing love he feels for his
children. These words of Nagai exemplify the powerful educative effect Aristotle
has observed in the affection children feel for their fathers: 1017
It is an affection born of flesh and blood, which for some
strange reason seems akin to the steam that bursts forth from
the hibachi at the head of my bed. … As I continued pretending
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to be asleep that day, Kayano became bolder and held her
cheek against mine. Her cheek gradually became warmer. As
though she were secretly enjoying a little treasure that she was
hiding from others, Kayano softly whispered, “Daddy.” She
wasn’t really calling me. It was rather that the thoughts that
were stuffed into her little breast had leaked out just a little. 1018

Aristotle insisted on the importance of a loving home atmosphere as the preferred
place of early moral education.1019 Moral education requires great rectitude from
the parent, and respect for the person of the child. This rectitude is fostered in the
home where each family member is valued for who they are, rather than what
they can do. The parent must be careful not to manipulate the child’s beliefs and
emotions to conform with whim and opinion, but to guide the child to form true
judgements. The child “borrows the eyes of wisdom”,1020 “listens to the words of
elders and the more experienced”,1021 and to their reasoned admonition and
exhortation.1022 In turn the child discovers, as Sherman says, “the intrinsic
pleasure of approximating virtue through action and emotion.”1023 Note the
imitative aspect is linked to the parent child relationship.

3.3.7

Development of virtue requires formation in what is appropriate in
respect to pleasure and pain… emotional education.1024

Nagai entitles one chapter “Words of wisdom I gave my children”.1025 He
encourages them, “Don’t scream out just because the light went off in a power
blackout.”1026 Elsewhere he writes for them, “Physical pain is relatively trivial. It
can be borne, and it’s gone when you die. Spiritual pain is more serious. You can’t
1018
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cure it on your own. Furthermore it’s still there after you die.” 1027 His parenting
intuition is that he must form his children in these matters. Note that it is not
simply a question of stoically gritting one’s teeth. Rather intellect is engaged. It is
a question of analysing the type of pain and making a judgement. He explains the
lesson to his child, and reinforces it with his own example.

This view is very much in step with Aristotle and Plato on the necessity for
formation of children in appropriate emotion, and the suggestion that the virtues
should also be considered as dispositions to feel appropriately. Broadie argues
that Aristotle is interested in feeling because feeling will often lead to action; also
he is concerned with appropriate and inappropriate feeling on its own account. 1028
We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasures or
pain that ensue on acts; for the man who abstains from bodily
pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate.... Hence
we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our
very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be
pained by the things that we ought; for this is right
education.1029

In its simplest form this appropriate emotion is the expression of what is
appropriate in respect to pleasure and pain. He writes, “All moral virtue has to do
with pleasures and pains.”1030 Virtue is not simply about maximising pleasure and
minimising pain, “but within the limits of ‘as one ought to’, and ‘when one ought
and ought not’”.1031 Here he is referring to action according to the right rule.1032

He argues that parental training involves a range of guided experiences.
In educating the young, we steer them by the rudders of
pleasure and pain; it is thought too that to enjoy the things we
1027
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ought and to hate the things we ought has the greatest bearing
on virtue of character.1033

Finding appropriate pleasure and pain consists in an emotional education with a
focus on such emotions as compassion, solidarity, right admiration and
appreciation, appropriate shame, appropriate contrition, pleasure in obedience,
pleasure in self control, and pleasure in generosity and sincerity in the right
occasions. Appropriate intellectual delight at discovery, also constitutes
appropriate emotion and an introduction to “non procedural” reasoning and
inference.1034

3.3.8

Laws, culture and expectations assist in fostering virtue.

We have seen a little of Nagai’s persistent efforts to build a culture of peace and
reconciliation amongst his countrymen. He understood that to foster such
personal attitudes on a widespread basis would take enormous work and energy.
He threw himself into the task despite his leukemia.

Aristotle’s view too was that the culture prevailing in any environment has a
profound effect on the development of virtue. Family and parental expectations
on the one hand, and social mores and laws on the other, must assist in training in
virtue.
The man who is to be good must we well trained and
habituated... (hence there is a need for laws) proceeding from
practical wisdom and reason.1035

Good laws “providing for the education of individuals and of groups and good
occupations are an important factor that should not be neglected. However,
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Aristotle warns, if the state helps little it is still up to each man to help his children
and friends to virtue. 1036

Aristotle’s concern was not solely with children but also with grown citizens prone
and even hardened to ignoble behaviours.
Laws not only necessary for the young: most people obey
necessity rather than argument, and punishments rather than
the sense of what is noble.1037

Sound laws and wise lawmakers are needed.
Arguments alone are insufficient. They may have the power to
encourage and stimulate the generous minded among our
youth, and to make a character which is gently born, and a true
lover of what is noble, ready to be possessed by virtue, ... but
they are not able to encourage the many to nobility and
goodness (who have not shame but fear of punishment, but live
by passion and have no conception of what is noble and truly
pleasant).1038

Right laws create a regime where certain behaviours of virtue can be inculcated.
The focus is on laws promoting temperance and a healthy hardiness:
To live temperately and hardily is not pleasant to most
especially to the young... hence there is a need for training
“under right laws” as this lifestyle will not be painful if
customary.1039

Yet this training must not simply demand conformity but must be accompanied by
internal formation as well, of the type we have seen above.
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The best laws, though sanctioned by every citizen in the state,
will be of no avail unless the young are trained by habit and
education in the spirit of the constitution.1040

The role of environment and early experience in the inculcation of virtue, in
general, has already been noted. Aristotle would argue that home environment
and family culture (even institutional culture at grandma’s, at pre-school, and at
boarding school) play a clear role in establishing an environment of security and
affection, as well as clear expectations for children, both for formation of
conscience (one aspect of prudence) and in order to establish effective regimes of
practice for habituation.

We shall now see that the developmental trajectory of virtue, moving from a
young child’s habituated behaviours to fitting affectivity and judgements, was
recognized by Aristotle.

3.3.9

The development of virtue takes place over time and respects the
development of the body.

We have already seen that training, to the moral virtues, is as education, to the
practical reason. 1041 Until a certain point is reached, a baby has no effective
capacity for education in the Aristotelian sense, but only for training. Thereafter,
progressively, the capacity for education develops. Aristotle is most conscious of
the developmental trajectory established at the biological level.
As the body is prior in the order of generation to the soul, so
the irrational is prior to the rational. The proof is that anger and
wishing and desire are implanted in children from their very
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birth, but reason and understanding are developed as they
grow older.1042
In the development of virtue, nature, nurture and the rational principle,1043 all
play their part.

Nature involves a process of anatomical development that is a precondition for
human flourishing at the biological level. Aquinas acknowledges what we
understand today as the normal processes of neural development occurring as
part-constituent of rational operations beginning to take place in the maturing
human being. In his discussion about whether children in state of innocence
would have had the perfect use of reason, Aquinas argues that in babies and
young children there is a “special impediment” to the use of reason deriving from
the immaturity (which he describes as “humidity”) of the brain.
Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their
natural powers as they have later on. ... birds teach their young
to fly. Moreover a special impediment exists (for man to
exercise his natural powers of reason) in man from the
humidity (immaturity) of the brain, as we have said above.1044

This concept of “special impediment” is in keeping with the view that biological
development is a condition for the development not only of intellect, but of
virtue. Man’s trajectory of development is not purely genetically programmed, but
it reflects man’s free interplay with nature.1045 States of virtue and vice may be
understood as the natural endpoint of a man’s experiences. The self-actualisation
of this biological “history” brings with it the potential for human flourishing or
frustration.
1042

Aristotle, Politics, 1334b.
Aristotle, Politics, 1332a39.
1044
ST, Ia, Q.101, Art.2.2. Reference to 99.1.
1045
Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 256. Gilson puts this beautifully: “Man’s
efforts to attain his end leave their mark upon him. Man’s soul as well as his body has a history. It
conserves its past in order to enjoy and utilise it in a perpetual present. The most general form of
this fixing of past experience is called habit.”
1043

317

Sherman observes that Aristotle adopts “a developmental conception of the
cognitive and affective capacities, as well as a conception of habituation in varying
degrees reflective and critical.”1046 Initially a child develops, in an incremental
way, perceptual and discriminatory capacities. As he grows the cultivation of
these cognitive capacities becomes an essential task in his affective development.
Nevertheless, “he will not yet, in a substantive way, cultivate the more
deliberative skills that enter into complex choice making.” 1047

The time arrives when there is a change of ruler. Adopting an Aristotelian idea,
Plutarch writes:
For intelligent people the passage from childhood to adulthood
is not an abandonment of rules, but a change of ruler.1048
The young person’s own reason takes over from the guidance of her carers.
Personal and biological maturity permits responsible, autonomous action.
Nevertheless, adolescence is a time when children “have strong passions and tend
to gratify them indiscriminately.”1049 Youth are, “owing to the growth that is going
on, in a situation like that of drunken men.”1050 It is a time of uneasy tension.

In the next chapter we will seek explanations at the biological level that assist in
understanding this development.1051
3.3.10 Practice of virtue requires effortful attention.1052

Amongst Nagai’s advice to his children he writes,
1046

Sherman, The Fabric of Character, 160.
Sherman, The Fabric of Character, 159.
1048
Plutarch, On Listening.
1049
Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1389a.
1050
NE, 1154b10.
1051
Neuroscience has described the link between the slow maturation of the frontal lobe that
assists in regulation of emotion and assessment of consequences for behaviour.
1052
Aristotle says three things are required for virtue: to know, to will, and to work steadfastly.
“First of all, that a man be aware; secondly, that should he choose, it should be in view of a
particular end; thirdly, that he should hold to his choice with firmness and steadfastness, and carry
it out.” (NE, 1105a31.)
1047
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Don’t start anything that you can’t make into a first-rate job.
Don’t quit anything you’ve started until you’ve made it into a
first rate job. 1053

Virtues are acquired by means of effort. At the heart of effort is sustained attention. “It is
easy to perform a good action but not easy to acquire a settled habit of performing such
actions.”1054

Recall the view of William James - our will is manifested in the attention we pay. When
the will is underdeveloped, or biological maturity inadequately supports rationality, we
may struggle to give attention where our reason tells us we should (as opposed to where
our sensitive appetite takes us).

This steadfastness requires the application of patience and constancy. Repetition
can be hard work. The acquisition of virtue is arduous. 1055

Virtue requires some process of learning or training ... all who
are not maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue may win
it by a certain kind of study and care.1056

It is difficult enough for young men to develop virtue in depth, owing to the relationship
between wisdom and experience.
It is thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be
found... The cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only
with universals but with particulars, which become familiar
from experience, but a young man has no experience, for it is
length of time that gives experience1057

1053

Nagai, Leaving my beloved children behind. 94.
NE, 5.9.
1055
NE, 1105a31.
1056
NE, 1099b16,20.
1057
NE, 1142a13-16.
1054
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Yet, if the foundations of patience, constancy and determination, have not been laid in
childhood, it can be difficult for older children and teenagers, in the adolescent tempest
of emotion, to make moral headway at all.
3.3.11 Virtue requires intrinsic motivation.1058

We have observed in Nagai’s actions that he acts for intrinsically rewarding
reasons. This does not mean that there may not be a desirable positive outcome,
but that the performance of the action is rewarding independent of the outcome.
Would Nagai have sought to rally his workers around the Rising Sun even should
their efforts have been pointless in saving lives? Given the patriotism shown in his
initial rejection of the message on the leaflet there seems every indication that he
regarded this action as worthy for its own sake. Would he still have treated the
enemy compassionately even if the wounds were mortal? No doubt he would
have. Would he urge peace even if the message fell on deaf ears? Again without
question this would have been the case.
Virtue fosters intrinsic rewards.1059 As we have seen, Aristotle proposed that
virtue is its own reward, and that the fulfilment ensuing on virtue, the acquisition
of genuine goods, is intrinsic to the practice of virtue. Virtue is “a prerequisite to
happiness and at the same time, happiness itself.” 1060 Virtue is not a means to an
end. Rather the end results of virtuous action are implicit in the very activities of
virtue.

1058

Samuel S Franklin, The Psychology of Happiness. A good human life. (NY: Cambridge University
Press, 2010). Franklin’s discussion of the influence of Aristotelian ideas on the contemporary
concept of intrinsic motivation gave rise to this section.
1059
We have encountered in Chapter 2 the concept of reward devaluation and the observation
that the development of habits fortifies against this. A fascinating study by Deci, Koestner, and
Ryan who reviewed over 100 experiments on the demotivating effects of extrinsic rewards, found
clear evidence of the way in which tangible rewards like money, candy, and prizes reduce interest
in a task at hand. These results are consistent with the view that the intrinsic motivation of
virtuous behaviour promotes wellbeing both subjectively and objectively. E. L. Deci et al., “A metaanalytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation,”
Psychological Bulletin 25, (1999): 627-668. Cited in Franklin, The Psychology of Happiness. A good
human life, 58.
1060
Franklin, The Psychology of Happiness. A good human life, 17; cf 84.
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3.3.12 Education specifically in wisdom and beauty is necessary in the
formation of virtue.1061

Nagai advises his visitors to find pleasure in natural beauty as an antidote to a
frenetic and aimless lifestyle that takes away peace. This advice is in close accord
with Aristotle’s view, noted immediately above, that moral education includes
learning to feel appropriately. This sophisticated moral education extends to an
appreciation, first lived and only then understood, of what worthy and noble. The
soul must be cultivated by habits of loving and hating finely.1062

Aristotle’s argument is that perceptual, affective and deliberative capacities will all
be most effectively fostered within such a refined education. “Full virtue is not
simply the excellence of the non rational part but itself combines the excellence of
character and of practical reason”.1063

It cannot be argued that “rationality emerges in an instant”; Sherman notes that
Aristotle refers to clear stages of child development, from an early period of
affective development and then the “more active development of the rational
(and deliberative) capacities, and then eventually the emergence of full
rationality.”1064

Aristotle urges an education which elevates the spirit. “There is a sort of education
in which parents should train their sons, not as being useful and necessary, but
because it is liberal and noble.”1065

He writes of the need not to vulgarise children in their upbringing.
Hence we may infer that what is noble, not what is brutal,
should have the first place. And parents who devote their
1061

“For the sake of the noble.” Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 90-95.
Cf NE, 1179b24-31.
1063
Sherman, The Fabric of Character, 158.
1064
Sherman, The Fabric of Character, 159.
1065
Aristotle, Politics, 1337b30ff.
1062
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children to gymnastics while they neglect their necessary
education, in reality vulgarize them. For they make them useful
to the art of statesmanship in one quality only.1066

Rather than passing on a set of pragmatic skills, we must raise children to aspire to
what is good, true and beautiful. Wisdom implies this deep respect for the truth.
Not surprisingly Nagai echoes this sentiment in his advice for his children: “Science
means falling in love with the truth.” 1067

In the Aristotelian vision music had an important role in moral education. The
emulative and empathetic mimetic enactment combined with positive
reinforcement from the music itself leads to a certain habituation.1068. This is a
reminder for our own times, that literature is a powerful medium for refined
education, and a warning that Lady Gaga’s words and actions do more damage to
young minds than we might be prepared to admit. “To judge rightly and to delight
in good characters and fine actions” is the very stuff of moral education. 1069

3.3.13 Overcoming incontinence and unlearning vice.

Nagai is of the view that persons in maturity can change their behaviours and
attitudes. He devotes much time in his final years to urging his fellow countrymen
to paths of peace and reconciliation. It is also apparent that he regarded the effort
to build peace as a difficult task that had to be attempted. It would be all too easy
to surrender oneself to the bitterness and hatred for the occupying forces. He saw
that such an unleashing of negative emotion would ultimately be counter
productive as explicitly he argued that man has a calling to love,1070 and that love,
and a character disposed to love, fulfil our human nature. Again Nagai’s intuitions
are in step substantially with the accounts of Aristotle and Aquinas.
1066

Aristotle, Politics, 1338b40-1339a5.
Nagai, Leaving my beloved children behind. 95.
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Sherman, The Fabric of Character, 182.
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Sherman, The Fabric of Character, 183.
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Nagai, Leaving my beloved children behind. 164. Nagai’s Christianity becomes more explicit in
his later writing, and he argues that love of God is man’s ultimate fulfilment.
1067
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The nature of vice is instructive of the nature of virtue.1071 Vice is the state of no
longer having within oneself noble desires and a noble end for one’s actions. The
vicious man deliberates and chooses a course of action for a good that will harm
him or others, taking pleasure in this. While virtue and vice are both habits, vice is
contrary to nature.1072

Hence, while virtue is freedom from those passions “that are not as they should
be as to manner and time”1073, vice is the disposition to give free rein to some
passion. Applying to this context the insight that reason is the form of virtue, 1074
that rationality provides for the ordering of material constituents to establish the
virtue, it would seem that vice can be seen as a lack or absence of right ordering
of the material constituents indirectly by our rationality and directly by the person
through the use of reason.

Essentially vice represents a complacent failure to have developed capacities for
self management; capacities which could reasonably have been expected to have
been developed are absent. This insight will have implications when we consider
the neural substrate of virtue.

3.4

Conclusion.

In this chapter I have reviewed the principal features of the Aristotelian and
Thomistic conceptions of virtue. On the basis of the scenarios from Nagai’s life
1071

Aristotle also develops the notion of incontinence, of less direct relevance here. “The
incontinent man, knowing that what he does is bad, does it as a result of passion; the continent
man, knowing that his appetites are bad, refuses on account of his rational principle to follow
them”(NE, 114510-11) “Incontinent people are not criminal, but they will do criminal acts.” (NE,
1151a10) The incontinent man knows he is doing what is not good for him but is too weak to avoid
it, whereas the vicious man is complacent in his choice.
1072
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.71, Art.2.
1073
NE, ii 3.
1074
It will be seen below that Aquinas specifies reason as the “form” of virtue (4.1.1.2 ). I would
suggest that “to give free reign” could take place two ways: the deliberate choice to follow
inappropriate passion, either for the recognised benefits of immediate gratification, or from
motives of self love despite awareness of duties to others; the complacent refusal to exercise the
reflection and judgement required to moderate the passion.
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presented in 3.1.2 I identified prominent characteristics of virtue evident in real
life in 3.1.4. Then, in 3.2 and 3.3, I identified broad characteristics of virtue
distilled from texts from Aristotle and Aquinas. The 23 qualities identified will, at
the conclusion of Chapter 4 and in the light of the content of that chapter, be
distilled into Table 4.1, in which they are cross referenced to the observations
from Nagai’s life, providing a simple demonstration of the effectiveness of the
Aristotelian/Thomistic template in describing superior personal qualities
encountered in real life.

324

Chapter 4

Understanding the cardinal virtues.
“...we are unfashioned creatures, but half made up, if one wiser,
better, dearer than ourselves - such a friend ought to be - do not lend
his aid to perfectionate our weak and faulty natures.”
Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus
Mary Shelley

The illustrations above, drawn from the life of Dr Takashi Nagai, demonstrate a
complex interplay between the cardinal virtues in each of his deliberate actions. In
Chapter 4 I investigate the distinctive qualities of each of the cardinal virtues. In
4.1 I argue for a restricted reading of Aquinas’ notion of “rational by
participation”1075 in reference to the dispositions of the sensitive appetites and
examine the case for and against whether fortitude and temperance may be
considered essentially biophysical qualities; in 4.2 I seek to clarify the specific
tasks of the cardinal virtues; and, and argue that each has a distinguishing
biological constitution. Finally, in the light of preceding discussion, in 4.3 I present
the case for the unity of the virtues.

I conclude by identifying 17 characteristics of virtue that will, in Chapter 5, be
aligned with neuroscientific data.
4.1

The cardinal virtues.

The argument.
In this following section, the differences between these virtues are analysed in the
light of Aristotelian and Thomistic texts.

I argue that:

1075

Each cardinal virtue has a distinctive biophysical “signature”.

ST, Ia-IIae, Q.50, Art.4.See also Q.59, Art.4, and Q.61, Art.2.
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Prudence and justice consist in habits perfecting the rational faculties: in
the performance of a virtuous act, their role is consequent to the
presentation of arduous goods and pleasurable goods to the intellect and
will by the sensitive appetites. The habits of prudence and justice are
corporeally manifested in perfections of certain biological structures that
are necessarily associated with rationality in the embodied life.



Fortitude and temperance are essentially perfections of biological
structures of the body which facilitate the presentation of appropriate
arduous goods and pleasurable goods for rational consideration.1076



Consequently it may be concluded that in actions of perfect virtue all four
cardinal virtues are present, not simply because Aquinas said it should be
so, but rather because the four cardinal virtues each perform different
roles, all of which are needed for the completion of a good action.



These arguments form a compelling case for the notion of the unity of the
virtues.

And these clarifications are essential if we are to identify that which is bodily in
relation to each of the cardinal virtues, the task which is the role of this study.
These views will inform Table 4.1 and therefore the work of Chapter 5 where
pertinent biological structures will be discussed in detail, and the actual partconstituents of virtue will be sought – the specific regions, neural pathways and
biophysical processes – that underpin virtue, in the sense already explained in
Chapter 1. Hence a necessary task of this chapter is the delineation of the roles
specific to each of the cardinal virtues.

Overview

1076

The view that temperance and courage are essentially embodied has its advocates. Titus and
Moncher write, “An Aristotelian-Thomist perspective, for its part, has argued that certain virtues
reside in the embodied emotional dispositions (not just in reason and will)… (relying on) instinctual
and acquired neural circuitry, and thus are properly considered bodily. The virtue tradition has
distinguished two large areas of affective virtues that accord with two types of embodied
affectivity: the emotions of desire (the attractive good) and those of difficulty (the difficult good).”
Craig Steven Titus and Frank Moncher, “A Catholic Christian Positive Psychology: A Virtue
Approach,” Edification 3, 1 (2009): 57-63.
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It is essential now to look closely at the individual cardinal virtues in order to
better understand their individual characteristics.

I argue that fortitude and temperance are essentially biophysical qualities of the
human body disposing the sensitive appetites to seek good that is in keeping with
reason. They are caused by reason either in that they are developed through
childhood training obedient to the reason of their parents, as simplistically
speaking, a dog develops obedience; or they are developed as a consequence of
one’s own rational actions.

Aquinas states, following Aristotle, that the moral virtues are rational “by
participation”.1077 This section argues for a restricted reading of this notion. It is
argued that fortitude and temperance should be understood most properly as
dispositions of the sensitive appetitive faculties, obedient to reason disposed by
its own proper virtues – in other words, that fortitude and temperance do not
pertain to rationality as their subject, and in themselves they do not moderate
rationality properly speaking, which is the task of both prudence and justice.
Rather, in their formation they require the ordering contribution of rationality. In
disposing acts of temperance or fortitude, the virtues of temperance and fortitude
are guided by reason disposed by knowledge of first principles, as well as the
virtues of prudence and justice. Although the virtues of fortitude and temperance
may be said to be caused by rationality and to dispose the body to rationality,
they are not dispositions of rationality.

Prudence and justice are habits of the operative (rational) powers, distinct from
fortitude and temperance (habits of the sensitive appetites). In the performance
of acts of virtue, it is argued that rationality itself is perfected only by the specific
virtues of the operative powers. It will be argued that the contribution of the
virtues of the sensitive appetite is prior, properly speaking, to the dialogue
between intellect and will as the human act unfolds.

1077

ST, Ia-IIae, Q.50, Art.4. See also Q.59, Art.4 and Q.61, Art.2.
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This preclusion of direct involvement of rationality in the intrinsic operation of the
moral virtues of the sensitive appetites, and the integrated involvement of the
four cardinal virtues in all virtuous acts, will be seen in Chapter 5 to be most
consistent with the neural structures associated with the operation of the virtues.
It will be suggested in Chapter 5 that an analysis of the biological partconstituents of virtue supports the views developed in this section and adds a
dimension of experimental proof to the distinction between moral virtues.

There will be continued emphasis on the human act serving to emphasise the
interdependence of the virtues and their integral operation in the completion of
the human act. Further illustrations will be drawn from the life of Nagai, serving
to test the discussion against reality, demonstrate the complex involvement of
virtues within individual good human actions, and illustrate the integrated
cooperation of various virtues in the exercise of such actions.

I now present the case for a restricted reading of Aquinas’ notion of
“participation” in reason by the moral virtues of the sensitive appetites. In 4.1.1
we will examine the principal arguments opposed to a restricted reading and
these arguments are answered systematically in 4.1.2. Specifically, the discussion
is focused on arguments for and against the view that fortitude and temperance
are more than ordered biophysical qualities of the human person. Clarity on this
issue will enable us, in 4.2 to look in turn at each of the cardinal virtues identifying
distinct features, and in 4.3 to reflect on the way in which the cardinal virtues
work together in the completion of the human act.

4.1.1 Arguments opposing the view that fortitude and temperance are ordered
biophysical qualities of the human person.
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Note that arguments presented below in 4.1.1.1-10 are answered in turn in
4.1.2.1-10.1078

4.1.1.1

Virtue is of the soul.1079

Virtue is properly of the soul. A good action is “activity of the soul in accordance
with virtue.” 1080 Human habits may only reside in the soul.
They cannot reside in the sensitive powers as such. These
powers, considered independently of reason, are determined
to their act by a kind of natural bent.... Only in the intellect do
we encounter that multiplicity of indeterminate powers
capable of being combined and organised among themselves.
... (These habits) are super added determinations which
establish definite relations between the intellect and its objects
or possible operations.1081

Hence virtuous action is freely elected; not only is habit “that which one uses
when one wills,”1082 but virtue is the facilitation of the rule of reason. It would
appear therefore that fortitude and temperance are necessarily more than
ordered biophysical qualities of the person.

4.1.1.2

Reason is the “form” of the virtues.

Aquinas offers a most perceptive insight into the structure and nature of virtue in
his discussion “Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?” In this topic he
addresses the challenge of distinguishing that which in virtue is biophysical, and
therefore prone to decomposition, from that which is formal. Aquinas argues “the

1078

An echo of the Summa’s methodology seems appropriate here.
NE, 1185.
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NE, 1198a18.
1081
Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 257.
1082
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.50, Art.5.
1079

329

formal element is precisely this order of reason”,1083 that the formal element of
virtue is the ordering of the material organism to facilitate the management by
reason of passion. This is a consequence of the notion that the soul, the
intellectual principle, “is united to the body as to its form.”1084 “Form,” insists
Aquinas “causes matter to be.”1085

As virtue represents an ordering its association with reason seems inescapable.
Aquinas explains that the virtues consist in the ordering, according to reason, of
the various powers of the soul, an ordering to each other and to external ends:
Virtue ... is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so far as, to
wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one
another, and to that which is outside.1086
Elsewhere we read: “Moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive part of
the soul in regard to some determinate matter.”1087

Rationality is the form of virtue, according to Aquinas. Rationality disposes matter
to support virtue, to sustain the operations of the soul, including understanding,
choosing, and more broadly, forming and exercising virtue. It seems therefore
reasonable to suggest that fortitude and temperance may not be understood
simply as ordered biophysical qualities of the human person.

4.1.1.3

Virtue is a “habit of choosing” and therefore all virtue would appear to
be a disposition of the rational appetite.

Quoting Aquinas, Jean Porter seems to insist that moral virtue resides in the
reason.
Thomas distinguishes the intention of the end, which belongs
to the moral virtues, from the specific choice, which belongs to
1083
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prudence.1088 “Finally, according to the Ethics, the principal act
of moral virtue is choice.”1089 Choice, however, is not an act of
the irascible and concupiscible powers, but of reason, as has
been said above. Moral virtue, therefore, is not in the irascible
and concupiscible powers, but in the reason.1090

In fact, as has been seen Aristotle presents each of the virtues as a “habit of
choosing”. This leads commentators to adopt the view that all virtues are
essentially about the perfection of the will: “the moral virtues perfect the will.” 1091
Thus, even the virtues of the sensitive appetites seem to play a direct role in
perfecting the rational appetite.

Furthermore, at the most refined level, Aquinas specifies the connection between
love and virtue. Virtue ensures that our loves are under the sway of rationality.
When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of love, we
refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us love is
set in order by virtue.1092

To love is an operation proper to the rational appetite, and therefore it would
appear that all virtue is ordered to love, and that rationality is inseparable from
the virtues.

4.1.1.4

Aquinas appears to suggest that the moral virtues are rational.

Texts of Aquinas appear to reinforce the notion that reason operates intrinsically
within virtue. In Aquinas’ vision of the perfected man, virtue has an integral role
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ST, Ia-IIae, Q.56, Art.4.4.
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to play for it is none other than a rightly ordered management of the body. He
writes,
Whereby just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due
external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its
proper regulated movement.1093
This view, appearing to attribute the ordering of reason to the virtues of the
sensitive appetite would seem difficult to reconcile with the view that fortitude
and temperance are essentially biophysical.

4.1.1.5

The practical intellect appears to play an intrinsic role in the virtues.

Christine Swanton appears to ascribe an intrinsic role to the practical intellect:
Aristotle (rightly) regards practical wisdom as the glue which
not only integrates the components of the profiles of the
individual virtues, but also unites those virtues one to
another.1094
If by “integrates the components of the profiles of the individual virtues”,
Swanton means an agent that is intrinsic to virtue, and use of the word “glue”
seems to suggest just this, then practical reason would seem to play some form of
intrinsic role in each of the virtues.

4.1.1.6

The speculative intellect appears to play a role within each of the
virtues.

It would appear that the speculative intellect is also necessary for virtue. We read
for example:
Moral virtue can stand without wisdom, science, or art, but not
without the habit of first principles and prudence.1095

1093

ST, Ia-IIae, Q.59, Art.5.
Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, 27.
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Naus, The Nature of the Practical Intellect according to St Thomas Aquinas, 75. Cf ST, Ia-IIae,
Q.58, Art.4.; ST, Ia-IIae, Q.65, Art.1.3.
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Hence, it would appear that speculative intellect plays an intrinsic role in each of
the virtues.

4.1.1.7

It would appear impossible to hold the view that acts of individual
virtues are not rational.

Aquinas appears to suggest that each virtue is instrumental in the exercise of its
own acts.
The function of virtue (is)... to make (the sensitive appetites)
execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper
acts. 1096
If the moral virtues were not inherently rational it would seem difficult to argue
that there could be, for example, acts of temperance or fortitude.

4.1.1.8

Virtue results from the ordering of corporeal processes by reason.

Although the virtues of the irascible and concupiscible reside in the sensitive part
of the soul we also read that they are in the reason and will according to their
“origin and beginning”. Aquinas argues that the rational constituent of virtue
consists in the ordering of the sensitive appetites by reason.
...habits of moral virtue are caused in the appetitive powers,
according as they are moved by the reason….1097
So, it would appear that the co-constituents of virtue to be reason and biophysical
processes. Hence it would seem that the notion of virtue must embrace reason.

4.1.1.9

As virtue is “perfection of a power to act”, therefore it “belongs to
that which is proper to the soul”. 1098
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Aquinas argues that as virtue is a power to act, it would appear to be necessarily
of the soul.
Virtue implies some perfection of power... power in reference
to being is on the part of matter... power in reference to act, is
on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since
everything acts in so far as it is in act... the body holds the place
of matter, the soul that of form. ... only those forces proper to
the soul, namely the rational forces, belong to man alone. And
therefore, human virtue... cannot belong to the body, but
belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore
human virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to
act.1099

4.1.1.10 The habits of virtue all enjoy a certain durability.

It would appear that the habits of virtue all enjoy a certain durability:
No bodily change seems capable of corrupting the intelligible
species residing in the intellect; since the intellect
independently of the body is the proper abode of the species;
for which reason it is held that habits are not lost either
through old age or death. ... For the same reason neither can
habits of virtue be corrupted, since they are also in the rational
soul, and as the Philosopher declares (NE, 1, 10) “virtue is more
lasting than learning”. 1100

Ramsay suggests that, even after dissolution of the body, both the rational and
sensitive appetites shed corporeal aspects but that the moral virtues, as rational
dispositions, all are retained:
After mortal life the absence of needs and disorder among the
bodily passions means that the material aspects of the virtues
1099
1100
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will not endure, but since the Blessed will possess perfect
rationality concerning every part of their existence and
complete conformity of their appetites to this, virtue will still
endure formally. Perfect virtue, the perfectly rational
disposition, is not a habit in the passions or the will, but a
unifying experience of reason which is extended to every
intellectual operation and with which every appetitive
operation conforms. The virtues, then, point towards Virtue as
an experience of reason.1101

This view seems incompatible with a conception of fortitude and temperance as
essentially corporeal.

4.1.2

Arguments supporting the view that fortitude and temperance are
ordered biophysical qualities of the human person.

4.1.2.1 Virtues “in the soul” must be understood correctly.

Even our superficial glance at the life of Nagai demonstrates that Nagai is the man
with these personal qualities. There is a grand inescapable reality about the
virtuous man… that he is the sum of his habits, and the corollary: that he operates
therefore through his habits. The person acts, in a moral sense, through his
virtues. Virtues empower us to act well. Because members of the body are organs
of the soul’s power, moral virtue is said to be of the soul.1102

The fact that the moral virtues are all “rational” should not lead to an assertion
that fortitude and temperance have no basis in the biophysical qualities of the
human person. As there is an obediential relationship, in a state of virtue, of the
sensitive powers towards reason, it is not necessary to assert some intrinsic role
1101

Ramsay, Beyond Virtue. Integrity and Morality, 173.
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.17, Art.9. “... all movements of members that are moved by the sensitive powers
are subject to the command of reason…. as the powers of the soul stand in respect of obedience to
reason, so do the members of the body stand in respect thereof.”
1102
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for reason within fortitude and temperance. 1103 Aristotle and Aquinas maintain a
clear distinction between what is rational and what is sensitive.1104 Aquinas
demonstrates the distinction between virtues perfecting the rational as their
subject and those of the irrational part of the soul, by speculating on the state of
the human soul after death. 1105 Aquinas clarifies that the powers of the sensitive
soul cannot exist without the body and therefore these virtues do not either. 1106

All human acts require operation of the rational appetite informed by the
intellect; it is therefore clear that the virtues of justice and prudence, associated
with these rational operations, must be powers of the soul.1107 This is so because,
“Habit needs to be in that power which is the principle of the act”, and hence for
example, “the possible intellect is the subject of intellectual habits”.1108
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Naus, The Nature of the Practical Intellect according to St Thomas Aquinas, 69-70. “Some
actions proceed from the soul through the body, and are, therefore, principally in the soul,
secondarily in the body. The same is true of the habits which modify them: they dispose the body
habitually to serve the operations of the soul. Accordingly there can be habits in the sensitive
powers in so far as they act under the command of reason. … (These moral virtues nevertheless)
perfect man as man. These are the intellectual and moral virtues of intellect and sense and
intellectual appetites.”
1104
Aristotle and Aquinas hold that the virtues of the irascible and concupiscible reside in the
sensitive, irrational, part of the soul.
1105
ST, Ia, Q.77, Art.8. “Some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject; as the intelligence
and the will. These powers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the body. ... Now
accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the subject ... such powers do not remain
actually; but they remain virtually in the soul as in their principle or root.”
1106
Aquinas, Disputed questions on the cardinal virtues, Art 4 Ad 13. “It should be said that some
teach that the irascible and concupiscible, the subjects of temperance and fortitude, are in the
higher part, not in the sensitive part of the soul. But this conflicts with what the Philosopher says in
Ethics 3, namely, that virtues are in the irrational parts. Others say that the powers of the sensitive
part remain in the separated soul either according to potency alone or according to act. But this
cannot be because the acts of the sensitive power cannot exist without the body; otherwise the
”
sensitive soul of the brutes would be incorruptible, which is erroneous.
1107
Strictly speaking, justice and prudence are not powers of the soul, but “in a power of the soul”.
Aquinas further states: “a power of the soul is the subject of virtue.” (ST, Ia-IIae, Q.56, Art. 1).For
the purposes of this thesis however, I do often refer to “person” as the subject of virtue. This is an
acceptable convention: for example, Jean Porter writes of “the person of true virtue” and “it is
proper to justice among the other virtues to direct the human person” (Jean Porter, The Recovery
of Virtue. (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), 114 and 124). Clearly, however, debate
over the true subject of the virtues is an important part of scholarship concerning Aquinas’s moral
theory.
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Ultimately that virtues are “in the soul” means that they can be utilised by the
human person to facilitate his wellbeing, they are not a rule unto themselves. It
does not imply that all virtues belong to the soul as their subject.

In summary, it is clear that moral virtues are properly “in the soul” as they are
acquired and directed by the person. Yet, as these moral virtues of fortitude and
temperance are habits of management of bodily emotion, they must corporeal.
The argument of this study is that this substrate consists in anatomical parts,
processes, and pathways which may reasonably identified within the organism.

Specifically, the virtue of fortitude will exhibit part-constituents with roles
mediating apprehension and management of fear, pain and anxiety. The virtue of
temperance will exhibit part-constituents mediating reward systems and
apprehension of pleasure. In common they will consist in part-constituents which
link emotional centres with cortical regions implicated in imagination, memory,
deliberation, and goal election. Each also will feature part-constituents which
account for habit formation, habituation of specific processes, etc. These
characteristics will be explored in Chapter 5.

4.1.2.2 Reason as the “form” of virtue correctly understood.

That reason is the “form” of the virtues may, at first sight, seem to suggest that
reason, as a matter/form co-constituent, is intrinsic to all virtue. But I suggest this
is an erroneous reading of this key source passage:
The material element in these virtues is a certain inclination of
the appetitive part to the passions and operations according to
a certain mode:- and since this mode is fixed by reason, the
formal element is precisely this order of reason.1109

1109

ST, Ia-IIae, Q.67, Art.1.
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The material element absent after death, is “a certain inclination of the appetitive
part to the passions and operations according to mode fixed by reason”.1110 It is
this “certain inclination” that is the very subject of this study. Aquinas’s words, “a
certain inclination of the appetitive part”, are consistent with the view proposed
by this study that the human organism is able to develop neural pathways that
dispose for self directed higher cortical modification of emotional reactions.
The formal element is not reason itself but “the order of reason”1111 which has
fixed the material element in a certain way.

In the life of Nagai, we witness extraordinary qualities of character in his later
years; his impressive peace and self-control have been noted above. It is
eminently clear that these qualities have a material element for they include the
ability to transcend fears of death, and separation from his deceased spouse for
whom he held a passionate love.

The position of this study is that our free and conscious efforts form, or reform,
our very biophysical constitution. By the effort we invest in good behaviours we
actually build virtue, we order our material constitution into neural structures,
better capable of supporting effective self management at the rational level.
Fortitude and temperance are habits caused in the sensitive appetite by repetition
of actions, actions which are repeated owing to the settled rational conviction
that personal actions for human flourishing must demonstrate fortitude and
temperance. It would appear that reason, perfected by prudence, the habitual
disposition of the practical intellect for right counsel, judgement and command,
plays a role in ordering the biophysical processes that are part-constituents of the
other cardinal virtues. Reason, human thought, directs the very ordering of
matter.

1110
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ST, Ia-IIae, Q.67, Art.1.
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For reason to be the form of the virtues of temperance and fortitude poses a
further challenge. These virtues are “of the soul” because they are at the free
service of the person, but they are dispositions of the sensitive appetite, and
these facts seem difficult to reconcile. A key to the solution lies in the fact that, as
we have seen in the life of Nagai, the cardinal virtues operate together. Acts of the
virtues of fortitude and temperance, dispositions of the sensitive appetites, will be
directed by rational operations which are themselves disposed by justice and
prudence. Without acts of prudence and justice there can be no rational direction
of the sensitive appetites; without prudence and justice rationality is unable to
inform the acts of these pathways of habituation. Therefore, as virtues are known
through their acts, acts of temperance and fortitude will be informed by acts of
prudence and justice. It would seem then that reason directing the individual acts
through acts of prudence and justice, builds up and characterises as virtues, the
virtues of fortitude and temperance.

The canine analogy can help. A dog has a trained disposition to obey the reason of
his master. Yet the dog is wholly material. So too fortitude and temperance are
acquired (and finely attuned) dispositions to obey our rational choices.

4.1.2.3 A correct understanding of “habit of choosing” is required.

It is true that virtue is presented by Aristotle and Aquinas as a “habit of choosing”,
yet this notion also must be reconciled with the clear distinction between virtues
of the sensitive appetites and those of the rational appetite and intellect.

The human act is a team effort: deliberation of the will informed by the intellect
leading to choice, and all with the prior input from the lower appetites, appetites
that to a greater or lesser extent have been already schooled in rational
management, to the extent that they are already disposed by pre-existing habits.
Choice resides formally in the will, but it does result from a
concurrence of the intellectual and volitional powers through a
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mutual causality in the orders of specification and exercise
respectively.1112

A key to clarification of the various roles of the virtues, the good moral habits, lies
in a correct understanding of habit. Habits hold a very special place in the
anthropology of Aquinas.

Habit is presented as a most broad category. Etienne Gilson observed:
Habits are not only qualities and accidents, but they are
qualities and accidents which lie closest to the nature of a
thing, and which come closest to entering into its essence and
integrating themselves into its definition.1113
Each power, rational and sensitive, is disposed by its distinctive and corresponding
habit. It is apparent that habit is a most broad category, simply indicating the
disposition appropriate to the power that it perfects.

Aquinas wrote:
Every power which may be variously directed to act, needs a
habit whereby it is well disposed to its act.1114
Within this broader category of habit Aristotle positioned virtue. Each faculty
directly involved in moral action is disposed by its appropriate habit. The
appropriate habits for the sensitive appetites are moral virtues of the
concupiscible and irascible appetites. The rational appetite, too, has its own
proper disposition, justice. The practical intellect is disposed by its own habit,
prudence.

The good habit, or virtue, appropriate to the nature of each power (the
speculative and practical intellect, and the rational and sensitive appetites) assists
1112

Edward Cook, The deficient cause of moral evil according to Thomas Aquinas (Washington:
Paedeia Publishers and The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1996), p93. This text is
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in the operation and function of that power, in integrated concert with the action
of the other habits, with the outcome that the whole organism flourishes.

It therefore stands to reason that wherever rational operations coincide with
sensible powers the rational operations can only be disposed by their own proper
virtues. Therefore, strictly speaking, it is incorrect to assert that all virtues pertain
to rationality as their subject.

A certain imprecision of terminology abounds in this area. We read:
concupiscence “judges its own desires to be good”1115, yet it is clear that
unmoderated sensual pleasure cannot judge. At best we can say that the intellect
presents to the will the principle that pleasure is to be pursued, and so pleasure in
the will is then pursued. But in this case it is clearly the rational appetite, not the
vice of intemperance, that does the choosing.

The capacity for choice does not properly reside in temperance and fortitude as
they are perfections of material appetites. For virtue to be a habit of choosing, it is
necessary, as a minimum, that every virtuous action be guided by rationality. This
is achieved by the contributions of prudence and justice in every action of perfect
virtue.

4.1.2.4 The moral virtues of the sensitive appetite are rational “by
participation”.

Aquinas argues that: “According to the mind of Aristotle... it is manifest that the
sensitive powers are rational, not by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic
i 13).”1116

I propose that to say of virtues that they are rational “by participation” is to say
that they are biologically grounded habits which reflect the right ordering of
1115
1116

ST, IIIa, Q.156, Art.3.
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.50, Art.4. See also Q.59, Art.4 and Q.61, Art.2.
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reason as their cause, and which perfect their respective appetites to desire
pleasures and avoid pains in keeping with right reason. Therefore I propose a
restricted reading of rational “by participation”; this view contrasts with a certain
accepted reading of Aquinas that suggests, wrongly in my opinion, an intrinsic role
of reason in the virtues of the sensitive appetites.

Fortitude and temperance, as habits of the sensitive appetites, lack in isolation the
necessary intrinsic rationality to be described properly as “rational”. Aquinas says
that “in so far as they obey reason the sensitive powers are said to be
‘rational’.”1117 Elsewhere we read: “Appetite is the principle of human acts
insofar as it partakes of reason.”1118

They are not even dispositions of the intellect or will, properly speaking.

Yet, again Thomistic terminology can be frustratingly equivocal. For example,
Aquinas makes cardinal virtues, instead of the agent, the subject of active verbs:
for example, he writes that prudence brings about the good respecting the
consideration of reason; that justice brings about what is due and upright in
operations; that temperance “restrains desires for the pleasures of touch”1119;
that fortitude brings about firmness of soul against any of the passions. This
transfer of agency can somehow give the impression that the virtues are in
command, or that somehow they are synomymous with reason. Yet only the
person acts; and properly speaking, for example, it is only with the assistance of
temperance that the person restrains desires. 1120

The view that all four cardinal virtues contain in some way an intrinsic rational
element appears to adopt this, unintended, transfer of agency. Such imprecise
1117
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readings of Thomistic texts appear to reinforce mistaken assumptions about
virtue.

What Aquinas means by “participation” may be further clarified by reference to
the doctrine of “participation in being”, introduced in Chapter 1, as analogously
relevant.1121 Participation implies exercise and enjoyment of certain benefits that
are not properly one’s own. It should be remembered that Aquinas taught that
substances possess being only by participation - being is predicated of finite
creatures by participation:1122 “All other beings that are not their own being but
have being by participation must proceed from that one thing.”1123

We can relate these reflections back to our discussion of Nagai. It has been noted
a number of times that each of the actions of Nagai appear to reflect dispositions
of various virtues, both at the material and the rational level. For example, the
compassionate treatment of the enemy soldier reflects not only justice but also
temperance (understood in a broad sense), fortitude, and prudence. Hence it may
be argued from this example that habits of the sensitive appetite are able to be
guided by habits of rationality, and in this sense we are able to say that these
habits are rational “by participation”.

4.1.2.5 The practical intellect is perfected by its own proper habit, prudence.

In a tightly argued text, Aquinas provides insights into the operation of prudence,
a “habit of the reason”. The text attributes to prudence an explicit ordination to
human flourishing, a direct consequence of the rectitude, the perfection, of
reason resulting from exercise of the virtue. He argues that prudence is needed to
perfect reason and so provide effective guidance to the other virtues. He
concludes, “An intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason,

1121

Arguably, according to Aquinas, the participation of virtue in reason is not only analogical but
ontological. Such a discussion would stretch the parameters of this current study.
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and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this virtue is
prudence.”1124

Nagai’s consistent mastery of his own actions demonstrates the presence of a
perfecting habit of the practical intellect. It makes no sense to hold that this habit
is intrinsic also to the perfecting habits of the sensitive appetites, which demand
their own perfecting habits which by necessity must be distinct from habits
perfecting rationality.

Reason exercises royal command. Reason governs the virtues of the sensitive
appetite not directly, or “despotically” as Aquinas would say.1125 Rather, he
explains, the appetites may or may not obey. Aquinas holds that fortitude and
temperance obey reason “royally”. This principle may also be used to
demonstrate what we could call the “exteriority” of reason to the sensitive
appetites.1126

The bottom line is that rationality, which must be present in any human act, will
have its own proper disposing virtues. When rationality is involved in acts of
fortitude and temperance, it will be disposed to act well by its own proper virtues
of justice and prudence. Fortitude and temperance are rational virtues, not
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ST, Ia-IIae, Q.57, Art.5. The full quotation is as follows: “Prudence is a virtue most necessary for
human life. For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, it matters not
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applies this view also to justice, the habit disposing the rational appetite.
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because rationality is intrinsic to them, but rather because they are dispositions of
their respective appetites to obey reason.

There are intimations of this distinction in the scenarios presented about the life
of Dr Nagai. The process whereby he brings his emotions under the rule of reason
is demonstrated in his response to the Allied leaflet dropped from the plane. This
contrasts with the apparently instantaneous insight to treat friend and foe with
the same kindness.

4.1.2.6 If in addition to prudence, the speculative intellect plays a role in virtue,
the speculative intellect will be perfected by its own proper habits.

Keenan clarifies the relationship between the speculative intellect, the practical
intellect and moral virtue. Each is distinct. He writes of “an implicit hierarchy” in
Aquinas: synderesis,1127 prudence, and then the moral virtues.1128 It is “Natural
reason known as synderesis (that) appoints the end to moral virtues.”1129 Each is
distinct: “Prudence relies on the moral virtues to dispose themselves to those
ends that synderesis has appointed.”1130

That the speculative intellect disposes moral virtue to its end, does not mean that
the speculative intellect is somehow internal to moral virtue. In fact we read that
the speculative intellect is perfected by its own appropriate habit: there are three
habits of the speculative intellect: wisdom, science and understanding.1131
Although we read that the virtue of understanding1132 (habitual awareness of first
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principles) is necessary for the operation of virtue, we return to the fundamental
principle that each power is perfected by its own specific virtue. In summary, the
speculative intellect does play a prior role in the exercise of moral virtue but is,
itself, perfected by its own distinct virtue, understanding.

Understanding and prudence do not operate like justice, nor justice like
temperance or fortitude. The rational virtues operate in modalities quite different
from those of the virtues of the sensitive appetites. A disposition of the sensitive
appetites must itself have exclusively sensible characteristics. Again consider the
analogy of the “self control” of a dog sitting on command, a self-control founded
on biological processes and elements; on the other hand, a disposition of the
reason, or of the rational appetite, may be expected to manifest less “materiality”.

4.1.2.7 Rather than of “an act of an isolated virtue” it appears more appropriate
to think in terms of “a moral operation perfected by the integral
involvement of multiple virtues”.

Although it is common usage, strictly speaking it is a misnomer to think or write in
terms of “acts of individual virtues”. Virtues do not act, rather they are
dispositions that perfect moral action. Furthermore, it would appear that “moral
acts disposed by individual virtues” itself is a rather theoretical construct. In
practice, every moral act requires prudent judgement and deliberation,
consideration of impact of the actions on others, and habitual self management
disposed by the virtues of the sensitive appetites.

It is evident from the scenarios presented in the life of Dr Nagai, that each of the
actions we examined in detail could be interpreted as an action in which
dispositions of the four cardinal virtues were all in evidence. For example, his
fabrication of the Japanese flag from his own blood demonstrates prudent action,
a concern for those he leads, as well as remarkable fortitude and self control.

346

It is more accurate for us to utilize language such as, “a moral operation perfected
by various virtues.” If we think in terms of “moral operations”, actions disposed by
virtues in concert, rather than actions disposed by “moral virtues acting in
isolation from each other” there is no longer any difficulty in ascribing rationality
to the actions of temperance and fortitude.

In contrast to a view that each of the individual moral virtues requires its own
internal “package” of rational and corporeal components, let us think rather in
terms of moral operations. Aquinas seems to suggest as much when he writes,
As much as the intellect considered in its purity differs from the
composite of soul and body, so much does speculative
operation differ from operation which takes place according to
moral virtue.1133

Note that he applies the term “operation”, specifically reserved to the action of
the intellect and will, to virtuous action in general which he suggests in the
analogy has a corporeal as well as rational dimension, a dimension extending into
the domain of the virtues of the sensitive appetites. If this reading is correct, he
therefore suggests the integrated complicity of various virtues in the completion
of one moral operation.

Furthermore, complexity of motivation suggests that virtues are present in
concert. Considerations of motivation are a useful lens through which we can
study whether or not “actions of individual virtues” may be said to occur. The
appropriate motivation of any action is that the deed be worthy in itself and
carried out for a noble end, that is, an end which is according to right reason and
which takes into full account one’s duties towards others. Hence the simple act of
a doctor carrying out a most unpleasant act is disposed by fortitude, and carried
out therefore according to right reason (prudence) with perfect regard for their
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Aquinas, In X Ethicorum, trans. C. I. Litzinger (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964), 1, 11.
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impact on others (justice); yet while it may be disposed by fortitude, it is clearly an
operation involving the contribution of all the virtues.

And is temperance involved in this action? Most definitely. One of the reasons
Aquinas offers for separate virtues for the concupiscible and irascible appetites is
that at times these appetites operate at cross purposes: the ardous and
nauseating good of treating a putrid wound is undermined by one’s desire for
delectable sensation. Both virtues are required.

It is clear that in this arguably-single action, Nagai is motivated by a variety of
intentions: to exercise his duty of leadership, to withstand pain sufficiently to
accomplish the action, to lift his own spirits. These intentions suggest the
involvement of various virtues, respectively justice, fortitude and perhaps some
virtue associated with temperance. Hence in this action of Nagai all the virtues are
arguably present.

4.1.2.8 As it is the cause of virtue, reason is necessarily external to moral virtue.

The moral virtues of the sensitive appetites may only exist properly speaking in
ensouled matter; the human body enjoys its capacity virtue because human
beings are rational. At the metaphysical level, the soul animates the body,
rationality disposes matter for virtue; and at the biophysical level, virtue is
“caused by human acts... (proceeding) from reason, by whose power and rule the
aforesaid good is established.”1134 The very acquisition of virtue is natural to a
human being. These insights offer far reaching implications for this study.

There is no question that reason, guided by the rationality of the agent, plays a
decisive role in the formation of the virtues. We read: “Habits of moral virtue are
caused in the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason.”1135

1134
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ST, Ia-IIae, Q.62, Art.2.
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.51, Art.2.
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Yet another, short, fascinating passage assists us in interpreting this “according to
mode fixed by reason”1136. Aquinas allows either for habits acquired by training as
a young child, or acquired by deliberate personal choice of repetition of acts. He
states that virtue is caused by human acts carried out at the direction of reason.
He writes,
Human virtue.... can be caused by human acts... (proceeding)
from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is
established.1137

This is born out also in a passage where Aquinas differentiates between the
material presence of the virtue and the origin of the sensitive virtues whereby
they are in reason and will, virtually, as a root. He uses the case of the separated
soul to illustrate the limitations of the virtues of the sensitive appetites. 1138

Of course, and here is the crux of the argument, if reason is decisive in giving
virtue its form, in being “origin and beginning”, then it is extrinsic to virtue.
Reason in such a role, would need to be perfected itself by previously existing
habits.

At times Nagai takes decisions that subsequently serve to build up his virtuous
character. For example, the decision to treat enemy patients with compassion and
the subsequent exercise of this decision, led to an habituation of these selfless
actions and to the discovery of the joy intrinsic to the virtue. In this we see an
example of how reason gives rise to virtue as its cause.

4.1.2.9 Analysis of the human act supports the view that various virtues are
present in concert in a single human act.
1136
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Virtue empowers us to act, but it is incorrect to conclude that therefore all virtue
pertains to the soul as its subject. It is argued here, in considering the elements of
the human act, that all the virtues are required for a perfect human act, and that
these virtues perform quite distinct contributions within the human act as it
evolves. Again the moments we have studied from the life of Nagai appear to
bear out the view that the various virtues are all present. Also, we see, for
example in his consideration of the leaflet, that it was only after he mastered his
anger and sensitivity to the enemy leaflet’s wording, that he was able to rationally
assess the message.

i.

Input from the sensitive appetite precedes the rational in the human act.
Aquinas states clearly that in the completion of good human acts, both
intellectual and moral virtues are needed.
…for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only
that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of
intellectual virtue; but also that his appetite be well
disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue.1139
But what is the relationship between these virtues as the act “evolves”
through the steps of intention and execution as outlined in Table 3.1?

Reflection on the “structure” of the human act suggests that input from
the sensitive appetite takes place prior to the interplay of intellect and will
that is present in every human act. Therefore it would be incorrect to
confuse the virtues of the sensitive appetite and the various virtues
disposing rationality.

At their origin, there are two basic kinds of appetitive potencies, one
pertaining to sense knowledge, the other to intellectual knowledge.1140

1139

ST, Ia-IIae, Q.58, Art.2.
H. D. Gardiel OP, Introduction to the Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas (III Psychology), (St Louis:
Herder, 1956), 82.
1140
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In man there are but two principles of human actions,
namely, the intellect or reason, and the appetite: for
these are the two principles of movement in man as
stated in De Anima iii text 48. Consequently every
human virtue needs be a perfection of one of these
principles.1141

The appetitive potency relating to sense knowledge has its own proper
disposition.
Sensitive appetite tends only towards particular goods
as such, but intellectual appetite, which is the will,
always desires these goods under some universal aspect
of good.1142
Thomas argues the sensitive appetites is composed of the concupiscible,
attracted to easily attained goods, and the irascible, attracted to arduous
goods. The concupiscible appetite is moved by the imagination and the
common sense, the irascible by the cogitative and the memory. 1143
Gardiel reflects, “Since the faculties eliciting these acts are organic powers,
the acts necessarily involve bodily changes,” 1144 changes, according to
Thomas, in the passions.1145

These organic powers present input to the rational appetite, by way of
phantasm, in the first steps of the human act.

Because these steps precede the interactions of the intellect and will that
have been outlined in Table 4.1. Because of this temporal precedence, in
actu it is evident that rationality and the sensitive appetites are distinct.

1141

ST, Ia-IIae, Q.58, Art.3.
Gardiel, Introduction to the Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas (III Psychology), 82.
1143
Gardiel, Introduction to the Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas (III Psychology), 83.
1144
Gardiel, Introduction to the Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas (III Psychology), 84.
1145
Aquinas enumerates 11 passions: love or hatred, desire or aversion, hope or despair, courage
or fear, anger, and joy or sorrow. See ST, Ia-IIae, Q.22-48.
1142
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ii.

The contribution of emotion to rationality also argues for a “moraloperations view” rather than of a view of actions disposed by isolated
virtues.
Analysis of the human act will not only account for rational action but for
rational action enriched with emotional input. In illustration we see in the
life of Nagai that the remarkable fabrication of the flag is propelled by
patriotic emotion. An analysis of how this happens can assist us in defining
the respective roles of the virtues.

There is necessarily a point in the deliberation preceding the completion of
a human act where emotional readings of the situation and an
appreciation of context of action come into play. I suggest that this can
happen at two points.

First, positive emotion associated with an action can provide stimulus prior
to the action. For example, a love of nature leads Nagai to write poetry
with imagery drawn from nature. Note that this refined pleasure is prior to
the actual choice to act. (Also prior to the action proper, negative
emotions can be mastered, as we have seen in his reaction to the leaflet.)

Second, positive emotion can be generated at the level of relationships
with others. Pertaining to the virtue of justice, and therefore in the rational
appetite, this takes place within the steps outlined of the human act. This
contribution takes place, it would appear, at the stage in the human act
which some term the practico-practical judgement in Aquinas’s psychology
(Steps 6-8 in Table 3.1), in which the will adds its own particularising
content to the input it receives from the intellect (correspondingly the
speculative-practical judgement) prior to its act.1146 This particularising
content is arguably moderated by the virtue of justice.

1146

For clarity of understanding about the role of the practico-practical judgement (not extending
however to implications for the virtue of justice) I have drawn on an article of Alice Nelson, Centre
for Thomistic Studies teaching materials: http://www.cts.org.au/articles (accessed 24/10/2012).
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This is a further argument for the complex interplay of all the virtues in
each act of virtue and a further compelling argument that no fully moral
action can be performed without taking the impact of one’s action on
others into account.

iii.

Furthermore, discrete ascription of a particular action to a single virtue is
problematic. Actions in real life manifest the constellation of virtues.
Actions in the real world defy discrete classification into boxes of one
virtue or another. For example, Jean Porter has drawn attention to the
folly of considering acts of temperance as if these are pursuits distinct
from concern for others. It is not possible to consider sexual temperance in
isolation from justice understood as a consideration for how one’s actions
impact on others. Every sexual act impacts potentially, and often
immediately, on others. Both notions, and therefore both virtues, are
present.1147

It would seem too that acts of perfect virtue must be enriched by justice.
Nancy Sherman draws attention to the need for virtuous acts to be
moderated by justice: “Virtuous agents act taking into account the
wellbeing of others, the common good.”1148 This is in accord with the
intuition that it is necessary to take into account the impact of our actions
on others for a given action to be just. In fact, acts of prudence will not be
perfect unless they take into account “circumspection”. I suggest that to
do so, in those matters relating to the rights and good of others, the habit
of justice is required in the will.

Jean Porter insists that it is recurring real life actions that provide the
matter for virtues. “Justice is concerned with actions which involve others,

Accessed 24/10/2012
1147
This is of course in keeping with the Thomistic view (ST, Ia-IIae, Q.61, Art.4).
1148
Sherman, The Fabric of Character, 4.

353

and not just the agent herself”. We should consider that all actions require
require rationality informed by justice for their perfection.1149

Note that Porter contrasts virtuous actions in real life with a rarefied
theoretical perspective that would like unrealistically to see a neat
delineation of virtues. Surprisingly she finds fault in Aquinas’s view of acts
of temperance, suggesting that such acts seem to exclude justice. Yet it is
Aquinas himself who insists that in a perfect act of one virtue all virtues are
present. (See also 4.3.1.)
However a perfect moral virtue is a habit directed to a
good work, done well. And taking the moral virtues in
this way, we ought to say that they are connected, as
nearly everyone agrees.1150

4.1.2.10

The “durability” of the individual virtues differs in meaning
according to the specific virtue.

The hypothetical discussions in Aquinas about the duration of the virtues in the
disembodied state are most illuminating on this question of the differences
between the virtues. He makes crucial distinctions between the virtues perfecting
rational operations and those perfecting the sensitive appetites.

Aquinas argues that the habits of virtue all enjoy a “certain” durability but draws
significant contrasts. In what does their durability variously consist?
Prudence retains a “quasi-formal element”1151, the intelligible species that remain
after corruption of the body. Aquinas naturally holds that, at the decomposition of
the body, any corporeal substrate of prudence and of the moral virtues
decomposes. Although Aquinas refers specifically to the phantasms the position of

1149

Porter, Moral Action and Christian Ethics, 143.
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.65, Art.1.
1151
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.67, Art.2.
1150
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this study would be that the bodily substrate should be considered more broadly
to include the array of neural processes, pathways and mechanisms assisting
virtue. Aquinas writes:
…the phantasms, by turning to which man understands in this
life by applying the intelligible species to them,1152 cease as
soon as the body is corrupted.1153
Similarly justice, although a disposition of the rational appetite, has a bodily
element that must ultimately decompose. 1154

Aquinas argues that, after the corruption of the body, in the state preceding
resurrection of the body, justice nevertheless will have a presence. 1155

Justice, then, enjoys an immateriality comparable to that of prudence, although
the operations of acts of justice and prudence stand somewhat in contrast.
Prudence is a habit of intellect. Justice is a habit caused in the will by reason, by
the settled conviction that personal actions must respect the rights of others. Acts
of justice will implicate specific part-constituents in memory, imagination and
presentation of the phantasm, motivation, empathy to others, reward systems of
the body, etc.

Justice will only operate in concert with prudence and the virtues disposing the
sensitive appetites. Aquinas says that the will is always implicated in the exercise
of moral virtues: “...since the will is a rational power, it may be variously directed
to act.”1156 On the one hand, as the virtue properly of the rational appetite and
through the involvement of reason, it would seem that biophysical pathways and
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cf ST, IIae, Q.84, Art.7 and IIae, Q.85, Art.1.5.
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.67, Art.2.
1154
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.53, Art.2.3. “The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is above time,
but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore in the course of time it undergoes change as
to the passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence the
Philosopher says (Phys iv text 117) that time makes us forget.”
1155
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.67, Art.1.3. “Justice however will remain because it is in the will. Hence of justice
is it specifically said that it is perpetual and immortal; both by reason of its subject, since the will is
incorruptible; and because its act will not change, as stated.”
1156
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.50, Art.5.
1153
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processes are concurrently implicated in the reasoning processes of rational
judgment and command, presenting particulars at the service of rationality. On
the other hand, justice is not present without the presence of the virtues of the
sensitive appetite. In sum, a constellation of part-constitutional processes
accompany the exercise of every virtue.

On the other hand, Aquinas draws a complete distinction between virtues of
prudence and justice, and the virtues of the concupiscible and irascible
powers.1157 Aquinas writes, “In these (moral) virtues (in the afterlife) there is a
formal element, which is the ‘order of reason’ (as we have seen above), and a
quasi-material element.”1158 Note the contrast with prudence, which he explains
retains a “quasi-formal” element.

The intellectual appetite is quite distinct from sensitive appetite “since what is
apprehended by the intellect is different from what is apprehended by the
senses.”1159 This is consistent with the view expressed elsewhere by Aquinas that
justice endures when the body and soul are separated. He explains that “the
intellectual appetite ... tends to individual things which exist outside the soul... as
standing under the universal; as when it desires something because it is good.”1160
The virtues of the sensitive appetites do not continue to exist except for the
“order of reason”, which as we have seen exists externally to the virtue, and in the
somewhat perplexing “quasi-material element”; yet after death, material goods
themselves are absent, nor is there any biological substrate to present phantasms
of that which is pleasurable and that which is painful.

In answer to Ramsay’s suggestion that the moral virtues, as rational dispositions,
continue to exist after dissolution of the body, it would seem important to clarify
the meaning of “rational disposition”. The only truly rational dispositions are
prudence and justice, or understanding, which perfects the speculative intellect
1157

ST, Ia-IIae, Q.57, Art.4.
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.67, Art.1.
1159
ST, Ia, Q.80, Art.2.
1160
ST, Ia, Q.80, Art.2.2.
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and establishes the end of the moral virtues. Aquinas makes it very clear that
fortitude and temperance are in fact dispositions of the material appetites, albeit
orderly dispositions caused by reason.

In summary, what is the role of reason with respect to the sensitive appetites?
Reason appears to interact with the sensitive appetites in two principal ways,
which we can refer to, for the sake of clarity, as the micro level, and the macro
level. 1161
i.

At what we can consider as the micro level, Aristotle argues that in
each human act motivated by the sense appetites one is moved by the
desire for appropriate pleasures and to avoid specific pains regarded as
inappropriate and disproportionate to a worthy outcome. Reason then,
in bringing to completion the human act, responds to the initial
appetitive stimulus, either by legitimising the choice, or rejecting it. 1162
Secondly, also at this micro level of individual acts, reason is able to
harness the energy of the passions at the service of the person.

ii.

At what we could call the macro level, a further outcome of this
process is that reason “trains” the sensitive appetites over time in what
is appropriate pleasure and pain.1163

4.2

Biological and functional distinctions between the virtues.

Now, having presented a systematic case for a restricted reading of “by
participation”, in the section which follows, I summarise Aquinas’ understanding

1161

Naus, The Nature of the Practical Intellect according to St Thomas Aquinas, 73. These two
processes appear described (albeit in a rather muddy fashion) by one commentator in the
following text: “Therefore reason, which moves the sense powers of appetite, and the appetites
themselves need habits in order to operate well. So in the concupiscible appetite there is the
virtue of temperance and in the irascible that of fortitude. These virtues keep their respective
powers habitually in line with reason.”
1162
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.57, Art.4. “... it is a requisite for prudence....that man is well disposed with regard
to the ends; and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence there is
need of a moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite.”
1163
This also corresponds to the process of “training” that Aristotle identified, along with
“education” which is more to do with the rational appetite and intellect, as one of the two key
methods of bringing about virtue.
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of the distinctive characteristics and role of each of four cardinal virtues.
Throughout I argue that Aquinas’ understanding of the moral virtues of the
sensitive appetites is indeed one in which reason plays a causal role in the
formation of virtue, but that in themselves, the dispositions of the sensitive
appetites are founded exclusively on the biological.

In order to better understand the relative roles of the cardinal virtues, and in
particular, to develop a clearer understanding of areas where we will expect to
find biophysical part-constituents for each, it is highly advantageous to utilise the
lens of hylomorphism.

This section builds upon, and should be read in the light of 1.4 in which the
hylomorphic underpinnings of this study and certain principles of rational
psychology are discussed.

An hylomorphic analysis of virtue, following Aristotle and Aquinas, will assist us in
discriminating between aspects of virtue associated with the operations of
rationality, and aspects pertaining to sensitive activity. Such an analysis provides
insights into the specific contribution of rationality to the formation and exercise
of virtue, into the ordering or “disposition” of anatomical structures and dynamics
which appear to facilitate virtue, and insights also into the distinction between the
various virtues in regard to their “corporeality”. Such an analysis is essential
prerequisite for Chapter 5, in which neural locations, pathways and processes will
be suggested, on the basis of current neuroscientific knowledge for the material
substrate of virtue. As neuroscience can only shed light on the material aspects of
virtue, a prerequisite for resolution of this task is to distinguish between the
rational and material characteristics of virtue.

It is important to bear in mind that while the cardinal virtues are regarded as the
principal umbrella categories of virtue, other virtues may or may not neatly
categorise under one or other of the cardinal virtues. Nevertheless, for the
purposes of clarity, this study focuses almost exclusively on the cardinal virtues.
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4.2.1 The cardinal virtues have distinctive roles in the operation of virtue.

As an introduction to an examination of the exercise each of the cardinal virtues,
let us turn to some elegantly condensed argument from Aquinas where he
explains their distinctive roles:
Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal
principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and
either way, we find there are four cardinal virtues. For the
formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good
defined by reason; which good can be considered in two ways.
First as existing in the very act of reason; and thus we have one
principal virtue called Prudence. Secondly, according as the
reason puts its order into something else; either into
operations, and then we have Justice; or into passions, and
then we need two virtues. For the need of putting order of
reason into the passions is due to their thwarting reason, and
thus the passions need a curb, which we call Temperance.
Second, by the passions withdrawing us from following the
dictate of reason, eg through fear of danger or toil: and then
man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates,
lest he turn back; and to this end there is Fortitude.
In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the
subjects of virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we
speak of now; viz, the power which is rational in its essence,
and this is perfected by Prudence; and that which is rational by
participation, and is threefold, the will, subject of Justice, the
concupiscible faculty, subject to Temperance, and the irascible
faculty, subject to Fortitude.1164
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ST, Ia-IIae, Q.61, Art.2.
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In the sections below, in turn we will focus on the specific role of each of the
cardinal virtues: prudence the virtue perfecting rationality, justice perfecting the
will, fortitude the irascible appetite, and temperance the concupiscible.

a)

The distinction between the virtues properly of the soul and those
properly of the body.

In the examples from the life of Nagai we saw moments of instantaneous insight,
convictions, and dispositions towards his fellow men, that are seemingly
independent of time and place, and any process of clarification; other actions both
of deliberation and of self control appear to take time with the subject acquiring
progressively greater lucidity. An example of the first is the powerful conviction
that he must treat all men equally; of the second, his ruminations on the import of
the leaflet. These contrasting examples suggest fundamental differences between
some virtues and others. Some appear to pertain to a truth that is grasped,
another to a process of managing one’s emotions.

First let us consider the broader contrast between the prudence and justice on the
one hand, and fortitude and temperance on the other. The cardinal virtues appear
to be part-constituted to differing extents by a material substrate. As we have
seen, habit is a broad term, denoting simply some form of disposition. The various
cardinal virtues are not habits in the same fashion. It is helpful to distinguish
between those cardinal virtues more closely associated with rationality, namely
prudence and justice, and those directly associated with the sensitive appetites.

b)

Prudence and justice, as they are associated more directly with the
rationality, are more removed from the biophysical substrate.

Aquinas argues,
Some of the powers of the soul are in it according as it exceeds
the entire capacity of the body, namely the intellect and will;
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whence these powers are not said to be in any part of the
body.1165

I suggest, on the basis of reasoning that “of the soul” can be understood broadly
as “of the person”, that it is within a reasonable understanding of this passage to
affirm that prudence and justice are, in part, neurobiological modifications of
pathways, processes and mechanisms, and that it is within the very nature of the
ensouled body, animated matter, that these pathways, processes and
mechanisms perfect rationality.

Aquinas goes on to suggest,
Other powers are common to the soul and body; wherefore
each of these powers need not be wherever the soul is, but
only in that part of the body which is adapted to the operation
of such a power.1166
In other words, powers common to the soul and body, and by this we can
understand all the virtues, are quite localised. Of course this view is compatible
with the view that the virtues, including fortitude and temperance, are also
powers of the soul, just as any other material organ able to be directed by the
rational appetite (for example the eye) operates as a power of the soul.

c)

Fortitude and temperance have a dual dependency: on the soul and on
the corporeal organs.

The soul is the principle of the act of virtue; the corporeal organs are material
causes of rational operations. Aquinas explains:
Every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ, depends not
only on a power of the soul, but also on the disposition of that
corporeal organ: thus the act of vision depends on the power of
sight, and on the condition of the eye, which condition is a help
1165
1166
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or a hindrance to that act. Consequently the act of the sensitive
appetite depends not only on the appetitive power, but also on
the disposition of the body.1167

In other words fortitude and temperance, habits by which the irascible and
concupiscible sensitive appetites are docile to reason, achieve their effect wholly
by means of corporeal processes and pathways that have been ordered by
reason.1168

d)

Temperance and fortitude are at the heart of a rational response to pain
and pleasure and therefore to appetition that is truly human.

Examples from the life of Nagai demonstrate just how fundamental to human
existence are the dual challenges of curbing wayward passions and overcoming
difficulties in the pursuit of difficult goals. We see this time and again: Nagai’s
repulsion to the putrid wounds is overcome in order for him to put into practice
his noble goal of ministering to the wounded; he overcomes his exhaustion and
concern for his safety in order to give positive leadership to his workers; he
masters his humiliation and anger to consider the implications of the Allied leaflet;
he masters his self pity and apathy in his illness to deliver a prodigious output of
writing aimed at helping others. There is no question that direction and mastery
of our sensitive appetites are the very matter of our daily lives.

On the one hand, the four cardinal virtues are concerned with management of the
realms of human activity... intellect, will, and sensitive appetites. But we must
remind ourselves that the intellect and will operate in this material world. To
some extent it is true to say that prudence and justice exist so that temperance
and fortitude are well guided. Aristotle’s emphasis on pleasure and pain in his
discussion of virtue helps us to see this clearly, and also this constitutive view of
1167

ST, Ia-IIae, Q.17, Art.7.
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1168
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virtue, with its emphasis on the role of rationality in managing the biological
aspects, can add clarity.

Aristotle places fortitude and temperance, ordered to the cultivation of man’s
passions,1169at the very heart of human appetition: to seek pleasure and avoid
pain. At this most elemental level temperance in response to hedonism, and
fortitude in response to fear and pain, are dispositions to self mastery. These basic
motivations are widely accepted by clinical psychiatry and supported also by
neuroscience. For example, the dominance of fear in the unregulated person has
been noted in contemporary psychopathology:
Brain scans show that many violent adults are still driven, just
like infants, by their ancient rage/fear and defence/attack
responses deep in the mammalian and reptilian parts of the
brain. The brain scans show all too little activity in the parts of
the higher brain that naturally regulate and modify raging
feelings. 1170

Aristotle and the psychopathologists would agree on many things. In a similar
way, children lack the wherewithal to manage their passions: The lives of children,
as much as that of intemperate men are governed by their desires.1171

Aristotle explains that pain and pleasure enter into both temperance and
fortitude.
The self indulgent man craves for all pleasant things or those
that are most pleasant, and is led by his appetite to choose
these at the cost of everything else; hence he is pained when
he fails to get them and when he is merely craving for them (for
appetite involves pain).1172
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Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 308.
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Yet, the specific distinction between temperance and fortitude is clear. 1173
The good of curbing the passions is found chiefly in those
passions which are most difficult to curb, viz, in the pleasures of
touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good defined by
reason, against the impulse of passion, is found chiefly in perils
of death, which are most difficult to withstand.1174

Aquinas stressed that these emotional responses are positively good but only if
they are managed by reason.
Emotion leads away from moral behaviour in so far as it is
uncontrolled by reason; but in so far as it is rationally directed,
it is part of the virtuous life.1175

Now I review the specialized roles of the four cardinal virtues below with a view to
gaining insights into the biophysical contribution of the body in the development,
state and expression of virtue.

4.2.2 Prudence.1176

The contribution of prudence, perfecting each action, has already been noted in
the four scenarios pertaining to Nagai above. Prudence on the one hand it is the
habit of readily recognizing and acknowledging what is right and true, and on the
more practical side, it is the habit of making sound judgements about what we will
do. The first refers to recognizing reality; the starting point of prudence is
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Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 263. This text from Gilson serves as a
further guide: “(Fortitude and temperance) bear upon the quality of acts, considered in relation to
the one performing them. Thus, they deal with the interior dispositions of the agent at the
moment of acting. They deal, in a word, with passions.” Hence he explains, “If the agent is actually
prevented from acting by fear of danger or of effort or the like, he needs fortitude to strengthen
him in the resolutions his reason dictates.” Analogously, temperance moderates the concupiscible
appetite allowing one to act according to right reason.
1174
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.61, Art.3.
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ST, Ia-IIae, Q.24, Art.2.
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Aristotle and Aquinas held that prudence, auriga virtutum, drives the chariot of the virtues.
Aquinas writes, “Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command
well.”
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knowledge of reality.1177 Second, prudence pertains to making decisions on right
principles. It is an essential virtue for effective action: “practical wisdom is
concerned with action.” 1178 What should also be evident are the common
characteristics of deliberation, judgement and action.1179
The goal of the practical intellect is “truth in agreement with right desire”.1180 And
the intellectual habit of the practical intellect is prudence, having “something in
common with the moral virtues; for it is right reason about things to be done.” 1181
The role of prudence is quite distinct from that of the moral virtues. 1182

Most importantly, we have seen that prudence is ordained to human flourishing:
“Prudence is a virtue of the rational part capable of procuring all that tends to
happiness.”1183 1184

4.2.3 Justice

a)

A broad understanding of justice

1177

“that which is prudent is in keeping with reality”: Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 9.
NE, 1141b21; Aristotle, De Virtutibus et Vitiis, 1250a30-37: “To prudence belongs right
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A broad notion of justice is exemplified in the scenes presented from the life of
Nagai. His service to his enemies, his patriotic leadership, his faith, his concern for
his countrymen, his diligent parenting… all of these are not strictly reciprocal, but
they all reflect a deep abiding concern to respect others and to live up to one’s
duties towards them.

In this study I adopt the broad understanding of justice that is in best keeping with
the spirit of the discussion in both Aristotle and Aquinas, and is also most
consistent with the neuroscientific insights on offer.

In The Recovery of Virtue Jean Porter argues for a broad notion of the virtue of
justice extending beyond strict reciprocity. Such an understanding, a justice by
which we measure our actions by the love and respect we have for others, is able
to demonstrate the deficiencies of duty and consequence based measures in
accounting for truly noble behaviour. Such a view is very attractive to this current
study which proposes for justice a contributory role in every perfect human act
whereby the impact of one’s actions on others is considered prior to the decision
to act.

Justice on this broad understanding is the disposition to act at all times offering all
others the respect due to them, with full acceptance of all our responsibilities in
this world. A parenting author who structures much of his work around the
development of virtue prefers to write of justice as just this: “respect and
responsibility”.1185 Another has founded the Institute for the 4th and 5th Rs –
denoting respect and responsibility.

Gilson describes justice in this broad manner.
(Justice) regulates the content and nature of the operation of
the will... assuring the moral value and rectitude of all

1185

James B. Stenson, http://www.parentleadership.com (accessed 10 May 2011).
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operations in which ideas of what is due and not due are
implied.1186
This second of the cardinal virtues” ensures rectitude in the election of the will for
means required in the pursuit of goals. Aquinas describes justice as the
psychological and moral state of a man who “firmly and permanently chooses to
render to each one his due.”1187 Aristotle teaches, “The best man is he who
exercises his virtue towards another”.1188 He dubs justice “the complete virtue”
because it orders one’s acts with respect to others.
Justice is often thought to be the greatest of the virtues...
proverbially “in justice is every virtue comprehended”.
We must not define justice in terms of tangible transaction, nor narrow the scope
of justice. Justice manifests externally but as a virtue it concerned with inner
dispositions, with choices. 1189 Universally, the just denotes what is lawful; and
particular case, what is fair and equal. It is a complete virtue because “it is the
actual exercise of complete virtue... because he who possesses it can exercise it
not only in himself but towards his neighbour also”.

It would appear that Aquinas, by aligning justice to the good of reason, himself
favoured a broad interpretation.1190 1191 Aquinas argues that justice is the state of
character that makes people disposed to do what is just, and makes them act
justly and wish for what is just.1192He explains the role of the virtue of justice.
Justice is “a habit whereby men will and do that which is just”
(Ethic v 1). Therefore the will is the subject of habit. ...The will is
inclined to the good of reason. But because this good is varied
1186

Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 263.
ST, IIa-IIae, Q.58, Art.1.
1188
NE, 1129b25ff.
1189
NE, 1134ff.
1190
It is true that Aquinas explains a taxonomy of justice, corresponding to the three basic
relationships: reciprocal justice (individuals to one another), distributive justice (community to the
individual), and general justice (individual to the community).
1191
Pieper opcit p.27 Pieper, a close follower of Aquinas was of this opinion. “‘It is the function of
justice to carry out the order of reason in all human affairs.” “The other virtues – fortitude and
moderation – serve the conservation of this good; it is their function to preserve man from
declining from the good. … Fortitude protects this realization (of the good made compelling
evident through prudence) and clears the road for it.”
1192
NE, 1129a7ff.
1187
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in many ways, the will needs to be inclined, by means of a
habit, to some fixed good of the reason, in order that action
may follow more promptly.1193
In writing about the various forms of debt that give rise to justice, it is clear that
he goes beyond strict reciprocity, including duties of religion and of filial
gratitude.1194

Aquinas explains that the rational appetite, being naturally attracted to the good
of the subject, requires no virtue to exercise this natural operation. The virtue
which disposes the rational will to act for the good of another, in contrast to that
of oneself, is justice. As we have seen, justice will always act in concert with
prudence, and that the moral virtues are “rational by participation”.1195

In summary, it is the position of this study that all moral acts require the
deliberations of justice. Every moral act has a dimension impacting on others and
so requires the exercise of justice if it is to be a good act. It is also apparent that
prudence is not possible without deliberations of justice, nor temperance nor
fortitude. It is perhaps for this reason Gilson suggests that justice incorporates the
other virtues: “Justice is a kind of general virtue which includes all other
virtues.”1196

4.2.4

An understanding of the biophysical dimensions of prudence and
justice.
(Read in conjunction with 4.2.1 a and b.)

a)

What is the matter?

1193

ST, Ia-IIae, Q.50, Art.5.
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.60, Art.3. “Corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are various
virtues…. Religion whereby we pay our debt to God, piety (respect) whereby we pay our debt to
our parents or to our country; gratitude, to our benefactors, etc.”
1195
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.59, Art.4.
1196
Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 292.
1194
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Acts of prudence and justice are acts of rationality with indirect material
cooperation to extent that each inform our reasoning processes involving material
assistance of memory, phantasm, imagination, etc. To the extent that these
biologically based processes are necessary (but not sufficient) for these virtues to
operate, they may be understood as part-constituents of virtue.

Various arguments support this view.

i.

It is important to understand that the management of the concupiscible
and irascible appetites is normally the product of a reasoning process.
Reasoning implies a process of thought disposed by habit. 1197 In our
exploration of this issue it is essential to distinguish reason from
immaterial rationality.1198

ii.

A reasoning process implies that there must be biophysical elements that
enable the process of reasoning: “the irascible and concupiscible are said
to obey reason rather than the intellect.”1199 Bodily elements imply
duration in decision making. We have seen in the examples from the life of
Nagai, for example in his consideration of the leaflet dropped from the
Allied plane, that deliberation as a precursor to virtuous action can take
just such duration.

iii.

The significance of phantasms has already been noted. Aristotle reminds
us that prudence involves assessment of particulars, necessitating

1197

“Excellence in deliberation is clearly a kind of correctness.”(NE, 1142b9) It involves reasoning.
It is “correctness in thinking”(NE, 1142b12). But it is not simply following formal rules of logic
which could lead a bad man to evil deeds. Excellence in deliberation is that which pertains to a
worthy end.
1198
DA, 427b27-28. In De Anima Aristotle addresses the interaction of intellect with the internal
senses of memory and imagination. He is of the view that the activity of “thinking” is partly in the
imagination and partly in the judgement of the intellect itself. “Thinking is different from
perceiving and is held to be in part imagination, in part judgement.”
1199
ST, Ia, Q.81, Art.3.
The full quotation: “The irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason... universal reason directs
the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible... but to draw particular
conclusions from universal principles is not work of the intellect , as such, but of reason: hence it is
that the irascible and concupiscible are said to obey reason rather than the intellect…. Man is not
moved at once according to the irascible and concupiscible appetites: but he awaits the command
of the will.”
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complicity of the material. 1200 The same may be said of justice. Aquinas
quotes Augustine’s view that while the intelligible species can be held in an
intellectual memory, intelligence itself “that by which we understand when
actually thinking”,1201 only exists in actu.1202 This supports the view that
the act of understanding is concurrent with and immediately dependent
upon the presentation of the phantasm. This appears to constitute a
further argument that there is no independent intellectual operation, of
the body and soul united, without biophysical complicity. 1203
iv.

The role of the intellect and rational appetite in voluntarily calling up
memories is contrasted with the formation of opinions (which Aristotle
holds is not voluntary as it is a reflection of perception of truth in the
intellect.) 1204 This interaction between imagination and reason, between
the concrete representation and the universal, is present in every human
act. Hence, every human act is carried out with the part-constituent of
neural complicity. Aristotle insists on this. 1205

v.

All this sits perfectly with the earlier discussion about the role of reason in
pursuit of the pleasurable and avoidance of pain. 1206

vi.

Furthermore, Aquinas tells us that “Words signify the conceptions of the
intellect”.1207 It would appear that language facilitates reason. Without

1200

NE, 1141b15-25. “Practical reason is not concerned with universals only – it must be concerned
with the particulars: for it is practical and practice is concerned with particulars.”
1201
ST, Ia, Q.79, Art.7.2.
1202
Cf Augustine, De Trinitate, XIV.
1203
ST, Ia, Q.79, Art.8. Aquinas sheds further light on material complicity in the virtue of prudence.
He writes, “Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers. We shall understand this clearly
if we consider their respective actions. For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth:
and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, so as to know an intelligible
truth.” Hence, Aquinas defines reason as the progression from one thing understood to another;
such a process of advancing from an understanding of “one thing” to another “thing” necessarily
would require constant reference to the phantasm, and interdependence on the material. This
opens the door to material processes that enable the process of reasoning, not of course the
understanding itself that is the product of reasoning.
1204
DA, 427b20.
1205
DA, 431a17. “To the thinking soul images serve as if they were contents of perception (and
when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad it avoids or pursues them). That is why the soul
never thinks without an image...”
1206
DA, 431b4-5. “The faculty of thinking then thinks the forms in the images, and as in the former
case what is to be pursued or avoided is marked out for it, so where there is no sensation and it is
engaged upon the images it is moved to pursuit or avoidance.”
1207
ST, Ia, Q.85, Art.5.
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language, utilising, as we have seen in Chapter 2, specialised locations in
the brain and specific biophysical processes for memory, our capacity for
intellectual thought could be largely curtailed.

b)

Biological perfections.

In summary, prudence and justice utilise biophysical processes and pathways
(associated with reasoning, memory, imagination, etc) that themselves are
identified with localised regions and processes in the brain.

Human action is rational action. Prudence and justice dispose our rational
responses. They dispose the intellect to act with habitual sound judgment and the
rational will to act with habitual respect for the rights of others. The rational
operations of truth and love require the assistance of biological part-constituents
in two senses:
i.

The very operation of reason requires the assistance of imagination,
memory, and other cortical systems and sensitive faculties.

ii.

Because, as it is proposed, the virtues all operate in harmonious
integration in support of rationality, it would appear that the partconstituents of the virtues disposing the sensitive appetites may also be
understood, to the extent that they offer necessary assistance, as partconstituents of the rational operations.

In conclusion, it is proposed at the neurobiological level, prudence and justice are
perfections of specific biological structures that are necessarily associated with
rationality in the embodied life. These perfections of bodily structures are
essentially neuronal facilitations of counsel, deliberation, judgement, command,
and disposition to accommodate the good of others, as required by the virtues of
prudence and justice.1208

1208

Counsel may be understood as a having a sound grasp of reality and duty in both physical and
ethical dimensions. Judgement implies the capacity to evaluate the intrinsic and extrinsic benefits
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4.2.5 Fortitude

As we have seen, the moral virtues of justice, fortitude and temperance reside in
the appetites.

Courage, as we have seen, is not about having the loudest war cry, but rather
about having a particular quality of self management. This latter notion of courage
is shown in the life of Nagai: risking his life to treat enemy soldiers with care and
dignity, overcoming his pain, discouragement and disorientation to push himself
to the limit in helping the victims of the bomb. Courage denotes a reflective
bravery… not simply the bold actions of an impulsive person under pressure.
Virtues are inner states. Aquinas says simply: “Endurance is more the essence of
fortitude than attack.”1209

An Aristotelian understanding of courage presents the virtue as:
The habitual choice of the golden mean that resides between
cowardice and recklessness in situations of danger that really
merit some fear.1210
The right management of one’s fear and its concomitant sorrow is at the heart of
the virtue. The essence of the virtue of courage is mastery of one’s emotions of
fear, to puts one’s life knowingly and calmly on the line. Joseph Pieper writes that
“the man of fortitude relinquishes, in self forgetfulness, his own possessions and
his life.”1211 Pieper, following Aristotle, argues that courage always contains an
element of a preparedness to risk one’s neck for a good cause1212.
of an action taking into account the good of others. Command implies the executive capacity to
carry decisions into action.
1209
ST, IIa-IIae, Q.123, Art.6.
1210
NE, III, focusses on courage and temperance and their corresponding vices.
1211
Josef Pieper, Fortitude and Temperance (London: Faber and Faber, 1955), 54.
1212
“… all fortitude has reference to death… readiness to fall, to die, in battle. … Fortitude that
does not reach down into the depths of the willingness to die is spoiled at its root and devoid of
effective power. Readiness proves itself in taking a risk, and the culiminating point of fortitude is
the witness of blood. … Without this readiness there is no Christian fortitude.” Pieper argues “the
cornerstone of the Christian ethical teaching is the concept of the bonum arduum.” Pieper,
Fortitude and Temperance, 14-16.
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Acts of fortitude are exercised in concert with acts of prudence and the other
virtues. Hence courage is exercised in making habitual choices, good choices put
forward by the virtue of sound judgement. Aquinas explains, in overcoming
danger, fortitude seeks not danger itself, but the realization of a “rational
good”1213, a rational good proposed by prudence. Without sound judgement there
can be no effective fortitude. St Ambrose, a man of both action and learning, said
simply, that fortitude must not trust itself. 1214

Aquinas held that reason ought to be the ruler of the passions. He held that since
the passions can be controlled by reason they should be controlled by reason 1215.
This is not semantics… he held that all those activities of man that can be guided
by reason must be guided by reason, or else man acts below himself; he acts in a
sub-human way. Hence, “fortitude without prudence is not fortitude”.1216 Rash
action not guided by prudence, even if wearing a Victoria Cross, would not qualify.
The Athenian admiral Thucydides has Pericles proclaim this very doctrine:
For this too is our way: to dare most liberally where we have
reflected best. With others, only ignorance begets fortitude;
and reflection but begets hesitation.1217

Once the necessary link between true fortitude and reason is accepted, the link
between fortitude and freedom follows; it is man’s spiritual powers, the will
making rational choices, that allow him freedom. In his saying, “Those who are
brave are free,” Seneca reminds us not only of the link between fortitude and
reason, but also that it is in the exercise of virtues, (viz. sound, habitual, rationally
guided choices) that man finds his freedom.

4.2.6 Temperance
1213

Aquinas, Virt Card, 4 ad 5.
Ambrose, De Officiis, (http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/03390397,_Ambrosius,_De_Officiis_Ministrorum_Libri_Tres_[Schaff],_EN.pdf accessed 22.11.12.) 1 35.
1215
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.24, Art.3.
1216
Pieper, Fortitude and Temperance, 23.
1217
Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, Bk 2, quoted in Pieper, Fortitude and Temperance, 26.
1214
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Temperance is “the virtue whose particular function is to restrain and check
passion,” 1218 “a virtue of the appetitive part, by which men cease to desire bad
sensual pleasures.”1219 Strictly speaking, as we have seen, it is “a mean with
regard to the bodily pleasures of touch.” 1220
To temperance belongs absence of admiration for the
enjoyment of bodily pleasures, absence of desire for all base
sensual enjoyment, fear of just ill repute, an ordered course of
life, alike in small things and in great. And temperance is
accompanied by discipline, orderliness, shame, caution.1221 1222

Lack of self mastery in these areas carries serious implications, because as
Aristotle argues, self indulgence is a more voluntary state than cowardice. Unlike
pain, pleasure does not “upset and destroy the nature of the person who feels
it.”1223 We are more responsible for our actions when we are seeking pleasure
than when we are fleeing fear and therefore failings in this area is all more
blameworthy. We will be seeking for reasons, at the neural level, of this greater
domination of the person, this greater obliteration of reason, caused by fear in
comparison with intemperance.

Temperance is a sine qua non for the truly rational life, for a life that is able to
show love for others effectively and with constancy. Aquinas writes of the inner
peace, the tranquillity of right order, which is the fruit of temperance. Order is a
mark of rationality; temperance as we have seen is “of the soul”. Aquinas says
that a meaning of temperance is “serenity of spirit”.1224

1218

Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 263.
Aristotle, De Virtutibus et Vitiis, 1250a30-37.
1220
NE, 1117b24ff. Note that Aristotle includes taste as a form of touch.
1221
Aristotle, De Virtutibus et Vitiis, 1250b7-11.
1222
NE, II 8-9. “The habit of choosing the best course of action between the two extremes of
overindulgence and impulsivity on the one hand, and of failure or inability to integrate one’s
passions and emotions into one’s actions; it is the golden mean between self indulgence and
insensibility.”
1223
NE, 1119a25.
1224
ST, IIa-IIae, Q.141, Art.2.2.
1219
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In the examples we have seen from the life of Nagai, these fruits of temperance
are clearly seen. Pieper refers to inner order, a quality that shines through in
Nagai’s calm, self control:
The purpose and goal of temperantia is man’s inner order, from
which alone … “serenity of spirit” can flow forth.1225
In other words, it is through the virtue of temperance that man is able to discover
unity of life1226.
…The primary and essential meaning of temperare, therefore is
this: to dispose various parts into one unified and ordered
whole.1227
Temperance enables rationality to shine through, manifesting the order and
serenity of soul. Without temperance these qualities will not surface; they require
a bodily docility, a capacity of the organism to obey the judgements of reason.

4.2.7 Biophysical aspects of fortitude and temperance.
(Read in conjunction with 4.2.1 c and d.)

a)

Subordination to reason.
Moral virtue assists the sensitive aspect to “obey” reason.1228 As we have
already touched upon, Aristotle explains that the essence of this
conformity of the sensitive aspect is the “royal” and voluntarily accepted
obedience to the reason, as a king governs his subjects and as a man

1225

Pieper, Fortitude and Temperance, 53.
Pieper writes, “Temperance is conceivable only on the basis of the fact that man has lost,
together with his original sanctity, his integritas, his ‘intactness’, the self evident inner order of his
nature.” Pieper, Fortitude and Temperance, 12-13.
1227
Pieper, Fortitude and Temperance, 53. Pieper writes, “Wherever forces of self preservation,
self assertion, self fulfillment, destroy the structure of man’s inner being, the discipline of
temperance and the licence of intemperance come into play. The natural urge toward sensual
enjoyment, manifested in delight in food and drink and sexual pleasure, is the echo and mirror of
man’s strongest natural forces of self preservation.”
1228
Sarah Broadie poses the question whether practice leads to expertise or addiction, and
concludes that the answer is expertise, given the rationality inherent in the exercise of virtue
bringing freedom of action. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 71.
1226
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governs his children. Broadie elaborates at some length on this analogy of
royal governance.1229It is “a hierarchical relationship but one between free
people”.1230 The will speaking, on all matters, “with the same voice as
reason,”1231obeys reason “as one does one’s father”.1232 It is a mistake,
however, to think that an obedient child is only imperfectly or potentially
in harmony with its parent. 1233

Rather, the non rational part in the virtuous state is fully integrated with
reason, including physically (the very point of this study), through partconstituents: “There is in human beings something capable of heeding
reason even though not itself the rational source.”1234

While fortitude and temperance, in themselves, are essentially biophysical
bodily qualities, they are ordered by reason and to reason. The “royal”
governance of reason is facilitated by virtue.
The irrational element ... appears to be two-fold. For the
vegetative element in no way shares in a rational
principle, but the appetitive and in general the desiring
element in a sense shares in it, in so far as it listens to
and obeys it.... that the irrational element is in some
sense persuaded by a rational principle is indicated also
by the giving of advice and by all reproof and
exhortation. 1235
It is clear that Aristotle views temperance and fortitude as irrational, and
therefore, material in constitution. Nevertheless he emphasises their
docility to reason and the role that reason has in their formation as habits.

1229

Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle.
Aristotle, Politics, 1259a 37-41, and 10-17.
1231
NE, 1102b28.
1232
NE, 1103a1-4.
1233
Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 65.
1234
Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 65.
1235
NE, 1102b28-34.
1230
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b)

Biological perfections.

Fortitude and temperance are modifications at the biological level of our
emotional circuitry; they level the playing field, so to speak, so that right
reason is in the game. This will not involve a dampening of pain or of
pleasure. Aristotle and Aquinas are intent on bringing the passions into
right order with respect to reason, not with destroying them. Aquinas
insists that a brave man is not who does not feel fear, but who, without
losing his equanimity, can master that fear.

Aquinas explains that,
The patient man is not the one who does not flee from
evil, but the one who does not allow himself to be made
inordinately sorrowful.1236
Similarly, temperance has not the aim of diminishing the intensity of sexual
pleasure or of eating fine food, but of managing the pursuit of those
activities according to reason.

Within the neural bases of fortitude and temperance we will be looking for
evidence of cortical inhibition of emotional signalling, as well as pathways
for cortical enrichment by emotional centres, and cortical executive
function enriched by emotional input.

As there is no courage without prudence, at the neural level, we will be
looking for forms of inhibition of emotional signalling from between
regions and along pathways associated with fear, pathways and regions
having rich connectivity to cortical regions identified as implicated in
deliberation, memory, goal election, consideration of consequences, etc.
1236

ST, IIa-IIae, Q.136, Art.4.2.
Teddy Roosevelt (1858-1919) captures this same admiration for the perseverance inherent in
fortitude and courage: “It is not the critic who counts, nor the man who points how the strong man
stumbled or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man
who is actually in the arena; whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives
valiantly.”
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In conclusion, it is proposed at the neurobiological level, fortitude and
temperance are perfections of specific biological structures that are
necessarily associated with rationality in the embodied life. They are
predispositions for rationally consistent responses to pain and to pleasure.
In the first place they are habitual responses, which when established,
allow a person more easily to manage fear of bodily danger and pain, and
inappropriate attraction to sense pleasures of touch.

4.3

Unity of the virtues.

Aquinas explains that the four cardinal virtues cannot be isolated from each other;
they form a unity. He asks whether the four (cardinal) virtues differ from one
another, and goes on to explain, quoting Gregory the Great:1237
There is no true prudence unless it be just temperate and brave; no
perfect temperance that is not brave just and prudent; no sound fortitude
that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice, without prudence,
fortitude and temperance. 1238

In the preceding section, in the light of an examination of virtue taking into
account Aristotle’s doctrine of pain and pleasure as primary motivations of action,
I have argued for this unity of the virtues. I have suggested that fortitude and
temperance, as habitual dispositions to pleasure and pain developed and guided
in their activity by reason, contribute to every good human act. Further I have
argued that justice, the habitual facility for assessing one’s actions by their impact
on others, is also necessarily integrated into every good human act. And of course,
as sound judgement is required for an act to be good, prudence must also be

1237
1238

Gregory. Moralia, xxii 1.
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.61, Art.4.
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integral. All four cardinal virtues perform different roles, and each is needed for
the completion of a good action.1239

Only if the cardinal virtues act in concert can we account for fulfilment of the
human person, as a unity of soul and body living in a community with others. Any
view which deprives acts of individual virtue of the benefits of mutual enrichment
by the other virtues cannot satisfy these three conditions for the flourishing of the
human person:


the interdependence of rationality and personal fulfilment (most
associated with prudence)



the interdependence of relationships, responsibility and personal
fulfilment (most associated with justice)



the interdependence of our bodily states and personal fulfilment
(most associated with fortitude and temperance).

Further, we have seen that Aquinas insisted that each operation or faculty
requires its appropriate disposing habit: for moral agency, a habit for the practical
intellect, a habit for the rational intellect, and habits of the irascible and
concupiscible appetites. Some who prefer not to take this text at its literal value
ascribe a non-materiality to the habits of the sensitive appetites. I suggest that
such an approach seems to question the role of the body in human fulfilment, and
deprives the body itself of necessary habits.1240

4.3.1 The virtues are “integrated distinct elements”1241 united in the person.

1239

Should someone object to this position by arguing the possibility, for example, of man, unjust
but endowed with the virtue of courage, I would answer that without the dispositions of justice his
rationality is necessarily defective, and his courage therefore directionless and incapable of acting
for a good end.
1240
Of course, recent neuroscientific contributions to the biological understandings of passion,
attention and learning, memory and habit formation all appear to emphasise the distinction
between as well as the linkages between habits of mind and habits of body.
1241
Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 65.
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Freedom clearly resides in the rationality of the person himself, but truly rational
decisions can be undermined if the cognitive power errs in preferring a lesser
good, or if the appetitive power is not obedient to reason. Habitual dispositions
are needed in both the cogitative and appetitive powers. 1242 Sarah Broadie
reflects on the dilemma of applying a matter-form analysis of rational substance.
She points out that without a clear Aristotelian understanding one can very easily
confuse what are “integrated distinct elements, with mere uniform unity.” 1243 The
key lies in the understanding of “person” as the subject of action and of
rationality.

In considering rationality, one can easily fall into one of diametrically opposed
views: that either matter itself, or the mind, be the ultimate cause of rationality.
Both are wide of the mark as discussed in Chapter 1. Nor is it a question of uniting
in the person what is material with what is non-material: rather rational existence
is a seamless integration of the material and the non-material. Rationality, by its
nature, requires a whole new way of looking at substance. Aquinas writes,
“Everything has unity in the same way that it has being.”1244

4.4

Conclusions.

Section 4.1 and 4.2 have sought to separate biophysical qualities of virtue from
that which is more directly in the rational domain. I have argued, within the
hylomorphic understandings provided in Chapter 1, that prudence and justice, to
the extent that they are dispositions of the rational powers, have only a
contributory corporeal aspect, while fortitude and temperance are exclusively
corporeal, though rational in cause. I have further argued, in 4.3, for the unity of
the virtues, that the cardinal virtues are all integral to good human acts.
1242

ST, Ia, Q.83, Art.3.
“We must consider the nature of free will by considering the nature of choice. Now two things
concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive
power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be
preferred to another; and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that that the appetite
should accept the judgement of counsel.”
1243
Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 65.
1244
ST, Ia, Q.76, Art.2.2.
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Some observations are pertinent.
i.

A “restricted reading” view of the term “rational by participation”1245
appears perfectly compatible with argument that virtues act in concert
respecting the unity of the virtues. The view that fortitude and temperance
are exclusively biophysical, though rational in cause, appears to
significantly strengthen the case for the unity of the virtues.

ii.

An understanding of the nature of, and the degree of, biological
contribution to the particular virtues,1246 accords adequate recognition to
the hylomorphic constitution of the human person. Such recognition is
essential if one is not to underestimate the importance of the contribution
of the body and the biological to human activity, and ultimately if one is
not to misrepresent human nature.

iii.

There is a grandly satisfying logic evident if one links the unity of the
virtues with the need for a notion of virtue which respects the composite
view of human nature. This composite view will be, not only with respect
to the composite nature of virtue in itself (having both rational and
material aspects), but also in the way in which those virtues disposing
rationality, operate in concert with the virtues disposing the sensitive
appetites.

iv.

A neurobiology of virtue appears to offer insights into fulfilment at the
rational, the interrelational, and the biophysical levels. (See discussion in
6.2.)

v.

There are important conclusions at the level of parenting and self
education. For example, the importance of training infants in behaviours
reflecting temperance and fortitude and the need to emphasise to children
the need for consideration of the needs and rights of others in every
action, are noted.

1245

ST, Ia-IIae, Q.50, Art.4.See also Q.59, Art.4 and Q.61, Art.2.
As has been constantly emphasized according to the hylomorphic understanding, discussion of
the “material” or the “biological” in the human constitution must be understood an integral
contributor to higher operations.
1246
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It has been argued that the distinct tasks of the specific cardinal virtues and their
integrated role in each human act are necessary consequences of our hylomorphic
constitution. These conclusions inform the tabulation of characteristics of virtue in
following section and in turn will guide the neurobiological analysis in the next
chapter.

4.4.1 Characteristics pertaining to the state of virtue.

In Table 4.1 I refine the qualities identified in Chapter 3, in the light of the findings
of Chapter 4, into distinct characteristics pertaining to the state of virtue and to
the acquisition of virtue. Note that Nos 1 and 2 pertain to specific virtues.

Table 4.1
Characteristics pertaining to the state of virtue
As proposed by Aristotle and Aquinas (3.2 & 3.3) and cross referenced to qualities evident in
Nagai’s actions (3.1.2).
Characteristics pertaining to the state of virtue

See 3.1.2

See 3.2 & 3.3

The virtues of prudence and justice dispose the
practical reason and the intellectual appetite
facilitating rationality and appropriate choices.
The virtues of fortitude and temperance dispose
the irascible and sensitive appetites to endure
appropriate difficulties and to seek appropriate
pleasure.
A capacity for rational goal election is evident.

iii, iv, vi

3.2.1

i, iv, v

3.2.1
3.2.1.1
3.3.7

ii

“Virtues change us.” The acquisition of virtue
creates a state of character, a way of being, that
tends to be permanent.
The virtuous state is in keeping with our human
nature.
In the exercise of virtue intrinsic motivation takes
priority over extrinsic motivation. Virtue is
motivated by that which is worthy to man’s nature.

vii

3.2.1.2
3.2.2
3.2.4

iii, iv, v

3.2.5

vii

3.3.9
3.2.5.1

7

Virtue facilitates effective action.

ii, viii

8

Virtue brings about ease of action.

viii

3.2.1.2
3.2.5.3
3.2.1.1
3.2.5.3

1

2

3
4

5
6

382

9

Virtue facilitates the flourishing of the person.
Virtue brings about a state of excellence: an
excellence of the person, inclusive necessarily of
both neurobiological flourishing and the exercise
of rationality. It is a state whereby reason and
rationality are empowered to manage activity. It is
a capacity for rationality that is reflective and
emotionally enriched and able to be carried
through into noble humane behaviours.
Characteristics of virtue in its acquisition
Essential features pertaining to virtue in its
acquisition.

10

The virtuous state results from habituation and
education.
Repetition, understood as critical practice, plays an
essential role in the acquisition of virtue: repetition
in appetitive responses, in responses manifesting
noble sentiment and attentiveness to others, and
in reasoning, deliberation and sound decision
making.
Education specifically in wisdom and beauty is
necessary in the formation of virtue.
Effortful attention plays a significant role.

11

12
13

14
15
16
17

Characteristics of virtue in its acquisition
Features that may not necessarily be present in
every case.
Advantage must be taken of the early years both
for training and provision of appropriate example.
Imitation of example is a key means for acquisition
of behaviours.
Explicit teaching and guidance as to right and
wrong, are needed.
Affection facilitates learning particularly in the
family environment.

i, v, ix

3.2.5.2
3.2.5.3

3.3.1
3.3.4

vii

3.2.3
3.3.8
3.3.10

3.3.2
3.3.3
3.3.6
3.3.6

The aim in Chapter 5 will be to propose for these characteristics, on the basis of
current neuroscientific knowledge, neural part-constituents, biological elements
that are integral to the exercise of virtue in the state of embodied soul.

Bearing in mind, as seen in Chapter 2, that neural processing in the brain is
extremely complex, it would be simplistic to suggest that virtuous activity is
localized and restricted to specific pathways and regions. Virtuous action, by
definition, potentially embraces the whole range of human activity, and so it is
clearly beyond the scope of any study to catalogue all the pathways and regions
with some involvement in virtuous activity. We must seek to distil the essential
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neural components of virtuous action. In Chapter 5 I will seek to identify the
neural basis for these essential material components of virtuous activity.

Notwithstanding the caution with which one should nominate particular brain
pathways and regions as implicated in activity of any moral type, to do so is
consistent with a vast and expanding literature that implicates involvement of
brain pathways and regions in the full range of human activities.

Although experimental verification of the neural substrates of virtue proposed in
this study is beyond the scope of the work, it should be noted that the various
sub-components of a neural “solution”, have already been verified experimentally
in the many studies to which I refer. The approach of this study is to align these
established jig saw pieces into a coherent and highly plausible view consistent
with the proposed notion of virtue.
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Chapter 5

The neural bases of virtue.

“A mind of moderate capacity which closely pursues one study
must infallibly arrive at great proficiency in that study.”
Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus
Mary Shelley

5.1 Reflections on the task being attempted.

There is scant literature referring explicitly to the role of neural structures in
virtue. The most noteworthy attempt is by William Casebeer in an article
published in Nature Reviews Neuroscience in 2003. Casebeer’s paper provides a
most valuable, broad brush endorsement of the task of identifying the neural
bases of virtue. He considers the various approaches to ethics and in the broadest
of terms suggests neuroscientific implications. He finds that because virtue is
experience-based it is not only more suited to scientific investigation but also the
ethical theory most likely to find correspondence in reality:
The current evidence allows us to draw a tentative conclusion:
the moral psychology required by virtue theory is the most
neurobiologically plausible.1247

He suggests that the neural “solution” will involve rich
interconnectivity between the cognitive and affective resources of the
brain, and recruiting aspects of the brain implicated in memory and
TOM.
Empirically successful moral cognition on the part of an
organism requires the appropriate coordination of multi-modal
signals conjoined with appropriately cued executive systems
that share rich connections with affective and conative brain
1247

Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural constituents,” 840-847.
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structures that draw on conditioned memories and insight into
the minds of others, so as to think about and actually behave in
a maximally functional manner. There is clear consilience
between contemporary neuroethics and Aristotelian moral
psychology.1248

Despite an ostensibly Aristotelian view of virtue, his focus is limited to “moral
reasoning”, and the role of virtue in supporting rationality remains implicit
without either elaboration or explanation. “Virtue” remains undefined, and
effectively there appears to be no appreciation of “habitus” nor of how good
habits may be acquired or in what they might consist, nor is any any
differentiation of the roles of virtue with respect to reasoning and sensitive
appetites. Casebeer makes no reference to brain plasticity; and there are only
single passing references to basal contribution and to “habit” itself.1249 In short he
demonstrates an impoverished understanding of virtue and consequently his
speculation about the neural bases of virtue is unable to account for the actions
and operations of virtue.

In addition there is a small but increasing number of studies which consider the
neural substrate of isolated behaviours such as honesty, compassion, empathy
and contemplation. Of these studies there appears to be none based on the
Aristotelian-Thomistic notions of virtue and ensouled body, and therefore offering
an articulated position with respect to human personality, autonomous
behaviour, and for the capacity of persons to modify behaviours in response to
environment, experience and their own choices.

In this chapter, I will argue for the existence of specific neural processes, brain
areas, and pathways, constituting a complex of systems that are implicated in the
development of virtue. My aim is to present a strong, inductive, empirical case for
1248

Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural constituents,” 843, suggests that the study of moral
cognition can be divided into “three branches: the moral emotions, theory of mind and abstract
moral reasoning.”
1249
He refers to “habits of character as informed by conditioned emotion and affect” (844).
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the neural bases of virtue; a highly plausible mapping of current knowledge of
neurobiology onto the characteristics of virtue identified in Table 4.1. Weight of
evidence will argue that substantially differing neural bases are incompatible both
with the neuroscience and with the Aristotelian and Thomistic notion of virtue.
This study stands to make a timely contribution to the field and to give direction
to research of an experimental nature.

This task, to my knowledge, has not been previously attempted.

5.1.1

Overview of this chapter.

First I draw insights from contemporary efforts to bridge the disciplines of
neuroscience and moral anthropology, with respect to the neural bases of
emotion and of morality. I discuss cross-current understandings of the neural
bases of emotion in recent explorations of the relationship between emotion and
reason by neuroscientists, Joseph LeDoux and Antonio Damasio, and
philosophers, Nancy Sherman and Martha Nussbaum. These neuroscientific and
philosophical approaches converge in the view that emotion and cognition are
interacting, complementary and highly integrated systems.

Second I offer a compact overview of the neural bases of morality, and draw on
the contemporary work in the discipline of psychopathology, by celebrated
neuroscientist, Michael Gazzaniga. In Table 5.1 I offer a summary of the neural
sites activated in moral activity as many of these must also subserve virtuous
activity. I note the increasing quantity of literature on the neural bases of moral
behaviour, and tabulate a representative sample of findings which emphasise
complexity of processing, and highly predictable centres of activation, results
which are consistent with observations about cognitive function offered in 2.7.

In 5.3 I propose neural bases for virtue.
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As a starting point, I propose that the neural bases of virtue must be considered as
a complex of interacting systems. I suggest that the neural complexity of the
human act, and of virtue itself, is a reflection of the psychological complexity of
the human act (as we have seen in 3.1.3), moving from appetency and motivation
at sense level, through evaluative reasoning to choice. I argue that, although
particular brain areas are shown to be active in certain tasks, we must describe
the neural dispositions of virtue in terms of neural interconnectivity and the
activation of multiple brain areas and systems, predisposed by specific plastic
development and thus able to work in highly elaborate concert. Only thus can we
approach an understanding of the neural bases of the dispositions of virtue. I
draw together in Table 5.2 an outline of the interconnected systems at work in
virtuous activity and then, drawing on the content of Chapter 2, I discuss the
neural bases for the characteristics of virtue offered at the end of Chapter 4 in
Table 4.1.

In conclusion in 5.4, as a model of the neural activity underpinning a specific act of
virtue, I offer a neural analysis of Nagai’s actions described Scenario 3. By analysis
of a real life scenario, I demonstrate that the neural schema is highly plausible and
readily applicable.

5.2

Insights from contemporary cross-disciplinary studies in emotion and
morality.

5.2.1 Understanding emotion.

Neuroscientists and philosophers have focused in recent years on the relationship
between emotion and reason/rationality. For the past twenty years, Joseph
LeDoux has been at the forefront of research into the neural bases of emotion,
most particularly of the emotion of fear.1250 He shows that emotional reactions
may be either regulated by higher cortical function or be direct and impulsive.

1250

Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, (London: Phoenix, 1998).
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Antonio Damasio argues that emotional somatic manifestations assist us in our
cognitive response to the world, and that it is a mistake to separate mind and
body. In common with philosophers, Nancy Sherman and Martha Nussbaum,
these neuroscientists are in agreement that emotion can and should enrich
decision making and that both emotion and reason possess biophysical correlates.

5.2.1.1 Joseph LeDoux

The work of Joseph LeDoux has provided some key lines of investigation for this
study. He adopts a non-reductive approach, described by Nussbaum as “explicitly
cognitive”.1251 LeDoux argues for emotion and cognition as separate but
interacting mental functions mediated by separate but interacting brain
systems.1252 His interest is very much as a neuroscientist, and his focus is on the
neural bases of emotion and regulation of emotion.

Of particular relevance for this study are these conclusions by LeDoux.

He suggests that reason and emotion should be harmonised; human biology, he
argues, supports the view that emotion be moderated but not negated by
reason.1253 Because brain systems generating emotion are highly conserved, he
argues that animal studies are valid indicators of the human brain systems
associated with emotion:1254 for example, by means of rat studies, LeDoux had
highlighted the central role of the amygdala in fear conditioning and the role of
the reciprocal cortico-amygdalic pathway in emotional regulation. 1255

LeDoux observes that connections from emotion to the cognitive are denser and
richer than connections from cognitive to emotional, allowing, he argues, for

1251

Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 105.
LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 69.
1253
LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 21.
1254
LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 17.
1255
LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 287.
1252
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emotions to flood consciousness.1256 He found that areas of the amygdala project
back to a wide variety of cortical areas (all cortical sensory areas, PFC,
hippocampus) allowing the amygdala to influence higher order thought process,
working and long term memories, ongoing perceptions, attention, mental imagery
etc.1257

He identifies a “high road” of emotional response whereby the amygdala is
informed of emotional content via the cortex, in preference to a “low road” of
direct input to the amygdala via the thalamus, 1258 and concludes that cortical
emotional regulation of fearful reactions requires reinforcement of this “high
road” by means of use dependent plasticities.

He notes that the hippocampus plays a key role when there is cortical regulation
of emotion and suggests that these hippocampal pathways require consolidation
and reinforcement by means of use-dependent plasiticities. He also notes that the
“high road” of cortical afferent to amygdala is informed by hippocampal
memory,1259 consistent with the view that the hippocampus is associated with
conscious declarative memory and the implicit emotional memory associated with
the amygdala (cf Chapter 2).1260

While LeDoux discusses pathways of emotional control, he does not directly
address habits of emotional control. He does not discuss the interplay of reward
pathways and emotion, but he does observe that emotions are powerful
motivators of future behaviours.1261

5.2.1.2 Antonio Damasio

1256

LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 19.
LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 287.
1258
LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 170.
1259
LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 199.
1260
LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 203.
1261
LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 19.
1257
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Another major figure in the contemporary dialogue between emotion and
neuroscience is Antonio Damasio. In Descartes’ Error (1994) he develops his
somatic marker hypothesis by which he argues that emotional somatic reactions
and consequent qualia assist reason. 1262 Most significantly he argues that emotion
enriches cognition, and writes broadly of an integration of “brain systems that are
jointly engaged in emotion and decision making” allowing management of social
cognition and behaviour.1263 Descartes’ error, he says, was to divide body and
mind.1264

In his 1999 text, The Feeling of What Happens, Damasio pursues this theme of
integration of awareness and emotional response. He argues that consciousness
and emotion are intimately related: consciousness as the conception that there is
both a self and an external object; and emotion as the internal experience of
change as a result of interaction with the external object, the “feeling of what
happens”. 1265

In a more recent book, Looking for Spinoza (2003), Damasio further develops the
theme of the unity of the organism. With Spinoza (and, as we have seen, in
keeping with Aristotle’s metaphysics) he argues that mind and body are
manifestations of the same substance.1266 “The body and the brain form an
integrated organism and interact fully and mutually via chemical and neural
pathways.” 1267 Accordingly Nussbaum states that Damasio presents a nonreductionist, physiological account.1268 Lacking explicit acknowledgement of the
concept of person (for example, he writes only of “organism”) his philosophy of
mind is arguably impoverished. Damasio relies on assertions such as “(it is)
unnecessarily incomplete and humanly unsatisfactory to reduce the mind to brain
1262

Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error (London: Vintage, 1994), 174. Damasio writes, “Somatic
markers are a special instance of feelings generated from secondary emotions. Those emotions
and feelings have been connected by learning, to predicted future outcomes of certain scenarios.”
1263
Damasio, Descartes’ Error, xix.
1264
Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error (London: Vintage, 1994) 249.
1265
Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens.
1266
Antonio Damasio, Looking for Spinoza (Orlando: Harvest, 2003) 12.
1267
Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 194.
1268
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 114.
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events.” 1269 He attempts a non-reductive understanding of the unity of the
organism, arguing,
The truly embodied mind … does not relinquish its most refined
levels of operation, those constituting its soul and spirit. … soul
and spirit, with all their dignity and human scale, are now
complex and unique states of an organism.1270
Yet ultimately, these statements are observations without metaphysical
justification. “Person” is much richer a concept than “organism”, capturing as it
does the specific qualities of rationality and of a unifying principle beneath
appearances.

Damasio’s attempts, therefore, demonstrate the difficulty, perhaps impossibility,
of defending specific metaphysiological conclusions about human nature in the
absence of a concept of person. They demonstrate the need that mind-body
speculation must be supported by a metaphysically rich anthropology.

Nevertheless, the work of Antonio Damasio positively provides assistance to, or
verification for, this study in several important ways.

Like Aristotle (see 3.2.1.1) he argues that all human motivations reduce to pain
and pleasure in some form or other. “Pain and pleasure are the levers the
organism requires for instinctual and acquired strategies to operate
efficiently.”1271 Significantly, within his anthropology he includes the development
of habits by which we manage our reactions to pain and pleasure: “our reactions

1269

Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 251.
Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 252.
1271
Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 262. Damasio appears to draw much from Aristotle, albeit
indirectly. For example, he quotes another aphorism from Spinoza: we are always moved by love
(understood as appetite for what is pleasurable) in some form or other. “An affect cannot be
restrained or neutralised except by a contrary affect that is stronger than the affect to be
restrained.”
1270
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to pain and pleasure can be modified by education”.1272 He offers neural
substrates for sadness,1273 and happiness1274.

He is drawn to a series of insights of Spinoza in an exploration of human
motivation and feelings.1275 Importantly for this study he links pleasure with
perfection of function, providing a rich avenue for eudaimonistic exploration. He
argues that organisms strive to achieve “a greater perfection” of function and that
Spinoza equated that perfection with joy. 1276

1277

(See 6.2.1.)

He describes emotion triggering sites as amygdala and VMPFC, and a further
“frontal region in the supplementary motor area and cingulate”.1278 He writes of
the basal forebrain, hypothalamus and nuclei of the brainstem as execution sites
for emotion. He presents a number of significant clinical and research based
observations about VMPFC.1279 1280 1281 1282 1283 1284 And he notes that the ACC

1272

Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 262.
Damasio quotes a case of a slightly misplaced electrode in the midbrain, possibly in the SN or
the periaqueductal gray region PAG, evoking profound sadness.
1274
Representative studies: Richard Davidson et al., “Reciprocal limbic-cortical function and
negative mood: converging PET findings in depression and normal sadness,” American Journal of
Psychiatry 156, (1999): 675-82; Richard Lane et al., “Neuroanatomical correlates of happiness,
sadness and disgust,” American Journal of Psychiatry 154, (1997): 926-33. Damasio also notes that
stimulation in SMA (eg in mPFC and dorsal PFC and Anterior cingulate) was shown to evoke
“genuine” laughter: Itzhak Fried, et al., “Electric current stimulates laughter,” Nature 391, (1998):
650.
1275
Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 12.
1276
Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 12.
1277
Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 11. His focus on Spinoza’s comment “Love is nothing but a
pleasurable state, joy, accompanied by the idea of an external cause” has the potential to connect
motivation and pleasure with a role for justice.
1278
Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 54.
1279
Hiroto Kawasaki, et al., “Single-unit responses to emotional visual stimuli recorded in human
ventral prefrontal cortex,” Nature Neuroscience 4, (2001): 15-16. Damasio notes the asymmetry is
in keeping with Davidson’s conclusion that right frontal cortices have a greater association with
negative emotions. He points out that single cell studies show how specific different neurons in the
right VMPFC in human subjects respond to pleasant and unpleasant visual stimuli.
1280
Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 152. Damasio argues that the VMPFC and amygdala are critical
areas of the PFC for reasoning/decision making and emotion/feeling.
1281
Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 61.
1282
R.W. Sperry et al., “Interhemispheric relationships: the neocortical commissures; syndromes of
their disconnection” in Handbook of Clinical Neurology Vol4, ed. P. J. Vinken and G. W. Bruyn
(Amsterdam: North Holland, 1969), 273-90. Damasio’s work confirms the right hemispheric
dominance in emotion, and that damage to somatosensory cortices in the right hemisphere
compromises reasoning/decision making and emotion/feeling as well as basic body signalling;
1273
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provides the location for intimate interaction between systems of
reasoning/decision making and emotion/feeling leading to external action
(movement) and thought animation and reasoning. 1285

5.2.1.3 Nancy Sherman and Martha Nussbaum

Aristotle explains in the Rhetoric that anger will be towards somebody whom we
think has caused us harm. Emotions are directed towards some object, according
to the Aristotelian notion. Accordingly Nancy Sherman discusses emotions as
“forms of intentional awareness”.1286

Martha Nussbaum appears to build on this notion in her explorations of emotion
in Upheavals of Thought which contains insights of significance to this study. She
rejects any simplistic or negative view and defines emotions in a positive manner
as:
… appraisals or value judgements which ascribe to things and
persons outside the person’s own control great importance for
that person’s own flourishing.1287

1283

Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 71. Damasio confirms that DLPFC damage compromises
reasoning/decision making on a broader scale and that DA driven reward systems are associated
with pleasure and with motivation for emotion regulation.
1284
Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 180. He links VMPFC to autonomic nervous system effectors, able to
trigger chemical responses from brain stem and hypothalamus.
1285
Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 72.
1286
In Making a Necessity of Virtue, Nussbaum writes, “Emotions are about something that we
represent in thought. Emotions are intentional states. As such they have cognitive content. They
are identified by that content, by what we dwell on, whether it be fleeting or with concentrated
attention… Such an account need not exclude other features of emotion, such as awareness of
physiological and behavioural response or felt sensations. The claim is that these, when present,
are dependent on cognitive (i.e. descriptive and evaluative content), and are directed toward that
content.” Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue, 55. Insight from Ana
C. Santiago, “A Study of Aristotelian Demands for Some Psychological Views of the Emotions” (PhD
thesis, Duke University, 2009).
1287
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 4. Nussbaum writes: “Emotions, I shall argue, involve
judgements about important things, judgements in which, appraising an external object as salient
for our own well being, we acknowledge our own neediness and incompleteness before parts of
the world that we do not fully control.”
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She presents a eudaimonistic vision in which “Emotions appear to be
eudaimonistic, that is, concerned with a person’s flourishing”.1288 In further
extension of this idea, she notes that Aristotle regards pleasure not as a feeling
but as unimpeded action. 1289 Flourishing includes, therefore, the concept of
mature biological development facilitating ease of action.
Of great value to this study also are a number of additional insights.1290 She insists
that “emotions are, like other mental processes, bodily.”1291 She also suggests that
this vision of emotion offers clarity on the specific roles of the cardinal virtues; if
emotion is essentially “thought of an object combined with thought of the object’s
salience or importance” this arguably lends a greater role to justice. Secondly, it
accords perfectly with an initial presentation of desires and aversions (understood
broadly as apprehensions evoking responses disposed by temperance and
fortitude or their contrary habits).1292

She argues that it was Aristotle himself who integrated emotion into the cognitive
world of the person, that Aristotle viewed pain as “pain at”, “as an intentional
state with cognitive content”. 1293

Discussing how particular representations in the mind make possible abstract
eudaimonistic conclusions, she notes the significance of “rich particularising
detail”, the connection to the imagination that differentiates specific evaluations
from abstract judgments. She writes that the imagining is “a vehicle for making a
eudaimonistic connection with the object” allowing for example compassion, and
downstream the exercise of justice.1294

1288

Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 22, 31
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 63
1290
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 103 Of note also is her evaluation of Seligman’s work as a
non-reductionist account where internal mental representations construct intentionality.
1291
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 25.
1292
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 61.
1293
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 63.
1294
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 65.
1289
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Also of note in this study of virtue, considered as voluntary habit motivated less by
external reward and more by intrinsic considerations, are her comments about
the need to modify the S-R model to one of “S-Organism-R” 1295 consistent very
much with the view raised in Chapter 2 that voluntary habits can consist of A-O
motivations replaced by S-R paradigms that are compatible with voluntary
behaviour.1296

5.2.2 Research into the neural bases of morality.

5.2.2.1 Gillett’s psychopathology.

a) The field of psychopathology.

Research into psychopathology can assist here, as it is a burgeoning field where
neurobiology and consolidated moral behaviours, albeit negative behaviours,
intersect. If one accepts the premise that through illness, environment or choice
such people have underdeveloped dispositions of virtue, insights are possible into
the neurobiology of virtue. For example, I have referred above (4.2.1.d) to studies
that suggest an excessive dominance of fear in psychopathic individuals.

Studies emphasise time and again the functional and structural abnormalities of
the the OFC, VMPFC and amygdala in psychopathic individuals.1297 A Nature article
in 2001 suggested that early imaging studies in this area suggested either that the
dysfunctional OFC or dysfunctional amygdala are at the basis of psychopathic
behaviour; the views may not be mutually exclusive.1298 Yang et al. have now
identified, by means of structural magnetic resonance imaging, marked
deformations, including lower volumes, of the amygdala in individuals with
psychopathy. They link these structural data to poor fear conditioning and poor
1295

Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 94.
Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 465.
1297
Walter Glannon, “Moral Responsibility and the Psychopath,” Neuroethics 1, (2008): 158; Kiehl,
et al., “Limbic abnormalities in affective processing by criminal psychopaths as revealed by fMRI”.
1298
Alison Abbott, “Into the mind of a killer,” Nature 410 (2001): 296-298.
1296

396

facial emotion recognition that are also present.1299 Note the potential link
between poor fear conditioning, and an inability, in developmental years, to
develop normal emotional responses from the faces of parents.1300 1301
“Empathetic dysfunction is one of the major features of psychopathology.” 1302
James and Blair find that the empathetic dysfunction of psychopaths is associated
with impaired processing of emotions of fear, sadness and possibly disgust, and
manifest multiple signs of amygdala dysfunction. 1303 Most interestingly they argue
that the lack of emotional empathy appears linked to dysfunction in “cortical and
sub-cortical face processing routes” involving amygdala, insula and OFC and
VMPFC. 1304 Potential for learning refined dispositions to pain and pleasure from
the face of one’s parents.

Another common thread of discussion in the literature is that of the apparent
“rationality” of psychopaths. However Maibom finds that her studies affirm
Damasio’s argument for the essential role of emotion in practical rationality.1305
She argues that the practical reason of psychopaths is impaired and that the basis
of this appears two fold: an emotional impairment, with abnormal responses to
fear, pain, guilt and empathy; and that are incapable of choosing means
appropriate to ends. They are “constitutionally incapable of adopting and carrying
out plans that affect the course of their lives in a pervasive and profound

1299

Y.Yang, et al. “Localization of deformations within the amygdala in individuals with
psychopathy,” Archives of General Psychiatry 66, 9 (2009), 986-994.
1300
This is consistent with my argument that children learn and embody refined attitudes to pain
and pleasure from the example of parents first of all. Psychopathic deficits possibly heightened by
environmental factors, appear to impair this process in early years.
1301
Other studies identify abnormalities in the corpus callosum: Adrian Raine et al. “Corpus
Callosum Abnormalities in Psychopathic Antisocial Individuals,” Archives of General Psychiatry 60,
(2003): 1134-42.
1302
R. James and R. Blair, “Empathic dysfunction in psychopathic individuals,” in Empathy in
Mental Illness, ed. Tom F. D. Farrow, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 12.
1303
James and Blair “Empathic dysfunction in psychopathic individuals,” 12.
1304
“If we could find means to increase the empathic reaction of children with psychopathic
tendencies, we might be able to considerably improve the prognosis of this disorder.” James and
Blair “Empathic dysfunction in psychopathic individuals,” 15.
1305
Heidi Maibom, “Moral unreason: the case of psychopathy,” Mind and Language 20, 2 (2005):
251.
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manner.”1306 She suggests that psychopaths flout moral and social norms, but
“experience no guilt or remorse, feel no empathy, and appear to be perfectly
rational.”1307

Lack of behavioural and emotional regulation also enters as an area of study. Corr
suggests that deficits of behavioural inhibition are the basis of these aberrant
behaviours. These deficits are associated with a consequent inflexibility with
respect to cognitive activity, associated also with inattentiveness.1308 Significantly
he argues that there are multiple systems, an “amalgam of processes”, that
underpin normal behaviour, and that dysfunction in specific processes may
account for the wide variations on psychopathology. He highlights for example
failure of systems for appetitive anticipation.

An important study utilizing diffusion tensor magnetic resonance imaging (DTMRI) shows neural underdevelopment in the limbic-cortical pathway connecting
the OFC and amygdala.1309 The authors found significantly reduced fractional
anisotropy (suggesting reductions in fibre density, axonal diameter and
myelination) in the right uncinate fasciculus (the major neural limbic-cortical
neural pathway) of psychopaths in relation to matched controls. 1310

In summary, studies into psychopathology appear to confirm dysfunction in
several of the principal candidate systems and regions appearing to be at the basis
of virtue. They draw attention to the role of attention, of regulation of emotion
and appetency, of imitation, and in particular of the high level of mutual
interaction required between limbic and cortical areas. Furthermore studies
highlight the necessity of a multi-systemic approach in order to describe the
neurobiological contribution to moral behaviour.
1306

Maibom, “Moral unreason: the case of psychopathy,” 243.
Maibom, “Moral unreason: the case of psychopathy,” 237.
1308
Philip J. Corr, “The The psychoticism–psychopathy continuum: A neuropsychological model
of core deficits,” Personality and Individual Differences 48, (2010): 695–703.
1309
M. C. Craig, et al. “Altered connections on the road to psychopathy,” Molecular Psychiatry
(2009), 1–8.
1310
Craig, et al. “Altered connections on the road to psychopathy,” 5-6.
1307

398

b) Gillett’s work.

Grant Gillett’s work builds on the clinical studies of psychopathology. In one
recent paper, he introduces neo-Aristotelian notions of character, agency, and
moral responsibility (in a consideration of Aristotle’s account of practical reason in
the light of Kant and Wittgenstein) and concludes “the will of the psychopath is
pathological (in Kant’s sense) because it is dominated by appetite and not
truth...”.1311 This is a fascinating insight drawing on the internal features of the
human act (Table 3.1) and emphasizing the importance of the virtues of prudence
and justice. By the neurobiological features characterising the absence of the
virtues, Gillett provides important insights about their neural bases.

Gillett presents a theory of action for psychopaths accounting for manifestly
intentional behaviour that is disconnected from prudence and moral
consideration.1312 Ultimately, he finds that the psychopath is moved by selforiented goals, and, lacking responsivity to others, lacks also responsibility. Often
seeing others as less clever than himself, he suffers from a “pathologically
restricted horizon of motivations” and “lacks the co-feeling and human
connectivity that lie at the heart of moral voice and moral orientation.”

Gillett suggests that moral responsibility according to a neo-Aristotelian
understanding involves the subject choosing, using his rational powers, to obey or
not to obey moral rules, and he sees these rules as pertaining not only to one’s
actions in the world in isolation from others, but also according to the demands

1311

Grant Gillett, “Intentional action, moral responsibility and psychopaths,” (2012 publication
pending), 10. Gillett’s work on criminal psychopathology adopts a classic approach of
neuroscience, that of learning about the brain by linking deficits of behaviour with anatomical
observation.
1312
A theory of action links psychology of the individual with an understanding of individual human
beings as moral agents. The author suggests that action may be explained either by a Millean
tradition, relying on prior causal events, or in the Nietzschean (neo-Aristotelian) vision of the
individual acting on the world to enact his life story. The latter he combines with the identitystructure view of intention and action that sees action as the outward manifestation of the
conception of the agent.
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that arise from relationships with others. Within this framework, the role of pain
in the form of disapproval, punishment, correction and discipline, is reviewed.
Gillett notes that, during the acquisition phase of virtue, virtuous acts are not
typically pleasant. Further he distinguishes between the cleverness of acting to
achieve one’s desired end, from the motivational sensitivity towards others that
normally accompanies ethical formation.1313

His findings, drawing on various physiological and fMRI studies typified in the
section above, highlight brain function in relation to poor choices, impulsivity, and
lack of regard for others:


Defective psychopathic response to fear based and aversive conditioning
is situated (in the “limbic prefrontal circuit - amygdala, orbito-frontal
cortex, insula, and anterior cingulate” areas of the brain.



Severe social deprivation and abuse are consistent with unimpaired
executive function and emotional intelligence.1314 (His thesis is that
deprivation and abuse impact most of all on practical reason.)



Psychopathic activity appears unimpaired by secondary emotions of
embarrassment and guilt.1315



Certain amygdala dysfunction appears in studies of criminal psychopathic
individuals.1316



Defective responses in sensorimotor cortices as well as limbic and paralimbic structures appear implicated in pathologically diminished
empathy.1317 1318

1313

Both are forms of rationality, but only the second contains a moral incentive. He argues that
the psychopath acts with self-directed interest as opposed to “the natural human propensity for
empathy and sensitivity to the suffering or negative emotions of others”.
1314
A. Raine, “Biosocial Studies of Antissocial and Violent Behaviour in Children and Adults: A
Review,” Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology 30, 4 (2002): 311-326.
1315
A. Damasio, “A neural basis for sociopathy,” Archives of General Psychiatry 57, (2000): 128-9.
1316
K. A. Kiehl, et al., “Limbic abnormalities in affective processing by criminal psychopaths as
revealed by fMRI” Neuroimage 11, 5 (2000), 677-684.
1317
T. Singer, “The neuronal basis and ontogeny of empathy and mind reading: Review of literature
and implications for future research’ Neuroscience and Biobehavioural Reviews 30, (2006) 855-863.
1318
Deely Q et al., “Facial emotion processing in criminal psychopathy,” British Journal of
Psychiatry 18 9, (2006): 533-539. Gillett also discusses psychopathic insensitivity to distress and
negative emotion shown in other’s faces.
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Gillett concludes that “the physiological and fMRI studies show the findings that
might be expected from the analysis of virtue and moral development found in
Aristotle and Kant...”,1319 that “our natural tendencies are transformed by
socialisation in which we learn to moderate our tendencies by instruction and
correction”.1320

Moreover he suggests that the advantageous pain, normally signalling
undesirability of actions is somehow deficient in the psychopath. He suggests that
“learned patterns of moral behaviour” can compensate for this deficiency.1321
Moral education consists in this. “Necessarily, then, the character must be good or
bad by its pursuit or avoidance of certain pleasures and pains.” 1322

Gillett’s work is a cross disciplinary study reconciling aspects of Aristotelian
psychology with neuroscience, and as such, serves as a useful precedent for this
study. Furthermore, his identification of the involvement of specific neural
structures in moral behaviour/psychopathology provides a valuable point of
reference.

5.2.2.2 Gazzaniga and the neural bases of free will.

In the 2009 Gifford Lectures, neuroscientist Michael S. Gazzaniga explores the
notion of free will. This topic is of importance to this study because a degree of
freedom of agency is a necessity for the development of virtue, and for the
operation of a rational being. Gazzaniga adopts a non-reductionist “strong
emergent” paradigm in which the emergent “is more than the sum of its
parts”.1323 A number of aspects of his analysis of free agency are particularly
useful for this study.
1319

Gillett, “Intentional action, moral responsibility and psychopaths,” 13.
Gillett, “Intentional action, moral responsibility and psychopaths,” 14.
1321
Gillett, “Intentional action, moral responsibility and psychopaths,” 14.
1322
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1121b33.
1323
Michael S. Gazzaniga, Who’s in charge. Free will and the science of the brain (NY: Harper
Collins, 2011), 124. See my response to “emergent rationality” in Appendix 1. A Response to the
Claims of Emergent Rationality by Non-reductive Materialism. However, because both
1320
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He argues that the integration of multiple brain systems underpins complex
aspects of personality. “It is becoming increasingly clear that consciousness
involves a multitude of widely distributed specialised systems and disunited
processes.” 1324 I argue and summarise in Table 5.2 that virtue may be seen as a
type of macro system, a complex of systems, requiring multiple integrated brain
systems for activation. Gazzaniga, by applying the concept to consciousness,
provides a useful, highly credentialed precedent for such a view. It is the view of
this study that such a “systems view”’ of virtue is appropriate to the extent that
virtue is understood as a biological facilitation for rationality.1325

Secondly he offers an alternative model for brain activity, springing from his own
research. He argues that “rampant” lateralisation of circuits is a mark of the
human brain, and that within the left brain is the “interpreter module” that makes
sense out of the literal view of reality presented by the right hemisphere. 1326

He writes of studies that demonstrate that suppression of the right DLPFC
increases self interest and self centred responses, and that VMPFC lesions impair
moral judgement. This is consistent with views of the role of the DLPFC that have
already been presented in Chapter 2 and in Table 5.1.1327

5.2.2.3 Neural subdivisions implicated in moral behaviour.

In this section I note commonly identified neural bases activated in situations
demanding a moral response, and complete the section with some comments also
about the neural bases of immoral, psychopathic behaviour, as well as of spiritual

hylomorphic and emergent rationalist approaches propose a single agent with rational and
biophysical qualities, the conclusions of Gazzaniga, LeDoux, Damasio and others (with respect to
neural bases, but not to anthropology nor metaphysics) transfer most readily to this study.
1324
Gazzaniga, Who’s in charge. Free will and the science of the brain, 102.
1325
That such a view should be applied also to consciousness is not so evident but discussion of
this issue is well beyond the scope of this study.
1326
Gazzaniga, Who’s in charge. Free will and the science of the brain, 35 and 86. This appears
consistent with the notions in 2.3.4.1 and 2.5.3.1 that affect arousal is preferentially in areas of the
right cortex, while emotional regulation pertains more to left VMPFC.
1327
Gazzaniga, Who’s in charge. Free will and the science of the brain, 170 and 177.
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and mystical experiences. These moral bases will further inform discussion in
5.3.3.2.

Green and Haidt in a major review paper note that moral judgement appears to
be based both on affect and reasoning, and that many brain areas contribute to
moral judgement.1328 Moll et al. find a “remarkably consistent network of brain
regions … involved in moral cognition”,1329 far more consistent than the variability
of activations for basic emotions of happiness, sadness, disgust, fear, and anger.
He finds that complex emotions (compassion, embarrassment, indignation, guilt)
show consistently to activate the same areas: ACC, aPFC, aTL, OFC , and STS.1330
1331

A great number of studies have sought neural bases for social behaviour. A typical
study, by Rilling et al., focused on altruistic cooperation. By means of fMRI
scanning of 36 women playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game a neural network
associated with reciprocal altruism was identified.
Mutual cooperation was associated with consistent activation
in brain areas that have been linked with reward processing:
nucleus accumbens, the caudate nucleus, ventromedial
frontal/orbitofrontal cortex, and rostral anterior cingulate
cortex. 1332

Other studies have identified the key role of the medial PFC (MPFC) in studies
concerning empathy, understanding for others, and the self-knowledge seen as a
1328

Joshua Green and Jonathan Haidt, “How (and where) does moral judgement work?” Trends in
Cognitive Sciences 6, 12 (2002): 517-123.
1329
Jorge Moll, et al., “The neural basis of human moral cognition,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience
6, (2005): 799. Moll looked at the various models for moral cognitive neuroscience, and proposed
the “EFEC (event–feature–emotion complex) framework”, a model based on the integration of
event knowledge, social perceptions, and basic emotional states. The authors argued that moral
phenomena emerge “from the integration of contextual social knowledge, represented as event
knowledge in the prefrontal cortex (PFC); social semantic knowledge, stored in the anterior and
posterior temporal cortex; and motivational and basic emotional states, which depend on cortical–
limbic circuits.”
1330
Jorge Moll, et al., “The neural basis of human moral cognition,” 805.
1331
Jorge Moll, et al., “The neural basis of human moral cognition,” 799- 808.
1332
James K. Rilling et al., “A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation,” Neuron 35, (2002): 395–405.
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prerequisite to moral responsibility. Furthermore, empathetic response to the
pain of others appears to be mediated by the mPFC.1333 1334 1335 Other studies
consider the roles of memory and imagination in moral activity. It appears our
judgements to trust others are processed on two different pathways, one
bypassing memory and simply assessing the face, and the other accessing memory
of behaviour of that person in the past.1336 Some people draw on the personality
trait information when judging trustworthiness others prefer to use facial
information.

Self-control disorder studies in children using electroencephalogram (EEG) as well
as fMRI of normal subjects, are consistent in linking the VMPFC and moral
behaviour, in finding that the OFC cues for moral behaviour and also the
acquisition of moral knowledge. ACC is linked to regulation of attention and
emotion, and (with the NAc, caudate, and OFC) for cooperation respecting the
rights of others.1337 Moral cognition systems appear modulated by DA, 5-HT, NA
and ACh. But “the proper operation of the system as a whole is crucial for
effective moral judgement.” 1338

Persistent antisocial behaviours have long been a subject of interest. Forensic
psychiatry like psychopathology is a large field offering insights into the neural
bases of moral behaviour. Studies of violent offenders have demonstrated that

1333

Philip L. Jackson, Pierre Rainville, Jean Decety, “To what extent do we share the pain of others?
Insight from the neural bases of pain empathy,” Pain 125, (2006): 5–9.
1334
Arnaud D’Argembeau and Eric Salmon, “The neural basis of semantic and episodic forms of self
knowledge. Insights from Functional Neuroimaging,” in Sensing Systems in Nature, ed. Carlos
López-Larrea (Landes Bioscience and Springer Science+Business Media, 2011). The mPFC has been
identified as playing “a key role in creating the mental model of the self that is displayed in our
mind at a given moment.”
1335
Ruby P., Collette F., D’Argembeau A. et al., “Persons with Alzheimer disease did not recruit the
mPFC when making judgments about themselves in perspective taking to assess self‑personality:
what’s modified in Alzheimer’s disease?” Neurobiology of Aging 30, (2009): 1637‑1651. In persons
with Alzheimer disease the mPFC appears inactive in judgements about self.
1336
J. D. Rudoy and K. A. Paller, “Who can you trust? Behavioral and neural differences between
perceptual and memory-based influences,” Frontiers of Human Neuroscience 3, (2009): 1-6.
1337
Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural constituents,” 844.
1338
Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural constituents,” 843.
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subjects have reduced grey matter in the PFC and patterns of abnormal limbic,
prefrontal and temporal brain activation.1339 (See also above, 5.2.2.1.)
It is demonstrated that emotions play a role in moral judgement.1340 A 2007 study
by Michael Koenigs of six patients with VMPFC bilateral damage indicated that the
subjects were more prone to utilitarian judgements on a certain type of moral
dilemma, but that in other types their responses were normal. “The findings are
consistent with a model in which a combination of intuitive/affective and
conscious/rational mechanisms operate to produce moral judgements.” 1341 1342

We must bear in mind the observation of Eric Kandel, Nobel laureate, that there is
no single neural locus of command and coordination. He writes,
“There is no single cortical area to which all other cortical areas
report exclusively, either in the visual or in any other system. In
sum, the cortex must be using a different strategy for
generating the integrated visual image.”1343 1344
If the brain requires complex coordination strategies to present an “integrated
visual image”, how much more, then, will complex coordination of systems be
needed for an integrated response to the world, for recognition of truth and
moral action. Yet, universal human experience is that in moral matters, as in
behaviours of moral insignificance, human responses can be unified and

1339

H. Soderstrom, et al., “Reduced frontotemporal perfusion in psychopathic personality”
Psychiatry Res 114, (2002): 81–94.
1340
Michael Koenigs et al., “Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral
judgements,” Nature 446, (2007): 908-911.
1341
Koenigs et al., “Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements,” 910.
1342
Darcia Narvaez, “Triune ethics: the neurobiological roots of our multiple moralities,” New Ideas
in Psychology 26 (2008): 95-119. Narvaez provides a useful summary of the neural bases of moral
behaviour within her “triune ethics theory”. She draws together neuroscientific evidence in
support of the three stages: security, engagement and imagination. Rather than a top down,
cognitively initiative view, she adopts a bottom up approach based on motivational orientations,
and so her work is complementary to this study; she understands appetitive systems in the body as
fundamental, a view consistent, as we shall see with the Aristotelian understanding of motivation.
The article also provides an excellent overview of key literature on the role of affection in gene
transcription.
1343
Eric R. Kandel and Robert H. Wurtz, “Constructing the visual image” in Eric R. Kandel et al.
th
Principles of Neural Science, 4 ed. (NY: McGraw, 2000), 340.
1344
Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 731.
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purposeful despite the varied systems involved. Again, let us remind ourselves
that neural excitation cannot make moral decisions, persons do.

Table 5.1 draws together findings from some dozen authors whose work involves
the neural bases of moral responsibility. The listing of areas and roles is by no
means exhaustive, but it is representative of the complex integration of neural
areas in moral action.

5.3

Neural bases.

5.3.1 A complex of systems.

The complexity of the brain is inescapable: the sheer extension of the neural
network, the intricate cooperation of mechanisms at the molecular, genetic and
cellular levels underpinning a grand collaboration of systems, and the possibilities
for connectivity blessed with the potential for a virtual infinitude of subtle
variations of synaptic strengths and neuromodulation. Indeed in 1949 Donald
Hebb had suggested that thoughts and memories were dependent on “cell
assemblies”, networks of neurons. He postulated that changes in cell connections
were the basis of learning, and that memory is both localised and distributed.
Commonly in the current literature we meet terms such as “vast neuronal
array”1345, and “neural pools”1346 to discuss the means by which networking
complexity of the brain contributes to mental processes. Susan Greenfield
proposes that “subsecond assemblies of 10s or 100s of millions of neurons lasting
a fraction of a second determine depth of consciousness.”1347 One need not fully
accord with the conclusion to appreciate the complexity of neural operations.

1345

st

Susan Greenfield, I.D. The Quest for identity in the 21 Century (London: Sceptre, 2008).
th
Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology, 5 ed., 471.
1347
st
Susan Greenfield, I.D. The Quest for identity in the 21 Century, 127. “Determine” however is a
word that carries unwanted connotations; use of “contribute to” or “subserve” would avoid the
suggestion that materiality could be the ultimate cause of free action. (See 6.4.2.2.)
1346
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There is recognition that individual systems in the brain operate with astonishing
breadth and complexity. Note for example this recent description of the
motivational system:
All of this being said, what should a neural mechanism of
motivation look like? According to the account pieced-together
in this dissertation, motivational mechanisms should look like
pulsating synaptic cascades across vast breadths of neural
tissue. From a seed of rhythmic activity, perhaps in
orbitofrontal cortex and the hypothalamus, motivation would
reach through planning mechanisms in dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, posterior parietal cortex, the cerebellum and motor
cortex, and all of the loops connecting these areas through the
basal ganglia and thalamus. Basically a motivation mechanism
should extend through most of the brain.1348
Other brain systems offer similar complexity.

Neuroscientist Mario Beauregard in The Spiritual Brain argues that various brain
systems are integrated in the performance of the highest rational functions, an
intricate cooperation of neural systems, areas and mechanisms facilitating actions
of the person. He says that transcendent experiences are
…implemented via a spatially extended neural circuit
encompassing brain regions involved in attention, body
representation, visual imagery, emotion (physiological and
subjective aspects) and self consciousness.1349

LeDoux makes an important point that the contribution of components in a
system is derived from the fact that the system exists. Individual components are
of this conditional value. Hence he writes of the system of emotional
1348

Anthony Landreth, “Far Beyond Driven: On the Neural Mechanisms of Motivation” (PhD thesis,
University of Cincinnati, 2007), 186.
1349
Mario Beauregard and Denyse O’Leary, The Spiritual Brain. A Neuroscientist’s Case for the
Existence of the Soul (New York: Harper One, 2007), 37. Beauregard writes, “The brain has a
neurological substrate that enables it to experience a spiritual state”. (39)
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management, “The amygdala is certainly crucial, but we must not lose sight of the
fact that its functions exist only by virtue of the system to which it belongs.” 1350

Something analogous happens with respect to virtue. By applying this principle to
the systems underpinning virtue, we gain a greater appreciation of the whole.
There is no doubt that the PFC and the BG, and numerous other individual brain
regions are intimately involved in the expression of virtue, but the whole is
greater than the parts. It is the soul that is the principle of unity and the principle
of virtuous action; when the soul departs the orchestra falls silent. The performers
go their separate ways. The music ends. Virtue may be understood as a complex
integration and orchestration of organic elements.

George Orwell said that good prose is like a window… you see straight through it
to the ideas it communicates; it does not draw attention to itself. Analogously, for
all the complexity of the underlying neural orchestration, it is the beauty of virtue
that is seen. We have seen that it is in his actions that the greatness of soul of
Takashi Nagai shines out.

The state of virtue will be underpinned at the neurobiological level by
mechanisms and pathways within the multiple systems of the brain that integrate
neural function under the agency of the person. These neurobiological bases
dispose for rational virtuous activity.

5.3.2 The principal brain systems contributing to the development and exercise
of virtue.

Our focus is not only on systems operating in isolation, but on “multiple neural
systems” which in turn are integrated in a highly coordinated manner. Grossberg
and Versace offer an fascinating integrative view of brain function accounting for

1350

J. LeDoux, “Emotion, Memory and the Brain,” Scientific American 270, (1994): 50-57. 56
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cortico-thalamic learning.1351 Furthermore parallel systems operate and
compete.1352 Pollak develops the idea of grand neural systems made up of
contributory systems; he writes,1353
Attachment, attention, emotion regulation, are likely to be
constellations of processes that emerge as output from
multiple neural systems… (and so it is necessary to seek)
biologically plausible models of the mental processes in
question. 1354

Such a level of integration and coordinated complexity suggests that the state of
virtue itself may be understood as complex of other systems, or several complexes
of interlinked systems (pertaining to the different virtues), operating across the
whole organism. It is the position of this study that the state of virtue may be
classified as a system because numerous somatic areas and subsystems
contribute, the process may be described scientifically, and results are replicable.
Ultimately it is a system that is ordained to the flourishing of the human person,
not only at the personal level, but at the biological level as well. This macro
system however, does not operate beyond personal control (such as autonomic
systems); rather it is a system over which the individual exercises considerable

1351

Stephen Grossberg and Massimiliano Versace, “Spikes, synchrony, and attentive learning by
laminar thalamocortical circuits,” Brain Research 1218 (2008): 278-312. In their Synchronous
Matching Adaptive Resonance Theory (SMART) model they argue that there is high level of
coordination between brain regions, dependent upon arousal, attention, memory, learning, and
expectation brain systems, and mediated by plasticities generated by resonance and synchrony.
1352
A. J. Gruber and R. J. McDonald, “Context, emotion, and the strategic pursuit of goals:
interactions among multiple brain systems controlling motivated behavior,” Frontiers in
Behavioural Neuroscience 6, (2012): 50. “Multiple brain systems acquire information in parallel and
either cooperate or compete for behavioral control. We propose a conceptual model of systems
interaction wherein a ventral emotional memory network involving ventral striatum (VS),
amygdala, ventral hippocampus, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex triages behavioral responding
to stimuli according to their associated affective outcomes.”
1353
Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with
developmental approaches to psychopathology,” 735.
1354
Cf. Gruber and McDonald, “Context, emotion, and the strategic pursuit of goals: interactions
among multiple brain systems controlling motivated behavior,” 50. Adding a new degree of
complexity, Gruber and McDonald (2012) comment on their finding that multiple brain systems
appear to compete in pursuit of goals. They discuss a ventral emotional memory network that is
constituted by ventral striatum (VS), amygdala, ventral hippocampus, and VMPFC.

409

autonomous control (directly, and through participatory systems such as the
attentional systems and systems for learning).

It is reasonable to suggest that neural systems operate in support of moral
actions. Casebeer notes multiple cognitive sub-processes involved in moral
cognition, “a highly distributed, whole brain affair”.1355 Greene and Haidt also
draw attention to the distributed nature of the neural bases of moral
cognition.1356 In a perceptive analysis of self reports of loss of will power by EL
patients Paul Foley argues that it is necessary to view the brain as “an integrated
whole” rather than separating out the psychic and the neurological elements.
Within that view he finds that the biological basis of the loss of willpower in EL
patients appeared to derive from dysfunction in the affective and motor centres
of the BG, with interference to connection between thalamus and pallidum.1357

Notably there is evidence that developmental maturation is associated with the
phenomenon of increased connectivity and coordinated systems in the brain.
Converging evidence suggests that, during development to adulthood, there is a
lessening of immediate functional connections to adjacent regions, and an
increase of connection between regions distant in the brain. “These novel
network-level findings bolster the claim that cognitive maturation occurs not in
unitary structures but in the connectivity and interactions between
structures.”1358

1355

Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural constituents,” 841 and 846. “Socio-moral behaviour
is rooted in the brainstem/limbic axis and PFC, with input and recurrent connections to and from
sensory and multimodal cortices and frontal lobe areas: so it involves more-or-less the entire
brain.”
1356
Greene and Haidt, “How (and where) does moral judgment work?” 517–523.
1357
Foley, “The Encephalitis Lethargica Patient as a Window on the Soul,” 184-214.
1358
Somerville and Casey, “Developmental neurobiology of cognitive control and motivational
systems,” 236-241; see also M. C. Stevens, et al., “Age-related cognitive gains are mediated by the
effects of white matter development on brain network integration,” in Neuroimage 48, (2009):
738–746; Beatriz Luna et al., “What has fMRI told us about the Development of Cognitive Control
through Adolescence?” Brain and Cognition 72, 1 (2010): 101. The authors write: “The transition
from adolescence to adulthood therefore can be seen as a change in mode of operation from
initially relying on more regionalized processing, such as in the PFC, earlier in development to
relying on a broader network of regions that share processing in an efficient and flexible manner at
the systems level.”
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And what are the neural systems that subserve the state of virtue? At the most
elemental level we find the systems and mechanisms of plasticity and learning.
Learning may be understood as our capacity to change in response to experience.
We can be conscious of some of these changes, and even direct them by our
choices; others will be at a subconscious level. The state of virtue denotes the
conscious possession of learned moral habits. Plasticity and learning, then, are the
two foundational systems for the construction of virtue. We have seen that
mechanisms of plasticity are virtually ubiquitous across all areas of the brain. 1359
Plasticity is triggered by a wide array of developmental, environmental and
experiential factors, and these mechanisms of plasticity are acknowledged to be
decisive in all learning and memory. We have seen that plasticities associated with
intracellular calcium and gene expression underpin structural changes resulting in
long term memory, consolidated learning of new behaviours, etc. The brain’s
capacity for plastic change is at the core of a neural explanation for the
phenomenon of habit, 1360 and, this study suggests, of virtue itself.

Higher “component” systems of the state of virtue utilise the mechanisms of
plasticity and learning. These are the systems of memory, attention, reward and
motivation, emotion regulation, habit formation, goal election, executive
execution of motor commands and cognition, consideration of consequences,
planning, and executive direction. In addition there are various subsystems
assisting specifically in the development of virtue: systems for empathy and
imitation, and systems disposing to sensitive periods of development.

Table 5.2 summarises the principal brain systems and mechanisms contributing to
the state and exercise of virtue, referring to summary tables associated with
neuroscientific systems discussed in Chapter 2.

5.3.3 The neural substrates of virtue. The state of virtue reflects a state of
neural and systemic maturity.
1359
1360

Butz, et al.,“Activity dependent structural plasticity,” 287-305.
Typical of the literature: Graybiel, “Habits, Rituals, and the Evaluative Brain,” 359-87.
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Having proposed that the state of virtue may be understood, at the neural level,
to operate as a system perfecting the various associated systems of the brain (in
5.3.1 and 5.3.2), and having identified the principal brain systems contributing to
the development and exercise of virtue (in summary form in Table 4.2, and in
more detail throughout Chapter 2) it now remains to set out the neural substrates
of virtue in some detail.

I do this in two stages. In 5.3.3.1 I lay out systematically the argument for what I
call the “neural excellence” view of virtue in the brain noting in summary form the
neural bases; in 5.3.3.2 I draw on neuroscientific understanding to account for the
17 characteristics of virtue identified in Table 4.1.

5.3.3.1 A “neural excellence” understanding of the neural bases of virtue.

a) A successful identification of the neural substrate of virtue and of the
individual cardinal virtues requires clarification of the terms virtue,
prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. The virtues of prudence and
justice are materially manifested as perfections of certain neural structures
that are necessarily associated with rationality and choice in the embodied
life. The virtues of fortitude and temperance are perfections of certain
biological structures constituting dispositions of the irascible and sensitive
appetites to endure appropriate difficulties and to seek appropriate
pleasure; thus we can say they are predispositions for rationality and
choice. In simple terms, the practical reason is understood, as the human
capacity to elect appropriate means and ends for action; the rational
appetite chooses what is good for oneself taking into account the good of
others; the irascible appetite chooses goods that are difficult to pursue;
the sensitive appetite chooses what is pleasurable. ‘Appropriate’ and
‘good’ refer to choices that are in keeping with the needs of human
nature. The view of this study, in line with Aristotelian and Thomistic
notions, is that all mental activity in the embodied life has a biophysical
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correlate, and therefore the dispositions of these four capacities have
neural substrates. These substrates may be identified. (For detailed
argumentation see Chapters 1, 3 and 4.) Furthermore the notion of the
unity of the virtues has been argued: in all virtuous human actions the
dispositions corresponding to all four virtues will be active. The fact that
acts disposed by fortitude and temperance require rational guidance
disposed by prudence and justice serves to clarify the distinctive neural
tasks of each of these virtues. (For detailed argumentation see Chapters 1,
3 and 4.)
b) Virtue is a state of neural and systemic maturity. (See Chapter 5.3.1 and
5.3.2) It is evident that this maturity corresponds to the biological
flourishing of the organism. (See Chapter 6.) The state of virtue is revealed
as a macro system: the result of a highly complex interplay of systems,
brain areas, mechanisms and pathways (neural, neurotransmitter and
neuromodulatory, etc). The flourishing of the organism as a consequence
of virtuous dispositions is seen in the mature development and integration
of organic “components”. The high levels of specific interconnectivity and
cooperation between systems, and fine tuning of mechanisms make
possible, as material causes, the rational operations of knowing reality and
loving other persons. In fact every experience leaves a trace of neural
changes in our brain; it will only be neural modifications serving these
deepest goods of our nature, of knowing and loving, that are associated
with virtue.
c) Virtue consists, structurally, in the constellation of neural modifications
reflecting maturity, at the genetic, synaptic, and cellular levels, in areas
of the brain and in its pathways, across all neural systems serving
rational action. These neural modifications facilitate, at a material level,
conscious and intentional action carried out for reasons of intrinsic
motivation, and include receptivity for neuromodulation associated with
reward pathways associated with pleasure inherent in virtuous action.
d) We have seen in Chapter 2 and Tables 5.1, and 5.2 that a great range of
brain areas and structures are involved in the formation of virtue.
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Developmentally-dependent (initially) and use-dependent plastic changes
in these areas and structures bring into being a material facilitation for
rational activity; they are the neural signature of the state of virtue.
Knowledge of the brain, while still advancing rapidly, has reached the point
that it is possible to discuss with some clarity the contribution of discrete
brain areas and how discrete areas contribute to the functioning of the
whole.1361 Principal areas of the brain in which will be found the mature
modifications of virtue include most areas of the PFC, areas of the other
cortical lobes associated with memory, deliberation, goal election,
consideration of consequences of action, moral judgement, attention,
imitation, response and delivery of affectivity, and for motor execution.
The BG, limbic and paralimbic structures, the neural pathways between
interconnecting these areas with the cortex, and the pathways for
neuromodulation reaching cortical and subcortical areas are also
intimately involved. In particular the pathways of emotional regulation, of
reward, motivation and goal election, and of habit formation are of great
significance.
e) Analysis of the exercise of virtue, or more properly of the various virtues, is
additionally complex because of its integration into the steps of the human
act itself. (See Chapter 3.1.3.) The analysis of the human act assists in
identifying the distinctive roles of fortitude and temperance (disposing
rationally appropriate appetitive representations prior to the
commencement of the act) and the roles of prudence and justice
(disposing the deliberations between intellect and rational appetite that
constitute the act itself).
f) Virtue is acquired by experience. “The human brain is inscribed (or carries
traces) that make its microprocessing structure the record of an unfolding
reality” writes Gillett.1362 (See Chapter 3.1.3.) The various mechanisms of
1361

Owing to advances in imaging techniques, the last two decades have brought a great increase
in knowledge of the functioning brain. Furthermore, as many neural mechanisms and systems are
highly conserved across species, animal studies add greatly to knowledge of the human organism.
1362
Quoted in: Stephen Lyng, “Brain, body, and society: bioethical reflections on socio-historical
neuroscience and neuro-corporeal social science,” American Journal of Bioethics 9, 9 (2009): 25-6.
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plasticity, making possible learning from sensory experience: explicit
tuition, environment, experience (guided and otherwise), and
repetition,1363 bring about the requisite neural changes. Plasticity explains
the capacity for the human neural system to modify structurally, and
functionally, disposing to new behaviours in a stable way. (Chapter 2 and
5.3.)
g) The material manifestion of the state of virtue may be described as the
sum of the perfections of neural structures necessarily associated with
rationality and choice in the embodied life.
h) We have seen that human motivation may reduce to seeking pleasure and
avoiding pain. The practice of virtue then is closely supported by a healthy
reward system, assisting motivation and goal election; a system that is
balanced with rationally cued, aversive responses when appropriate:
“Much of our behaviour is shaped by learned associations between stimuli,
our responses to them, and the rewards and punishments that result.”1364
Virtuous action is motivated by pleasures appropriate to our rational
nature, and by the forbearance of difficulties for the sake of a noble
reason. (See Chapters 1, 3 and 4.) In fact, the virtues of fortitude and
temperance dispose the human reward systems, and closely associated
systems of emotional regulation, to good health. It is patently not
healthful for the organism to pursue rewards and exercise emotional
responses which are detrimental to the wellbeing of the whole organism;
therefore it is necessary that reward choices and emotional regulation are
subject to cognitive processing. Fortitude and temperance dispose, at the
neural level, the reward and emotion systems towards cognitive
processing. Reward systems in the brain commence with sensory and
somatosensory feedback to the OFC and limbic areas which are
interconnected. Centres for both gratification and aversion are present in
most limbic system structures. Aversional stimulation, for example in the
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D. Narvaez and J. L. Vaydich, “Moral development and behaviour under the spotlight of the
neurobiological sciences,” Journal of Moral Education 37, 3 (2008): 289-312.
1364
th
Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology, 6 ed., 540.
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amygdala, produces unpleasant sensations such as fear and sorrow,
consciously registered through the amygdalic pathways via medial
thalamus to the cortex, and by somatosensory cortices registering bodily
reactions triggered by amygdalic output to the hypothalamus; 1365 in
contrast a sense of pleasure or reward is associated with gratification,
notably mediated by the NAc,1366 pallidum and amygdala, and associated
with -opioid and phasic DA signalling. 1367 Furthermore, limbic structures
and the OFC inform the ventral striatum and the hypothalamus as well as
the VTA and SN which reciprocally deliver DA to the OFC, amygdala,
ventral striatum and hypothalamus.1368 Directly, and in a second pathway
through the ventral pallidum, the ventral striatum also inputs the medial
thalamus via a pathway returning to the OFC.1369 (See 2.6 for more detail.)
This reward system is triggered in the OFC and amygdala by sense input.
Arguably the due calibration of these areas is a major focus of the virtues
of fortitude and temperance; but, as a system is only as strong as its
weakest link, a healthy reward system requires all components and
linkages to be calibrated to respond to pleasures with moderation and
maintain a degree of equanimity in the face of dangers of one form or
another.
i) Maturity in virtue is evidenced by implicit motivation as opposed to
extrinsic rewards. In the development phase of virtue, neural reward
systems (mediated principally by DA) are implicated as goals for A-O
paradigms. This shift from A-O to S-deliberation-R paradigms involves
increased activity in the dorsal BG, a transition to intrinsic motivation and
ease of action, and decreased cortical activity. 1370
Some types of instrumental learning result in a strong
association between a stimulus and an action that
becomes resistant to reward devaluation. This kind of
1365
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Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology, 6 ed., 540.
th
Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology, 6 ed., 534.
1367
Leknes and Tracey, “A common neurobiology for pain and pleasure,” 317-8.
1368
The ventral striatum is reciprocally connected also to the VTA and SN.
1369
th
Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology, 6 ed., 428.
1370
Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 472.
1366
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associative memory, in which the stimulus becomes
stronger than the outcome to trigger the response, is
called habit….The more this associative memory
becomes represented by a larger number of associative
units, the more difficult it will be to erase them when
the reward outcome or the novelty decreases. 1371
Note that outcome devaluation affects neither habit nor virtue. 1372 (See
2.6.4)
j) The exercise of virtue requires cortical emotional regulation. Emotional
regulation is closely associated with the conscious perception of reward
expectations. Training in temperance and fortitude (see below p. and q.)
consists in what could be described as the “plastic calibration” of the
amygdala, and other limbic, basal and cortical structures associated with
aversion and reward, in line with Aristotle’s insistence that children be
trained to seek appropriate pleasures. A further aspect of emotional
regulation is the reinforcement of pathways from amygdala to the PFC.1373
1374

Cortical processing alone, however, is insufficient for virtue. Cortical

processing, in turn, must be disposed by prudence and justice. (See below
n. and o. and also Table 5.2)
k) The practice of virtue requires explicit involvement of systems for goal
election, a consequence of effective presentation and processing of
rewards, and of emotion regulation. Goal election, in its final phases, is a
cognitive process disposed by prudence and justice. (See Table 5.2)
Neural modifications during the acquisition of virtue will be dependent
upon goals that are self-elected, or goals, as in the case of a young child for
example, that are elected by another. In both cases, virtuous goal election
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Da Cunha, et al. “Learning processing in the basal ganglia: a mosaic of broken mirrors,” 166.
Da Cunha, et al. “Learning processing in the basal ganglia: a mosaic of broken mirrors,” 166.
1373
th
Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology, 6 ed., 540.
1374
LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 170. Sense input received in the amygdala is infused with
emotional content. Thence, output will be either to hypothalamus (for bodily reactions to
emotional stimulus), which is “the low road” identified by LeDoux, or areas of PFC implicated in
conscious control and emotional expression, aspects of “the high road”.
1372
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is a task of rationality, therefore disposed either by one’s own prudence
and justice, or by the prudence and justice of the guide whom one obeys.
l) Virtue is a form of learning characterised by the acquisition of habits. The
development of habitual behaviours is attributable to mechanisms of
plasticity in brain areas and in brain pathways. Certain habits associated
with virtue initially appear cognitively based (eg a habit of deliberation
before acting), while others appear more procedural in the strict sense,
with a striatal basis (eg the habit of courteously smiling to each new
person one meets). Cognitive habits however will not simply be mediated
by cortical plasticity. Striatally mediated habits are not restricted to
subconscious procedural activities; automaticity may develop in formerly
goal directed actions mediated by striatal changes. 1375 Cortically elicited
DA release (from VTA and SN), in both PFC and striatum, reinforces goal
election and mediates, by repetition, striatally based habit learning: “Habit
learning is achieved after overtraining in the striatum.”1376 Graybiel
suggests that oscillatory activity in the cortico-basal loops is involved in
establishing the habit, and that that chunking of behaviours, of action
repertoires, is evidence for a neuronal shift from limbic to regions of motor
and cognitive output. “Thus the relation between habits and the evaluative
brain is that habits are an endpoint in the evaluation process.”1377 (See
2.4.5) Note that as habits are acquired, reward mediation in the ventral
striatum gives way to dorsal automatisation. (See above i.)
m) Systems responsive to sensitive periods and to affection, and systems of
imitation play significant roles in acquiring behaviours particularly during
developmental periods. (See Table 5.2)
n) Prudence is characterised by rich and reciprocal connectivity primarily
between the DLPFC and other with cortical areas serving memory and
somatic and sensory input, with the OFC, DMPFC, BG, and amygdala
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Wickens, “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia,” 125.
Da Cunha, et al. “Learning processing in the basal ganglia: a mosaic of broken mirrors,” 166.
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Graybiel, “Habits, Rituals, and the Evaluative Brain,” 378.
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serving emotion regulation, with the ventral striatum assisting in goal
setting and motivation. (For more detail see Tables 5.1 and 5.2, and 5.3.2)
o) Justice is characterised by habitual understanding for others, consideration
of the impact of one’s actions on others, empathy, and considerations of
fairness, capacities mediated primarily by the aPFC, mPFC, VMPFC, OFC
(especially medial OFC), ACC (especially rostal ACC), insula, limbic and
paralimbic areas, and the BG. (For more detail see Tables 5.1 and 5.2, and
5.3.2)
p) Fortitude is mediated first of all by the BG-thalamo-cortical loop and
enriched connectivity between the OFC and the amygdala. At its most
elementary level, the expression of fortitude may be understood as a
capacity for rational, habitual suppression of debilitating responses to fear
or pain. The various pathways of emotional regulation are also implicated.
Various brain regions are shown to be active including OFC, DLPFC, VMPFC,
areas of the amygdala and of the BG. The close association of pain and
pleasure systems in the brain allowing balanced cognitive judgements has
also been noted. (For more detail see Tables 5.1 and 5.2, and 5.3.2).
q) Temperance is mediated primarily by the DLPFC and ACC, and by the
various pathways of emotional regulation associated with the OFC,
DMPFC, BG, with the ventral striatum assisting in goal setting and
motivation. (For more detail see Tables 5.1 and 5.2, and 5.3.2)
r) Exercise of these four virtues will also be subserved by ready access to
memory. Many forms of plasticity dependent learning and memory are
implicated in the development of virtue. Deliberations implicit to
cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, and goal election
require activation of both long and short term declarative memory, as
well as procedural memory and emotional memory. (See Table 5.2.)
Consolidation and plasticity in memory pathways is a necessity for virtuous
judgement. Activation of declarative memory is necessary in evaluating
the value of actions.
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s) Acquisition of the four virtues will be served particularly by mechanisms
of imitation priming responses in accord with the exemplar. (For more
detail see Tables 5.1 and 5.2, and 5.3.2)
t) The state of virtue should be seen as the endpoint of neural development,
of a developmental sequence of behaviours associated with the ordered
biological dispositions of fortitude and temperance informing right
judgement. It involves an ongoing interplay between biological
development, practical reason, experience, consideration for others, and
the repetition of positive goal directed behaviours. The state of virtue
makes use of the constellation of mechanisms and processes operating in
across the various brain regions and pathways between them. Habit
provides a mechanism for the organism to act more efficiently at the
neuronal level, allowing the diversion of attention elsewhere and
absorbing fewer cerebral resources. During the period of acquisition, both
implicit procedural memories and virtue, move from the explicit to the
automatised. 1378 Both are acquired by a process initially involving
attentive, voluntary and repetitive action and explicit knowledge. During
the human act and therefore the process of acquisition of virtue, concrete
representations are present in mind.
u) Finally, happiness as ‘the reward of virtue’1379 can be identified on
various levels.
i.

Choices associated with appetite are rewarded indiscriminately by the
body’s hedonic reward systems. As we have seen this is a normal
concommitant to human acts. In biological terms this will be reflected
in mechanisms of -opioid and phasic DA signalling and 5-HT uptake
inhibition.

ii. Pleasure enjoyed with self control is more enjoyable because it is
longer lasting, and because it is enriched by the joy of knowledge of
benefits to others, and is free of any bitter aftertaste of self interest.

1378
1379

See Chapter 2 for referencing.
NE, 1099b16.
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Such reward satisfaction following upon intrinsic motivations has been
discussed. This will also be reflected in DA and opioid signaling.
iii. Via thalamic pathways from the striatum to the OFC that allow
cognitive modification of PFC to upregulate DA release, rewards are
modified to reflect the conviction to that proposed virtuous actions are
rationally desirable; a source of reward reserved for what is perceived
as a rational choice.
iv. Virtue empowers the functional flourishing of the organism. (See b.
immediately above.) This state requires the efficient interconnection of
the cortical, sub cortical, limbic, and brain stem regions, and the
mature development of the full array of biophysiological attributes of
the human being.
v. Virtue empowers the functional flourishing of the person, facilitating
openness to reality and the capacity to love other persons.1380 (See b.
immediately above.) This is facilitated not only by rich connectivity
between sensory cortices and the PFC but enriched brain activity
supporting just action (see p. above), and prudent action (see o.
above), supported by effective emotional regulation at the service of
rationality.
vi. Virtue empowers the teleological flourishing of the person. The
endpoint is eudaimonia, a state of general flourishing marked by
effective self-management mediated by the neurophysiological
dispositions of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude. It satisfies
two conditions for the presence of virtue – on the one hand mature
neurobiological development, integration of systems, efficiency and an
emotionally enriched life; and on the other a rationality that is
disposed to seek and recognise truth and to love others. The wellbeing
of the human person requires effective integration of the rational and
physiological, the complete harmonisation of body and soul. This is the
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Affective experience in turn feeds back into the paradigm of virtue development, facilitating
peace of heart and motivating further positive behaviours.
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ultimate meaning of eudaimonia. (There will be further discussion of
flourishing in Chapter 6.)

5.3.3.2 The neural bases of virtue

I will now map the neural substrates of virtue to the characteristics of virtue
established in Chapters 3 and 4. The state of virtue is understood as a state of
excellence at the neural biophysical level for each of the characteristics.

This section proposes neural features for the 17 characteristics of virtue identified
in Table 4.1. These 17 characteristics are divided, as per the original table, into
three categories according to their association with the acquisition of virtue. For
each point I offer brief philosophical clarifications of the characteristic under
discussion (relating findings of Chapters 3 and 4 to the neurological domain) and
then I summarise the proposed neural signature for the characteristic under
discussion. Finally, for each characteristic, I list the neural systems (see Table 5.2)
associated, thus emphasizing the underpinning systemic integration. Tables
summarizing discrete neural systems and their prima facie linkage to virtue are
included in the endnotes.

….

A. CHARACTERISTICS PERTAINING TO THE STATE OF VIRTUE

1. The virtues of prudence and justice dispose the practical reason and the
intellectual appetite facilitating rationality and appropriate choices.

Philosophical clarifications.
 The different virtues exhibit distinctive biological features. In the
Aristotelian/ Thomistic understanding, the human person is the
animated body. Rational activity is conducted by a body animated by
a human soul. As has been reviewed in Chapter 4, four cardinal
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virtues are necessary to account for operations and activities of an
embodied soul. On this basis it is necessary for the four cardinal
virtues to have distinctive neural signatures. Hence, the virtues of
prudence and justice are materially manifested as perfections of
certain neural structures that are necessarily associated with
rationality and choice in the embodied life.
 Prudence1381 and justice1382 contribute habits perfecting the rational
faculties,1383 and therefore directing choices consequent upon the
presentation of arduous goods and pleasurable goods to the intellect
and will by the habits of the sensitive appetites.1384
 Rationality and rational choice as we have seen in Chapters 1, 3 and
4, while not reducible to the biological, possess and are manifested
by means of sensible, neurobiological concomitants.
 Furthermore, (as has been argued in Chapter 4) in a state of virtue
the unity of the virtues holds: all virtues are present and their action
is fully integrated. Not only will the virtues of prudence and justice,
here described, be enlisted in the direction of actions disposed by
fortitude and temperance, but the self-dominion accompanying
fortitude and temperance (described in the section immediately
1381

The virtue disposing the practical intellect is prudence. As we have seen in Chapter 4,
prudence may be understood as the habitual disposition of the practical intellect to be of right
counsel, to judge well and to command well. Aquinas argues that prudence is needed “to perfect
the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end”. (ST, Ia-IIae, Q.57,
Art.5.) It is “right reason about things to be done,” (ST, Ia-IIae, Q.58, Art.3.1) the habitual
disposition of the practical intellect to be of right counsel, to judgement well and to command
well. The starting point of prudence is knowledge of reality. Furthermore, “memory, experience,
tact, good judgement, and sagacity” all either arise from prudence or accompany it. (Aristotle De
Virtutibus et Vitiis, 1250a30-37) It is “well trained reason, capable of working out the particulars of
a problem, of foreseeing the probable consequences of an act, of using powers of circumspection,
of weighing the individual circumstances of a situation, of exercising caution lest good intentions
ultimately do more harm than good. Reasoning, foresight, watchfulness, precaution are all
essential elements of prudence, and there is no real prudence without them.” (Gilson, The
Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 288.)
1382
As we have seen in Chapter 4, Justice is the virtue which disposes the rational will to act with
due respect to the rights of others. Aquinas argues that justice is the state of character that makes
people disposed to do what is just, and makes them act justly and wish for what is just. (NE,
1129a7ff. ) Strict reciprocity of duty but also extending to duties of religion and of filial gratitude.
1383
Aquinas writes of virtue as the “perfection of reason” in ST, II-II, 51,1.
1384
The intellectual appetite is understood as the attraction to abstract pleasurable goals brought
about by reward mechanisms in the brain responding to particular representations of goods
associated with those abstract goals.
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below) make prudent and just action possible. Hence, the neural
signature of the virtues disposing a single human act will reflect the
presence not only of the virtues disposing the intellect and rational
appetite, but also those disposing the irascible and sensitive
appetites.
 We must keep present that it is the person who is rational, not
particular brain cells. Although it is the case that the PFC, and higher
cortical areas in general, are more active in supporting the
dispositions of prudence and justice, it would be an unwarranted
conclusion that man’s intellectual life, his capacities to grasp the
truth of things or to love rationally, have their bases solely in activity
in the higher cortical areas. This position would have no philosophical
justification in keeping with the views of Aristotle and Aquinas.
Beyond the highly complex integration of all brain areas, including
limbic and basal structures, accompanying all activity in the cortex,
activity in the brain itself is supported by the organic life of the
organism, respiration, nutrition and circulation. Our microfocus on
neural structures and pathways and mechanisms must be balanced
by acknowledgement of the functional, existential, and objective
unity of the person.

Neural bases
At the neurobiological level, prudence and justice are perfections of
specific biological structures that are necessarily associated with
rationality in the embodied life. They are established by plasticityelicited changes to neural structures, which optimise neural and
biological efficiency and are essentially mechanisms for use-induced
establishment and reinforcement of neural pathways.

These perfections of bodily structures are essentially neuronal
facilitations of the following biophysical tasks. These tasks together
account for the roles of counsel, judgement, command, and the
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disposition to accommodate the good of others, as required by the
virtues of prudence and justice.1385
 A facilitation for (hereafter described as “capacity for”) processing of
sensory data as a prerequisite for grasping the reality of the context
for decision making. This processing will be directed by the lateral
PFC informed by the accurate cortical somatosensory feedback via
PNS and lower brain areas that is required for effective cortical
processing.
 Capacity for planning and foresight, and for consideration of
consequences of impact on others. This latter role is primarily a task
of the VMPFC, 1386 1387 the ACC and the OFC. Areas of the PFC are
active in consideration of possible future outcomes.1388 1389 1390
Contribution of the right DLPFC has been noted. It is believed that the
PFC, and in particular the OFC, is the site of appreciation of moral
consequences of behaviour.1391
 Capacity for cognitive processing of emotional content, and
particular reward representations reaching PFC via OFC (input from
cortico-striatal, and cortico-limbic pathways). Clinical studies show
time and again that frontal cortical inhibitory zones suppress lower
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Counsel may be understood as a having a sound grasp of reality and duty in both physical and
ethical dimensions. Judgement implies the capacity to evaluate the intrinsic and extrinsic benefits
of an action taking into account the good of others. Command implies the executive capacity to
carry decisions into action.
1386
Davidson, “Affective style, psychopathology, and resilience: Brain mechanisms and plasticity,”
1196-1214. It was the medial PFC that suffered damage in the case of Phineas Gage.
1387
Lee, et al., “Regulation of human behaviours,” 190.
1388
J. M. Fuster, The prefrontal cortex, (New York: Raven Press, 1989).
1389
J. Grafman,“Alternative frameworks for the conceptualisation of prefrontal functions” in
Handbook of Neuropsychology, ed. F. Boller and J. Grafman (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1994), 187.
1390
R. Passingham, The frontal lobes and voluntary action, (Oxford: OUP, 1993). Passingham is
recognised as a decisive pioneer of an understanding of PFC function and its role in support of
decision making.
1391
Note that damage to the medial PFC and frontal cortex leads to socially inappropriate
behaviour, disinhibition, emotional impairment, difficulty in planning, and impaired working
memory, as noted above in the celebrated case in 1848 of Phineas Gage but borne out by many
animal studies and human case studies. Cf Gazzaniga, Who’s in charge. Free will and the science of
the brain.
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order behaviours. 1392

1393

Emotional and reward representations are

generated in the medial PFC in conjunction with the BG via reciprocal
pathways. BG are also active in concert with the PFC, enlisting limbic
structures for processing emotional content and memory. 1394
Cognitive processing of emotional representations channeled
through the OFC via limbic-cortical pathways is primarily in DLPFC,
VMPFC, and OFC itself. 1395 1396 1397 This will be assisted by generation
of representations in the memory (primarily distributed in cortex and
in amygdala), as required for the representation of the anticipated
goods. Note that, via striatal pathways, the medial PFC is capable of
upstream modification on ACh and DA release, further modifying
reward and emotional representations. 1398 1399 Plasticity in spindle
cells understood to facilitate goal directed behaviour and self
control.1400 There is evidence that emotional and reward election
management requires the PFC areas to be in rich reciprocal
communication with the amygdala and striatum. 1401
 Capacity for associated deliberation about abstract goods (again
primarily in the PFC) represented by the above particular reward
representations. This cognitive activity directed by the lateral PFC will
be facilitated by recruitment of memory (principally corticaldeclarative, emotional memory via the limbic pathways, and
hippocampal memory) which “supports the capacity to make
1392

M. R. Bennett, “The prefrontal-limbic network in depression: Modulation by hypothalamus,
basal ganglia and midbrain,” 483.
1393
Zotev et al., “Self-Regulation of Amygdala Activation Using Real-Time fMRI Neurofeedback”.
1394
Koch, “Consciousness,” 1220.
1395
Davidson, “Affective style, psychopathology, and resilience: Brain mechanisms and plasticity,”
1196-1214.
1396
Barbas and Zikopoulos, “Sequential and parallel circuits for emotional processing in primate
orbitofrontal cortex,” 57.
1397
Balbernie, “Circuits and circumstances. The neurobiological consequences of early relationship
experiences and how they shape later behavior,” 237-255.
1398 Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with
developmental approaches to psychopathology,”747.
1399
Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 470.
1400
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 104-105.
1401
Ray and Zald, “Anatomical insights into the interaction of emotion and cognition in the PFC,”
479-501.
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generalisations and inferences from memory”.1402 1403 Recruitment of
various forms of short and long term memory at cortical, limbic, and
striatal sites in particular, facilitate recall of contextual particular
information, emotional cues, and also abstract rules of right and
wrong. The BG also play a direct role in the task of deliberation: areas
of BG interconnected with PFC are implicated in intentional
behaviour, learning and decision making. 1404
 Capacity for consequent generation of an intention is supported by
mechanisms of reward and goal election. As we have seen, goal
election and cognition of reward representations appear to be
closely associated functions. Rational intention will be informed by
medial PFC emotional processing balanced by laterally directed
deliberation.1405 1406 Input from the BG, modifying the PFC via
thalamic pathways, is also considered a key regulator of voluntary
behaviour.1407 Capacity for deliberation is an integrating cognitive
task directed by the lateral cortex. 1408 1409 Active brain areas are
diverse but feature strong connectivity. 1410 Memory in the striatum
not only appears to instruct the PFC with respect to procedural
patterns of behaviour,1411 but the striatum contributes to an
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Manns and Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain systems,” 1165.
th
Marieb, Elaine N. and Katja Hoehn. Human anatomy and physiology. 8 ed. San Francisco:
Pearson, 2010, 459. Declarative memory pathways involve sensory input carried to the association
cortex; information is then sent to the medial temporal lobe, including the hippocampus and
proximate temporal cortical areas that link to the PFC and the thalamus. ACh from the basal
forebrain released into the PFC and the medial temporal lobe is believed to trigger memory
formation.
1404
Wickens, (2009) “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia,”119.
1405
Markowitsch, et al., “Brain circuits for the retrieval of sad and happy autobiographic episodes,”
643-665.
1406
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 104-105.
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Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 464.
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Miller and Wallis, “The prefrontal cortex and executive brain functions,” 1201.
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Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 88.
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Lee, et al., “Regulation of human behaviours,” 189-199.
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emphasis on intentional behaviour, learning and decision making. 1412
1413

 Executive command is a task of the lateral cortex enlisting motor
cortices, the cortico-BG-thalamocortical loop, the BG, and the
cerebellum. 1414 1415 1416 1417 1418 (See No. 7 in this section.) This will
be complemented by the capacity to carry through executive
commands to appropriate execution.
 Capacity to utilise language as a vehicle for thought. For this the PFC
links extensively to Broca’s Area also in the frontal cortex.
 See also n. – q. in 5.3.3.1 outlining the particular neural features of
each of the four cardinal virtues considered individually.

Note that in the performance of a single human act, these tasks are
seamlessly integrated.1419

Prudence consists in appropriately formed neural structures that assist
the intellect in reaching correct conclusions about ends and means. The
lateral PFC is the principal site active in deliberation about
consequences and means, planning and foresight. Lateral and medial
PFC are densely interconnected and facilitate human volitional
activity,1420 and cognitive deliberation about emotional content.1421
1412

Wickens, (2009) “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia,”119.
Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 465.
1414
Doyon, et al., “Contributions of the basal ganglia and functionally related brain structures to
motor learning,” 62.
1415
Kaas and Stepniewska, “Motor cortex,” 159.
1416
Barbas and Zikopoulos, “Sequential and parallel circuits for emotional processing in primate
orbitofrontal cortex,” 73.
1417
Wickens, (2009) “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia,”119.
1418
th
Nolte, The human brain. An introduction to its functional anatomy, 5 ed., 473.
1419
The analysis of the constituent parts of the human act (3.1.3) provides essential knowledge for
the correct sequencing of activities at a somatosensory level and at the rational level. It provides a
clear understanding of the distinctions between counsel, judgment and command, and of the roles
of prudence and justice in informing these actions. Importantly also, it provides an understanding
of the reciprocating deliberation between the intellect and the rational appetite prior to
command. For example, an appreciation that particular reward representations precede to-and-fro
deliberations between parts of the cortex prior to a single completed human act is essential the if
the neural signature of the virtues disposing that human act are to correctly be identified.
1420
Lee, et al., “Regulation of human behaviours,” 189-199.
1413
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Justice consists in appropriately formed neural structures that assist the
rational will in choosing correctly. Neural structures include aspects of
those aspects of b-e which are related to affective appreciation and
evaluation, and emotion-cued reward representations. In particular,
areas of medial and orbital PFC are centrally implicated. These are the
principal cortical sites for emotional processing, reward evaluation,
deliberation about positive and negative affective consequences and
means, and planning and foresight, most particularly with respect to the
impact proposed actions will have on others. Recruitment of systems
for empathy (including mirror neurons) to assist in understanding
consequences of actions on others is also required. Areas of BG also,
interconnected with amygdala, and PFC assist in deliberation about
rewards with emotional content. Furthermore, a habit of expectations
of cortical (ie conscious) DA reward in response to appropriate
consideration for the impact of actions on others will be a further
indicator of possession of the virtue.

In summary, the PFC should be considered the most significant brain
area associated with the virtues of prudence and justice, although
various other brain areas are directly implicated, most significantly
other cortical areas, the BG, the limbic system, and the pathways
connecting these. The neural activity associated with prudence and
justice takes place in a highly integrated and coordinated manner across
multiple areas of the brain.

Associated systems
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of
emotional management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit

1421

Source for information in this section on the frontal cortex is, unless otherwise specified: Lee,
et al., “Regulation of human behaviours,” 190.
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formation. Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and
executive direction.
2. The virtues of fortitude and temperance dispose the irascible and sensitive
appetites to endure appropriate difficulties and to seek appropriate
pleasure.1422

Philosophical clarifications.
 Virtue consists in appropriate (ie rational) response in respect to
pleasure and pain. Regulation of emotion is at the heart of virtue.
Fortitude and temperance dispose for the effective management of
emotion. Rational guidance systems, disposed by prudence and
justice, then are able to act.
 Fortitude1423 and temperance1424 are essentially perfections of
biological structures of the body, directly associated with
management of emotional life, which facilitate the presentation of
appropriate arduous goods and pleasurable goods to the intellect
and will. It has been argued that fortitude and temperance are, in
total, ordered biophysical qualities of the human person; they
facilitate rational action in the same way that a well-trained animal
obeys the rationality of its master, eg by eating only when permitted,
defending the master’s interests by fighting, etc.

1422

The irascible and sensitive appetites, are understood as the attraction to concrete pleasurable
goals brought about by reward mechanisms in the brain responding to particular representations
or sensory input. Fortitude disposes the irascible appetite to endure difficulties in pursuit of
difficult goods. Temperance disposes the sensitive appetite to obey reason in moderating pursuit
of pleasures.
1423
Fortitude is a particular quality of self management; the right management of one’s fear and its
concomitant sorrow is at the heart of the virtue. The essence of the virtue of courage is mastery
over one’s emotions of fear with readiness in necessity to put one’s life knowingly and calmly on
the line. “The man of fortitude relinquishes, in self forgetfulness, his own possessions and his life.”
Pieper, Fortitude and Temperance, 54.
1424
Temperance is “the virtue whose particular function is to restrain and check passion” (Gilson,
“
The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, 263). It is a virtue of the appetitive part, by which
men cease to desire bad sensual pleasures” (Aristotle De Virtutibus et Vitiis 1250a30-37). In the
strict sense it is “a mean with regard to the bodily pleasures of touch” (NE, 1117b24ff). “To
temperance belongs absence of admiration for the enjoyment of bodily pleasures, absence of
desire for all base sensual enjoyment, fear of just ill repute, an ordered course of life, alike in small
things and in great. And temperance is accompanied by discipline, orderliness, shame, caution.”
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 We have seen that with respect to temperance Aristotle understood
that virtue consists in finding pleasure in the right things for the right
reason to the right degree. Thus we should look for the temperance
in the changes and dispositions in the pathways triggering pleasure
as well as in the cognitive reassessment and adjustment of sense
pleasure, a reassessment of fitting sources of pleasure.
 We have seen that with respect to fortitude Aristotle understood
that virtue consists in enduring difficulties in the right things for the
right reason and to the right degree. Thus we should look for the
fortitude in the changes and dispositions in the pathways triggering
fear as well as in the cognitive reassessment and adjustment of fear,
a “recalibration” of what makes us fearful.
 Note that, the points which follow should be read most particularly
in conjunction with the No. 1 in this section outlining the common
neural bases of prudence and justice, and n. – q. in 5.3.3.1 outlining
the particular neural features of each of the four cardinal virtues
considered individually. This is discussed in No. 1, immediately
above, according to the understanding of the unity of the virtues. 1425

Neural bases
At the neurobiological level, the virtues of fortitude and temperance
consist in plasticity elicited changes to neural structures. These changes
are brought about by mechanisms for use-induced establishment and
reinforcement of neural pathways and they serve to optimise neural
and biological efficiency. These perfections of bodily structures are
essentially neuronal facilitations, plasticity elicited predispositions for
rationally consistent responses to pain and to pleasure. They serve to
enable rational action. In the restricted sense they consist of habitual
responses, which when acquired, allow a person more easily to manage
1425

Note that an understanding of the unity of the virtues leads to the conclusion that the work of
the virtues is highly integrated, and points to the difficulty of precisely delineating at what point
the work of fortitude and temperance is completed, and where the work of prudence, most
particularly, commences.
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fear of bodily danger and inappropriate attraction to sense pleasures of
touch. In a broader sense they refer to habitual responses of patience
and determination in the face of difficulties, and to habitual responses
of appropriate moderation of pleasurable activities.

They are constituted by integrated activity in neural bases below.
Activity is primarily in interconnected areas of the PFC, limbic system,
and BG, dedicated to emotional regulation, bearing in mind that the
various emotions are represented, as would be expected, at differing
locations in the brain.

Fortitude and temperance, as we have seen, are brought about by
“training” according to Aristotle, in a way analogous to training an
animal. As such they may be viewed as varieties of “conditioned
response”, itself a broad term denoting learning brought about by some
form of incentive. These conditioned responses are compatible with,
and facilitate, conscious rational goal election.

The points below must be read in conjunction with No.1 above. In the
light of the above proviso, the common neural bases for fortitude and
temperance follow.
 Areas of the PFC (OFC, medial PFC, and lateral PFC) and areas of the
amygdala and of the BG are the key structures in management of
fear and pleasure. The capacity of the PFC to elicit conscious
representations of emotion, and to assess affective consequences of
actions is at the heart of this emotional regulation.1426 The PFC has
projections to and from the forebrain systems associated with
sensory data, with voluntary motor movement, with long term
memory, and with systems processing affect and motivational state.
1426

Davidson, “Affective style, psychopathology, and resilience: Brain mechanisms and plasticity,”
1196-1214.
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It is also interconnected to brain areas processing external
information (linked to sensory systems/cortical and subcortical
motor systems), as well as internal information (limbic and midbrain
involving affect, memory and reward).
 Cognitive processing of emotional representations reaching the OFC
via limbically modified thalamocortical pathways is primarily in
DLPFC, VMPFC and OFC, those areas of the cortex adjacent to the
limbic areas, and are believed to regulate emotional response.1427
1428 1429 1430

Conscious regulation of emotion utilizes both the DLPFC

and VMPFC. It is believed that the DLPFC recruits input from the
VMPFC (which includes the OFC) when there are conflicting
emotional situations.1431
 The OFC is regarded as the limbic gateway to the cortex. OFC
inhibition of subcortical areas such as the amygdala is a key to affect
regulation.1432 Neuroplastic remodelling of the frontal lobes is at the
core of improved affect regulation in the PFC, allowing the OFC to
effectively inhibit activation of subcortical areas such as the
amygdala.1433
 The ACC, within the medial PFC, has been called the “major outflow
of the limbic system” and is active in the experience of pain and
distress. 1434 With the OFC it plays a central role in cortical regulation
of emotion.1435 The ACC appears to play a role in inhibiting impulsive

1427

Guyton and Hall, Textbook of Medical Physiology, 11th ed., 738.
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 88.
1429
Barbas and Zikopoulos, “Sequential and parallel circuits for emotional processing in primate
orbitofrontal cortex,” 57.
1430
Davidson, “Affective style, psychopathology, and resilience: Brain mechanisms and plasticity,”
1196-1214.
1431
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 88.
1432
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults.
1433
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults.
1434
Posner and Rothbart, “Developing mechanisms of self regulation,” 429.
1435
Balbernie, “Circuits and circumstances. The neurobiological consequences of early relationship
experiences and how they shape later behavior,” 237-255.
1428
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behaviours and in generating goal-directed behaviours.1436 There is
evidence that it plays a role in analysing conflicting options.1437
 The BG informs the limbic loop of emotional management and plays
a significant role in regulation of emotional responses.1438 1439 1440
This finding supported by clinical observation that dysfunction of
basal ganglia-limbic circuitry leads to schizophrenia and severe
anxiety.1441
 The amygdala projects back to virtually all areas of the cortex
influencing not only responses to fear, but higher order thought
process, working and long term memories, ongoing perceptions,
attention, mental imagery, principally in assistance to emotional
regulation. 1442 1443
 Pathways for emotional regulation are found in the BG-thalamocortical loop importantly already associated with habit formation,
and in the limbic-OFC-ACC loop. 1444 Limbic modulation requires rich
reciprocal connections with the OFC. 1445 1446 Significantly, the NAc in
the BG is adjacent to the OFC and rich interconnections exist
between them. Limbic modulation also requires interconnectivity to
memory centres. OFC links to other cortical memory centres and to
subcortical memory centres including amygdala and hippocampus.
The lateral OFC, the OFC, and medial PFC are interconnected and

1436

Markowitsch, et al.,“Brain circuits for the retrieval of sad and happy autobiographic episodes,”
643-665.
1437
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 88.
1438
rd
Martin, Neuroanatomy: Text and Atlas, 3 ed., 347.
1439
Heatherton and Wagner, “Cognitive Neuroscience of Self-Regulation Failure,” 132-139.
1440
Michael W. Shiflett and Bernard W. Balleine, “Molecular substrates of action control in corticostriatal circuits,” Progress in Neurobiology 95, 1 (2011): 1–13. “How the striatum controls the
influence of reward learning on the cognitive control of action selection and initiation at a cellular
and molecular level is an area of active research.”
1441
Tortora and Derrickson, Principles of Anatomy and Physiology, 11th ed., 493-494.
1442
LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 287.
1443
Hamann, et al., “Ecstasy and agony: activation of the human amygdala inpositive and negative
emotion,” 135–141.
1444
Pare et al., “New vistas on amygdala networks in conditioned fear,” 1-9.
1445
Heatherton and Wagner, “Cognitive Neuroscience of Self-Regulation Failure,” 132-139.
1446
Somerville and Casey, “Developmental neurobiology of cognitive control and motivational
systems,” 236-241. Cortico-striatal pathways appear crucial for cognitive control.
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play a critical role in cognitive and emotional processing and in the
formation of motivation for the selection of behaviours.1447 DA
modulation of reward pathways is well established. 1448

1449 1450

 Various forms of memory are recruited in support of emotional
regulation. Consideration of the perceived good of emotional
regulation is associated with recruitment of memory (principally by
hippocampal-cortical memory systems informed by the amygdala)
the generation of reward representations associated with a
pleasurable good, and associated DA and opioid signaling.

Fortitude consists in appropriately formed neural structures that assist
the irascible appetite to obey rationality. These are essentially learned
dispositions at the neural level regulating fear responses and aversive
responses to pain.

As fortitude involves the rational management of fear, it is necessary to
describe the neural bases of the experience of fear in order to better
understand the neural bases of fortitude. To describe the neural bases
of the experience of fear I draw, among others, from the work of
Joseph LeDoux:
 The PFC is active in conscious representations of emotion, and in
assessing affective consequences of actions.1451 The presence of
fear, the capacity to experience fear, indicates the maturation of
working memory and in particular the OFC, linking temporal lobe
limbic areas (amygdala and temporal pole cortex), the subcortical
drive centres (in hypothalamus), and the DA neurons in reward

1447

Barbas and Zikopoulos, “Sequential and parallel circuits for emotional processing in primate
orbitofrontal cortex,” 57.
1448
Pine, et al., “Dopamine, Time, and Impulsivity in Humans,” 8888-8896.
1449
Buitelaar, “Adolescence as a turning point: for better and worse,” 357.
1450
Floresco, “Dopaminergic regulation of limbic-striatal interplay,” 400–411.
1451
Davidson, “Affective style, psychopathology, and resilience: Brain mechanisms and plasticity,”
1196-1214.
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centres of VTA.1452 ACh is responsible for the mediation of vivid
fearful memories. 1453
 The amygdala is active in the experience of fear, mediates emotional
influences on attention and perception, and regulates emotional
responses. Mechanisms of synaptic enhancement are linked to
emotional memory in studies of amygdala circuits that mediate fear.
1454

Emotional memory seems associated with the BLA which

includes the lateral, basolateral, and basomedial nuclei, and the
CEA.1455 The lateral nucleus area tags memories with emotional
“markers”.1456 Recall of these memories is mediated by
hippocampus.1457
 The BLA seems key in development of an aversion, of fear
conditioning. BLA draws input from widespread cortical areas, and
from the sensory nuclei of the thalamus, with reciprocal connections
to hippocampal and striatal memory systems. Outputs also extend
from BLA to CEA and thence to subcortical areas controlling fear
related responses such as heart rate, blood pressure, sweating,
hormone release, etc. 1458
 Emotional arousal appears to promote synaptic plasticity (for
memory and learning) by various mechanisms including release of
NE.1459 The emotional circuitry is also modulated in an excitatory way
by ACh from the gigantocellular neurons of the reticular excitatory
area.1460

1461

1452

Schore, “Effects of a secure attachment relationship on right brain development, affect
regulation and infant mental health,” 7-66.
1453
LeDoux, “Emotion circuits in the brain,” 155-184.
1454
Byrne, “Learning and memory: basic mechanisms,” 1141.
1455
LeDoux, “Emotion circuits in the brain,” 155-184.
1456
Davidson, “Affective style, psychopathology, and resilience: Brain mechanisms and plasticity,”
1196-1214.
1457
McGaugh, “The amygdala modulates the consolidation of memories of emotionally arousing
experiences,” 1-28.
1458
LeDoux, “Emotion circuits in the brain,” 155-184.
1459
Kessels and Malinow, “Synaptic AMPA Receptor Plasticity and Behaviour,” 344.
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Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 581.
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 Cortisol, adrenaline, and noradrenaline are triggered from the
adrenal glands in times of stress that may or may not accompany
fear.1462
Neural regions associated with the apprehension of pain are
widespread and include the lateral PFC, anterior and posteria insula, the
OFC, the MPFC, the anterior cingulate gyrus, areas of the BG, the
thalamus, amygdala, hippocampus and various other subcortical
regions. 1463

It is proposed that the specific neural bases of fortitude are essentially to be
found in neural modifications in the above pathways, most particularly in the
following ways:
 Cortical processing of pain and fear responses is facilitated by the
cortico-basal ganglia-thalamocortical loop which permits complex
cognitive-emotional interaction, and offer insights into processes of
planning, goal selection, self-regulation, attention and motivation.
There are dense interconnections between the OFC and the
amygdala, and between the amygdala, the hippocampus, and the
ventral striatum.1464 Furthermore, it is shown that motivation and
meaning are analgesic factors. 1465 Therefore plastic modification of
reward and goal setting pathways can effect changes in the pain
threshold.
 The VMPFC and the amygdala are the key brain areas implicated in
fear and its management. The VMPFC, the DLPFC, the hippocampus,
and amygdala constitute the core elements of the neural circuit (the
1462

Sunderland, The Science of Parenting, 40. “Brain scans show that early stess can cause the HPA
axis (the stress response system in the body) to become permanently wired for oversensitivity.”
“When a child experiences prolonged, uncomforted distress, the hypothalamus releases
corticotrophin releasing factor (CRF)”, which in turn stimulates the pituitary gland to release the
hormone adrenocorticotropin (ACTH) which travels to the adrenal glands (on top of each kidney)
which produce cortisol which in the short term “can help us to respond to stress by boosting the
level of glucose in the blood.” However continued exposure to high levels of cortisol is detrimental
to neurons. (p87)
1463
Leknes and Tracey, “A common neurobiology for pain and pleasure,” Figure 2, 317.
1464
th
Nolte, The human brain. An introduction to its functional anatomy, 5 ed., 469.
1465
Leknes and Tracey, “A common neurobiology for pain and pleasure,” Figure 2, 317.
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cortico-amygdalic pathways) critical for deactivating conditioned
fears. 1466
 Neurotransmitters modulate the individual’s emotional
responses,1467 We have seen, for example, 5-HT released into the
hypothalamus and limbic structures inhibits aggression. 1468 1469
 Emotional inhibition makes use of inhibitory pathways in the brain.
GABA is the major inhibitory transmitter in the mammalian brain
further modified by the presence of steroids (denoting stress) and
testosterone. 1470 1471 GABA and GABAergic genes are seen as key
mediators of learning and memory in anxiety, and in specific in the
amygdala and hippocampus, regions of the brain involved in memory
and anxiety. 1472
 Consciousness of wellbeing and inner peacefulness as a consequence
of release of opioids from the hypothalamus,1473 and release of
cortical (ie conscious) DA reward in response to appropriate
endurance of difficulties will be further possible indicators of virtue.

Temperance consists in appropriately formed neural structures that
condition the sensitive appetite to obey rationality. These are
1466

Morgan et al., “Extinction of emotional learning: contribution of medial prefrontal cortex”. In
rats it is the mPFC that plays a significant role for fear extinction in rats; this area corresponds to
the DLPFC in humans.
1467
Depue andCollins, “Neurobiology of the structure of personality: Dopamine, facilitation of
incentive motivation, and extraversion,” 514.
1468
Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 581.
1469
Guyton and Hall, Textbook of Medical Physiology, 11th ed., 730.
1470
Siegal and Sapru, Essential neuroscience, 124. Note that inhibitory refers to the effect at the
synapse and that therefore inhibitory pathways do not necessarily result in inhibition of actual
behaviours. Sometimes the opposite result is obtained by the mechanism.
1471
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults. 204. Note reference to the
work of LeDoux in this area. Sunderland writes that GABA naturally inhibits high levels of cortisol
and calms the amygdala. “Research shows that if young mammals are left alone or in a prolonged
state of distress, this can have a marked influence on how the genes for GABA unfold in the brain.
This can alter the brain’s sensitivity to stress, resulting in an agitated attitude to life for much of
the time.” Sunderland, The Science of Parenting, 44.
1472
Kalueff, “Neurobiology of memory and anxiety From genes to behaviour. (Review)”.
1473
Sunderland, The Science of Parenting, 87. Endorphins for the relief of pain are “endogenous
morphine”; oxytocin, released in the pituitary gland brings about feelings of comfort and well
being and inhibits the triggering of the body’s stress response system. Opioid receptors are
ubiquitous in the brain.
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essentially learned dispositions at the neural level regulating formation
of pleasure representations, and response to these representations.

The neural bases for the experience of sense pleasure consist in:
 Basic sexual drives associated the hypothalamus in association with
somatosensory feedback pathways trigger neurochemical and
hormonal release. DA, originating in the VTN and SN, is sent via
reward pathways, to the striatum, medial PFC and some twenty
other locations.
 Equivalent pathways associated with sense pleasures with respect to
food and drink.
 Emotional memories are laid down in the BLA, reward and
procedural memories in the striatum, and associated declarative
memories distributed through the cortex.

It is proposed that the specific neural bases of temperance are
essentially to be found in certain neural dispositions. Hence the neural
bases for temperance consist in the following:
 The facilitation of cortically moderated responses to basic sexual
drives associated the hypothalamus, and reward representations in
the medial PFC and the striatum, following pleasurable stimuli.
Reinforcement of appropriate emotional memory, procedural
memory and declarative memories will be take place in association
with this.
 Facilitation for conscious management of lustful feelings in DLPFC
and ACC, which have been shown to be activated in suppression of
sexual response.1474 The DLPFC, interacting with VLPFC and ACC,
becomes active in choosing to resist feelings deemed
inappropriate.1475
1474

Beauregard, et al., “Neural correlates of Conscious Self-Regulation of Emotion,” 1-6.
th
Noted in Nolte, The human brain. An introduction to its functional anatom , 6 ed., 605.
1475
Lee, et al., “Regulation of human behaviours,” 190.
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 Established pathways of habituated responses to pleasure in keeping
with rational choice, in association with cognitive pathways
regulating reward responses, assessing impact on others, and
assessing proposed behaviours against moral learning.
 DA modulation of appropriate reward representations in the
striatum exerts in turn a major modulatory effect on cortical output
via the cortico-striatal connection and the via the thalamolimbic
pathway. 1476 Cortico-basal-thalamic loops lead to further
modulation and reinforcement of appropriate pathways.
 Consciousness of wellbeing and inner peacefulness as a consequence
of release of opioids from the hypothalamus,1477 and release of
cortical (ie conscious) DA reward in response to appropriate sense
pleasure, will be further possible indicators of virtue.

In 4.2.6 I asked why fear has the capacity to obliterate reason more easily than
sense pleasure. The neural bases for these two responses are distinct, and it
would appear possible that the central role of the amygdala, and direct
interconnectivity with the hypothalamus, offer an explanation for this enhanced
function.1478 The studies of LeDoux demonstrate that fear responses are highly
phylogenetically conserved; for evolutionary reasons, the sympathetic, fight or
flight responses triggered by the amygdala, have an override capacity.1479 Cortical
processing comes second. It would seem too that pathways for the experience of
sense pleasure to some extent are more cortically driven, a result of choice rather
than of chance encounter in the environment requiring split second response. For
this evolutionary reason too, it would seem that response to fear is more
dominating and subrational.

Associated systems
1476

Da Cunha, “Learning processing in the basal ganglia: a mosaic of broken mirrors,” 158.
Sunderland, The Science of Parenting, 87. See also preceding Sunderland note.
1478
th
Nolte, The human brain. An introduction to its functional anatomy, 5 ed., 469.
1479
For an introduction to the anatomy and physiology of the brain: Larry W. Swanson, “Basic plan
rd
of the nervous system” in Squire, Larry et al. Fundamental Neuroscience. 3 ed. Burlington, MA:
Elsevier, 2008. Chapter 2.
1477
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Plasticity. Systems for learning. A-O paradigms giving way to S-R paradigms.
Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of emotional management.
Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit formation. Cognition,
consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and executive direction.
Systems for imitation and empathy.

3. A capacity for rational goal election is evident.

Philosophical clarifications.
In this section we look more closely at the neural basis for cognitive
management of goal election. Cognitive management of goal election is
a necessary but insufficient condition for the presence of virtue.
Cognitive choices must not only be present but also disposed by
prudence and justice (as discussed in No.1 above). Vice is none other
than the deliberate choice of harmful behaviours.

We have seen in No.2 that fortitude and temperance may be developed
by incentive learning. In such a paradigm will be found rational goal
election, supported by reward incentives for appropriate behaviours.

In addition what can be called an intellectual or spiritual joy is effected
by harmonious rational activity. This may be understood as the peace,
comprehended rationally, and further rewarded by the body’s reward
systems, derived from due order in one’s emotional and passionate life,
and from an appreciation of the good accruing to others because of
one’s virtuous activity.

The pleasure associated with virtuous action is first of all a
consequence of the reward systems and pathways. These reward
systems operate at two levels: as a motivation to act, and as a further
reward for virtuous action.
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Neural bases
Our focus in this section is on the reward systems of the human
organism, associated with goal election and motivation; our focus is on
how these, in themselves, are subject to the neural facilitation of virtue.
Reward systems may either be subject to cognitive direction, or (in the
case of impulsive behaviour) over-ride effective cognitive direction. It is
shown for example, that subcortical sensory inputs to the amygdala can
drive emotional responses that precede cortical awareness, thereby
circumventing executive direction. 1480

Neural modifications associated with virtue will dispose reward systems
to cognitive deliberations thereby offering the satisfaction of greater
self management attuned to the integrated flourishing of the entire
organism.

The neural bases for the human reward systems involve:
 The exciting DA driven, and the blissful endorphin driven systems. DA
release is the principal mechanism of reward activation and, as we
have seen, is interdependent on opioid signalling. The hormone
oxytocin manufactured in hypothalamus provides specialised reward
incentive, upregulating mood. A further type of reward activation
involves 5-HT release into the limbic area and hypothalamus. 1481
1482

5-HT receptors are found in nerve endings throughout brain. 1483

 Areas of the amygdala, BG, and OFC are major reward “centres” of
the brain. 1484

1485

They are richly interconnected. Cue-reward

learning and synaptic plasticity in the amygdala, more particularly,
1480

Pare D, Quirk GJ, and LeDoux JE 2004 New vistas on amygdala networks in conditioned fear.
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and learning,” 194.
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442

the LA appears to be a decisive mechanism underpinning goal
directed behaviour. Note that goal directed behaviour does not
necessarily imply consciously elected action.
 Hedonic reward has been long believed to be mediated by DA
projections from the VTA of the basal forebrain.1486 Midbrain DA
systems appear to provide reward signals to the PFC strengthening
specific connections for particular behaviours.1487 1488
 We have seen that there are two major DA systems in the brain: one
projecting from the SNpc to the caudate and the putamen in the
striatum and in a minor way to the NAc;1489 another, the
mesocorticolimbic DA system originating in the VTA and innervating
the NAc, the amygdala and the various parts of the cortex,
particularly the PFC. 1490 This second system is regarded as central to
the brain’s reward circuit,1491 1492 and critical in facilitation of
incentive motivation.1493
 These DA systems, triggered by cortico-limbic afferents,1494 in
response to novel reward stimuli are the principal reward signals
acting on the PFC to strengthen specific connections for particular
behaviours.1495 1496
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Di Filippo et al., “Short term and long-term plasticity at corticostriatal synapses: implications
for learning and memory,”116.
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Miller, E. K., and Cohen, J. D. “An integrative theory of prefrontal function” Annual Review of
Neuroscience. 24 (2001): 167-202.
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 The BG play a major role in learning owing to their plasticity,
presence in the reward and emotional regulation pathways, and
efferent neuronal pathways to sensory cortices allowing somatic and
sensory feedback. 1497 Closed cortical (lateral PFC, OFC, and the
premotor cortex) - striatal loops appear to enable PFC to link
complex anticipated behaviours with rewards, relying on rapid
plasticities of the striatum. 1498
 The NAc is topographically linked to basolateral amygdala and is a
major terminal area for DA release in the reward pathways. The role
of the striatum is essential in reward and motivation, organising
somatosensory representations in a topographic manner. It draws
cortical inputs from many areas of cerebral cortex.1499

The neural bases facilitating virtuous activity in association with the
human reward systems will facilitate activity in the following structures
and pathways.
 Plasticity in the OFC enables cortical processing of reward
representations. The OFC is the key area for volitional goal election.
Reward representations in the OFC are associated with goal-directed,
conscious choices of action.1500 The OFC permits association
information to access representational memory promoting
“voluntary, cognitive, and goal directed (not stimulus driven)
behaviour and facilitating new learning.” 1501 It is activated by tasks
where processing of rewarding or emotional information is
required,1502 1503 1504and where information about rewards and
punishments is integrated with their predictors to select goals for
1497
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1499
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1500
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Davidson, “Affective style, psychopathology, and resilience: Brain mechanisms and plasticity,”
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Roberts and Parkinson, “Functions of primate orbitalfrontal cortex, 250.
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action. 1505 1506 Medial OFC appears implicated in reward and the
lateral OFC in punishment. 1507
 The OFC through its rich reciprocal connections to the limbic system
and to the striatum plays a major integrating role. 1508 The OFC
(particularly area MOC13) integrates both stimuli and responses with
complex associations of reinforcement.1509 MOC 13 is believed to
integrate appetitive and aversive factors that are environmentally
dependent."1510
 Plasticity in the DA pathways and uptake in the PFC facilitates
cortical processing of reward representations. A large proportion of
PFC neurons assisted by DA release, encode rewards linking
behaviours to goal directed consequences. 1511 It is postulated that
DA neurons in the midbrain respond when a reward seems
imminent. 1512
 Plasticity in areas of the BG facilitates conscious reward processing.
1513

Like the OFC, the striatum is activated in association with

movement for an expected reward. 1514

1515

The BG contain

inhibitory GABAergic neurons, 1516 requiring strong and coherent
excitatory cortical inputs from almost all cortical areas to become
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active. 1517 Over time A-O behaviours activating the ventral striatum
give way to S-R behaviours.1518

1519

As has been discussed, S-R

behaviours can also be volitional.1520
 Plasticity in connectivity between the BG and the OFC is crucial to
the body’s reward system, and hence to systems for goal election.
Cells of the striatum become active in anticipation of reward,
mirroring reward coding in the OFC.1521 1522 DA is released into the
striatum leading to further limbic modification of neural
transmission. DA modulation in the BG in turn brings about a decisive
modulatory effect back on the cortex via the cortical-BG-cortical
pathways. Striatal DA depletion is shown to lead to severe disruption
of learned movement sequences.1523 This further supports the view
that there is an interconnection, at the level of the BG, between
reward pathways and learned sequential behaviours. The DA system
acts as a learning signal for behavioural reinforcement but also may
well be involved in attention and motivation before all important
events, both positive and negative. Its action is facilitated by neural
loops. 1524
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Wickens, “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia,” 125.
1519
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becomes associated with management pathways of actions.
1520
Beretta et al., “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia: A similar code for physiological and
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greetings to strangers, may of course be fully intended and free, despite their intrinsic motivation.
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between the sustained activity in striatal cells in comparison with the hundreds of millisecond
activations of DA cells of the midbrain. The striatal-cortical reciprocal pathways connect reward
centres in the BG and PFC and play a major role in goal election. DA, a principal mediator of
plasticity, is decisive in development of habits of goal directed action.
1523
Horvitz, “Stimulus-response and response outcome learning mechanisms in the striatum,” 135.
1524
Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with
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 Consciousness of wellbeing and inner peacefulness as a consequence
of release of opioids from the hypothalamus,1525 and release of
cortical (ie conscious) DA reward will be further possible indicators of
virtue.

Associated systems
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Reward
and motivational systems. Systems for habit formation. Cognition, consideration
of consequences, planning, goal election, and executive direction.

4. “Virtues change us.” The acquisition of virtue creates a state of character, a
way of being that tends to be permanent..

Philosophical clarifications.
At a secondary level, it is universally recognised that the habits we
develop change us as people: good habits, virtues, change us for the
better; bad habits, vices, for worse. Habit formation may be seen to
consist in, at the neural level, of plasticities that facilitate certain ways
of acting and thinking.

Here I look at character, understood as a stable way of being that is
associated with and denoted by qualities that have been acquired or
developed. My focus is on habits that are acquired, the stable
behaviours that define character.

Neural bases
 Explanation for the quasi permanent nature of character changes in
the virtuous state is found at its foundation in the brain’s capacity to
incorporate use-induced structural plasticities which elicit

1525

Sunderland, The Science of Parenting, 87.
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permanent structural changes at the neural level, predisposing
thereby to changed behaviours.1526
 Cortical and BG plasticities appear central to the stable,
characteristic ways of acting and thinking that constitute personality
and that are evident in emotional management systems, reward
evaluation, systems for cognition and deliberation, and in the facility
to act.
 The cumulative effect of genetically transcripted changes on
personality is profound.1527 In fact structural plasticities may have
more permanent and lasting forms. For example, hippocampal
plasticity is supplanted by cortical plasticity over time that is
mediated by the striatum. 1528 1529
 There is a compelling case supporting the view that the BG are a key
component in the development of stable voluntary habits.1530 1531 In
conjunction with the PFC, the BG are now increasingly regarded as a
key brain area for reward and emotion processing, cognition and
voluntary goal election, and for behaviour changing modulatory
input to the cortex. BG are now seen as a centre, not only for
subconscious facilitation of habits, but also mediating deliberate
attention, and limbic modulation of cognition and action.1532 (see
2.6)
 The BG are now recognised as an area critical for learning, cognition
and behavioural control. 1533 1534 Furthermore, the role of the BG,
1526

Butz, et al., “Activity dependent structural plasticity,” 287-305. As we have seen, plasticity is
now known to be virtually ubiquitous in the human brain.
1527
Malenka and Bear, “LTP and LTD: an embarrassment of riches,” 5-12. This is despite the fact
that LTD is the mechanism whereby LTP can be reversed in the neocortex.
1528
Pasupathy and Miller, “Different time courses of learning related activity in the prefrontal
cortex and striatum,” 873-876.
1529
For distinct forms of memory systems and the story of their discovery, the principal source of
material that follows: Manns and Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain systems,” 488.
1530
Manns and Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain systems,” 1165. The role of the BG in
modifying cortical motor representations is well documented.
1531
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and of the cortico-striatal pathways, in conscious goal election is
increasingly well understood. 1535
 It has become clear in recent years that the PFC-basal pathways
sustain voluntary movement, whereas the motor cortex-basal
ganglionic modules underlie more automatic movements.1536 The
role of the BG in instructing the cortex in S-R situations is well
understood.1537 Now it is becoming clear that S-R habituation need
not necessarily be subconscious nor, per se, non-volitional. BG
pathways appear integral to the pursuit of complex, purposeful,
behaviour patterns,1538 It may be argued that individual goal directed
behaviours on repetition become automated and less reward
dependent, but nevertheless they remain purposeful, thereby
fulfilling requirements for virtuous action.1539

Associated systems
Plasticity. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of emotional
management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit formation.
Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and executive
direction. Systems for effective execution of motor commands. Systems for
imitation and empathy.

5. The virtuous state is in keeping with our human nature.

Philosophical clarifications.
1534

Beretta et al., “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia: A similar code for physiological and
pathological conditions,” 349. “It is well known that the cortico-striatal network controls
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to reward feedback, and stimulus linked actions, largely automatic or habitual.”
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Wise and Shadmehr, “Motor control,” 153.
1537
See for example: Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation”; Da
Cunha, “Learning processing in the basal ganglia: a mosaic of broken mirrors”.
1538
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Virtue assists human beings to flourish by disposing us to rational
action.1540 The virtuous state, in keeping with our human nature,
facilitates the fulfilment of our needs as human beings, understood by
some as the goods of human flourishing (6.2), and promotes the
complete realisation of personal potential (ie both at the biological level
and at the level of the transcendental fulfilment by truth and love).
Virtue offers us the capacity to be open both to the truth of experience
and to transcendent truth, to elect reasonable goals for pursuit without
interior hindrance, and to respond with love in interpersonal
relationships.

Neural bases
 Virtue fosters the complete realisation of personal potential at the
biological level. The development of virtue is manifestly a state of
integration of brain systems, and a realisation of the capacity to learn
most effectively from experience. The integration of the brain
systems harnessed for the possession and expression of virtue is
suggested by Table 5.1 and is central to this proposal for the neural
bases of virtue. The capacity to learn from experience is a
consequence of mechanisms of plasticity in conjunction with the
somatosensory system, and systems for imitative learning.
 Biological flourishing of the organism may be understood as the
maturity of neural development. It implies the highest degree of
development and specialization of individual neural components,
mechanisms and systems, together with the development of
interconnectivities (of all cortical, sub cortical, limbic, brain stem
regions and PNS, together with the full development of
1540

NE, 1106a15. “That which makes its possessor good and his work good likewise”. The good
may be understood that which is most fulfilling according to one’s nature; rationality is ordered to
choice of what is good.
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neuromodulatory pathways). Thus is enabled the most complete
integration and contribution of all elements at the service of
emotional direction and enrichment, and which, in turn, is at the
service of efficient, rationally directed action that takes the rights of
others into full account.
 Virtue offers the complete realisation of personal potential at the
transcendental level by fostering an integration of emotional and
rational life. Through a disposition to rational action, one is
empowered to know and to love in an habitual way.
 See No. 1 above for an overview of the neural manifestations of
rational action.
 Note also that the development of neuronal maturity in the support
of rational operations is a gradual process. Neonates manifest little
activity in the cerebral cortex and this accords with the Aristotelian
view that infants and children, because they do not possess full
rationality, are incapable of perfect virtue.1541
 See also 6.2.1.

Associated systems
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of
emotional management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit
formation. Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and
executive direction. Systems for effective execution of motor commands. Systems
for imitation and empathy. Sensitive periods of development.

6. In the exercise of virtue intrinsic motivation takes priority over extrinsic
motivation. Virtue is motivated by that which is worthy of man’s nature.

Neural bases

1541

Byrne, “Learning and memory: basic mechanisms,” 1142.
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Intrinsic motivation leading to virtuous activity is present in several
ways:
 As has been discussed, once a disposition is acquired, A-O paradigms
give way to S-R paradigms (possibly operating below the threshold of
consciousness), leading to intrinsic reward associated with -opioid
and phasic DA signalling in the BG, NAc, pallidum and PFC.1542 (It is
argued that S-R paradigms are compatible with rational action.1543)
 Actions disposed by virtue will be intrinsically rewarding, a trigger in
themselves for the contentment mediated by reward systems.
 By the exercise of the virtue of justice (see No. 1 above) which is
always present in virtuous action, actions are disposed to take into
account the good of others. This may be understood as a form of
intrinsic motivation because there is no conscious hedonic benefit
sought by the protagonist in interpersonal relationships. Persons may
never be instrumentalised for personal gain or reward.

Associated systems
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of
emotional management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit
formation. Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and
executive direction. Systems for imitation and empathy.

7. Virtue facilitates effective action.

Philosophical clarifications.
While not all virtuous action need manifest in external activity, external
activity that does result is rationally directed, taking the needs of others
into account, addressing one’s own needs, having both sound intention
and prudent selection of means.
1542

Leknes and Tracey, “A common neurobiology for pain and pleasure,” 314-320.
Yin and Knowlton, “The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation,” 465. The speed of
development however is striking. In the first four years of life, cerebral neuronal metabolic activity
increases to twice adult levels, thereafter declining to adult levels by age 15.
1543
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 See No. 1 for actions originating in the intellectual appetite.
 See No. 2 above for actions originating in the sensitive appetite.
 The virtue of prudence will underpin selection of ends and means.
(See 5.3.3.1.n.)
 The virtue of justice takes account of the impact of actions on others.
(See 5.3.3.1.o.)

Effective direction of habitual external behaviours is effected by
complex pathways involving primarily the PFC, the motor cortices and
the BG.

Neural bases.
We have seen in No.1 above, the role of executive command in the
virtue of prudence. This was described as a task of the lateral cortex
enlisting motor cortices, subserved by systems for action selection or
goal election, and motor pathways utilizing the BG-thalamo-cortical
loop, the BG, and the cerebellum, complemented by the capacity to
carry through executive commands to appropriate execution. 1544 1545
1546 1547 1548

Here I focus on the facilitation specifically of these tasks.

This is a further characteristic that is necessary, but in isolation
insufficient, for the presence of virtue.

The facilitation of execution of intended action requires integration of
the various sectors of the frontal lobe (most specifically the lateral PFC,
an area oriented to action1549, and the motor cortices), enlistment of the
1544

Doyon, et al., “Contributions of the basal ganglia and functionally related brain structures to
motor learning,” 62.
1545
Kaas and Stepniewska, “Motor cortex,” 159.
1546
Barbas and Zikopoulos, “Sequential and parallel circuits for emotional processing in primate
orbitofrontal cortex,” 73.
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Wickens, (2009) “Synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia,”119.
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orbitofrontal cortex,” 73.
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BG and cerebellum (for procedural facilitation), and directed neural
activity in subsequent pathways via brain stem to execution in the PNS .

Plasticity in these motor pathways is well documented. ACh is the
principal excitatory mediating agent at the neuromuscular synapse,
opening ion channels and triggering the phenomenon of muscular
memory. Epi also plays a role.1550 AMPA trafficking is the mechanism
appearing to underlie the formation of neuronal pathways, and
behaviour modification itself.1551 Activity at the motor synapse can be
self reinforcing with synapse pruning serving to optimise the
connection,1552 1553 causing the synapse to be responsive to the specific
environment of the individual. 1554

The neural facilitation for effective action will consist in the following
aspects:
 The PFC itself is richly endowed with connections for conscious
motor management to motor cortices, the primary motor cortex, the
premotor and supplementary motor areas and Broca’s area. In
addition to “anatomical loops” between the PFC and the BG , there is
rich interconnectivity between the functional sectors of the frontal
lobe, the cerebellum, the BG, and lower brain structures enabling
execution of cortical commands. The medial PFC “provides goal
directed motor plans selected within the NAc on the basis of
contextual and emotional associations from both the hippocampus
and the amygdala”.1555
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 Multiple memory systems are associated with execution of goal
directed motor plans.1556 The premotor cortex holds motor activity
in memory. 1557 Motor memories and learning are triggered in the
premotor cortex by ACh released from the basal forebrain. 1558 The
dorsal striatum lays down memory for the long-term storage of welllearned movement sequences and motor habits. 1559 The cerebellum
holds movement programming.1560 Hippocampal plasticity and
memory are evident in the development phase of habits in the
striatum, and in the formulation of goal directed motor plans.1561.
 Long term storage of explicit motor knowledge is in the PFC and
associated parts of the BG, while storage of intermediate term
explicit motor knowledge is in the MTL. 1562
 The BG are most involved not only in cortical management of
emotion, and habit formation, but also in motor management. The
dorsal striatum lays down memory for motor habits and instructs the
PFC in S-R situations.1563 The putamen receives input from motor and
somatosensory cortical areas. 1564 Processing of motor commands
takes place here and in the GP.1565 BG outputs directly affect activity
of motor areas in the cortex,1566 operating “mainly to modify cortical
motor representations rather than control behaviour through direct
motor inputs”.1567 The GP and the SN of the BG also play a major role
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Manns and Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain systems,” 1174.
th
Marieb and Hoehn, Human anatomy and physiology, 8 ed., 437.
1558
Siegal and Sapru, Essential neuroscience, 124.
1559
Floyer-Lea and Matthews, “Distinguishable Brain Activation Networks for Short- and LongTerm Motor Skill Learning,” 517.
1560
th
Marieb and Hoehn, Human anatomy and physiology, 8 ed., 458-459.
1561
Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with
developmental approaches to psychopathology,” 747.
1562
Wise and Shadmehr, “Motor control,” 137-157.
1563
rd
Squire et al., Fundamental Neuroscience. 3 ed.
1564
th
Nolte, The human brain. An introduction to its functional anatomy, 5 ed., 469.
1565
th
Martini, Fundamentals of Anatomy and Physiology, 6 ed., 486.
1566
th
Nolte, The human brain. An introduction to its functional anatomy, 5 ed., 469.
1567
Manns and Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain systems,” 1165.
1557

455

in motor control, 1568 selecting patterns of cortical activity, and
ultimately selecting and reinforcing chosen motor programs.1569
 The BG-thalamo-cortical loop processes subsequent motor
commands. Motor learning involves a “functional interplay...
between cortico-striatal, cortico-cerebellar, and limbic systems.” 1570
 The cerebellum assists in movement and motor habits and is now
recognised to have a likely role in formation of cognitive habits.1571
1572 1573

Furthermore, there is now evidence that the cerebellum and

the BG are far more interconnected ,via a cerebello-thalamo-striatal
pathway, and are therefore interactive, than has been long
thought.1574
 Axonal myelination facilitates speed of sensory and motor
messaging through much of the PNS and CNS.
 See also 6.2.1.2.

Associated systems.
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for
habit formation. Memory systems. Cognition, consideration of consequences,
planning, goal election, and executive direction. Systems for effective execution of
motor commands.

8. Virtue brings about ease of action.

Philosophical clarifications.
1568
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The easy repeatability of behaviours associated with virtue is
immediately seen, for example in habitual courtesies, habits of getting
up when the alarm goes off, habits of reacting to difficulties with
patience, etc.

Neural bases.
Here we focus on the development of habit, automaticity, in good
behaviours. Ease of action is primarily a result of a number of neuronal
mechanisms and loci of facilitation:
 Preferential pathways are established by mechanisms of plasticity: in
the pathways of the CNS and PNS, in motor, emotional and
deliberative areas and pathways, in the various seats of memory, etc.
 Mechanisms of habit learning, of automatisation, offer an
explanation for the phenomenon of behaviours that appear to
remain robust in the absence of immediate rewards. A-O paradigms
give way to S-R paradigms with lower cortical demand: action
becomes more efficient as action moves from high levels of cortical
activation to simpler patterns of activation that are associated with
automaticity.
 The BG mediate subconscious facilitation of habits, cognition and
action.1575 Hence they are now recognised as areas contributing to
conscious control of established behaviours. The putamen, an area of
the sensorimotor striatum, 1576 involved in learning and movement
initiation and neuromodulated by DA from the SNpc, is also enriched
by reward pathways.1577
 See 6.2.1.2.
1575
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Associated systems.
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems
for habit formation. Systems for effective execution of motor commands.

9. Virtue facilitates the flourishing of the person. Virtue brings about a state of
excellence: an excellence of the person, inclusive necessarily of both
neurobiological flourishing and the exercise of rationality. It is a state
whereby reason and rationality are empowered to manage activity. Capacity
for rationality that is reflective and emotionally enriched and able to be
carried through into noble humane behaviours.

Philosophical clarifications.
 Flourishing, those habits “by which a person acts well”,1578 is in effect
the “reward of virtue”.1579 It denotes a state in which autonomy and
agency, mastery over one’s operations and activities, are enhanced.
Autonomy is a consequence of enhanced rationality and an
enhanced capacity to bring one’s plans to fruition. See also No.5.
 See also 6.2.1.2 where I argue that flourishing may be understood on
at least three levels: affective, functional and teleological (directly
facilitating of the final end of the person).

Neural bases.
 Nos. 1 and 2 above, focused on the capacity for the person to act in a
truly rational and emotionally enriched way are the heart of
eudaimonia. The high degree of integration of systems required, in
support of emotional regulation and cognitive goal selection directed

1578
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towards moral behaviour, is well established and increasingly
acknowleged.1580
 Nos. 7 and 8 above, focused on ease and efficiency of action,
enhancing further to the autonomy of the person, contribute further
to his functional flourishing. Functional flourishing requires structural
maturity at the cellular and systemic levels, as well as functional
integration. Essentially these processes are driven by developmental
gene transcription triggered by internal processes and appropriate
sense inputs. As the person matures after infancy, the subject’s own
goal choices increasingly direct experiential inputs that consolidate
pathways facilitating future behaviours. Development becomes
increasingly self regulated, or at least offers the potential for this to
be so.1581
 Learning pathways need to be both efficient and cognitively directed:
a result of plasticity and well developed mechanisms supported by
habitual management of attentional systems.

Associated systems.
Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of emotional
management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit formation.
Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and executive
direction. Systems for effective execution of motor commands. Systems for
imitation and empathy. Sensitive periods of development.
1580

A representative sample of supporting papers: Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural
constituents,” 841-849; Grossberg and Versace, “Spikes, synchrony, and attentive learning by
laminar thalamocortical circuits,” 278-312; Greene and Haidt, “How (and where) does moral
judgment work?” 517–523; Somerville and Casey, “Developmental neurobiology of cognitive
control and motivational systems,” 236-241. Also see Stevens, et al., “Age-related cognitive gains
are mediated by the effects of white matter development on brain network integration,” 738–746;
Luna, et al., “What has fMRI told us about the Development of Cognitive Control through
Adolescence?” 101.
1581
The work of Wolf Singer is of relevance. His work focuses on how the brain is modified by
experience, and on the synaptic modifications underpinning the neurobiological basis of learning
and memory. At the Pontifical Academy of the Sciences gathering of experts in Human
Neuroplasticity and Education in October 2010, he spoke of the “massive rearrangement of
functional networks” in adolescence, and of the “second chance” to reconstitute one’s neural
structures in a way more conducive to personal fulfilment. Note reference to Singer in Table 1.1. A
hylomorphic critique of 20th century currents in philosophy of mind.
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B. CHARACTERISTICS OF VIRTUE IN ITS ACQUISITION
Essential features pertaining to virtue in its acquisition.

10.

The virtuous state results from habituation and education.

Philosophical clarifications.
Habituation in the Aristotelian sense consists of training from one’s
earliest years, primarily in the behaviours appropriate to fortitude and
temperance. Education, in Aristotelian sense, consists both in the
learning of appropriate information (for example, of right and wrong in
accord with nature) and the acquisition of appropriate experiences. In
both, guided experience, imitation of good example, aspiration to what
is good, true, and beautiful, and appropriate correction of erring
behaviours are essential. Education also requires explicit ethical and
behavioural instruction, carried out in a practical and contextual
manner.

Neural bases.
 The neural bases for mechanisms of habituation are a result
primarily of the plasticities, primarily use-induced, present in
mechanisms of learning associated with the virtues of fortitude and
temperance (see No. 2 above). These are complemented by the
explicit development of habits and automaticity in specific
behaviours (see No. 8 above.).
 The neural bases for mechanisms of education are a result primarily
of the plasticities, primarily use-induced, present in mechanisms of
learning associated with the virtues of prudence and justice (see No.
1 above.) These will be complemented by mechanisms of imitation
inspired by exposure to what is good, true and beautiful (see No. 12
below), and explicit ethical instruction (see No. 16 below).
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Mechanisms of attention need to be engaged in order to facilitate
learning (see No. 13 below).

Associated systems.
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of
emotional management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit
formation. Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and
executive direction. Systems for effective execution of motor commands. Systems
for imitation and empathy. Sensitive periods of development.

11.

Repetition, understood as critical practice, plays an essential role in the
acquisition of virtue: repetition in appetitive responses, in responses
manifesting noble sentiment and attentiveness to others, and in
reasoning, deliberation and sound decision making.

Neural bases.
 Use-induced plasticities and pathways operate across most brain
areas and pathways, established by Hebbian laws, underpin the
synaptic strengthening that results from repetition of neural firing.
(See 2.2 and Tables 2.3 and 2.15)
 Other forms of learning also contribute. The possibility of self
induced and parentally guided conditioning has been discussed.
 DA reinforcement of goal directed activity underpins a broad
spectrum voluntary plastic reinforcement of behaviours.

Associated systems.
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Systems of emotional
management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit formation.
Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and executive
direction. Systems for effective execution of motor commands. Systems for
imitation and empathy. Sensitive periods of development.
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12.

Education specifically in wisdom and beauty is necessary in the formation
of virtue.

Neural bases.
All experience leaves neural changes. Education in wisdom and beauty
is acquired, in the Aristotelian view, by exposure to appropriately true
and beautiful experience. Experiences where there is effortful attention,
positive emotional association, repetition, or novelty are shown to have
greater potential to effect neural change. Mechanisms of cognitive
learning and memory, as well as use-induced plasticities, will be
implicated.

Neural facilitation of these pathways of learning consists in plastic
modification of neural structures associated with:
 Attentional control. (See No. 13 below, and Tables 2.9 and 4.2
Attentional Systems.)
 Mechanisms for learning. (See No. 16 below, and Tables 2.4 and 4.2
Systems for learning.)
 Pathways for empathy. (See No. 15 below, and Tables 2.6 and 4.2
Systems for imitation and empathy.) This will be most relevant in
ease of adoption of behavioural example of parents, siblings,
mentors and friends.
 Pathways responsive to positive emotional context and affection.
(See No. 17 below, and Tables 2.2 and 4.2 Sensitive periods of
development.)

Associated systems.
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of
emotional management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit
formation. Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and
executive direction. Systems for imitation and empathy.
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13.

Effortful attention plays a significant role.

Philosophical clarifications.
Human beings have some capacity to reflect on the direction and level
of attention operating in their sensory systems (most significantly the
visual system). They have some capacity to redirect or focus that
attention if they so choose. If the activity pursued is virtuous, the choice
to focus one’s attention must also be virtuous as it is integral and
necessary for the intended act. The relationship between willpower
(which, if rational and effective, will with due regard to the unity of the
virtues involve the spectrum of established virtues) and attention has
been noted.

Neural bases.

Effortful attention appears to be a prerequisite for much of the learning
associated with the development of virtue. This is so for at least two
major reasons:
 The attentional system is a key to self-directed brain plasticity, and as
such is a key to free and volitional behaviour.
 Effortful attention would appear to be present in all learning from
sensory input (consider for example a small child learning by
observing). The nucleus basalis, and the attention system in which it
plays a critical part, have the capacity to guide plastic
development.1582

In the learning stages of habit development there are much higher
levels of attention evident in the cortex, than when the behaviour has

1582

Doidge, The brain that changes itself, 84-88.
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been incorporated as habit, at which time procedural mechanisms
dominate.

Neural facilitation in attentional systems will consist in the following:
 Plasticity in the fronto-parietal attentional control system is the core
mechanism for attention. 1583 1584
 Learning related and use-dependent plasticities in the nucleus
basalis, the parietal lobes, the ACC, and the BG. Each plays a key role
in attentional learning. In these cases the actions will be constituted
at the neural level by an integrated constellation of neural activities,
similar to those outlined in Nos. 1 and 2 above.
 The BG play an integral role in attention regulation, 1585 1586 1587 1588
and in attentional loops.1589
 ACC involvement in attentional systems, appears necessary for
learning, and a prerequisite for goal election and executive
command. 1590
 Note that No. 13 refers to the attention required for learning to take
place.

Associated systems.
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems.

C. CHARACTERISTICS OF VIRTUE IN ITS ACQUISITION
Features that may not necessarily be present in every case.

1583

Froemke, et al., “A synaptic memory trace for cortical receptive field plasticity,” 425-429.
Doidge, The brain that changes itself, 84-88.
1585
nd
Hole Jnr., Human Anatomy and Physiology. 2 ed.
1586
Markowitsch, et al.,“Brain circuits for the retrieval of sad and happy autobiographic episodes,”
643-665.
1587
Doidge, The brain that changes itself, 84-88.
1588
Kaas and Stepniewska, “Motor cortex,” 167.
1589
Doidge, The brain that changes itself, 84-88.
1590
Markowitsch, et al.,“Brain circuits for the retrieval of sad and happy autobiographic episodes,”
643-665.
1584
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14.

Advantage must be taken of the early years both for training and
provision of appropriate example.

Philosophical clarifications.
Considerations under this heading will account for the effectiveness of
early experience noting Aristotle’s dictum: “We like best what we first
experience,” and his imperative to form habits while children are very
young. 1591

Neural bases.
Mechanisms for enhanced learning in early years take advantage of
periods of greater sensitivity, constituted at the neural level by
enhanced developmental and activity induced plasticities. Learning in
critical periods is comparatively effortless because of activity in the
nucleus basalis.1592

The relationship between sensitive periods and cortical development is
now shown.1593 1594 1595 (See also No.17.)
 Attentive mothering leads to gene transcripted cellular changes in
the hippocampus reducing basal levels of glucocorticoids, abolishing
thereby anxiety and fearfulness, and facilitating learning.1596
 Emotional arousal, for example in the positive affect produced by
sound mothering, appears to promote synaptic plasticity. This

1591

Aristotle, 1103b.
Doidge, The brain that changes itself, 84-88.
1593
In the case of imprinting, neurons in intermediate and medial mesopalium (IMM) become
responsive and selective for the stimulus; there are local increases in NMDA receptors, an
increased size in certain synapses, and a transitory surge in inhibitory activity. While imprinting is
not directly a mechanism of virtue development, in a sense it may be regarded as a prerequisite
mechanism laying necessary foundations for affection facilitated plasticity, etc. Systems associated
with responsiveness to affection are directly implicated in sensitive periods
1594
th
Coon, Essentials of psychology, 7 ed, 115.
1595
th
Laura E. Berk, Development through the lifespan, 4 ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2007), 126.
1596
Core content here derived from Knudson, “Early experience and sensitive periods,” 525.
1592
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promotes learning by various mechanisms including release of
NE.1597
 The end of sensitive period is triggered sensory input and possibly by
myelination.

A wide range of mechanisms are directly involved in the plasticities of
sensitive periods and developmental periods. Some of the more
significant include:
 As with other occasions when plasticity is at work, NMDA receptors
triggering gene transcription associated with LTP and LTD are integral
to the mechanisms of the sensitive periods and developmental
learning.
 Attentional mechanisms operate in conjunction with the great range
of mechanisms of plasticity are associated with sensitive periods of
development. Hence attentional learning plays a significant role here
also. (See also No.13)
 Guidance mechanisms are particularly active during this time:
astrocyte, and associated molecular guidance cues of migrating
neurons and production of growth (trophic) factors.1598
 The amygdala is particularly active in mediating early attachment
relationships, and reaction to stress and nonconscious emotional
memories.1599
 Hypothalamic oxytocin is also implicated; the oxytocin bonding
pathways are active in periods of attentive mothering.
 DA plays a key role in cortical information processing around
puberty. 1600

1597

Kessels and Malinow, “Synaptic AMPA Receptor Plasticity and Behaviour,” 344.
Stevens, “Neuron-astrocyte signalling in the development and plasticity of neural circuits,”
278-288. Neurotrophins such as BDNF can also play an essential role in anatomical remodelling.
1599
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 3, 36.
1600
Rapp and Bachevalier, “Cognitive development and aging,” Chapter 45.
1598
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 Up to the age of 20, there is a gradual decline in synaptic density, a
refinement and clarification of pathways; cortical myelination
appears to continue to the fourth decade of life. 1601 1602
 It appears that changes in dendritic architecture, and abnormalities
in the myelination of axons are at the basis of aging in the prefrontal
cortex, rather than neuron death and a simple decline in PFC
synapses.1603

Associated systems.
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of
emotional management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit
formation. Systems for imitation and empathy. Sensitive periods of development.

15.

Imitation of example is a key means for acquisition of behaviours.

Neural bases.
 Imitative learning is effective because plastic changes in neuronal
structures are triggered, allowing the adoption of new behaviours.
Mechanisms for learning behaviours, for learning moral behaviours
and attitudes, and for learning empathy, through imitation consist in
the activation of mirror neurons present in areas of the cortex, most
particularly in the left frontal operculum area (Broca’s area), the right
anterior parietal cortex,1604 Imitative mechanisms involve activity in
the fronto-parietal and the superior temporal cortex, the amygdala,
and insula.1605
 An important aspect of imitation is the capacity to empathise, to
read the feelings of others. There is widespread association of mirror
1601

Rapp and Bachevalier, “Cognitive development and aging,” Chapter 45.
Principal source for this section: Knudson, “Early experience and sensitive periods,” 525.
1603
A. Peters, et al., “Are neurons lost from the primate cerebral cortex during normal aging?” in
Cerebral Cortex 8, (1998): 295-300.
1604
Iacoboni, et al. “Cortical Mechanisms of Human Imitation,” 2526-2528.
1605
Carr, et al.,“Neural mechanisms of empathy in humans: a relay from neural systems for
imitation to limbic areas,” 5497-5502.
1602
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neurons with the development of empathy. In addition, the OFC is
regarded as having a major role in processing the “interpersonal
signals necessary for the initiation of social interactions between
individuals”. The OFC operates in a limbic circuit comprising OFC,1606
1607

AC gyrus, amygdala and temporal pole. It would appear too that

right orbitofrontal and right anterior insula cortices are components
of a pathway that integrating bodily responses with attentional and
emotional states. 1608
 VMPFC and OFC are needed for associating incoming information
with existing response contingencies, linking information to
motivational importance, and for working memory... plasticity in
these areas is necessary for object reward association memory, and
contextual fear conditioning. The medial PFC, especially the ACC, has
abundant links to limbic system via the hippocampus, the shell region
of the NAc and the amygdala. There is a likely contribution of this
pathway to DA and 5-HT modulation of cortical socioemotional
areas.1609
 The PFC and the complex integration of brain areas, including lateral
and medial PFC, are associated with deliberation about emotional
content is also involved. Effective emotional modulation of
deliberation is essential for sound reasoning particularly in areas
requiring empathy with others, understanding of others’ viewpoints
etc.1610
 The BG are known to play a role in anticipating movement.1611 1612

1606

Nitschke et al., “Orbitofrontal cortex tracks positive mood in mothers’ viewing pictures of their
newborn infants,” 583-592.
1607
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 103.
1608
Schore, “Effects of a secure attachment relationship on right brain development, affect
regulation and infant mental health,” 7-66.
1609
Pollak, “Early adversity and mechanisms of plasticity Integrating affective neuroscience with
developmental approaches to psychopathology,” 747. In primate studies, the amygdala has been
shown to project directly to medial thalamic nucleus and thence to VMPFC, facilitating
involvement in processing social information requiring plasticity dependent learning and memory.
1610
This is a very strong take home message from Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought.
1611
Tortora and Derrickson, Principles of Anatomy and Physiology, 11th ed., 493-494.
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Associated systems.
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of
emotional management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit
formation. Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and
executive direction. Systems for effective execution of motor commands. Systems
for imitation and empathy. Sensitive periods of development.

16.

Explicit teaching and guidance as to right and wrong, are needed.

Philosophical clarifications.
Guidance as to right and wrong will include, when appropriate,
appropriate correction to assist in reforming behaviour.1613

Neural bases.
Neural facilitation in pathways of cognitive learning consists in plastic
modification of neural structures associated with:
 Attentional control. (See No. 13 above, and Table 2.9 Attentional
Systems, and Table 5.2.)
 Imitation of example is a powerful means of inculcating ethical
values. (See No. 15 above.)
 Correction communicating affection and empathy is shown to be
more effective in bringing about neural restructuring than methods
motivated by fear. A moderate degree of stress promotes neural
restructuring; excessive stress paralyses.1614
 Cognitive learning requires particularly intense activation of learning
mechanisms (See Table 2.4 Systems for learning, and Table 5.2.)
1612

Graybiel, “Habits, Rituals, and the Evaluative Brain,” 379. In this way the BG are acknowledged
to have a key role in control and modulation of social behaviours and may be integral to a
progressive evaluation process of behaviours.
1613
Correction will normally take the form of admonition that enlightens. Aquinas insists that even
punishment must be medicinal – restoring justice, and bringing a wrong doer to the point of
recognising his or her error.
1614
cf Sunderland, The Science of Parenting, 38.
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Learning usually involves strengthening and consolidation at the
synapse, and associated changes in the dendritic tree. Learning
associated with LTP and LTD is mediated by NMDA receptors,
coexisting with AMPA receptors, activated by L-Glutamate.1615
 Memory in the cortex is plastically responsive to experience.1616 (See
Tables 2.5 and 5.2 Memory systems.)
 DA, 5-HT, NA and ACh appear to modulate the moral cognition
systems. OFC cues for moral behaviour and also moral knowledge
acquisition. 1617 Activation of stored memories depends on
hippocampus and the PFC – temporal cortex connection.1618
 Declarative memory features the explicit recall required in cognitive
learning. Hippocampus initially acts as retrieval system for
information in widespread areas of neocortex. Over time, the
hippocampus reactivates the neocortical representations (by
repetition and rehearsal, etc), bringing about plasticity in corticocortical connections. 1619
 The PFC (focusing on acquisition of new rules) and the BG (focusing
selection of rules appropriate to the situation) play complementary
roles in rule learning.1620

Associated systems.
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Reward
and motivational systems. Systems of emotional management. Systems for habit
formation. Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and
executive direction. Systems for effective execution of motor commands. Systems
for imitation and empathy. Sensitive periods of development.

1615

See discussion in Waxham,“Neurotransmitter receptors, ” Chapter 9.
Manns and Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain systems,” 1174.
1617
Casebeer,“Moral cognition and its neural constituents,”843.
1618
Tomita, et al. “Top down signal from prefrontal cortex in executive control of memory
retrieval,” 699-703.
1619
For distinct forms of memory systems and the story of their discovery, the principal source of
material that follows: Manns and Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain systems,” 488.
1620
Wise, et al.,“The frontal-basal ganglia system in primates,” 317-356.
1616

470

17.

Affection facilitates learning particularly in the family environment.

Philosophical clarifications.
Family and social culture, as well as appropriate laws and rules are
needed.

Neural bases.
The capacity to respond to affection is shown to be developmentally
sensitive, and is centred in the emotion responsive areas of the PFC: the
VMPFC and the OFC. 1621 Furthermore affectionate mothering and
affectionate teaching style facilitates learning and associated
plasticities.
 Cortical development is shown to positively correlate to the presence
of affection, and consequent perfusion of hypothalamic oxytocin.1622
1623

 Attachment and positive maternal affect are linked to DA mediated
reward arousal in the right brain of the infant1624.
 Emotion laden events cause release of Epi and glucocorticoids by
adrenal glands leading onto release of NE in amygdala, increasing its
activity and thereby consolidating memory in other parts of the brain
(direct by connections to striatum, hippocampus or cortex; and
indirect by connections with nucleus basalis which innervates much
of cortex). 1625

1621

Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 103.
Core content here derived from Knudson, “Early experience and sensitive periods,” 525.
1623
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 8.
1624
Schore, “Effects of a secure attachment relationship on right brain development, affect
regulation and infant mental health,” 24
1625
For distinct forms of memory systems and the story of their discovery, the principal source of
material that follows: Manns and Hichenbaum, “Learning and memory: brain systems,” 488.
1622
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 Unless intense arousal is involved, emotional arousal appears to
promote synaptic plasticity in memory promoting learning. 1626
Mechanisms include release of NE.1627
 Left side PFC has been shown to play a role in maintaining positive
affect. Medial insula and the anterior cingulated cortex also mediate
affective feelings. 1628
 Reduced affect leads to underactive OFC. OFC function is relative to
the individual’s reaction to emotional laden events in the
environment.1629 1630

Associated systems.
Plasticity. Systems for learning. Attentional systems. Memory systems. Systems of
emotional management. Reward and motivational systems. Systems for habit
formation. Cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election, and
executive direction. Systems for imitation and empathy. Sensitive periods of
development.

5.4 A case study: a simplified neural analysis of a virtuous action performed by
Takashi Nagai

In conclusion to this chapter the analyses of 5.3.3.2 are applied to one of the case
studies from Chapter 3, the moment when Nagai reads and rereads an American
leaflet claiming that Japan’s defeat is inevitable. (See Scenario 3)

1626

Bechara, et al.,“Emotion, Decision Making and the Orbitofrontal Cortex,” 295-307. See Cahill et
al., “The amygdala and emotional memory,” 295-296.
1627
Kessels and Malinow, “Synaptic AMPA Receptor Plasticity and Behaviour,” 344.
1628
Davidson, “Affective style, psychopathology, and resilience: Brain mechanisms and plasticity,”
1196-1214; Sunderland, The Science of Parenting. Identification with family or culture heightens
positive affect and desire to learn, and neural restructuring. Clarity of expectation and
communication, with explicit input and positive affection promotes effective cognitive learning.
1629
Roesch and Schoenbaum, “OFC as gateway,” 202.
1630
Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 8. We have seen that imaging
studies of orphans (See 2.4.4 Early Experience and Sensitive Periods) reveal abnormalities that are
consistent with the behaviours that appear to follow upon being raised in environments of social
deprivation, in particular, the manifestation of an underactive OFC in comparison with normal
children.
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This exercise serves as illustration but also as a form of validation for the results
presented in this chapter. It is a demonstration that the proposed model of virtue
and neuroscience accommodates a real life case study of a virtuous act, as
described in precise psychological observations by the subject himself.

Table 5.3
A simplified neural analysis of Scenario 3.
For complete description of scenario see Chapter 3.1.2 Scenario 3.
Action
(3.1.2 Scenario
3)

Virtue commentary
(3.1.2 Scenario 3
Commentary; 3.1.3 Virtue
and the human act.)

“The chief
nurse came
running up and
handed me a
sheet of paper”

Nagai has already
demonstrated that he has
finely attuned
responsibilities to those he
leads, and habitual
courtesy. He takes the
leaflet from the nurse,
conscious of his duties
towards her. It is
reasonable to surmise that
this sense of responsibility
as well as his training in
scientific objectivity
assisted him in applying
sufficient deliberation
before committing himself
to judgement.
Justice will dispose Nagai
to take his duties to the
nurse and to the survivors
into account, giving
appropriate example and
reaching a final
deliberation in the best
interests of the entire
community he finds
himself leading. An
unspoken principle he
clearly follows is that

Neural analysis
Note that it can be only the person as the
subject of the action when we are
considering a human act. However when we
are not referring to a human act, but to
unconscious responses by parts of the body
(eg ACh heightens attentiveness) or to the
action of part of the body (eg my eye
blinked, my amygdala responded to
emotional input) there is no problem
specifying non personal subject.
Prior learning of duty and courtesy, both
disposed by justice, lead Nagai to respond
to the nurse’s implicit request to read the
leaflet.
Nagai is extremely drained and exhausted
as it is the day after the bomb has exploded.
He has suffered much blood loss and has
lost consciousness at least on one occasion.
The need to care for the wounded has given
him little rest. He is also fatigued from the
responsibility of leading the growing group
of survivors. Exhaustion will be manifested
in lower levels of attention, a heightened
capacity for emotionally initiated
representations (an overactive
imagination), and difficulty in suppressing
goal irrelevant sensory inputs.
When Nagai is approached by the nurse and
becomes aware of the American leaflet, his
fronto-parietal attentional system is
triggered. ACh from the nucleus basalis is
released into the thalamus and into areas of
the parietal, frontal and cingulated cortices,
heightening attentiveness. Attentional loops
between the BG and the cortex are
established. DA, a facilitator of attention, is
also activated for emotional and reward
responses.
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Nagais’ initial
glance at the
leaflet revealed
the cause of the
catastrophe as
an atomic blast.
Nagai writes,
“In the depth of
my being I felt a
tremendous
shock. The
atom bomb has
been
perfected!
Japan is
defeated!”

“… Conflicting
emotions
churned in my
mind and heart
as I surveyed
the appalling
atomic
wasteland
around me. … A
bamboo spear
lay on the
ground. I kicked
it fiercely and it
made a dull,
hollow sound.
Grasping it in
my hand, I
raised it to the
sky, as tears
rolled down my
cheeks. The

truth, no matter how
unpalatable, must be
faced… and for a leader to
do so is necessary.
Nagai’s description of how
his passionate reaction
subsides on successive
readings of the leaflet
gives us a remarkable
insight into how
deliberation can enable
mastery of passion. What
is initially less obvious is
the interior battle that
Nagai has fights in order to
respond rationally to the
news.
There is an initial
movement of
complacency towards the
truth. He comprehends
the American claim and
reacts initially
dispassionately.

Conflicting emotions well
up within him, of
frustration, sadness,
anger, patriotism and
shame at defeat.
He deliberates briefly
about the prospects of
victory for Japan in the
face of a nuclear power
and concludes there is no
hope of victory.
At some point there is a
rejection of blind
passionate assertion.
Prudence disposes his
readiness to apply himself
diligently to assess the
truth of the American
claims. Justice ensures

As Nagai glances at the leaflet initial visual
input is channelled to the BLA from the
sensory nuclei of the thalamus which has
filtered out other inputs allowing his full
attention on the leaflet. A degree of fear
conditioning will be evident in the BLA given
the suffering that Nagai has endured.
There is an initial numbness, a lack of
cortical response associated with a welling
sadness (perhaps reflecting a left VMPFC
that is underactive in managing right side
negative affect), but Nagai falls back,
perhaps heightened through his training as
a scientist, on an established habit of
seeking knowledge. He reads in the text a
confirmation of his suspicions of a nuclear
blast. His scientific knowledge gives him
virtually an intuitive grasp of the potential
of the bomb. Cortical representations of
sadness for his country and people, and
disgust at the Americans, flood his cortical
memory and a negative emotional state
overwhelms reason.
Even in a state of physical and psychological
exhaustion, Nagai’s learned self mastery is
sufficient for him to utilise cognitive
pathways to gain some management of
passionate predisposition, reacting with
deliberation, and consideration of
consequences.
We are witnessing a “low road” emotional
response unmediated by the cortex.
Although there is consciousness in the PFC
of the response, there is little cortical
processing. A further surge of emotional
memory inputs flood into the BLA via
reciprocal connections to the hippocampal
and striatal memory systems. There are
neural activations of fear, sadness, anger
and disgust (in the anterior insula). Outputs
from the BLA trigger a rage response in the
dorsomedial nucleus of the hypothalamus.
This hypothalamic response directs rage
related motor patterns.
The various limbic aversion centres also
activate. Limbic afferents to the PFC via the
OFC trigger consciousness of the emotional
response and provide an initial justification
based hippocampal call up of DA mediated
conscious short term memories of the
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bamboo spear
against the
atomic bomb!
What a tragic
comedy this
war was! This
was no longer a
war. Would we
Japanese be
forced to stand
on our shores
and be
annihilated
without a word
of protest?”

that does not dismiss the
American claims out of
hand.

suffering witnessed in association with the
bomb. These representations are in the PFC.
The reward system is activated and Nagai
seeks gratification in the pointless action of
kicking the bamboo spear. DA floods the
NAc in anticipation. GP and the SN select
patterns of cortical activity and motor
programs for action drawing on movement
sequencers in the dorsal striatum.
Hippocampus is enlisted for goal direction.
The BG instruct the motor areas of the PFC
via the BG-thalamo-cortical loop. PFC and
motor cortices deliver executive command.
The bamboo is kicked.
The BLA is now drawing input from
widespread cortical areas, and from, and
from cortical, hippocampal and striatal
memory systems. Nagai shows a greater
awareness of his current state, looking
around and reflecting on his situation.
Attempts to articulate the situation serve to
mitigate his passionate reaction. Nagai
indulges in a flight of imagination calling up
a succession of cortical representations of
future scenarios, and this diverts his
attention away from sensory input and into
deliberation. Effectively is buying time for
cortical processing of the overwhelming
emotion. The initial surge of passion,
corresponding to a neuromodulating flood
of ACh and DA, dissipates somewhat and he
is able to adopt a more cognitive response.
His training in self-discipline can now take
effect.

“I read the
leaflet once and
was stunned.”

By learned pathways of
reflection Nagai sets about
the task of reaching the
truth of the situation.
Quickly Nagai refocusses
on reaching the truth or
falsehood of the American
claim. Very swiftly has
Nagai moved through
steps of the human act
concerning ends and
means (Table 3.1. Steps 17.). His end is to reach the

Also he is conscious that he has an
audience. His desires to give good example,
despite an absence of evident reward, are
mediated by overlearned S-R responses in
the ventral striatum. His prior training has
brought about this mechanism.
Nagai’s self mastery is characterised by
habitual obedience of the emotional realm
to rational command. Goals and rewards
are not needed as incentives. Sdeliberation-R pathways have taken over.
Input to the PFC via the BG-thalamo-cortical
loop reestablishes higher cortical, as
opposed to emotion driven, management.
Emotional thalamic and limbic centres are
now redisposed to cortical override. Prior
learning of fortitude and temperance have
established pathways moderating
emotional responses so they are obedient
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truth. The means is to
weigh the message of the
leaflet with his own
assessment. Prior to the
commencement of his
deliberative reading there
is a moment of “election”
towards the means to
reach the chosen good: by
reading and calm
consideration he decides
he will reach the truth.
(Table 3.1. Step 8 of the
human act. See also 3.1.3
Virtue and the human
act.)
Despite his impeding
emotion he shows
determination to face
truth no matter how
unpalatable it may be.
(Table 3.1. Steps 9 to 11.)
He makes a judgement
that the truth can be
reached by suppressing
immoderate emotion and
then applies himself
rereading the leaflet
weighing its assertions
against his own knowledge
and estimations.
“I read it a
second time
and felt they
were making
fools of us.”

Nagai’s established
dispositions to moderate
and divert excessive
emotional representations
and expressions are the
result of prior learning.
The actions of these
dispositions permit
cortical deliberation to
occupy his attention.
Nagai’s response in this
situation, and his
character in general, is
built on previously
established behaviours
and convictions upon
which he can draw.

to rational direction. The habit of fortitude
will be present in preferential pathways in
the BG-thalamo-cortical loop, and
strengthened top-down connections
between the OFC and the amygdala. The
prior habituation of temperance will be
present in mediation primarily by the DLPFC
and ACC. In the past it is likely that this
habituation was associated with DA rewards
that consolidated the pathways of self
control. In this current scenario, with the
habit established, it is unnecessary for DA
perfusion to take place. Various brain
regions now coordinate to regulate
emotional reaction: OFC, DLPFC, VMPFC,
further areas of the amygdala and of the
BG.
Emotional regulation leads to cortical
direction of reward expectations. Emotional
representations are consciously suppressed.
Cortical management is consolidated via
action plans involving rereading. Even
though it is unlikely that this is a conscious
strategy, nevertheless it is likely to be a
learned strategy… to divert oneself into a
cognitive task in order to take the heat out
of emotion.

Nagai’s habit of application at the task until
the desired outcome is achieved is a
consequence of prior training. His election
of the goal to read and reread involves
deliberative evaluation utilising numerous
cortical areas, drawing particularly on
episodic memory, self knowledge, scientific
knowledge and skills of critical assessment.
Intrinsic motivations have come to the fore:
of commitment to the truth, and that one’s
duty to others must be fulfilled. These
appear to be the result of cortical neuronal
pathways established and consolidated by
prior experience and DA reinforcement,
originating in the VTA and SN and mediated
by the ventral striatum, by childhood and
military training and in happier times. The
prior habituation of prudence will be
present in this rich and reciprocal
connectivity, primarily to and from the
DLPFC, with other cortical areas serving
memory and somatic and sensory input,
with the OFC, DMPFC, BG, and amygdala
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serving emotion regulation, with the ventral
striatum assisting in goal setting and
motivation. Similarly the prior habituation
of justice consists of consolidated pathways
in the aPFC, mPFC, VMPFC, OFC (especially
medial OFC), ACC (especially rostal ACC),
insula, limbic and paralimbic areas, and the
BG. These rich connections serve to give
preferential traffic to deliberations about
understanding of others, consideration of
the impact of one’s actions on others,
empathy, and considerations of fairness,
etc.

“I read it a third
time and was
enraged at their
impudence.”

In the analysis of the
human act (3.1.3) it was
noted that sense appetite
acts upon the will
particularly at Steps 2,4,6,
and 8; that “undue sense
appetition can negate
effective use of the
intellect”.

It is possible to detect in this change of
behaviour the classic pattern noted by
1631
Graybiel:
a passing from reward
mediation in the ventral striatum (Nagai’s
kicking fruitlessly against the goad),
associated with the emotional gratification,
to a dorsal automatisation, carrying out
duty as he has trained himself to do (Nagai’s
determination to grapple with the truth and
face it). Such an automatisation is
consistent with our knowledge of the
character of this wonderful man.
In neural terms this means that the person
is aware of cortical representations of
attractive or aversive sense objects, and
that reward systems provide
neuromodulatory incentive for preferential
attention to, and pursuit of these goals via
appropriate action plans.
Cognition and the capacity to reach the
truth can be overwhelmed by the
presentation of attractive or aversive
cortical representations. This is the battle
that Nagai fights in the first, second and
third reading.
However by holding to his action plan of
rereading he is able to regulate the emotion
sufficiently to allow deliberation and a final
judgement as to the truth of the American
message.
As we are discussing aversional content,
direct involvement of reward systems is
minimal. However, during prior learning the
habits of prudence, justice, fortitude and
temperance were established; during this
time the reward systems were greatly
active, leading to DA mediated

1631

Graybiel, “Habits, Rituals, and the Evaluative Brain,” 378.
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reinforcement of regulatory pathways
triggered in the OFC and amygdala by sense
representations. These pathways are
available now for Nagai’s use in coping with
this particularly difficult situation.
“But when I
read it a fourth
time I changed
my mind and
began to think
it was
reasonable.”

Nagai has reached the
point a judgement about
the trustworthiness of the
American leaflet.

“But when I
read it a fourth
time I changed
my mind and
began to think
it was
reasonable.
After reading it
a fifth time I
knew that this
was not a
propaganda
stunt but the

He gives his assent to the
assertion of the leaflet.
The word “sober”
indicates his attainment of
“quies”. (Table 3.1. Step
12 of the human act. See
3.1.3 Virtue and the
human act.) This
achievement of quies
contrasts with Nagai’s
fierce kick to the bamboo
spear: destructive,
impulsive, futile, and

In the course of moral evaluations and
judgements there is a complex integration
of numerous neural subdivisions which
show significantly consistent activation
across numerous studies. (See Table 5.1 and
Table 5.2.) Therefore it is possible to
predict that, in this case, Nagai’s neural
activity is likely to include heightened
activation in numerous areas:
 DLPFC, ACC, the ventral striatum,
and amygdala will reveal principal
activation.
 Above baseline activation will also
be evident in mPFC, VMPFC, OFC,
the posterior
cingulate/retrosplenial cortex,
superior temporal cortex, STS, the
temporo-parietal junction, medial
hypothalamus, and insula.
 LPFC and Right OFC will be active in
the suppression of sadness.
 Considerations of the social norms
of patriotism and of cultural
expectations of a leader will
involve further integration of areas
such as the VMPFC, lateral OFC,
and aTL, assisted by storage of
social perceptual representations
in the temporal lobes,
 In addition, reflecting Nagai’s
frustration at the shame of defeat
and empathy with the pain of
others, the rostral ACC, and the
anterior insula will show activity.
 Posterior cingulate, and inferior
parietal lobe will show activity
during the Nagai’s brief
catastrophising.
In Nagai’s reading of the flyer, in this single
human act seeking the truth of the issue,
we have witnessed a highly complex
interplay of systems (memory, emotional
management, deliberation, goal election,
consideration of consequences of action,
moral judgement, attention, reward to
some extent, and motor execution), of brain
areas, of mechanisms and of pathways.
The end result has been the harmonisation
of the emotional life with the rational life.
The disorder of actions carried out without
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sober
1632
truth.”

pointless.
Acquiescence to the truth
implies also a degree of
self mastery.

cognitive approval and direction, is replaced
by an admission of the truth and a quieting
of wayward passion.

This exercise has also served to clarify certain understandings of virtue in action.

Reason and judgement, and the virtues of prudence and justice, are exercised in
what we could call a “biophysical dimension” that incorporates duration. As Nagai
explores the truth of the American claims his deliberations are protracted in time.

Examples drawn from actual life argue strongly for the unity of the virtues. Nagai’s
struggle against his emotional reaction is quietened only when he admits that the
American leaflet reflects truth. Emotional management is a necessary though
insufficient condition for virtue. Management of passionate responses and the
disposition to acquire and accept the truth pertain to different virtues. Virtues
that directly dispose rational operations as well as virtues that enable emotions to
correctly inform, or respond to, rational command are both needed.

The contributory work of the virtues of fortitude and temperance is prior to the
deliberations of the human act. In this case, the contributory involvement is
manifested in the rereadings and evaluations of the leaflet’s content. The action
of these virtues is ongoing during the reading in response to the tenacity of the
emotional reactions he experiences. It is fascinating to note that, at the point
where Nagai admits the truth, the violent emotional responses subside. (They are
replaced by a sadness and lethargy which will require a further virtuous response
from Nagai.)

Automatised habituated dispositions for positive action are able to come to the
fore once the flood of passion passes. Of course, should there be no habituated

1632

Nagai, The Bells of Nagasaki, 52-3.

479

positive habits, or should there be vices, the flood of passion will not be diverted
but may stand in even greater relief.

5.5 Conclusion.

A highly probable model for the neural bases of virtue has now been described on
the basis of an hylomorphic anthropology. I have presented arguments
supporting the view that virtue, as understood by Aristotle and Aquinas, is
embodied, I have described the distinctive nature of that embodiment as it
pertains to the cardinal virtues, and I have identified 17 characteristics that
capture the nature of virtue. For each one of these characteristics I have identified
processes that account for, at the neurobiological level, the specific contributory
task that I have identified. I have noted the capacity of the brain to operate
multiple processes, concurrently and in concert, in support of goals of the
person’s own choosing, and that this view of virtue, as a complex of systems, is
highly consistent with that view.

This approach respects the soul as principle of being, unity and function; it
accounts for rationality of the person and human freedom; it supports the view
that neural bases are necessary for, but alone cannot account for, human
operations.

In mapping the discrete characteristics of virtue against the neuroscience, I have
identified supporting neural structures, pathways and mechanisms. In summary:
i.

Human motivation and goal election are supported by the reward
structures of the brain that are in reciprocal communication with cortical
structures.

ii.

Emotional regulation is supported by limbic-cortical connectivity
permitting bottom up modification of cortical “decision making”, and topdown direction and regulation. I have argued that neuroscience and
philosophy converge in describing the complementary roles of emotion
and reason in a balanced happy life. The very presence of reciprocal
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substantial neural pathways is firm evidence of both cortical direction and
subcortical modification of regulation and decision making. A neural
reality, consistently presented in this study, is that neuronal pathways
develop when used, but atrophy in disuse. I have distinguished between
the relative roles of the OFC, the DLPFC and the VMPFC in emotional
regulation, with implications for motivation.
iii.

It has been shown that the established cognitive activity of the PFC
requires the complement of subcortical structures of the limbic system and
the BG for these activities of emotion regulation and goal election. I have
further argued that the involvement of the BG is crucial, not only by its
implication in emotion and reward pathways but also because the BG are
the principal seat of automaticity of actions. It has been shown that such
automaticity is not necessarily opposed to conscious, voluntary goal
election.

iv.

The “second nature”, the ease of use that characterises virtue, is
attributable primarily to mechanisms of structural plasticity in both cortical
and subcortical regions and in the relevant communicating neural
pathways. Plasticity in the structures of the BG underpinning automaticity
is a further source of the facility for ready action that we find in actions
disposed by virtue.

v.

The notion of a complex of systems is supported by a weight of current
neuroscientific opinion. I have argued that the systems of reward
evaluation, of goal setting, of motivation, and of emotional regulation are
supported by “upstream” systems of plasticity, learning and memory, and
capacities for attention, critical learning, and imitation and empathy.

vi.

In support for the notion of the unity of the virtues and of the distinctive
neural “signatures” for each of the cardinal virtues I have reviewed the
complexity of the human act and noted the necessary and consequent
neural complexity of any virtuous act. In particular, I have noted the
activity of the sensitive appetites prior to every rational choice and noted
the distinctive pathways involved in each of the cardinal virtues.
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vii.

Cognition centres in the PFC (assisted by other cortical and lower areas
primarily implicated in reward and emotional assessment, sense
apprehension, memory, attention, and motor planning and command)
support the integrating capacity of rationality and the reflection and
reasoning that are manifestations of prudence.

viii.

Cortical pathways and brain areas are demonstrably implicated in cortical
assessment of the consequences of actions on others. These too are in
reciprocal connection both by DA pathways, and BG-thalamo-cortical
loops, with the reward systems and centres, providing further incentive for
action. I have argued that the virtue of justice resides most typically in the
habitual activation of these areas.

ix.

I have argued that human actions commence with sensitive appetitive
responses to perceptions or imaginative representations in the memory
(but not necessarily of specific past events) of pleasure and aversion, and
that the essence of virtue is to find pleasure in what is in keeping with our
nature, along with a readiness to endure difficulties to obtain those things
that we know to be good for us. In essence, neural dispositions in our
reward processing and in our responses to fear support temperance and
fortitude.

In Chapter 6 I will turn my focus to a eudaimonic analysis of what we have seen at
the neural level. At the beginning of this current chapter, I noted Casebeer’s
observation that the virtuous life will be characterized by neural elements
operating in a “maximally functional manner”.1633 I will focus on this notion of
functional fulfilment along with affective and teleological fulfilment. In conclusion,
Chapter 6 will also offer neuroscientific, philosophical and pedagogical
conclusions relevant to this study.

1633

Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural constituents,” 843.

482

Chapter 6

Flourishing
“A human being in perfection ought always to preserve a calm
and peaceful mind and never to allow passion or a transitory
desire to disturb his tranquility.”
Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus
Mary Shelley

6.1 This study proposes a necessary role for virtue in human flourishing.

Elizabeth Anscombe proclaimed the need to get the psychology right if we are to
do moral philosophy (see 1.6.1). 1634 This study insists that we must get the biology
right too. Psychology and neurobiology must be in sync. It is appropriate to
investigate whether virtues are all that Aristotle, Aquinas, and their followers
claim them to be; if they are truly the key to human fulfilment and wellbeing, and
if hylomorphic anthropology reflects reality, then it is appropriate to expect this to
be evident at the biological level.

So, in Table 4.1, a major characteristic of virtue was identified as follows:
Virtue facilitates the functional flourishing of the person. Virtue
brings about a state of excellence: an excellence of the person,
inclusive necessarily of both neurobiological flourishing and the
exercise of rationality. It is a state whereby reason and
rationality are empowered to manage activity well. It is a
capacity for rationality that is reflective and emotionally
enriched and able to be carried through into noble, humane
behaviours.
Evidence presented in Chapter 5 has supported the view that virtue has a material
foundation in the neural structures of the brain and that this material structure
can be identified. I argue that these neural structures manifest, in their maturity
1634

Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, 26-44.
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of expression and integration across the entire brain, the role that virtue plays in
human fulfilment itself, and that there is a biological aptitude and predisposition
in human beings for the development of virtue.

That the neurobiology of virtue may be described, and more importantly, that it
constitutes a state of a neurobiological perfection must carry far reaching
implications for the study of ethics. Aristotle proclaimed, “Happiness is the reward
of virtue”,1635 with happiness understood as human fulfilment, flourishing,
eudaimonia. In this concluding chapter we examine the evidence to support the
view that happiness, understood as flourishing, is indeed a consequence of the
neurobiological presence of virtue.

The identification of the neural structures of virtue and of a biological aptitude for
the development of virtue, for the necessary role of virtue in flourishing, must
serve to strengthen the recognition of virtue ethics as superior to consequentialist
and deontological approaches in offering a model for human wellbeing.

It will be noted below that the work of Martin Seligman supports the view, as
predicted by rational psychology, that virtues are demonstrably conducive of
human wellbeing at the clinical level. That these clinical phenomena may be
shown to be supported by a neurobiology of virtue necessarily constitutes a far
reaching ratification not only of Seligman’s position but of hylomorphic
anthropology, as a true model of the human being and human flourishing. This
necessarily carries profound critical consequences both for the evaluation of
current theories of philosophy of mind and of moral development, and for
practical approaches to pedagogy and parenting.

6.1.1. Reflecting on the structure of this study.

1635

NE, 1099b16.
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After offering a prima facie case for the profound integration of the rational and
the physical in the human person, Chapter 1 situated the philosophical
dimensions of this study within contemporary approaches to philosophy of mind
and ethics and within ethical theory. The significance of the hylomorphic
foundation for this study has been discussed - the profound unity of material and
non-material aspects in the human person, to the extent that human
neurobiology participates in rationality and in every rational action.1636

Chapters 2 presented a representative overview of current research into six lines
of investigation that it is reasonable to associate with the acquisition and exercise
of virtue: plasticity, learning and memory, habit formation, emotional regulation,
goal election and reward, and cognition and executive function.

The principal task of Chapter 3 and 4 was to identify key characteristics of virtue.
Against a panorama of differing and opposing definitions of virtue, it is necessary
to adopt a robust understanding of positive, dispositions of character acquired by
repetition and practice. A broad Aristotelian understanding of virtue has been
proposed, founded on Aristotelian and Thomistic rational psychology and an
understanding of the hylomorphic view of substance, and attuned to eudaimonia,
a notion derived from Aristotle and found in the work of prominent virtue
ethicists.

My essential methodology was, in the light of clear examples of virtuous action
present in real life case studies and with the aid of insights from contemporary
virtue ethicists, to distil from seminal Aristotelian/Thomistic texts the
characteristics of virtue. Controversial questions were largely avoided, as outside
the scope of this study, except that a restricted reading was offered for the notion
of rationality “by participation” of the moral virtues of the sensitive appetites:
fortitude and temperance were proposed as ordered biophysical qualities of the
human person. In turn this led to greater clarification about the characteristics of
1636

As we have seen, Aquinas however distinguishes between powers “common to the soul and
body”, and other powers “exceeding the entire power of the body” (ST, Ia, Q.76, Art.8.4).
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the specific cardinal virtues and their distinctive contributions within the broad
notion of virtue. Arguments were presented for the unity of the virtues. An
analysis was offered of the distinct functions of the four cardinal virtues in
disposing a virtuous human act as described by Aquinas. I argued that such a
coherent understanding of the contribution of each of the four virtues to the one
human act is a prerequisite to any proposal for the neural bases of virtues. In
conclusion, Table 4.1 was presented, listing key characteristics of virtue.

Chapter 5 married the characteristics of virtue with the neuroscience against a
backdrop of recent cross-disciplinary work in regulation of emotion and moral
action. The model offered suggests that, in the acting person, virtuous dispositions
of thought and action are constituted at the neural level by highly integrated
contributory brain systems (emotional regulation, reward, attention, memory and
learning, habit formation, cognition and command) supported by a range of
mechanisms of plasticity allowing a certain permanence and durability. These
established ways of thinking and behaving thus become characteristics of the
personality of the subject.

Ultimately I have sought to capture the complexity of the exercise of virtue and its
reflection in neurobiology. I have wished to apply the real knowledge we have of
the brain into the formation of a coherent picture for the development, exercise
and state of virtue. I have proposed, by means of an integrative analysis of current
research into brain function, a highly plausible model for the neural bases of
virtue understood in the Aristotelian and Thomistic sense.

It is highly conceivable that the accuracy of this model could, in time, be
experimentally tested. By highlighting, at the biological level, the integrative
nature of rationality, and by drawing cross disciplinary insights from rational
psychology, I hope to stimulate interest in what presents as an important field for
further exploration.

6.1.2 The task of Chapter 6.
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On the first page of this study I proposed four central questions for investigation:


To develop a methodology by which I can identify the core characteristics
of the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of moral virtue.



To identify, on the basis of current neuroscientific knowledge, the neural
substrates that may be reasonably demonstrated to play a substantial role
in the acquisition and exercise of virtue.



In the light of neurobiological evidence, to draw conclusions about the role
of virtue in human flourishing.



To consider wider implications of these findings, with particular respect to
philosophy of mind, ethics and parenting.

The first and second of these questions have been addressed in detail in preceding
chapters; brief concluding reflections are offered below in 6.3. The primary task of
this chapter is to present conclusions with respect to the third and fourth of these
questions. Eudaimonic conclusions will be discussed in 6.2 with brief critical
reflections also offered in reference to Flourish, a 2011 text by Martin Seligman
which draws the notion of eudaimonia into the domain of clinical psychology;1637
neuroscientific conclusions will be summarised in 6.3; philosophical conclusions in
6.4 will include brief reflections on philosophy of mind; and pedagogical
conclusions bring both the chapter and the study to a close.

6.2

Eudaimonic conclusions

This study proposes that man has a biological aptitude or predisposition for virtue,
and that virtue is required for human flourishing. I argue that the brain is
biologically disposed to the development of virtue. As it were, the conduits for
virtue are already laid in the brain by way of genetic predisposition and
participation in rationality; however the wiring will need to be installed by the
1637

Martin Seligman Flourish: a new understanding of happiness and well-being and how to
achieve them. (London: Nicholas Brealey, 2011).
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user himself through experience and repetition of actions, guided by rational goal
setting.

Human flourishing necessarily includes flourishing of the brain... the full and
integrated development of the brain and its capacity to mediate a self-determined
life. The argument of this study is that this biological aptitude for flourishing
extends to the neurological domain: that the concept of human flourishing should
properly include brain development along those lines of development to which
the organism is biologically predisposed.

I argue that man’s biological aptitude for flourishing is found in his ability to
develop to the full his natural powers along the predisposed lines for the
development of the human organism. This is also consistent with the view of
Aquinas that virtue disposes man to perfection according to his nature.1638

These lines of predisposed development incorporate the constellation of
pathways and mechanisms that underpin virtue development. Further, I argue
that, as virtue develops there is an extensive integration of the neural resources of
the person (cognitive, executive, emotional and sensorimotor systems, and
pathways facilitating habitual action); an integration that empowers man for
rational self-management and necessarily implicit to human flourishing.

My discussion of eudaimonic conclusions will focus first on this biological aspect –
that the full development of the organism is indeed a form of flourishing, and then
on the broader issue of fulfilment of the person, and in specific the eudaimonia of
virtue.1639
1638

“Whatever is lacking for a thing’s natural perfection may be called a vice.” ST, Ia-IIae, Q.71,
Art.1.quoting Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, iii.
1639
Note that the following sections contain material most relevant to this section: 1.6.4 (This
study is situated under the umbrella of eudaimonist virtue ethics), 2.4 (Habit formation), 2.5
(Neural bases for emotional control), 2.6 (Neural bases for goal directed behaviours and reward
activation), 2.7 (Cognition and executive function), 3.2.5 (Virtues accord with the natural
perfecting of the person), 3.2.5.3 (Virtue brings about human fulfilment), 3.3.7 (Development of
virtue requires formation in what is appropriate in respect to pleasure and pain… emotional
education.), 3.3.12 (Education specifically in wisdom and beauty is necessary in the formation of
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6.2.1 Flourishing at the biological level.

Nobel laureate Kandel noted above (5.2.2.3) what could be called a principle of
decentralisation that operates in the brain, that there is no central command
centre in the brain.1640 This reflects Hebb’s prophetic insight in 1949 that a cell
assembly, all the activated cortical cells, provide the internal representation of a
stimulus distributed through the brain.1641 Such a highly distributed model
requires advanced interconnection for effective function. Facilitated
interconnectivity is also required for effective cortical, or top down, governance of
emotional and motivational life.

In keeping with these observations I have suggested that the state of virtue
presents as a highly developed facility for interconnection between brain regions
and systems making use of the constellation of pathways, mechanisms and
processes operating across the various brain regions and pathways between
them. It is founded upon principles of use-induced plastic reinforcement of neural
connections. Habit provides a further mechanism for the organism to act more
efficiently at the neuronal level, allowing the diversion of attention elsewhere and
absorbing fewer cerebral resources. During the period of acquisition, both implicit
procedural memories and virtue, move from the explicit to the automatised. 1642

It is a state of systemic maturity. The state of virtue manifests as the endpoint of
neural development, of a developmental sequence of behaviours associated with
the ordered biological dispositions of fortitude and temperance informing right
judgement. It involves an ongoing interplay between biological development,

virtue), 3.3.9 (The development of virtue takes place over time and respects the development of
the body), 4.1.2.7 (Rather than of “acts of isolated virtues” it appears more appropriate to think in
terms of “moral operations performed with the integral involvement of multiple virtues”), 5.3 (The
neural bases of virtue), 6.1 (This study proposes a necessary role for virtue in human flourishing),
6.2 (Neuroscientific conclusions), 6.3 (Philosophical conclusions).
1640
Kandel and Wurtz,“Constructing the visual image,” 340.
1641
Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 731.
1642
See Chapter 2 for referencing.
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practical reason, experience, consideration for others, and the repetition of
positive goal directed behaviours.

6.2.1.1 Rational operations in the present state of life are conducted with
sensible knowledge and sensitive appetites as their “material
cause”.1643 Therefore neural development that forms the biological
basis of virtue is a “material cause” for eudaimonia of the person.

Aquinas says that sensible knowledge is, in a way, “the material cause” of
intellectual knowledge. “It cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and
perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather it is in a way the material
cause.”1644

If, along the same lines, we can argue that the sensitive appetites (presenting
aspects of pain and pleasure to the intellect and will) are, in a way, the material
cause of the human act (Step 2 Table 3.1), then we can also say that the sensitive
appetites disposed by the virtues of fortitude and temperance are the material
cause of good human acts.

Therefore, the virtues of fortitude and temperance in their neural bases (see
argument in 4.1), are the material cause of eudaimonia, if eudaimonia is to be
understood as a state brought about by consistently good human actions. By
extension we could also argue that the neural part constituents of prudence and
justice should also be included as material causes of eudaimonia.

Ultimately, it is this state of advanced interconnection and systemic integration
underpinning virtue is the “material cause” of eudaimonia in the person.

1643
1644

ST, Ia, Q.84, Art.6.
ST, Ia, Q.84, Art.6.
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Aristotle taught that “The soul in a certain way requires the body for its
operation.”1645 He explained the key role of the material:
No one can learn or understand anything in the absence of
sense, and when the mind is actively aware of anything, it is
necessarily aware of it along with an image.1646
The word “necessarily” is important: in the state of body and soul united, all
understanding not only starts in the senses but is dependent upon the
presentation of the phantasm.

He explains that suspension of the sensitive powers (eg during sleep) hinders the
judgement of the intellect; 1647 1648that, “The corruptible body is a load upon the
soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to
man at all ages.”1649

He says that cooperation of the body is necessary for acquisition of new
knowledge and necessary for application of acquired knowledge, 1650and insists
that the cooperation of the body as material cause for rational operations is
according to human nature.
It is as natural for the soul to understand by turning to the
phantasms as it is to be joined to the body; but to be separated
from the body is not in accordance with its nature, and likewise
1645

ST, Ia, Q.75, Art.7.3.
DA, 431b. In Book 3 of De Anima Aristotle affirms that the soul understands nothing without a
phantasm.
1647
ST, Ia, Q.84, Art.8.
1648
ST, Ia, Q.101, Art.2. “... the state of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the
sensitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tied and the interior sensitive powers
hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or delirious.
Now the sensitive powers are situate in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are
hindered, the action of the former is necessarily hindered also; and likewise, consequently, the use
of reason.”
1649
ST, Ia, Q.101, Art.2.1.
1650
ST, Ia, Q.84, Art.7. “...not only when it acquires fresh knowledge, but also when it applies
knowledge already acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers.
For when the act of the imagination is hindered by a lesion of the corporeal organ, for instance, in
the case of a frenzy; or when the act of the memory is hindered, as in the case of lethargy, we see
that a man is hindered from actually understanding things of which he had previous knowledge....
when we wish to help someone understand something we lay before him examples from which he
forms phantasms.”
1646
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to understand without turning to phantasms is not natural to it;
and hence it is united to the body in order that it may have an
existence and an operation suitable to its nature.1651
The implication is, consequent on the theological principle that grace respects
nature, that the embodied soul will only operate in a way suitable to its nature, ie.
utilizing the neural structures of the body.

Consonant with this view, Aquinas holds that, “(The human soul) reaches an
understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and
movement.”1652 Now elsewhere he explains, “The nerves,” we are told, “are
instruments of movement.”1653 Hence it is compatible with these texts to
conclude that Aquinas anticipated a neural part-constituent for the operations of
the intellect.

6.2.1.2

Rational operations in the present state of life are conducted with the
body as their final cause.

In 3.2.5.3 above, it has been argued that virtue perfects not only the soul but also
the body.

Aquinas writes,
...the function of virtue (is)... to make (the sensitive appetite)
execute the commands of reason, by exercising (its) proper
acts. Whereby just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due
external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its
proper regulated movement.1654
In other words, through rationality, manifested as virtue, the person flourishes.
In keeping with the view that the soul united to the body
“perfects the soul”, it is further argued also that virtue realises
1651

ST, Ia, Q.89, Art.1.
ST, Ia, Q.79, Art.4.
1653
ST, Ia, Q.99, Art.1.
1654
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.59, Art.5.
1652
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the perfected structure of the body. Hence there is an aspect of
final causality also present. 1655

This final causality derives from the fact that the body is integral to the person and
the development of virtue, with all the bodily ramifications is according, as
Aquinas says, to the “due disposition” of the person. We read, “Virtue implies not
only a perfection of power, the principle of action; but also the due disposition of
its subject.”1656 Note that this concept of “due disposition” is consistent with the
view that virtue is not any arbitrary ordering, but a “right ordering”, of neural
connections.

Note that this notion is relevant also with respect to the unity of virtues. Precisely
because the various virtues act in integrated concert, each with its requisite
disposition of the materiality of the body, that the flourishing of the person is
achieved. Virtue not only disposes the organism to rationality (because there is no
virtue without rationality in the first place), but also rationality we can say
disposes the human organism to fulfilment.

6.2.2 The neurobiology of eudaimonia.

The notion of eudaimonia in this study
In 1.6.3 mention was made of the variety of positions adopted by virtue ethicists
with respect to eudaimonia. Not only do Aristotle and Aquinas have differing
concepts of eudaimonia, but how eudaimonia is to be understood in Aristotle has
been the subject of various schools of thought. Hence, prior to drawing
eudaimonic conclusions, it is necessary to offer further brief clarifications about
the position adopted in this study.

1655

Aquinas, Questions on the Soul, trans. James Robb (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University
Press, 1984), 59,62. Cited in Ramsay, Beyond Virtue Integrity and Morality, 137.
1656
ST, Ia-IIae, Q.71, Art.1.
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Nagel identifies two accounts of eudaimonia in the Nicomachean Ethics: the
intellectualist (ie a state of contemplation) and the comprehensive account in
which fulfilment is to be found in the “full range of human life and action”. 1657
Nagel proceeds to argue, “This (second) view connects eudaimonia with the
conception of human nature as composite, that is, as involving the interaction of
reason, emotion, perception, and action in an ensouled body.” 1658 This study
considers eudaimonia in this second, arguably richer, category. It is a view that
perfectly accommodates considerations about the neural bases of virtue and
evidence for flourishing at the biological level.

Rorty also addresses this issue and appears to accord with this second view. She
proposes an integrated account: that the contemplative life (the fruit of the
intellectual virtues) and the active life (fruit of the moral virtues) are compatible in
the fulfilled life.1659 She argues, “For a human being, Aristotle says, to live well is
to perceive well and to think well. These are natural energeiai:1660 their exercise is
paradigmatically pleasurable (1170a16-20).”

Other commentators also argue for this integrative account that embraces both
intellectual and moral realms. In 1.6.3 we saw that the positions of Hursthouse
and Swanton are broadly aligned with the view that the fulfilment of the person is
integrated with the development of virtue.

Hursthouse draws attention to the importance of phronesis (wisdom) in the
development and exercise of virtue. She argues that Aristotle saw virtue and
phronesis as two aspects of the same thing; and that it is impossible to have one

1657

Thomas Nagel, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia in Aristotle’s Ethics” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed.
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 7. McDowell too reflects
this view, suggesting that Aristotle proposes two possible views on the meaning of eudaimonia: an
intellectualist view, and the view that accommodates moral virtue. John McDowell, “The role of
eudaimonia in Aristotle’s Ethics” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 373, note ii.
1658
Nagel, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia in Aristotle’s Ethics,” 7.
1659
Amelie O. Rorty, “The place of contemplation in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics” in Essays on
Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 378.
1660
energeiai: a unified self contained whole.
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without the other.1661 For example, Aristotle explains that both wise and
villainous people can be called clever. “Wisdom is not the same as (cleverness)
though it does involve it. ... A wise person is able to deliberate well about the sorts
of things that conduce to the good life in general, ie eudaimonia.”1662 Hursthouse
highlights the role that phronesis plays in virtue and in human flourishing. She
says, “Like arête … phronesis was an almost unrecognised concept in modern
moral philosophy until the virtue ethicists brought it back.”1663

These contrasting positions of Hursthouse and Swanton with respect to
eudaimonism are enlightening. Hursthouse develops a moderate position, closely
reflecting Aristotle’s own thought and bridging the teleological and the non
teleological accounts. Swanton on the other hand highlights deficiencies, or
perhaps gaps, in Aristotle’s treatment of eudaimonia, and articulates the essential
nature of virtue as a responsiveness to being, thus defending the primacy of virtue
ethics over other ethical systems.1664

In contrast with Aristotle, Aquinas utilises the word beatitudo in place of
eudaimonia. Aquinas considers the happiness of beatitudo to be “complete
fulfilment to which nothing can be added by way of improvement or

1661

Hursthouse, “Virtue Theory,” 51.
NE, 1140a24-29.
1663
Hursthouse, “Virtue Theory”; and Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, 51. Swanton takes
issue with “monistic” approaches found in proponents of relationship ethics and some versions of
Aristotelian eudaimonistic ethics “according to which, the rationale of all the virtues is their being
needed for the flourishing (good) of the agent”. She argues for a “pluralistic” approach, “moral
responsiveness” requiring a variety of modes: love, respect, creativity, promotion etc. “What I call
the profile of a virtue is that constellation of modes of moral responsiveness or acknowledgement
which comprise the virtuous disposition.” Swanton (in Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, 48) argues
against what she regards as a “monoculture of consequentialist thought”. Swanton insists that
virtue cannot be instrumental in pursuit of goods such as love, friendship and pleasure as these
goods are not independent of virtue and that it is misleading to consider goods as having an
absolute value. For example, the value of particular goods may be derived from the relationship to
the agent himself. She seeks to “combine eudaimonism and naturalism through the unifying idea
of the perfection of our rational nature”(54). The point, as for Aristotle, is that the notion of virtue
derives from the very nature of the person.
1664
Swanton’s debt to Aristotle is evident, though she advocates a somewhat more eclectic
approach to virtue ethics and moral psychology, drawing even on notions derived from Nietzsche’s
theory of self love, in order to emphasise that she regards virtue as integral to the natural
wellbeing of the subject.
1662
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variation”,1665 and contrasts it with felicitas, earthly experiences of happiness. He
regarded man’s ultimate good as the perfection of the intellect by means of what
he calls beatitudo, which is often translated as happiness. To live the good life
knowledge however is insufficient; he argued that the acquisition of virtues is
necessary. These qualities enable us to make effective use of moral
knowledge.1666 Implicit to beatitudo is the notion, far beyond Aristotelian
understandings, of blissful union with God. Nevertheless, beatitudo as ‘the
perfection of the totality of a well lived human life’1667 bears much in common
with the comprehensive account offered by Aristotle. Both are the outcome of a
fully realised life according to nature, as each distinctively defines it. Both argued
for the necessity of rationality for life directing choices and happiness, and that it
is virtues that perfect rationality and human action. They see the development of
virtue as a response to being, a requirement for happiness.

In conclusion this study adopts a moderate eudaimonistic approach that considers
virtue, following Aristotle and Aquinas, to be constitutive of and enabling of
human flourishing understood as the development of our natural faculties.

A notional distribution of the neural bases of eudaimonia.
The explicit reference to eudaimonia in No.9 in Table 4.1 leaves much still to be
elaborated about the relationship between part-constituents of the characteristics
of virtue and eudaimonia. To some extent the immediate affective outcomes will
be reflected in the intrinsic reward outcomes associated with Nos.2 and 6, and
functional aspects certainly enter into Nos. 7 and 8. While functional flourishing
may include everything from efficiencies of transmission of neural commands, to
facilitated emotional regulation, there are also major objective positive outcomes
such as enhanced freedom of action, augmented capacity to love others, which
deserve acknowledgement as functional advantages. No. 9 focuses very much on
1665

Brian Davies, “Happiness” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. B. Davies and E. Stump
(Oxford: OUP 2012), 232. 227-237
1666
For a useful useful primer on Aquinas’ thought: Peter S. Eardley and Carl N. Still, Aquinas: A
guide for the perplexed (London: Continuum, 2010).
1667
Brian Davies “Happiness,” 227-237.
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teleological flourishing: that the rational operations of the organism are directly
facilitated. In fact, it appears that the notion of eudaimonia is associated with all
the characteristics in some way or other.

In Table 6.1 I consider the neural bases of the characteristics of virtue in the light
of affective, functional, and teleological categories of fulfilment. Detail concerning
the relevant neural bases is found in 5.3. This division follows upon simple analysis
of the nature of these characteristics: some are more associated with feelings of
pleasure and contentment, others reflect the nature of virtue as a facilitation of
action, and the third category most reflects the rationality of virtuous action, that
it is performed for an evident end.

Table 6.1
A notional distribution of neural bases of eudaimonia.

Indicative categories of fulfilment

Characteristics of the state of virtue having
neural bases.
For description of the neural bases of
characteristics refer to 5.3.

1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

The virtues of prudence and justice
dispose the practical reason and the
intellectual appetite facilitating
rationality and appropriate choices.
The virtues of fortitude and
temperance dispose the irascible
and sensitive appetites to endure
appropriate difficulties and to seek
appropriate pleasure.
A capacity for rational goal election
is evident.
“Virtues change us.” The acquisition
of virtue creates a state of
character, a way of being that tends
to be permanent.
The virtuous state is in keeping with

Affective

Functional

Conducive to
subjective
feelings of
contentment.

Directly
associated
with
satisfaction
derived from
this neural
and
cognitive
efficiency.









Teleological
Directly
facilitating
rationality
and
therefore
directly
enabling
virtuous
moral
choices.
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our human nature.
In the exercise of virtue intrinsic
motivation takes priority over
extrinsic motivation. Virtue is
motivated by that which is worthy to
man’s nature.
7. Virtue facilitates effective action.
8. Virtue brings about ease of action.
9. Virtue facilitates the flourishing of
the person. Virtue brings about a
state of excellence: an excellence of
the person, inclusive necessarily of
both neurobiological flourishing and
the exercise of rationality. It is a
state whereby reason and rationality
are empowered to manage activity.
It is a capacity for rationality that is
reflective and emotionally enriched
and able to be carried through into
noble humane behaviours.
Characteristics of virtue in its acquisition
For description of the neural bases of
characteristics refer to 5.3.
6.

10. The virtuous state results from
habituation and education.
11. Repetition, understood as critical
practice, plays an essential role in
the acquisition of virtue: repetition
in appetitive responses, in responses
manifesting noble sentiment and
attentiveness to others, and in
reasoning, deliberation and sound
decision making.
12. Education specifically in wisdom and
beauty is necessary in the formation
of virtue.
13. Effortful attention plays a significant
role.
Characteristics of virtue in its acquisition
For description of the neural bases of
characteristics refer to 5.3.
14. Advantage must be taken of the
early years both for training and
provision of appropriate example.
15. Imitation of example is a key means
for acquisition of behaviours.
16. Explicit teaching and guidance as to
right and wrong, are needed.
17. Affection facilitates learning
particularly in the family
environment.
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Note that all three aspects of fulfilment should be present in an enriched
understanding of embodied eudaimonia. Affective pertains to those
characteristics directly conducive to subjective feelings of contentment.
Functional pertains to aspects of neural efficiency at the behavioural level.
Teleological includes those characteristics more directly facilitating rationality and
therefore directly enabling virtuous moral choices.

We should be mindful that these characteristics all pertain to differing facts of
virtue itself. A definitive categorization is not possible; rather, the notional
distribution of characteristics of virtue across indicative categories serves to
highlight the complexity of the neural bases of eudaimonia.

The sections immediately following comment on the neural bases for the
affective, functional and teleological aspects of eudaimonia.

6.2.2.1 Affective fulfilment. Discussion of the neural bases for the feelings of
contentment associated with virtue.

Our focus here is not on arbitrary feelings of wellbeing, but on wellbeing directly
associated with the state, exercise or acquisition of virtue.

A convincing case may be presented that the dispositions of virtue lead to
heightened positive affect. While choices associated with appetite are rewarded
indiscriminately by the body’s hedonic reward systems and this is a normal
precursor to human acts, it is reasonable to suggest that pleasure enjoyed with
self-control is more enjoyable because it is longer lasting, and because it is
enriched by the joy of knowledge of benefits to others, and is free of any bitter
aftertaste of self-interest.

So, feelings of contentment will manifest at the neural level first of all in
mechanisms of DA regulation, -opioid messaging and 5-HT uptake inhibition, but
also via thalamic pathways from the striatum to the OFC (allowing cognitive
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modification of PFC to upregulate DA from the VTA and SN). Thus reward
signalling is modified to reflect the conviction that proposed virtuous actions are
rationally desirable; a source of reward reserved for what is perceived as a
rational choice.

Cognitive memory in association with emotional memory facilitates recall of
positive experiences in a manner exemplified in Wordsworth’s “Daffodils”. In this
way, in addition to intrinsic functional benefits towards facility for preferred
actions, we find that ease of action, clarity of deliberation, and so on, engender
the experience of rational joy.

Peace and wellbeing, appreciated at the emotional level as a freedom from fear
and a feeling of contentment, should also be included at this point. The capacity
for self-management, and ultimately of happiness, is intrinsically dependent upon
the successful management of one’s emotional life (see 5.3.3.2 No 2 for neural
bases). It is said of Alexander the Great that he had in his power all things except
his passions, unaware that the greatest of empires is to possess dominion over
oneself.

6.2.2.2 Functional fulfilment. Discussion of neural and cognitive efficiencies. The
intrinsic functional benefits of virtue.

Autonomy and ease of action are directly a result of virtue. Virtue requires
enriched neural connectivity and well developed neural pathways, a neural
perfection in some way analogous to physical fitness, empowering a person to act
more freely.

Neural and cognitive efficiencies, offered by the neural characteristics of virtue,
may be identified at various levels. Flourishing of the organism is a state denoted
by mature development of neural systems and mature integration of brain
systems; freedom to live an emotionally enriched life constitutes a further
important dimension of organic functionality.
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Neural bases for the intrinsic functional benefits of virtue appear to consist in the
following:

i.

Systemic integration that characterises the state and operations of virtue. This
integration exhibits the benefits that result from integrative processes:
efficiencies, and an end result beyond the reach of individual contributions (in
this case the various contributing systems, brain regions and pathways.)

ii.

This systemic integration facilitates a self-regulation that is characterised by
intrinsic motivation, a rich emotional life, and effective motor command.
Emotional life is passionately felt, and passionately appreciated at the
cognitive level, with a heightened aesthetic sense. Nevertheless, in a state of
virtue, internal emotional expression does not eclipse cognitive deliberation.
Such a situation would directly result in internal neural inefficiencies of loss of
objectivity in interpreting sense data leading to poor decision making, and
confusion or a loss of internal peace as a consequence of anxiety at not being
in control, or as a result of not acting in one’s best rational interests. This rich
emotional life complemented by an inner peace has been noted in the life of
Takashi Nagai in 3.1.1 and demonstrated in Table 5.3.

iii.

As virtue develops cortical activity is enriched by duly moderated, emotional
responses. Reward representations and emotional responses have been
calibrated by training in that which is most apt for human nature in pleasure
and pain. Emotional regulation must not be understood as a circumventing of
emotion leaving redundant “circuitry” and superfluous systems. As virtuous
behaviours are acquired, direct limbic routes remain for fast response if
needed. As virtue is acquired, pathways between limbic centres and cortical
processing areas are established and consolidated, allowing both cortical
regulation to some extent of emotional responses, and also permitting
emotional enrichment of cortical understanding.

iv.

Loops and oscillatory messaging appear to offer the neural efficiencies of
amplification of transmission, distillation of the core messages by filtering out
of noise. Emotional processing via loops offers such efficiencies of circuitry.
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Well calibrated perfusion of neuromodulation, in coordination with such
reverberation and oscilliatory messaging appears to offer insights into the
neural bases supporting a constant state of mind, and possibly even playing a
role in peace of mind. 1668
v.

Neural efficiencies as a result of mechanisms of habit formation are present.
Neural resources are optimised. As habits are consolidated, and fewer cortical
resources are enlisted in the performance of actions,1669 attention can be
focused elsewhere. “The brain is constantly trying to automate processes,
thereby dispelling them from consciousness; in this way, its work will be
completed faster, more effectively and at a lower metabolic level.
Consciousness, on the other hand, is slow, subject to error and
‘expensive’.”1670

vi.

Neural resources dedicated to emotional self regulation are reduced as virtue
is acquired. There are natural developmental analogies for this.
Voluntary suppression of a primary emotion, such as sadness,
requires more prefrontal work in children than in adults.
Conscious and voluntary self regulation of emotion is more
challenging (cognitively and affectively) in children than in
adults because the maturation of the connections linking the
prefrontal cortex and the limbic structures is not yet
completed. 1671
Similarly, the effort to be cheerful in children exhibited increased PFC
activation. 1672

1668

The basal-thalamo-cortical loop appears most relevant here. Da Cunha, “Learning processing in
the basal ganglia: a mosaic of broken mirrors,” 163.
1669
For example, Solso finds that experts use less energy in their brains responding to stimuli in
their domain. R. L. Solso and D. W. Massaro, The science of the mind: 2001 and beyond, (Oxford:
OUP, 1995).
1670
Gerhard Roth, “The Quest to Find Consciousness,” Scientific American Mind, January-February,
2004.
1671
Beauregard and O’Leary, The Spiritual Brain. A Neuroscientist’s Case for the Existence of the
Soul, 136.
1672
Beauregard and O’Leary, The Spiritual Brain. A Neuroscientist’s Case for the Existence of the
Soul, 136. Increased activation is noted in lateral PFC, OFC (just above the optic nerve input), mPFC
and rostral ACC.
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vii.

Stable intrinsic motivations replace the unreliability of extrinsic reward. As
habits are formed behaviours become increasingly resilient against reward
devaluation and efficiencies of intrinsic reward take dominance. Motivation
becomes independent of extrinsic reward. This accelerates further useinduced synaptic stabilisation: reinforcing behaviours are repeated more
readily once motivation is internalised.

viii.

The proximity of brain regions with key involvement adds further efficiencies
of interconnectivity. PFC, BG and limbic structures, with their interconnections
and loops, have been identified as key brain areas associated with the state of
virtue. These systems are adjacent in the architecture of the brain offering a
considerable neural efficiency for interconnectivity. This efficiency is further
enhanced by the fact that the BG and the limbic systems, enjoying rich
neuromodulator infusion, are adjacent to temporal lobes which are
themselves richly interconnected to the PFC and active in cortical memory,
and are situated between the autonomic systems linked to the brainstem and
cortical regulation.

ix.

Structural neuronal plasticity is a major cause of functional efficiency.
Structural changes facilitate pathways for preferred reward and emotional
responses, for deliberation, and for preferred motor outcomes. The stability of
virtue and of associated personality is accounted for, at the neurobiological
level, by structural plastic change as a consequence of gene expression
mediated by processes such as LTP and LTD. For example: preferred reward
outcomes could include intrinsic rewards for helping another; preferred
emotional responses could include remaining calm in a crisis; preferred motor
outcomes could include ready courtesies of smiling, etc. Mechanisms of
neuroplasticity offer greater speed, accuracy and efficiency in replicating
behaviours, by means of established pathways of motivation, processing,
command, and execution. Experience-based, Hebbian learning associated with
forms of LTP and LTD appears to play a major role in these mechanisms,
accounting for enhanced interconnectivity upon which procedural sequences
involved in virtuous actions are founded.
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x.

Sensitive periods and affection induced plasticities offer further efficiencies.
Guided by the reason of parent or caregiver, a child’s sound early
development of likes and dislikes, the precursor behaviours to fortitude and
temperance, are assisted by sensitive periods of responsiveness and by caregiver affection.

xi.

Mechanisms of imitation lead to direct incorporation of emotional responses.
This is manifested most particularly, though not exclusively, in younger
children. This facilitates parental and caregiver guidance in what, according to
reason, should be sought as pleasurable and what should be avoided.

xii.

The experience based paradigm of learning which underpins virtue
development brings a grand efficiency. Every experience carries potential for
learning not only at the cognitive level, but by inducing direct biological
modifications below the threshold of consciousness.

xiii.

In the development of the neural bases of virtue, a law of increasing returns
operates. Arden and Linford explain, “On the macro level: the more often we
do something, the more likely we are to do it again.”1673 Choices to act
virtuously serve to encourage future choices along the same lines. The neural
basis for this is found in use-induced plastic reinforcement of pathways of
preferred behaviours; simultaneously, unused and little used pathways are
pruned away.

6.2.2.3 Teleological fulfilment. The neurobiology of eudaimonia at the
teleological level.

In 5.3.3.1 u. teleologically oriented eudaimonia was described as:
A state of general flourishing marked by effective selfmanagement mediated by the neurophysiological dispositions
of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude.
…(underpinning) a rationality that is disposed to seek and
recognise truth and to love others.

1673

Arden and Linford, Brain-based therapy with children and adults, 21.
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In this section I consider eudaimonia, at the teleological level, under this aspect.
We saw (1.4.1.a) that flourishing, fullness of potentiality, is necessarily associated
with final causality; here we discuss flourishing of the person with respect to his
proper ends: truth and love.

Man is empowered for truth and love by the integrated action of the virtues
disposing his acts for perfection. Virtue facilitates inhibition of impulsivity towards
inappropriate and harmful pleasures, assists in mastery of timidity and
moderation of rashness (see 3.4.3.5-7 and 5.3.3.2 No.2), inclines towards a spirit
of relationship and respect for others, and assists in the dominion of reason.
There is compelling inductive argument that the state of virtue is a state of natural
happiness, and that therefore that the neural part-constituents of virtue are
aspects of the natural developmental trajectory of the human being, although this
natural development can be frustrated by the individual.

As we have seen (4.2.2) man’s capacity to grasp truth is perfected by prudence.
His capacity to moderate his own goods in relation to the goods of others is
perfected by the dispositions of justice (4.2.3, and 5.3.3.2. No.1 for neural bases
of both virtues). Virtue empowers the person for openness to reality, accuracy in
evaluating reality, planning, sincerity about reality; it empowers man for right
deliberation about means and goals, and about abstract goods.

On the basis of truths grasped and knowledge of one’s own end, it is possible to
make rational choices to choose rightly, to be in “good shape for self
determination”.1674

Furthermore, life is “relational” starting even at the synapse itself. Our capacity to
move ourselves towards the goals we understand to be good for ourselves
1674

John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 86. Finnis argues
that human flourishing is dependent on the possession of various goods, among them the basic
good of life is characterised by the capacity for self determination. Other goods such as practical
reasonableness necessitate the presence of virtue.
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necessarily requires the capacity to grasp the truth of things or people: I will love
another whom I understand to be a good for me. Hence, flourishing at the
personal level includes an openness to another in a personal relationship to the
degree that that person is understood as a good for oneself. It is common
experience that happiness in life is dependent on the experience of these loving
relationships.1675 In turn these positive experiences facilitate further positive
behaviours, nourishing human maturity. Reciprocally, it is shown that the quality
of relationships experienced by a child will affect brain development.

Biological processes facilitate a state disposed to knowing and loving. It seems
natural to human beings to love with all their being, with full integration of the
biological. Knowing too requires full integration of the biological. Without this
vision, knowing and loving remain as ancilliary activities to man, failing to enlist
one’s entire being, optional fulfilments for limited aspects only of human nature.
It would in fact be self-contradictory to argue that human beings are fulfilled by
knowing and loving were these operations not carried out with the integrated
involvement of the body.1676 Virtue may be understood as the neurophysical
disposition enabling rational operation, and is the key to our knowing and loving
in a fully integrated way. The perfection of the body must be integral to the
perfection of the person in a permanent way.1677

1675

Cf John Paul II, Redemptor Hominis, (1979), 10. “Man cannot live without love. He remains a
being that is incomprehensible for himself, his life is senseless, if love is not revealed to him, if he
does not encounter love, if he does not experience it and make it his own, if he does not
participate intimately in it.”
(http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jpii_enc_04031979_redemptor-hominis_en.html)
1676
Norman Doidge regards oxytocin as the neural substrate for love and commitment, creating a
calm and warm mood and triggering trust between couples and between mothers and children. He
christens it “the commitment neuromodulator”(119), and suggests that as a neuromodulator it is
more able to “enhance or diminish the overall effectiveness of the synaptic connections and bring
about enduring change” (118). Doidge is of the view that oxytocin assists imitation of another’s
intentions and perceptions, and counters self-centredness. (119) He quotes Walter J Freemen of
Berkeley who argues there to be two massive neuronal organisational times: falling in love and
parenting. Doidge, The brain that changes itself, see discussion 116-121.
1677
The very perfection of the risen Christ reveals, to a Christian, that bodily perfectibility is
permanent, and that how we are hereafter is proportionate to how we become now.
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I am fulfilled by knowing and loving with all my being, without holding back, a
complete giving in which all my senses, internal senses, memories, desires,
planning and deliberations are enlisted and present. This understanding is in
accord with a definition of love that embraces complete self-giving. (See also
Woytyla’s enriched understanding of person, and fulfilment in loving relationships
in 1.4.3.) To love with all my heart is to love not only the “movement” of love
towards the good that is loved, but, in interpersonal love, the mutual possession
of the beloved and complete self-giving of the beloved. This is true flourishing.
Virtue is the only path. It is the biological key.1678

Happiness normally also accompanies the capacity for autonomous action that is
necessarily a feature of human maturity. It is also common experience that
happiness depends upon peace of heart, that quality of character reflecting the
capacity to direct oneself to the goals one holds to be of greatest value in life. It
may be argued that good habits, habits following upon choices of what we
perceive as deeply good for us, bring this peace. A further case may be presented
that habitual dispositions for meditation, reflection, and contemplation of beauty
are also implicated in happiness.

Note that while peace of heart may appear to be a subjective element, there is a
manifestly objective basis in the due order in one’s life and in one’s
neurobiology.1679

6.2.3 Fulfilment through virtue.

Links between virtue and fulfilment are found in two prominent contemporary
professors of psychology whose work is largely consistent with the
Aristotelian/Thomistic view of virtue as a source of fulfilment for man. Both
venture into the neuroscience.
1678

For this reason, for a Christian, Christ is the model of human activity; a man who knows and
loves “in” his very being.
1679
“The peace of all things lies in the tranquility of order; and order is the disposition of equal and
unequal things in such a way as to give to each its proper place” Augustine XIX.13, p. 938.
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The work of Samuel Franklin openly attempts to demonstrate that a greater part
of the anthropological wisdom, and biological accuracy, of current psychology may
be traced back to Aristotle’s teachings about virtue. The other is the initiator of
the Positive Psychology movement, Martin Seligman, who presents the view that
at the clinical level (and therefore at the level of biological structures) that virtue
perfects the nature of man. Seligman’s most recent text, Flourish, presents his
current thought on the topic.

6.2.3.1 Samuel Franklin

With the intention of building a bridge between contemporary biopsychology and
Aristotle, Samuel Franklin has published in 2010 The Psychology of Happiness. A
good human life. He discusses “the physiological basis of virtue”.1680
Aristotle suggested that virtue is the moderation of emotion by
reason. Although it took 2,500 years, we now have neurological
evidence that he was right. 1681

Drawing on the work of LeDoux, he outlines a simple model for the implication of
biological structures in the operation of virtue. At the core of his insight is the
contrast between a longer cortical route for emotional processing, involving eye –
thalamus – visual cortex – amygdala – PFC – emotional reaction, with a more
direct route: eye – thalamus – amygdala – emotional reaction; 1682 he argues that
the longer cortical route is integral to virtue. He holds that the capacities for
“executive control” lie in prefrontal areas.1683 He argues for the instrumentality of
the PFC in executive control and self awareness and result in foresight,
judgement, social graces, creativity, empathy, reasoning, and reliability,1684and

1680

Franklin, The Psychology of Happiness. A good human life, Chapter 12.
Franklin, The Psychology of Happiness. A good human life, 117.
1682
Franklin, The Psychology of Happiness. A good human life, 117.
1683
Franklin, The Psychology of Happiness. A good human life, 119.
1684
Franklin, The Psychology of Happiness. A good human life, 119.
1681
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suggests that both humans and primates suffering damage to the prefrontal areas
(think of Phineas Gage) lose these capacities.
Here lay the capacities for “executive control”, the ability to
make reasonable decisions, to inhibit when appropriate, and to
say and do the right thing. The prefrontal lobes appear to be
the centres where visual images become meaningful and where
reason and emotion join together.1685

The absence of any discussion whatsoever touching on the hylomorphic makeup
of the human person is a serious omission from the perspective of this study. He
suggests, incorrectly from an Aristotelian perspective: “The prefrontal lobes ...
may be the seat of our humanness, our ergon.”1686

6.2.3.2 Martin Seligman

Martin Seligman, Professor at University of Pennsylvania and a recent past
President of the American Psychological Association, is a giant of contemporary
psychology. Having won acclaim for his groundbreaking work on resilience for
young people, in 2004 he coauthored with Christopher Peterson Character
Strengths and Virtues, an analytical framework for discussion of character defined
as a composite of positive traits or habits.

Their avowed aim was to “reclaim the study of character and virtue as legitimate
topics of psychological inquiry and societal discourse”, seeking to elevate
discussion of virtues to a clinical basis through an evidence-based methodology.
They stated, “We believe good character can be cultivated, but to do so we need
conceptual and empirical tools to craft and evaluate interventions.” This
confirmation of the role of virtue and particularly of its contribution to flourishing
is timely.

1685
1686

Franklin, The Psychology of Happiness. A good human life, 119.
Franklin, The Psychology of Happiness. A good human life, 120.
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Seligman and Peterson through an exhaustive process identified six umbrella
abstract virtues: wisdom, courage, justice, temperance, humanity and
transcendence and a further list of character strengths subordinate to the virtues.
Their list of virtues bears resemblance to core virtues of the various traditions of
man.

Under the six headings the authors drill down to twenty four character strengths,
or stable traits of character; for example wisdom is the umbrella virtue for
creativity, curiosity, open-mindedness, love of learning, and perspective. The
authors suggest that one can further descend to what they call “situational
themes”, habits manifesting the character strengths in specific circumstances. The
whole process is thus from the abstract to the specific habits that manifest the
virtues. Pleasingly Aristotelian.

They are at pains to remind us that theirs is not the final word, but the work is
most impressive nonetheless. Major sections in the book discuss aims and
methodology of the project, the character strengths in detail, and assessment
processes. Chapters on each character strength are the work of contributing
experts in their own specific fields. Discussion of each strength follows a standard
template: definitions, traditional approaches, measures, benefits, manifestations,
cross-gender and cross-cultural variations, interventions for fostering, areas for
future study, and bibliography.

Early in the work, Seligman and Peterson review understandings of virtue through
the great cultural traditions of the east and the west. It is most of all in the
writings of the great Greek philosophers that Seligman and Peterson find their
inspiration. The four cardinal virtues closely align with five of the six of Seligman
and Peterson. Only transcendence at first sight is not easily categorized yet
Socrates and his followers would no doubt have included a transcendence within
the speculative virtue of wisdom. Not only does the actual articulation of the
virtues essentially correspond, but the vision of a virtue as a good habit closely
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aligns. Seligman has now built upon this work, taking it an overtly eudaimonistic
direction… “strengths of character that make the good life possible.”

Building on his earlier work, Seligman has now published Flourish. The new work
broadens his definition of happiness. He proposes five indicators of flourishing:
positive emotion, engagement, relationships, meaning and accomplishment.
Relationships and accomplishment receive more emphasis than in his past
works.1687 Nevertheless his analysis appears to have compatibility neither with
that of Aristotle nor with the basic human goods as outlined by John Finnis and
others.1688

An attempt to align the three perspectives suggests that Seligman’s divisions are
based on a subjective perspective: for example, Seligman overtly discusses
positive emotion and the experience of meaning and accomplishment, whereas
both Aristotle and Finnis prefer to limit their analysis to objective context. I
suggest this reveals a significant difference in approach. Ultimately Seligman
prefers to discuss the subjective experience of virtue and the subjective
experience of happiness, rather than the existential reality of virtue. While this is
understandable given his clinical emphasis it is perhaps inevitable given
Seligman’s lack of a metaphysical anthropology. This does not, however, detract
from the value of Seligman’s findings on the necessity of virtue for human
flourishing. The power of clinical findings is in their objective basis in evidence; it is
Seligman’s analysis that adds the note of subjectivity.

6.3

Neuroscientific conclusions

6.3.1 Reflections on the model that has been proposed.

1687

Seligman Flourish: a new understanding of happiness and well-being and how to achieve them.
In 3.2.8 we saw that Aristotle regarded virtue as necessary though not sufficient for happiness
and he enumerated requirements for happiness.
1688
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During my investigations there have been moments of significant insight that have
given shape to this study. An understanding of these stepping stones will provide
an appropriate lead-in to a summary of neuroscientific conclusions, and may
stand my key findings in greater clarity.

The role of virtues as factors that promote wellbeing has been most evident to me
in my professional life. I am still in close touch with a great number of students,
some now in their late 30s, whom I knew very well through a decade of their
school lives. Many are flourishing and some are struggling. It has become patently
clear to me that that our habits will either pull us through or, if they are bad
habits, come back to bite us.

A Time article fifteen years ago about the developmental windows in a child’s
brain got me thinking about a project describing the neural basis of virtue
understood as good habits, and that it could be possible to demonstrate
scientifically the benefit of virtues.1689

Once I started on the project, it became very clear that the solution needed to
embrace the unity of the virtues. When I dissected the actions of Nagai it became
clear that good actions in real life consistently require the dispositions of most, if
not all, of the cardinal virtues. Rereading the Nicomachean Ethics in the light of
the task I was undertaking, I was struck by Aristotle’s remarkable insights about
pain and pleasure as human motivations, and of the virtues of temperance and
fortitude disposing for appropriate pain and pleasure. The role of temperance and
fortitude fell into place as necessary dispositions prior to every human act.

When I was considering the possibility of neural bases for prudence and justice, it
became apparent that, during the process of deliberation, reasoning requires the
ongoing support of phantasms drawn from memory (and imagination, which is a
form of composite memory). This fact and the description in Scenario 3 where

1689

J. Madeleine Nash, “Fertile minds,” Time Magazine, 3 February, 1997.
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Nagai reads and reads again the pamphlet dropped from the plane before he
comes to a conclusion, made it clear to me that embodied rational deliberation
has duration and is conducted with the ongoing assistance of, is disposed by,
neural structures.

The observation of trained dogs that obey their owners’s commands to sit at kerbs
(even when, as in the suburb where I live, dogs receive instruction in a foreign
language!), accorded remarkably with the observation of Aristotle that acts
disposed by fortitude and temperance in a small child must follow the reason of
the parent. This led me to the view that fortitude and temperance must essentially
be neurobiological features.

When the discovery of mirror neurons received publicity, initially I could see a
possible role of this neural mechanism in assisting the uptake of parental example.
I then read of Aristotle’s insistence that parents must teach refined attitudes to
pleasure and pain, by example and body language in an ongoing emotional
education, and thus teach emotional regulation. The mirror neuron thus offers a
mechanism not only to assist in imitation of example and development of
empathy but for the very core business of emotional education: children are able
to embody their parent’s emotional reactions to pain and pleasure … again for
better or for worse.

At a comparatively early stage in this project, an integral role for the BG struck me
as necessary.
i.

In my readings in neuroscience on habit formation in the brain, I was
struck by the recent expanding understandings of the function of the BG
(extending to involvement in reward and emotion processing, and
cognitive support for decision making and goalsetting). I had come seeking
a neural basis for good habits, and it was felicitously coincidental that the
area most associated with automaticity enjoyed rich reciprocal
interconnectivity with the PFC and with the limbic areas. It struck me that
the Hebbian principle brings with it a corollary: connections are not only
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built by activity, but the existence of connections indicates activity, and
dense interconnection indicates a virtual information
highway.Furthermore, the physical location of the BG also struck me as
highly conducive to an integral role.
ii.

Addiction studies brought to my attention the pathways in the BG for the
transformation of reward related behaviours to habitual behaviours, with
corresponding reduction in reward significance. This struck me as a
significant parallel to the reward independent intrinsically motivated
behaviours of mature virtue, most especially given the presence once
again of the BG in the equation. The reality of reward incentivation for
small children (and puppy dogs) during stages of habit formation further
suggested to me a role for the BG in mature virtue.

iii.

Furthermore, addiction studies note the coexistence of BG addiction
pathways with clear-headed, calculating rationality in the addict. This
suggested that positive BG habits could also have a rational dimension.
That there are no motor pathways directly from the BG demonstrates that
the role of the BG is to modify motor commands not to issue them. In
principle, the abundant basal-cortical connectivity can support positive
reflective habits, not only unconscious habit and addictive behaviours.

My attendance at the Persons and their Brains conference at Oxford in July 2012
and subsequent meetings and correspondence with several figures writing in
philosophy of mind and neuroscience have given me greater clarity of
understanding concerning the shortcomings of the notion of emergence and of
the need to repackage the hylomorphic view in terms that can engage with
neuroscience. A chance meeting with a professor of Thomistic philosophy helped
me refine my view of the unitive and functional role of the soul.1690 1691
1690

Discussions and correspondence with Professor Antonio Malo of the University of the Holy
Cross, Rome.
1691
These insights are presented in Appendix 1. A Response to the Claims of Emergent Rationality
by Non-reductive Materialism and in several articles I have penned in subsequent months. Several
online pieces I have contributed to MercatorNet website, http://www.mercatornet.com/:“The
battle to reclaim free will,” 6 July 2012; “Stephen Covey: reviving the forgotten notion of virtue,”
22 August 2012; “What’s the matter with Analytic Philosophy,” 4 September 2012.
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6.3.2. A summary of neuroscientific conclusions.

I have argued that the neural bases of virtue (as have been presented in 5.3 and in
Table 5.2) consist in the highly coordinated integration of higher neural systems at
both the functional and structural levels, subserved by the lower neural structures
and other bodily systems (sustaining life and supporting physical activity). These
neural bases manifest the plasticity that is virtually ubiquitous across the neuronal
pathways of the human brain; this plasticity, and the systems of learning,
memory, habit formation, emotional regulation and goal election offer the
primary mechanisms to assist in the stabilisation and reinforcement of behaviour
by repetition and in response to environmental inputs.

In the normal course of events consolidated neural pathways are a use-induced
consequence of repeated choices disposed by the virtues of prudence and justice
(and therefore with full respect for duties towards others), free from the negative
consequences of emotion driven choices (through the dispositions of
temperance), and from unreasonable fears of external obstacles (though the
dispositions of courage). In other words, it is rational and virtuous choices
themselves that further consolidate stable dispositions of virtue in a marvellously
efficient paradigm of development; the very neural circuitry involved in individual
virtuous acts becomes over time a flexible myriad of expressways and flyovers for
ease of action (pathways facilitating attention to others, intrinsic reward,
emotional management, consideration of consequences to others, critical
judgement, prior planning, decisiveness, etc). In complement to each virtuous
action, preferential recall in cortical memory systems and reward circuitry, is
further consolidated by each virtuous action: preferential priority for subsequent
behaviours is accorded to practised behaviours. This will be true for practised
positive behaviours (eg sincerity, service to others, patience, a capacity to endure
discomfort for a reasonable motive, etc) but also for negative behaviours (eg
laziness, reactions of disrespect, surrender to anger, etc).
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The state of virtue manifests at the neural level as a systemic harmonisation, a
grand integration of the mental resources of the human being. An ongoing
interplay is required between biological development, practical reason,
experience, consideration for others, and the repetition of positive goal directed
behaviours. Established interconnections facilitate, most importantly, higher
cortical management of a person’s emotional life and of deepest motivations for
action. For this reason as we have seen (See 5.2.2.2), the development of the
neural dispositions for virtue may be seen as a flourishing of the human organism
at the biological level.

Furthermore this complex systemic integration is ordained to the fulfilment of the
person at the holistic level, to eudaimonia in the most complete sense of the
word. (See 5.2.2.3) The development of the neural structures supporting virtue is
manifestly the end point of a developmental process that is, so fittingly given our
yearning for rational self-determination, autonomous. Freely elected life
experiences and free responses to environmental and experiential inputs are the
raw material from which virtues are formed. The state of virtue is a state of neural
and systemic maturity, but one which, in some way, one constructs oneself.

6.3.3 Associated insights into brain structure and function.

In Chapter 1 I suggested that this study has the potential to contribute to our
understanding of the human brain. The following insights appear particularly
noteworthy:
i.

In keeping with the evolutionary preference for increasing efficiency in
organisms and organic systems, this study holds that increased
integration and interconnectivity of brain areas and brain systems are
manifestations of normal developmental processes. This is suggested,
for example, in the clarification of interconnections between brain
regions brought about by synaptic pruning (see 2.2.4, 2.2.5 and Table
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2.15) with resulting greater efficiencies of connectivity, and found also
in descriptors of the Templeton research grants (2.1.1.2). 1692
ii.

This study supports the view, gaining greater traction with improved
imaging, that deep cortical structures play a more significant role in
cortical and cognitive activity than had been previously understood.

iii.

The BG appear to play a most significant integrative role by facilitating
cognitive processing of emotion, reward considerations and habit
formation.

iv.

Note that plasticity denotes not only flexibility for change, but
paradoxically the capacity to become and remain in a different
configuration. This capacity, first to be responsive to remoulding, and
then for the “concrete to set” is at the heart of the stabilized pathways
that are manifested in virtue. It was noted in Chapter 2 that the
capacity to lock in behaviours is “the forgotten … aspect of
plasticity”.1693 The essence of this quality of plasticity appears to be
found most of all in permanent changes associated with gene
expression brought about by structural reconfigurations at the level of
the dendrite. Hebbian paradigms of synaptic strengthening govern the
development of brain structures that reflect procedures of behaviour
and associations between environmental stimuli.

v.

The necessary integration in cognitive learning of systems of attention
has particular significance in the development of the virtues of
prudence and justice, which rely less on early training and more on
explicit guidance. Attentional difficulties in adolescence must be a
significant hindrance to moral development.

vi.

In the model of virtue proposed, neurotransmitter perfusion most
particularly of DA in response to cognitive reward perception plays a

1692

Note too, that in descriptors of the Templeton research grants, (2.1.1.2) accord with the view
that virtue manifests in high levels of integration and interconnectivity between neural systems:
most particularly in the integration of the brain’s emotion and reward/motivation/goal election
systems, with systems of cognition, planning and executive management. Note, for example, that
the rational moderation of pleasure and rational endurance of pain for a proportionate good,
necessarily present in acts of temperance and fortitude, requires a high level of neural
interconnectivity between reward, emotion, emotional memory, cognition and executive centres.
1693
N. Doidge, The brain that changes itself, 276.
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most significant motivational role, most certainly in the early stages of
acquisition of the virtue. But also, on the basis that the body possesses
mechanisms to reward activities that are perceived as enjoyable with
DA, 5-HT and opiates,1694 these pathways are also likely to constitute
the basis of intrinsic reward associated with virtue.1695
vii.

In the model of virtue proposed, the lack of resilience, shown in the
virtual epidemic of depression and anxiety present in young people,
would appear to consist in a heightened sensitivity to conditioned
fears, and a corresponding lack of development cortical management
pathways.

viii.

The ready facility found in young people for the development of habits
is also shown to be grounded in the neuroscience: it is proposed that
structural plasticity at the neuronal level provides the mechanism
underpinning the long-term changes which characterise virtue. It is
also proposed that mechanisms of structural plasticity provide the
neural substrate for the necessary rational elements that underpin true
virtue. It is argued that structural plasticity is also implicated in the
greater self management of emotional life that virtue affords... and in
the experience of happiness and peace that self management provides.

ix.

I have presented neurobiological evidence that we human beings have
the evident ability to bring about, by our own choices, the neural
development of our brain systems that are necessarily conducive to
the exercise of rationality and emotional regulation across the
spectrum of virtuous behaviours. I suggest that this neural
development may be understood, because of excellence of cognitiveemotional integration and connectivity it entails, as the pathway par
excellence for our maturity as human persons.

x.

Ultimately this study into the neural bases of virtues is a further
witness that the material is integral to our humanity. A state of virtue is

1694

Addiction studies of video gamers show this.
The research into the bases of intrinsic reward under the Templeton research grants offers the
possibility of early clarification of this model.
1695
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a stable disposition to know and to love, and is ordered to our deep
fulfilment. To program ourselves for happiness we need to build up, by
dint of constant choices and effort, a repertoire of positive behaviours;
as we consolidate them, these experiences change us. Functional
change leads to permanent change both neuronally and personally.
Virtue based approaches remind us that rationality and matter are
profoundly integrated.

6.4 Philosophical conclusions.

In 6.4 I draw together conclusions, in the light of the neuroscience and
hylomorphic theory, with respect to:
i.

Anthropology – In addition to the points raised in 6.1 and 6.2
concerning eudaimonia, I offer reflections arising from this marriage of
neurobiology and hylomorphism. I consider the unity of the virtues and
offer brief reflections on the distinction between virtue and vice.

ii.

Philosopy of mind – I consider the comparative advantages, in the light
of an identification of the biophysical part-constituents, of the
hylomorphic approach to philosophy of mind. I suggest that a notion of
soul as principle of being, unity, and function of the person accords to
hylomorphism the language to engage more successfully with
contemporary currents in philosophy of mind and demonstrate a
patently superior approach to materialist and dualist understandings.

iii.

Virtue ethics – This study suggests that virtue ethics, because of a
demonstrated relationship to human biophysiology, is superior to
consequentialist and deontological approaches.

iv.

Hylomorphism itself – I consider the insights that the hylomorphic
account of human freedom and rationality stands to gain from a
deeper understanding of neuroscience.

6.4.1 Anthropology. Understanding of the human person. Advantages of an
hylomorphic approach.
519

By describing the neurobiological basis for acquired character traits, this study
offers a heightened appreciation of the effect that choices and behaviours,
experiences and environment play in defining who we are.
Plutarch wrote that character is inured habit.1696 For better or for worse this is
true. Our personality is sooner or later defined by our habitual behaviours. The
traction obtained by repeated negative or positive behaviours is founded in the
biological basis of virtue. Matter brings determination; in the case of virtue, a selfelected determination. A comprehensive model has been offered, consistent with
both the identified characteristics of virtue and with the neuroscientific data,
describing how emotion and processes of goal election may either hijack
rationality or reinforce decision making.

6.4.1.1 Unity of the virtues reveals itself as a biological necessity.

This study serves to considerably strengthen the case for the unity of the virtues.

In 4.3 I argued for the complementary and integral activity of the cardinal virtues
in every human act. My approach consisted of the following: I offered
observations of the apparent complex integration of the various virtues in real
scenarios; in concert, I argued that an analysis of the human act (Table 3.1)
reveals composition by various elements each requiring the distinctive perfection
of the various virtues; then, noting Aquinas’s argument that each virtue must play
a distinctive role, and on the basis of a close reading of Thomistic texts, I offered a
“restricted understanding of Aquinas’ “reason is the form of the virtues”. In
summary I have argued that all four cardinal virtues are present in actions of
perfect virtue because the four cardinal virtues each perform different roles,
disposing the sensitive appetites, the intellectual appetite and the intellect. All are
needed for the completion of the good action.

1696
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When these arguments based on observation, dissection of the human act, and
deduction from an understanding of the differing roles of the virtues based on
analysis of Aristotelian and Thomistic texts, are complemented in 5.3.3 by
identification of highly plausible neural bases of each of the cardinal virtues, a
compelling argument crystallises: it would seem that the unity of the virtues be a
biological necessity.

6.4.1.2 Some thoughts on the nature of vice.

Vice is understood popularly as the antonym of virtue. In 3.3.13 the nature of vice
was discussed. Vice is a disposition to give free rein to a passion, following one’s
sensitive nature “contrary to the order of reason”.1697 It stands in contrast to both
virtue which, generally speaking, is the habitual rational choice of a good that is in
keeping with one’s nature, and to incontinence in which the action against nature
is contrary to the express will of the agent who lacks the mastery that would be
accorded by possession of the virtues of justice, fortitude or temperance.

The neural analysis of Chapter 2 serves to highlight that vice and virtue are not
simple alternatives. Vice is a habit of complacent abrogation of rational
deliberation and so is most harmful for the subject. Vices are best understood as
an absence, accompanied by rational justification, of neural circuitry facilitating
adequate evaluation of goals.

Vice and virtue are not simple alternative trajectories of development; vice is a
privation of neural development. A correctly formed understanding of vice leads
us to understand that bad habits are not a simple alternative to good habits; there
is a world of difference both in function – rationality informed by appropriate
ends- and structure – vice must necessarily exhibit defective pathways of

1697

ST, Ia-IIae, Q.71, Art.2.
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deliberation and/or evaluation of consequences of one’s actions, accompanied
also possibly by impoverished emotional regulation.

Vice is a self-imposed privation of rationality. Neurally it will be constituted by
direct pathways between passion and behaviour, bypassing due deliberation. As it
is a complacent attitude, it will be accompanied by higher cortical reward
representations denoting awareness and enjoyment of one’s actions. There will
be no consequent activity in brain centres for sadness and guilt. The bottom line
is that the person in the grip of vice is content to underutilise the human capacity
to deliberate effectively about ends. Such underutilisation becomes neurally
reinforced, through strengthening of direct, non reflective routes, the more the
relevant behaviours are pursued.

6.4.2 The benefits of a non-reductionist, hylomorphic approach to philosophy
of mind.

In Chapter 1 notions of anti-reductionism, rationality and person were introduced
as essential to the Aristotelian view of virtue. In Section 1.5, I adopted Haldane’s
advocacy of a “return to form”, and proposed the suitability of an hylomorphic
solution to the mind-body problem. A convincing, non-reductionist position
appears impossible without the concept of person as agent. Here I further
conclude that the anti-reductionist position and notions of person, rationality, and
virtue, are further supported by an enriched understanding of causality (6.4.2.1)
and by an understanding of soul that is adequate to underpin human freedom
(6.4.2.3, and Appendix 1). Thus, in the first case, I further distance hylomorphism
from any taint of substance dualism, and in the second, I avoid a narrow and
deterministic definition of causality that considers only material cause.

We have seen that contemporary philosophy of mind, in seeking to account for
human behaviour and material causality, is dominated either by reductionistmaterialist approaches on the one hand, essentially denying freedom, or antireductionist approaches on the other. Within the latter, this study proposes that
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only an approach founded on the Aristotelian-Thomistic vision of the human
person succeeds in accounting for both causality and freedom. We have seen that
the other principal non-reductionist approach to philosophy of mind has looked
either to substance dualism in one form or another for a solution accounting for
human freedom, or to a paradigm of emergent rationality.

Ultimately, free human action is as inconceivable in a model of human nature that
proposes a dual substance solution as in one that is purely material. The first, in
affirming freedom disposes of a single human subject, and the second is incapable
of offering a rationally satisfying accommodation for freedom within the
determination of matter. The hylomorphic solution, is however, as we have seen,
a “non dualist, dual aspect, ontological anti-reductionist” approach to the human
person; an approach that reconciles human freedom with the notions of material
causality essential to neuroscientific method.1698

6.4.2.1 The importance of an hylomorphic understanding of brain function and
structure.

What if someone should ask whether there is any practical difference between a
materialist (reductionist or non-reductionist) understanding of the brain and an
hylomorphic understanding? In the first, matter is the agent; in the second
animated matter operates. Does this difference have any real significance? Could
it be that agency resides ultimately in neural structures and neurochemicals?
Could it be that hylomorphism is simply an act of faith that preserves a realm of
immateriality?

On the contrary, this study argues that rationality is only possible if the
hylomorphic understanding of matter holds. Rational understanding and rational
choices to move ourselves towards what we know is suitable for ourselves seem
only explicable within a paradigm of participation ungoverned by the
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A classification suggested by Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind”.
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determination of matter. A materialist explanation of human beings is not
rationally satisfying.

There is undeniable evidence of the human capacity to transcend the material.
Human beings can transcend from the concrete and the immediately perceived;
they can acquire wisdom, understanding about what things are and their purpose.
Human beings can choose; they can elect to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of
goods that they believe will enrich them even on a non-tangible level; also a
human being can form interpersonal relationships whereby he or she dedicate
themselves to carry out the will of another seeing this as for their own fulfilment
in some way.1699

Because this evidence of man’s capacity to operate at a transcendent level is
undeniable, and because materialist accounts cannot explain non-material
realities, material explanations for man’s nature are necessarily inadequate. And
once the inadequacy of the material agency is established, the notion of “person”
as moral agent is a necessary further conclusion on the basis of unity of being.
Note that the conclusions first of the hylomorphic constitution of man, and of his
personhood are both based on observation of the real nature of things. Take away
the hylomorphic constitution of man and he is denied personhood.

There are only five possible explanations for the presence of rationality of human
beings.
i.

That human beings are puppets of a rational principle beyond
themselves. This is manifest nonsense as it removes every skerrick of
agency from mature human beings.

ii.

A reductive materialism that defines matter as the functioning agent,
and argues that all human behaviour has its explanation in cells,
currents, neurotransmitters, etc. This is a deterministic position and is
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ultimately a denial of rationality; an assertion that rationality and
human freedom are essentially illusory.
iii.

A substance dualism that defines the soul as the functioning agent,
leading to insuperable contradictions in accounting for causation and
for interaction between human beings and physical experience.

iv.

A non-reductive materialism arguing that rationality emerges from
matter itself. Yet an emergent rationality must be tied to the
determinism inherent in matter; it cannot explain the capacity to grasp
universal truth, nor human freedom. As both of these are manifest
realities, non-reductive materialism is ultimately a self-contradictory
position. The term “emergent” appears to be an unscientific sleight of
hand. Furthermore, to resort to “chaos” and “quantum”, as some do,
to explain personhood and freedom either misunderstands rationality
or takes refuge in a mysticism that is ultimately irrational.

v.

The hylomorphic solution which is more subtle and satisfying, arguing
that there must be another principle for human activity beyond matter
but intrinsic to the human being. This special quality cannot emerge
from the matter itself nor be a separate substance to the body. It is a
principle animating the body itself but must be received from beyond
the body. This principle of activity is the rational soul. The hylomorphic
solution is founded on the observation that an animated human body
is essentially of a different order from a living animal or a non-living
thing.

The prevailing position in neuroscience is that of materialism, either reductive or
non-reductive, but either way materialism. It is my hope that this crossdisciplinary study, in subjecting the assumptions of neuroscience to a rigorous
philosophical critique, assists in bringing to this exciting field the depth of an
hylomorphic understanding of man.

Without a broader acceptance of hylomorphism in the community of
neuroscience, it would appear that the neurobiology of abstraction, of human
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freedom, of personal agency and interpersonal relationships must remain
undervalued and possibly understudied. Without acknowledgement of rich
complexity of the human person, and the role of truth and dedicated
interpersonal love in human fulfilment these fields will remain uncultivated in
neuroscience. There are of course noteworthy exceptions of persons currently
working in these fields. Because, in the hylomorphic scheme of things, virtue
opens the door to truth and interpersonal commitments, it is my hope that neural
studies of virtue, in the light of hylomorphism, open the door to neural studies of
human flourishing at an even broader level.

6.4.2.2 An enriched understanding of causality accords with the anti-reductionist
view and permits dialogue between scientific and philosophical
explorations.

In this task of applying neuroscience to an anthropology that respects human
freedom, an enriched, essentially Aristotelian, understanding of causality is
necessary, that discriminates between material, formal and final causes at the
neural level. Without such discrimination it would appear impossible to
accommodate both biological materialism and the human freedom manifested in
the rational development of virtue ordered to the flourishing of the person.
Without such an enriched understanding it would various appear impossible to
reconcile man’s freedom with the determinism inherent in matter.

Therefore I propose that these investigations into the neural bases of virtue,
indeed all neuroscientific endeavours attending to human subjects, must respect
the following notions of causality:
i.

Experimental method understands an efficient causality operating at the
material level. The cause of water turning to steam is the Bunsen burner.
The cause of the accident is the drunk driver. A key mistake of reductive
understandings of neuroscience is that causality is simplistically reduced to
one category: efficient/material causality. This is an impoverished view of
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causality; 1700 in the development of virtue, I suggest that appropriate
experience is the efficient cause of the development of habit. There are
clearly other factors in play, but no good habit can exist without
appropriate experience.
ii.

Good habits in their neurobiological bases are the material cause of virtue.
Good habits are truly embodied. The body is a necessary co-constituting
factor of good habits in the embodied state. In our embodied state all
human activity in the rational, moral, conscious order, not only has
manifestations in man’s physical being, but is mediated through the
physical.

iii.

Although rationality is mediated through the physical it is not reducible to
the physical. It is the person who is rational, not his or her brain.
Biochemical mechanisms alone are insufficient to account for free action.
Human development and human behaviours cannot be reduced to actions
subject to a material determination. Through our rationality we become
masters of our own development. Hence, rationality, is the formal cause of
all virtue.1701 An understanding of this concept has discussed at length in
Chapter 3.

iv.

Good habits are characteristics, not merely of biology, but of the person.
Indeed as was presented in 5.2.1.2, it is argued that the flourishing of the
person is the final cause of virtue, that good habits, with all of the
biological embodiment that this implies, are the means by which a state of
human flourishing is achieved.

Without this enriched appreciation of causality, I suggest it is not possible to
reconcile neuroscientific understandings with human behaviour, nor to reach
findings of significance both to philosophy and neuroscience.

1700

Formal and final causality are neglected completely.
Not only does Aquinas affirm this principle, but Haldane as we have seen, argues that a return
to an understanding of formal cause is absolutely necessary if we are to find a way forward in
philosophy of mind, if we are to reconcile man’s evident, albeit limited, freedom of action, with
notions of causality in the physical world.
1701

527

6.4.2.3 Functionalist approaches to hylomorphism.

a) Rationality is functionally integrative.

An enriched understanding of causality offers a solution satisfactory to both
neuroscience and to an anthropology protective of rationality and freedom. We
have seen in particular that it is essential to embrace notions of formal and final
causality if one is to reach an accommodation satisfying to both.

I argue here for a “functional” understanding of rationality. By this I mean the
view that rationality is the principle of being, unity and function for the person; it
offers a path by which physicalist understandings of matter may be moderated by
non physical factors. Without such an understanding of rationality there seems to
be no possibility of a dialogue between physicalism and metaphysics. Once
rationality is dismissed as a physically dependent element in the constitution of
the person, there would appear to be no longer any room for human freedom.
The notion of an emergent freedom ultimately appears self contradictory,
grounded as it is in physical laws.

We have seen that rationality, ultimately, is not simply something one does, nor a
reflection of physically constitutive parts; it is something of one’s very being.
Activity follows upon nature; function is a reflection of being. A functional
approach therefore readily accommodates the Aristotelian notion of the rational
soul as a principle of activity in the entire body. Consider Aristotle’s text: “As pupil
and sight are the eye, so, in our case, soul and body are the animal”.1702 A
profoundly functional understanding of the soul is proposed; sight for the eye is
analogous to rationality for the body. Furthermore, Aquinas considers rationality
to be an overarching operative power; an emphasis once again on function as a
descriptor of what it means to be and act as a human being.1703 He noted also (see

1702
1703

DA, 413a.
ST, Ia, Q.48, Art.5.
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1.4.1.b) that the soul “perfects each part of the organism”1704 and that it is “whole
in each part”.1705

It follows that rationality is “functionally integrative”. It is indeed helpful to
identify functions of the mind in order to discuss structures of thought (see 3.1.3),
but, in discussing, for example, the parts of the human act or notions such as
“agent intellect”and “operations of the soul”,1706 we must not obscure the fact
that the acting person is the agent, that emotional life intimately enriches
personal judgements, and that rightly ordered appetitive responses to pain and
pleasure are necessary for sound, embodied, rational choices. It is an affirmation
that acquisition of accurate sense data, moderation of emotional response and of
reward anticipation are as valuable to the act of thinking rationally as the
conclusion itself. A “functionally integrative” view of rationality assists in such
synthesis. It is patently faithful to Aristotle and Aquinas but presented in language

1704

ST, Ia-IIae, Q.22, Art.2, Art.76.8.
SCG, II.72.1485.
1706
Although beyond the scope of this study, I suggest that it is not helpful from a Christian
perspective either to talk of the soul as agent in preference to the embodied soul, or the ensouled
body. It is completely compatible with the Christian understanding of the substantiality of the soul,
to affirm that, in embodied life, rational expression could be said to be the very task of the
animated body. The view that rationality is a fitting operation for neural part-constituents respects
the theological principle that grace respects nature. Commentaries, as well as Aquinas himself,
write of the soul as agent of various activities, but a close, cross-referenced reading of Thomas
always clarifies the understanding that the person, the ensouled body, is the agent. Nevertheless
such an emphasis on soul as agent can lead not only to dualist turns of phrase but to dualist ways
of thinking. A failure to emphasize the “ensouled body” as agent, can lead to the conclusion that
the operations of the soul are independent from the body at least as far as their “intellectual
activities” go. Take for example this current metaphysics instructional text:
It is at this highest point of animal life that intellectual knowledge comes into play in
human knowledge. For, it is by the co-working of the imagination (as a cognitive
instrument) and the intellectual (abstractive) power of the spiritual soul (as principal
agent) that the essential character of the accidental forms expressed in the imagination,
reaching to the substantial forms of the things so represented, are opened up, whereby
they can be known and understood by the intellect. This abstraction (and illumination) is
not the activity of knowledge. It simply puts the forms (by a spiritual impression) into the
understanding intellect, which is where the immanent activity of knowledge occurs. This
is the beginning of human knowledge as it is intellectual or spiritual. There remains, as all
are conscious of, a long and arduous process of intellectual work (reasoning) still to do
before any degree of full human knowledge is achieved. This course is part of that work-in
progress. (www.cts.org.au accessed 26/10/12).
Note, that for the sake of “clarity” the author is making soul, intellect, and abstraction the subjects
of actions. Yet in the process, an impression is created that activities at this level are conducted
without the complicity and assistance of the ensouled body. One could almost conclude that
association with the body bespeaks an unworthiness for these higher functions.
1705
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accessible to contemporary philosophy of mind, familiar with the various currents
of functionalism.1707 (See: 6.4.2.3.c.)

In confirmation of this, recent work on emotion suggests that emotion has a place
in rational decision making.1708 In a paradigm where function pertains to the
acting person such a view presents no problem. In the light of an hylomorphic
understanding of animated flesh, an ensouled body, it is reasonable to suggest
that the emotional responses and reward apprehensions initiating the human act,
provided they are moderated by fortitude and temperance and provided they are
in keeping with principles of justice, are themselves integral to rationality.

In summary, a functional view of rationality appears better able to engage with
contemporary intellectual currents, and it resists any narrowing of the concept of
rationality in a way that would undervalue the integral contribution of the body.

b) A response to prevailing physicalism.

Yet materialist conceptions dominate the neuroscience. Larry Squire, author of a
standard neuroscience text asserts that all behaviour and all of mental life have
their “origin in the structure and function of the nervous system”. 1709 Stephen
Lyng captures the determinism of contemporary neuroscience in acknowledging
the work of Grant Gillett: “Countering the prevailing neurophilosophical view of
human action as a product of largely unconscious brain events, Gillett employs his
relational model to dispel the notion that free will is only an illusion”.1710

These materialist conceptions dominate also in contemporary philosophy of mind,
perhaps for want of a more closely considered philosophical position. For
1707

Although well beyond the scope of this study, I would think also that such language is more
accessible to the expectations of analytic philosophy.
1708
The work of Nussbaum and Damasio has been noted above. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought;
Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error.
1709
rd
Larry Squire, et al. Fundamental Neuroscience, 3 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008).
Introduction to Section 1.
1710
Lyng “Brain, body, and society: bioethical reflections on socio-historical neuroscience and
neuro-corporeal social science,” 25.
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example, words from Kandel, dismissive of human freedom, were quoted in 1.3:
“All biological phenomena are properties of matter”.1711 Tellingly he
acknowledged only two possible approaches to philosophy of mind: physicalist or
dualist. Hylomorphism was completely off his radar.

Contemporary currents in neuroscience seek to account for human freedom
either by emergentism, which is a form of non-reductive physicalism, or by
dualism. Both appear logically flawed.

Emergentism suggests that non-material realities can emerge from purely
material origins. For example, Susan Greenfield argues that the brain is
“personalized through a unique and ceaselessly changing configuration of
neuronal connections”. Yet, ultimately, human freedom cannot exist in a being
which is wholly material and therefore determined. Nor is it logical to take refuge
in qualia, one’s “inner sanctum”,1712 as in some last bastion against materialism.
How could qualia escape the determinism of their origins? The emergent views of
Joseph LeDoux (5.2.1.1), Antonio Damasio (5.2.1.2), and Michael Gazzaniga
(5.2.2.2) seem similarly problematic. 1713 (See Table 1.1, and Appendix 1.)

Various forms of contemporary dualism and epiphenomenalism deny causality
between the real and mental worlds, leave it as unexplained, or resort to fanciful
theories. Schwartz, for example, insists that mental events can precede biological
events in the brain. 1714 Yet dualism is not a rational option: in its modern forms
an immaterial mind controls the body (yet is paradoxically derived from and
therefore ultimately dependent upon matter), or two orders of being are

1711

th

Kandel et al., Principles of Neural Science, 4 edition, 1317.
st
Greenfield, I.D. The Quest for identity in the 21 Century, 168 and 132.
1713
Gazzaniga Who’s in charge. Free will and the science of the brain, 124.
1714
Schwartz and Begley, The Mind and the Brain, 319. “There are no rational grounds for denying
that conscious mental effort plays a causal role in the cerebral changes observed in OCD patients.”
On the one hand Schwartz denies causality as we know it by invoking Quantum theory as an
explanation for non-material realities; on the other he enlists causality in asserting that mental
events are distinct from physical events: “thinking creates pathways”.
1712
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proposed without any causal interaction from the mental to the physical. 1715 (See
Table 1.1)

Hylomorphism has been proposed as the “third way” (1.4). Openness to the
hylomorphic solution can free neuroscientists from determinism and from
dualism. There are indications that both Schwartz and Greenfield would be open
to such a resolution as they preserve person as agent, and this agent enjoys a
freedom subject to certain physical limitations. In addition, Susan Greenfield
(differing from Schwartz) affirms the hylomorphic principle that the mental and
the physical are not separate events. Schwartz writes: “There are no rational
grounds for denying that conscious mental effort plays a causal role in the
cerebral changes observed in OCD patients”, 1716 but Susan Greenfield insists that
for every thought there is “a physical correlate”.1717 It would appear that neither
Schwartz nor Greenfield are, per se, committed materialists; simply that, perhaps
like Eric Kandel, they had not conceived of a third way and had opted, one for an
emergent approach and the other for dualism, for the best theories on offer.1718
(See further discussion in Appendix 1. e.)

c)

Bridges to contemporary philosophy of mind.

Hylomorphism provides a pathway to reconcile human freedom with the
determinism of physical laws. Martha Nussbaum and Grant Gillett are two
philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition who have sought to marry hylomorphism
with neuroscience. To do so they have emphasised variations on a functionalist
approach. These insights are of value to this study.

1715

We have seen above (1.5) the criticisms that highlight the “crypto-cartesianism” of
contemporary materialism that posits a matter which appears to be none other than the matter of
dualism. Such crypto-cartesian thinking constitutes a further category of dualism.
1716
Schwartz and Begley, The Mind and the Brain, 319.
1717
st
Greenfield, I.D. The Quest for identity in the 21 Century), 50.
1718
To take this observation a little further: Greenfield, from a background of neuropharmacology,
emphasises the brain chemistry; psychiatrist Schwartz seeks a way to preserve the power of
cognitive based therapies. Hylomorphism offers a bridge between the hard sciences and cognitive
clinicians.

532

Nussbaum adopts a functionalist hylomorphic solution in order to answer the
materialist philosophies of mind often associated with neuroscience and the
substance dualism that is sometimes proposed as an unconvincing response to
determinism. Nussbaum champions the work of the functionalist Hillary Putnam
as compatible with hylomorphism,1719 and takes issue with Burnyeat’s suggestion
that “Aristotle’s philosophy of mind is no longer credible because Aristotelian
physics is no longer credible”.1720

She argues that certain contemporary functionalist approaches are indeed
Aristotelian. Burnyeat had sought to force a wedge between Aristotle and Putnam
by arguing, “the whole point of functionalism is to free our mental life from any
particular material setup”1721. Nussbaum responds, drawing on the
Metaphysics:1722
The soul is not an “it” housed in the body but a functional
structure in and out of matter. Matter is, in its very nature, just
the thing to constitute the functions of life (it is not a thing to
which these functions of life can be reduced). 1723

She concludes, “As Aristotelians we do not discover something behind something
else, a hidden reality behind the complex unity that we see and are. We find what
we are in the appearances. And Aristotle tells us that if we attend properly to the
appearances the dualists’ questions never get going.” 1724
It is not appropriate to inquire whether the soul and the body
are one – just as it is not appropriate in the case of wax and its
shape, and in general the matter of each thing and that of
1719

See especially Martha Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, “Changing Aristotle’s mind” in Essays on
Aristotle’s De Anima, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon,
1992), 27-56. This compendium of essays contains further useful sources.
1720
M. F. Burnyeat, “Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind still credible (A draft)” in Essays on
Aristotle’s De Anima, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon,
1992), 15-26. Quotation from p16.
1721
M. F. Burnyeat, “Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind still credible (A draft),” 16.
1722
“Some things are just are this or in this, or these parts ordered in such and such a way.’ M,
1036b22ff.
1723
Martha Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, “Changing Aristotle’s mind,” 56.
1724
Martha Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, “Changing Aristotle’s mind,” 56.
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which it is the matter.... If you attend in the appropriate way to
the complex materiality of living things, if you understand the
common conception of what it is to be a living thing, you will
not ask that question.1725

Whilst Nussbaum does not enter discussion about neural substrates, she (as also
John Haldane, noted in Chapter 1) establishes an hylomorphic response to the
mind-body problem, and reaffirms authoritatively that discussion of a biophysical
substrate for mental activity is indeed valid within a Aristotelian-Thomistic
approach.

A recent paper by Grant Gillett also presents a modified hylomorphic
understanding of human beings in which, he writes, “both matter and form (or
body and subjectivity) are important”.1726 In assessing the ethics of psychosurgery,
Gillett suggests that form is “not just a configuration of matter but a holistic,
subjective, relational and embodied reality: the person who exists in our midst as
a being-in-the-world-with-others”.1727

He takes Aristotle’s dictum “If the eye were an animal, then the sight would be its
soul” and develops a multifaceted view of the soul that “involves” relatedness
with others, “an identity that evolves over time”, “a stream of conscious
experience”, and a moral standing as a socially situated agent whose life story is
lived out and elaborated among (others)”.1728 In particular, he rejects a focus on
narrow cognitive functions, insisting that the human psyche (the soul) is shaped
primarily by interaction with others. In seeking to summarise Aristotle’s view of
the soul, he offers five principles, including: that the soul is shaped by life among
others, that it is “the expression of patterns of activity laid down in the brain”, and

1725

DA 412b6-9
Grant Gillett, “The gold-plated leucotomy standard and deep brain stimulation,” Bioethical
Inquiry 8, (2011): 35.
1727
Gillett, “The gold-plated leucotomy standard and deep brain stimulation,” 35.
1728
Gillett, “The gold-plated leucotomy standard and deep brain stimulation,” 35.
1726
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that it is a “unique, interactional configuration of brain function shaped by a
segment of the human life world.” 1729

While it is in keeping with Aristotle’s view of the embodied soul that the soul is,
while not exclusively, “the expression of patterns of activity laid down in the
brain”, it does seem open to misinterpretation to describe the soul as
“interactional brain function”. Surely Aristotle, in discussing the soul, would have
us focus on the functions of the embodied person rather on functions of the brain
alone. For Aristotle, a human brain without a human soul is inconceivable. It is the
soul which gives the brain its meaning, not vice versa. I think rationally because of
my soul; the soul must not be reduced to intellectual activity let alone to brain
function.

However Gillett’s emphasis on the interactional, and therefore the functional, as
essential to the definition of the human psyche, provides us with a rich line of
eudaimonistic exploration, building the case for the essential distinction that
necessitates the virtue of justice, and integrating that virtue into a vision for
human flourishing.

A functionalist approach is also found in Mario Beauregard who defines mind not
as substance but as a collection of mental processes and events.1730 In effect this
opens the door to the existence of an underlying substance or person, but without
attempting any metaphysical explanation of the assertion. The merit of
Nussbaum’s and Gillett’s functionalist paradigm stands out clearly when one
compares their approach with that of Jeffrey Schwartz, the “non-materialist UCLA
neuropsychiatrist”1731 who, as we have seen, argues that minds change brains.
Without a functional, non-reductive emphasis, efforts to accommodate human

1729

Gillett, “The gold-plated leucotomy standard and deep brain stimulation,” 36.
Beauregard and O’Leary, The Spiritual Brain. A Neuroscientist’s Case for the Existence of the
Soul, 315.
1731
Beauregard and O’Leary, The Spiritual Brain. A Neuroscientist’s Case for the Existence of the
Soul, xiii
1730
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freedom by arguing that the non-material substance of the mind acts on the
material substance of the brain, must drift towards the substance dualism.

d) Conclusions.

The hylomorphic solution provides the subtle philosophical conception of reality
that is required for logical consistency. We have seen that the soul, rather than a
substance in its own right,1732 must be the principle of being and function of the
subject. Furthermore, as this principle of rationality may not be derived from
matter it must in some way be received. There are no other options.

This “principle-received”, neither derived from matter nor a substance in its own
right, must be a sharing in some manner or other. As Martha Nussbaum has said,
we must attend carefully to the “complex materiality of things”. 1733 The answers
are all there. In Thomistic terms, this sharing is a participation in the being of God;
it is participation in perfect “act” (refer to 1.4.1.a), participation in the being of
God himself. The evidence of human freedom leads inexorably to the conclusion
that the soul is a gift of functional participation in the divine act of being. (See
Appendix 1. A Response the Claims of Emergent Rationality.)

Only a “received” rational principle can explain both rationality and the necessary
unity of the subject. Only perfect “act” can offer the possibility of such
“functional” participation. The conclusions extend beyond neuroscience, yet I
suggest they provide the only possible path forward to provide a philosophy of
mind that is rationally satisfying.

Functionalist explanations therefore appear to demonstrate convincingly how the
“return to form”1734 advocated by Haldane can marry with neuroscientific
1732

Notwithstanding the term “substantial form” applied to the soul (1.4.1), I refer to the soul in
the embodied life as not a “substance in its own right”. I suggest that the term “substantial form”
offers a glimpse into the dignity of participated rationality, personhood.
1733
Martha Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, “Changing Aristotle’s mind,” 56.
1734
Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind”.
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evidence that would otherwise appear deterministic. Of course it is not only
Nussbaum and Gillett who are focussed on function. It is Aristotle himself who
argues for the necessity of four virtues on the basis of the four appetitive
functions they perform. Observation of function leads to metaphysical
conclusions. Aristotle is the original functionalist. 1735

6.4.3 Advantages of a virtue based approach to ethics over consequentialist
and deontological approaches.

I have argued that the understanding of virtue is more in keeping with the
complexity of human nature itself. According to the Aristotelian-Thomistic notion
of virtue, virtue possesses both sensitive (exclusively biological) and rational
dimensions. Aristotle and Aquinas propose that sense memory, imagination and
appetite, and processes such as imitation and habit development, are in complex
interplay with the knowing and choosing which are inherent in all fully human
action. I have argued that the contribution of these various processes in accord
with what is for the good of the subject, are supported at the biophysical level.
Virtue, so long regarded as essential component of human flourishing in the
philosophical tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas, is now demonstrably so by the
findings of contemporary neuroscience.

On this basis it is possible to argue for the superiority of a virtue based paradigm
evaluating human behaviour. Virtue ethics stands in contrast with rule and duty
based ethical systems and consequentialist approaches, all of which are theory
based and give little significance to human experience and to an anthropology
where rationality and matter are intrinsically integrated (see also 1.6). 1736 These
approaches find less support in the neuroscience: as ethical systems they are
learned and applied cognitively, whereas virtue development is acquired
principally by profound experiential modification of the organism itself. In short, it
1735

Dermot Moran ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2008), 977. “It is often said that Aristotle is the founder of functionalism because of his
view that the function of an entity determines its form.”
1736
For this reason, Robert Louden writes of virtue ethics as “anti-theory”.

537

would appear that virtue based development best accords with a view of man
where bodily development is integral to his very nature.1737 Along this line a
strong inductive case may be mounted in support of a rich, virtue-based, moral
development of the person, and such an inductive case is necessarily
strengthened by the identification of physical bases for virtue.

6.4.3.1 A contemporary validation of virtue ethics in the light of neuroscientific
evidence.

I noted in 1.7 that contemporary accounts of moral behaviour fall broadly into
consequentialist, deontological or virtue based approaches. In 3.1.5 an analysis
was offered demonstrating that virtue ethics appears superior to consequentialist
and deontological paradigms in accounting for the behaviour of Takashi Nagai.

A number of arguments were offered. There is an undeniable causality operating,
present in Nagai’s own worldview and born out in his actions over a substantial
period of his life, demonstrating that actions effectively flow from settled states of
character. Furthermore, there is a striking correspondence between specific
behaviours (eg the role of passion and deliberation, the presence of intrinsic
motivation, and the evidence of happiness subsequent to virtuous action)
predicted by virtue theory and Nagai’s own self description of moral actions. It is
evident too that virtue theory offers the capacity to accommodate the human
freedom and rationality that are apparent aspects of human nature. These
qualities of the virtue based account contrast with the apparent inability for rule
based and consequentialist paradigms to account for Nagai’s behaviour.

It is hoped that a biological validation of virtue ethics will serve to focus moral
education on virtue development, heightening the political, popular and clinical
1737

Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural constituents,” 844. Casebeer notes the experience
based nature of virtue development, “It is a practice affair”. He suggests that althought “moral
reasoning and action are “whole psychology, whole brain’ affairs”, the neurobiology of a Kantian
position would have a frontal emphasis in Kant, and a pre-frontal, limbic and sensory emphasis in
Mill, but would be the “properly coordinated action of all” in Aristotelian approaches.
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recognition of the role of virtues in moral development. It will also serve to
publicise in neuroscientific circles the possibilities of an hylomorphic
anthropology, focussing on the human person, and permitting an analysis of
human action that embraces the rational.

We have seen that the focus accorded by the Templeton Foundation, and the
clinical work of Seligman and Peterson. (1.2.3.1 and 6.2.2.2) 1738 promise a
contemporary neuroscientific validation of virtue based approaches. Also, a
biological validation of virtue ethics would be a significant contribution to the
burgeoning field of neuroethics, a field exhibiting a most diverse and at times
contradictory range of views, from the physicalist perspectives typified by Neil
Levy1739 to Darcia Narvaez’s defence of moral education.1740 Physical evidence for
the neural bases underpinning the development and acquisition of virtue, based
on an hylomorphic understanding of the human person, would be a significant
challenge to purely physicalist approaches. It would offer a way forward for an
enriched scientific view of the human being.1741

6.4.3.2 Understandings of neurobiology assist the discipline of virtue ethics.
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Seligman and Peterson, Character Strengths and Virtues. See also: Martin Seligman, Authentic
Happiness (NY: Free Press, 2002).
1739
Neil Levy, Neuroethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
1740
Darcia Narvaez, “Human Flourishing and Moral Development: Cognitive and Neurobiological
Perspectives of Virtue Development” in Handbook of Moral and Character Education, ed. L. P.
Nucci and D. Narvaez (NY: Routledge, 2008).
1741
If moral virtues are essentially neural structures established ultimately at the promptings of
reason (one’s own or one’s parents’), what are “infused virtues”? This thought experiment is
appropriate here and it sheds light on the nature of moral virtue and the importance of truth and
moral conviction as prerequisites for virtue. Infused virtue is a form of virtue that comes as a
divine gift. (cf Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Virtue, Q.1, a.10.) It seems unlikely however that
infused virtues have a neural signature: this would require a miraculous biophysical
reconfiguration. Furthermore, the theological understanding of infused virtue is that without good
will to exercise the infused virtue there can be no apparent effect; this would not be the case were
there a neural presence which must deliver some degree of permanent impact on behaviour.
Therefore it would appear that, just as moral virtue disposes for particular actions, infused virtues
are graces that also dispose for particular actions. They appear to be the promise that stable,
actual graces will be available to assist the person to act in specific positive ways and so build up
the actual moral virtues. I propose that these graces consist essentially in an infused
enlightenment; a clear perception of a truth. For example, infused justice may consist in such a
conviction that all men and women are brothers and sisters to me. Antonio Malo accorded with
my view of this in a personal discussion in July 2012.
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This study has the potential to clarify apparent imprecisions in contemporary
writing in virtue ethics.

In much contemporary writing in virtue ethics itself, discussion of virtue as a form
of habit seems largely unexplored. One finds virtue defined or described in
terminology such as “dispositions of responsiveness” and “the expression of fine
inner states”,1742 “being well endowed with respect to the agent’s actions, desires,
and emotions”1743, “powerful and enduring concern”1744 “substantive dispositions
to choose what is right”.1745 These approaches, while admittedly not seeking
neurobiological precision, lack the benefit of insights that neurobiological studies
can provide. Outside of the discipline of virtue ethics, the range of
understandings of the term virtue drifts further from a conception of virtue as the
spectrum of positive habitual behaviours: Rawls, for example, defines virtues
relatively narrowly as “strong and normally effective desires to act on the basic
principles of right”.1746 A neurobiology of virtue will assist in standardising
approaches by anchoring definitions in physical reality.

A neurobiological lens on the notion of virtue offers the possibility of a deeper
appreciation of:
i.

The processes and pathways for habitual management of emotion,
demonstrating that they fall in the trajectory of human maturation, and
are not a line of development merely parallel to impulse challenged
personalities.

ii.

The distinction between habits, on the one hand, and on the other, less
neurobiologically precise terms such as states, enduring concerns, and
normally effective desires. These latter suggest phenomena rather than
stable features of personality that are demonstrably established and
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Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, 5.
Rosalind Hursthouse as presented by Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, 94.
1744
Philippa Foote as presented by Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View, 94. Cf Philippa Foote,
Virtues and Vices, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
1745
Statman, “Introduction to Virtue Ethics,” 49. Statman presents this a the moderately pluralistic
view held by certain virtue ethicists.
1746
Rawls, A theory of justice, 436.
1743
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enduring, and are oriented towards action through the integration and
consolidation of neural pathways for emotional and reward oriented
responses, moderated by brain systems performing tasks of emotional
management and goal election.
iii.

The neurobiological attentional processes which we utilise for directing our
concentration which are arguably implicated in the neural systems for will
and choice. An understanding of these systems can facilitate greater self
awareness and consequent greater self management, as well as more
effective cognitive therapies.

6.4.4 Fine tuning the hylomorphic approach.

This study also presents an opportunity to refine explanations of AristotelianThomistic psychology, allowing it to engage more effectively with contemporary
neuroscience. Just as the Copernican revolution changed understanding without
changing the philosophical essentials of cosmology, so too, accommodating the
new evidence, it is possible that there can be insights into traditional
understandings of reason, virtue, vice, etc.

Although the notion of person as an ensouled body is extremely well developed
philosophically, there is little written from the Aristotelian perspective (we have
looked at two notable exceptions in Nussbaum and Gillett) that considers how the
lens of neuroscience can assist Aristotelian philosophy and illuminate aspects of
rational psychology, embodied rationality, and the very notion of fulfilment itself.
Reflections on the nature of, and fulfilment for, embodied rationality can provide
a valuable contribute to this field.

I have suggested that a study of neuroscience in the light of hylomorphism throws
into relief several key principles:
i.

The importance of a view of the soul as principle of being and function. As
we have seen, this is a view of rationality highlighted by Putnam and
Nussbaum in the 1990s in response to physicalist theories.
541

ii.

A view that the unity of the virtues is a biological necessity.

iii.

An understanding of vice, not as a parallel alternative to virtue, but as a
privation of biophysical development.

iv.

The possibilities for a language, accessible to neuroscience and to
contemporary philosophy of mind, better able to explain the tenets of
hylomorphism. (cf discussion in 6.4.2.3.a.)

There are further observations that can be made.

An understanding of the human biophysical constitution leads to a deeper
appreciation of the trajectory of human maturation, and of what is required for
human beings to flourish. Modification of the biophysical that is implicit to the
Thomistic account is “fleshed out” so to speak, and in so doing implications
become evident. For example, the need for enriched Aristotelian notions of
human flourishing becomes apparent: the interplay of neural structures and
human freedom necessitates the Thomistic development of “participation in
being”.1747 And in turn this leads to a further argument for the objective basis of
human flourishing: we know ourselves as sharers, participants, in rational life, and
know moreover that our greatest fulfilment is in accepting the invitation to seek
truth, and to respond to that Loving One who invites us to share being. (See
6.4.2.3.d and especially Appendix 1. A Response the Claims of Emergent
Rationality.)

An understanding of neural involvement in mind function must lead to a deeper
appreciation, in accord with basic hylomorphic tenets, that knowing and loving
can only take place in this embodied life with the biophysical as material cause.
1747

"St. Thomas...grasped from the very beginning the theoretical significance of the opposition
between Plato and Aristotle and the absolute need to overcome it by bringing their fundamental
principles and conclusions into agreement. This he did by elaborating his own notion of
participation. This notion, in contrast with the Neoplatonic concordism, presents an entirely new
concept and principle: it is the concept of esse as actus essendi, not to be confused with the
existentia of Augustinianism and of rationalism. It is from the concept of esse as ground-laying first
act that Thomas develops his own notion of participation and his entire metaphysics.” Cornelio
Fabro, "The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of Participation," Review
of Metaphysics 27, (1974): 451-457.
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Every action and every choice dispose us either for, or away from, excellence in
knowledge and love. The vision of man that has been proposed is complex. The
human being is understood as a person, an embodied soul, an animated body,
with rational powers, and therefore fulfilled not only by sense knowledge and
pleasure, nutrition and security, and movement and emotional life, but also by
activities in the rational order of knowing truth and choosing, and ultimately by
the free gift of self in loving relationships.1748

An understanding of neural involvement in mind function has the potential to
clarify Aristotelian/Thomistic notions of the nature of intellectual life itself. For
example, should we distinguish, on their biophysical characteristics, the
deliberations that lead to rational outcomes from the rational insights and choices
themselves? Clearly deliberations of reason, underpinning what we could call the
“process” of the human act, manifest a biological substrate. They have duration,
they involve brain areas for attention, for reward apprehension, for cognitive and
emotional memory, for assessment of consequences, for issuing commands, etc.
Yet it is clear, too, that even the instantaneous events of grasping a truth, and
making a choice, are biology dependent; at the most elementary level, for
example, there can be no conviction of truth or choosing of goods in this life
without consciousness. Yet even the very moment of flash of insight into the
nature of things or the very moment of choice (and the inner life of the person
cannot reduce to just these moments) will nevertheless be accompanied by neural
correlates- not only accompanying emotional surges and heightened attention,
but neural activity directly associated with the knowing and the choosing.

1748

Scruton argues that unhappiness is driven by lack of truth and lack of relation to others;
ultimately perhaps by a lack of virtues of sincerity, compassion, and generosity. Roger Scruton,
“Connecting Catholic Anthropology to a Secular Culture,” Edification 3, 1 (2009): 80-82. Scuton
writes: “I think particularly of the need to persuade people that one of the principal causes of
unhappiness in modern societies is the ‘self delusion’, about which Vitz (1994) has written in other
terms: the delusion that what I truly am is this inner thing that is hidden from the world, and that
my happiness consists in nurturing it and taking from others what is needed to supply it with its
needs. That delusion is the opposite of the truth. Happiness comes from forgetting the self; from
thinking of others; from seeking to give and not to take – and that idea, which is of course contained in the doctrine of Christian charity, can be phrased in secular terms that make it
immediately apparent to the ordinary agnostic that therapy based in the Christian faith might be
exactly what people suffering from the self delusion require.”
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Strictly speaking the operations of the embodied intellect are the capacity to
grasp the true nature of things, and the choice to move oneself towards what one
has grasped as a good.

Within the flesh and blood human being it is absurd to suggest two acting
substances. In a psychologically balanced human being there should be no wrestle
for agency between the operations of rationality and the activities of the body,
notwithstanding our excursion into psychopathologies which demonstrated that,
when the body is not functioning as it should, the pathologies may drive
behaviour rather than the agent himself. Operations of rationality are carried out
in the ensouled body, on this count capax for intellectual activity; the soul is a
principle of function and unity, not a separate functioning agent.

And what then of the human capacity to abstract from the concrete to universals?
Was this not Aristotle’s proof for the immateriality of the soul? Surely abstraction
to universals takes place beyond the reach of matter? No again. The wrong
question is being asked. Rather we should ask: What is special about human
beings empowering them to see the truth of things? It is the person that acts: an
animated body capable of abstracting to universals, of seeing the truth of things
and of seeking unreservedly that which, or that whom, it perceives as good for
itself. Hence we see that reflections on the biophysical constitution of human
beings have the potential to clarify perhaps popular misconceptions about
Aristotelian and Thomistic thought.

6.5

Pedagogical conclusions

In 1.7.1 it was suggested that virtue ethics is superior to other paradigms of ethics
in its understanding of the principles of education. It offers three clear
advantages.
i.

At the most fundamental level, the focus of virtue ethics is on the qualities
of the agent rather than his actions; it offers a more incisive understanding
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of education because it is empowering of the agent. Ultimately, a virtue
based view of education emphasises the primacy of formation of
character, what we could call the “sacred” formation of character.
ii.

Virtue is a more effective model for moral and skills development because
it is experience based and thus takes into account the anatomical realities
of plastic change as a result of experience. All that we choose to do, all
that we consent to experience, all that we enshrine as desires in our
hearts, all that we elect as convictions in our minds – all these things sculpt
our personalities. Every experience has the potential to change us, to
consolidate ways of acting and thinking. This sacred and exquisite
sensitivity to experience is well captured in a passage by Mitch Albom:
All parents damage their children. It cannot be helped.
Youth, like pristine glass absorbs the prints of its
handlers. Some parents smudge, others crack, a few
shatter childhoods completely into little jagged pieces,
beyond repair.1749

iii.

There is a grand interplay between the emotional and cognitive realms;
the underpinning educational psychology presents a harmony between
emotion and reason. Emotions guide us in selecting the experiences that
we know will change us. Sound emotional responses help us make sense of
the environment, responding with appetency or rejection. Temperance
and fortitude may be understood as acquired emotional responses to the
environment; to be nurtured in a child through training, and when
complemented by prudence and justice bestowing self management
experiences and environment.

6.5.1 Ineffective moral pedagogies.

The report card for moral education initiatives, at least in the USA, is less than
flattering. In 2010 the results of a major study of Social and Character
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Mitch Albom, The five people you meet in Heaven, (London: Little Brown Book Group, 2004).
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Development (SACD) programs were released. The study found that SACD
programs produced no improvement against control schools on measures of
emotional and social competence, nor in behaviour or academic performance.1750

This need for a coherent framework upon which to structure character education
programs is also apparent from a 2011 Science review of intervention programs to
improve executive function (designated as a range of personal qualities
summarised by “creativity, flexibility, self control, and discipline”1751 and therefore
including what we have discussed as emotion regulation). The authors assessed a
range of current programs. In response, I make the following observations:
i.

The variation between the character education approaches was
substantial: computerised and other games based training for working
memory, speed and reasoning, aerobic exercises, martial arts, meditation,
role play games, Montessori culture, heightened expectations and
reinforcement for behaviour, and conscious training in self control
strategies.

ii.

The variations however were the result of intuitive, rather than analytically
argued, lines of investigation. The programs offered broad alignment with
the view that emotional regulation and repeated practice must lie at the
basis of effective approaches.

iii.

Interventions, except for the Montessori program and, to some extent, the
PACT program which teaches self control strategies, did not place an
explicit priority on respect for others, ie the virtue of justice.

iv.

Interventions generally did not seek to empower students in conscious self
management, even though this is a sine qua non of adult self regulation
and necessary for skills of personal assessment and refined goal setting. In
general there was a lack of appreciation that the virtues disposing for

1750

The Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education, "Efficacy of Schoolwide
Programs to Promote Social and Character Development and Reduce Problem Behavior in
Elementary School Children", October 2010,
http://ies.ed.gov/ncer/pubs/20112001/pdf/20112001.pdf.
1751
A. Diamond and K. Lee, “Interventions shown to aid executive function development in
children 4-12 years old,” Science 333, (2011): 959-964.
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rationality would be crucial in personal goal setting, and therefore in
ensuring transfer of skills.
v.

In the design of the programs, there appeared little appreciation of the
neural bases for attention, personal goal setting for arduous tasks.

vi.

The ineffectiveness of the programs appears to reflect the lack of
comprehensive rationale behind them. Gains were modest at best, and
mostly manifested at the lower performance end of the scale. In most
cases there was a low level of transfer of skills learned to tasks beyond the
immediate exercise, “Executive function training appears to transfer, but
the transfer is narrow.”

Kevin Ryan, founder and Professor Emeritus of the Center for the Advancement of
Ethics and Character at Boston University, ascribes this undeniable failure to the
poor understanding, by designers of programs, of what constitutes human
character and human flourishing, and a public policy that emphasises the role of
the state over that of the family.1752

These worrying conclusions suggest that important insights for moral and
character education and intervention programs may be gleaned from this study
into the neural bases of virtue. Design of improved programs, although beyond
the scope of this study, should incorporate the systematic anthropology that has
underpinned this study:
i.

Parental efforts require all support and facilitation.

ii.

The programs must be designed on the basis of a rich psychological
understanding of the developing person, endowed with a range of specific
powers (intellect, rational appetite, sensitive and irascible appetites) each
requiring nurture.

iii.

Appreciation of the unity of the virtues must be an essential element.
Programs must seek the integrated development of sound judgement,
respect for others, resolution in the face of difficulties, and self control.

1752

Kevin Ryan, “The failure of modern character education,” prepublication draft in personal
correspondence, 2 November, 2012.
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iv.

In particular considerations of justice and habits of cognitive assessment
must be present in all human acts, if young persons are to be empowered
to set goals effectively.

6.5.2 Insights from the neuroscience.

In the section that follows, I restrict discussion to insights that may be gained from
a study of the neural bases of virtue, although these insights will have wider
pedagogical application, for example, into the design of teaching programs or in
guiding one’s own children.

a) Principles of plasticity.
i.

We have noted the Hebbian principle. Neural electrical activity
builds more permanent connections. Consequently it is clear that
both our conscious and unconscious thoughts and behaviours are
self reinforcing; they effectively change our brain by synaptic
strengthening along specific neural pathways, facilitating like
thoughts and behaviours that utilize these pathways. (See
extensive references to use-induced plasticity, especially 2.2.)

ii.

Vivid experience is shown to be linked to learning. It is human
experience that novel, sense laden and dramatic experiences (for
example war, sex, drugs, loud music, first exposure to something
truly surprising) are not only indelibly etched in memory, but also
that this retention of vivid experience is more easily revisited,
acquiring a certain addictive quality (for example studies show that
pornography “changes our brains”,1753 or of the phenomenon of
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Judith A. Reisman, “The psychopharmacology of pictorial pornography restructuring brain,
mind and memory and subverting freedom of speech,”
(http://www.drjudithreisman.com/archives/brain.pdf; accessed March 2009).
G. J. Meerkerk, et al., “Predicting compulsive Internet use: it's all about sex!” Cyberpsychology and
Behaviour 9, 1 (2006): 95-103; Patrick F. Fagan, “The effects of pornography on individuals,
marriage, family and community,” in Research Synthesis, Family Research Council, (December
2009). In the last document note testimony about pornography addiction by Mary Anne Layden of
Centre for Cognitive Therapy, University of Pennsylvania (Testimony for US Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 18 November, 2004).
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soldiers seeking repeated tours of duty, or of the addictive
behaviour of serial killers). 1754
iii.

Emotional engagement has been shown to be closely linked to
learning, to the development of new pathways in the brain. (Table
2.2)

b) Habit formation as learning.
i.

Consolidation of learning normally requires repetition and takes
place over time. Therefore it may be concluded that material
processes are involved and that neural configurations and
connections are facilitating the learning process. People who
exhibit virtues (such as cheerfulness, self control, or courage), or
vices (such as dishonesty, laziness, or insincerity) exhibit these
behaviours repeatedly… character traits exhibit stability and are
sound predictors of future behaviour. A neuroscientific
understanding is that ease of repetition suggests established
circuitry. Ease of repetition suggests an established pathway in the
brain, and so too an inability to retain flexibility is a sign of an
established pathway. (See 2.2, 2.4 and 3.3.4.)

ii.

The repetition required in learning and unlearning is arduous. This
is found for example in the application of mental discipline to build
up some desired capability – in the time it takes to build up
intellectual habits such as planning ahead and problem solving,
habits of emotional management of anger or appetite, or even
intentionally performed motor skills such as a tennis forehand.
That it is arduous to develop habits suggests also a material process
where patience is required but eventually is rewarded.

iii.

There are windows for learning that correspond to developmental
stages in the biological make up of the human being. Windows of
opportunity that are age related, and the intractability of
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See discussion: Difede and Cukor, “Evidence-Based Long-Term Treatment of Mental Health
Consequences of Disaste among Adults,” 336-339.
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behaviours outside of those windows, despite all good intentions to
change them, bespeak a material physiological foundation for
learning. There is a timeline of development for the human
organism; there are windows of opportunity, sensitive periods, for
the development of various capacities. These windows of
development embrace not only the development of sensory
powers (such as sight and hearing), but also mechanisms of
emotional expression, and of emotional management, virtues. (See
Table 2.2.)
iv.

It is recognized that first experiences are particularly powerful in
the development of neural pathways. The neural basis for this
appears associated with the principle that guides sensitive periods
of development: reception of appropriate experience closes off the
sensitive period. (See 2.2.4) The applicability of this phenomenon
to parenting is immediately apparent.

v.

Concomitant physical activity has been shown to be associated with
increased capacity to form new connections and to learn.

c) Pathways of habit formation.
i.

Habits also short circuit the need for cognitive processing; take for
example the action of a touch typist who has no need to reflect on
each key stroke. (Table 2.7.)

ii.

At the moral level, habit formation may be positive (virtues) or
negative (vices). Such habits can seem virtually “hardwired” and be
very difficult to change, with simple intentions insufficient; we see
people with such good intentions, but unable to put their desires
into action. Emotion driven behaviours take up residence and
become the default behaviours; another dynamic is at work
suggesting a more permanent change has taken place in the
organism. Repetition builds habits and dependency upon those
habits; for example, established sleeping and eating patterns can
be hard to break, just as pattern of poor self control can also be
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resistant to efforts to change.(Table 2.7) But also, when good
habits are embodied, these learned, emotionally attuned, positive
behaviours will carry us through periods of tiredness, illness or
stress.1755
iii.

The mechanisms of synaptic modification and modulation of
transmission provide an excellent explanation not only for the
construction of habits but for habits of varying intensity. (Tables
2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.15.)

iv.

The popular adage reminds us, ‘The best predictor of future
behaviour is past behaviour’. Thought and behaviour are closely
interconnected; past behaviours fuel our expectations, goal setting,
and action plans. Habitual behaviours fuel our thoughts; behaviours
very much make us who we are. (Table 2.14.)

d) Principles of memory.
i.

Certain thinking and acting processes include a physical
component: we see that some memories can be affected by time,
either diminishing in intensity, or actually become more vivid as we
obsessively “rewrite” them focusing on specific perceptions. Again,
these phenomena are consistent with changes at the neural level.
(Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5.)

ii.

Dementia also gives us insight into the material mechanisms of
memory. A person, suffering from the neural degeneration that
characterises dementia, can lose memories or reaccess memories
dormant for decades in the subconscious. This suggests that
memories are tied very much to material mechanisms, mechanisms
now increasingly well described. (Table 2.5.)
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An example: a friend explains that he returned exhausted from an overseas trip, and “failing to
keep his mouth shut”, found himself in a destructive, domestic argument that led to a decision to
leave the marriage. The same man, 30 minutes later, still tired but drawing on established humility
and sincerity, found the strength and self control to make his apologies and turn around a
potentially tragic situation.
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e) Principles of imitation.
i.

The experience of imitation leads directly to learning without the
necessity of cognitive involvement. It will be seen that imitation is a
key factor in the acquisition of behaviours underpinning virtue. The
relevance to parenting and the moral education of younger
children is immediately apparent. (Table 2.6.)

ii.

An understanding of the function of mirror neurons offers
heightened appreciation of the mechanisms whereby our own
experience, including sense experience, profoundly dyes our
behaviours. For example, one who has not experienced love, will be
unable to put love into his actions. (Table 2.6.)

f) Interplay between emotion and learning.
i.

Emotions are demonstrably bodily functions; yet the chemical
messages at the heart of appetite, desire and passion, can initiate
processes that conclude in more or less free choices.1756 (Tables
2.8 and 2.11.)

ii.

It is shown that the emotional centres of the brain, in particular the
amygdala, are richly connected via the limbic pathways both to the
PFC and to the BG, and play a key role in the generation of habitual
behaviours. This study proposes that these areas, among others,
are substantially implicated in the acquisition of virtues. (Tables 2.8
and 2.13.)

g) Healthy body; healthy mind.
i.

Damage to the PFC leads to compromise of what are normally
regarded as moral behaviours. This outcome is consistent with poor
moral choices under analogous situations when the biology has
been compromised, for example in moments of utter exhaustion,
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US pro-life activist, Terri Herring, cites scriptural references to Christ “moved by compassion”,
and argues that human beings can draw the energy to act from attention to, and reflection on,
appropriate emotional stimuli. (Oral presentation at Redfield College, Sydney, 2004.)
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under extreme stress, in dementia, etc. It would appear that
learned, emotion-driven, negative behaviours can surface when
inhibitory decision making is impeded. (See 2.7.)

6.5.3 Parenting conclusions

If neuroscientific knowledge confirms the role of virtue in human flourishing it is
all the more imperative that we refocus on the necessity of positive input in the
lives of impressionable children, that we help parents maximise their effectiveness
by sound neuroscientific insights, that we shield children from negative inputs
that have the potential to profoundly change them for life, and that we actively
promote the development of personality underpinned by habitual strengths of
character.

A biological validation of virtue based moral education carries far reaching
implications at theoretical and practical levels. Virtue ethics in the tradition of
Aristotle and Aquinas itself receives validation as an ethical system most suited to
human flourishing. The model of human flourishing that, prior to some decades
ago, underpinned character education in the West for two and a half millennia, is
revalidated.

There is currently much confusion in educational circles about the importance
that should be given to virtue development in moral education. Some would
replace virtues with values, failing to understand that good intentions while
important are far from being good habits. Others use the terminology of values
and virtues, sometimes remarkably interchangeably,1757 yet because they fail to
ground virtue in what befits man’s nature, they cannot escape a relativistic
framework.1758 Others resort to fragmented suggestions of varied worth without a
1757

This appears to be a fault in the much publicized The Book of Virtues by the former US
Secretary for Education: William Bennett, The Book of Virtues (Melbourne: Bookman Press, 1994).
1758
The National Values Framework created by the Howard Government in 2004, seemingly
founded on consequentialist and relativist approaches to virtue ethics, appears to be inspired by
these approaches.
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foundation in an adequate understanding of man.1759 A relatively small proportion
of parenting authors do adopt a virtue building approach. Notable are Thomas
Lickona1760, James Stenson1761, and Stephen Covey1762 in the USA, Donald De
Marco1763 in Canada, and David Isaacs1764 in Europe. Parenting for Character also
features a virtue-based rationale.1765 This current study offers a scientific
justification for the practical strategies found in these works. It provides an
evidence-based verification of the approach these authors take; and this is a
necessity if virtue-based moral education is to gain traction in contemporary
society.

The neuroscientific evidence supports parenting approaches that foster the
development of virtue. I argue that this study in fact confirms virtue development
as a scientifically sound approach to moral development. It is an urgent task to
identify neuroscientific insights that assist parenting. This is beyond the scope of
this current study, however below I briefly identify parenting practices which, in
the light of current neuroscience, would serve to facilitate children’s moral
development.

Furthermore, it is hoped that this project may contribute to a popular
reassessment of the importance of virtue in moral education and parenting.
Despite the fact that virtue ethics is a dynamic field of philosophical study with an
enduring presence also in moral theology,1766 and despite the fact that for some
two and a half thousand years the development of virtue has been regarded in the
1759

For example, Steve Biddulph’s writing appears to lack an adequate underpinning psychology.
Thomas Lickona, Character Matters: How to Help Our Children Develop Good Judgment,
Integrity, and Other Essential Virtues (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004) is one of Dr Lickona’s
more recent works.
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James B. Stenson, Upbringing: A Handbook for Parents of Young Children (New York: Scepter,
1992).
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Stephen Covey, The 7 Habits of Highly Effective Families (New York: Allen & Unwin, 1997).
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Donald DeMarco, The Heart of Virtue (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1996).
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David Isaacs, Character Building: A guide for parents and teachers, 2 ed. (Dublin: Four Courts
Press, 2001).
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Andrew Mullins, Parenting for Character (Sydney: Finch Publishing, 2005).
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For example: Peter Kreeft, Back to Virtue; Traditional Moral Wisdom for Modern Moral
Confusion (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,1986); Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues ; Pius XI, On the
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West as the foundation for moral education, virtue is now much misunderstood
and marginalised in both public policy and in contemporary writing on parenting.

6.5.3.1 Applications to parenting

The goal of the morally educative dimension of parenting is to foster the sound
capacity for reflection and action facilitated by the virtues. Maturity of character
and the freedom to act autonomously result from the development of virtue.
A parenting model consistent with the neuroscience presents strategies for
fostering virtues, and for the management with meticulous care of inputs entering
into the life of the child. It is so right that parents focus on habits, manifest
behaviours, that help a child develop a healthy autonomy with inbuilt safeguards
against physical and psychological compulsion by external forces, but also
empowering them to avoid debilitating internal faults of laziness, self centredness,
timidity, etc.

Environment and experience are decisive in development of character. The
parent-child relationship, founded on mechanisms of bonding, fueled by parental
care and affection, and conducted in an atmosphere where selfless service
between family members is the norm, provides a natural venue for moral growth.

Elements of a parenting model consistent with the neuroscience include:
i.

Acknowledgement that parental responsibility for the formation of moral
character in an impressionable child includes decisive guidance in the early
years in development of fortitude and temperance, and in the years when
rationality becomes active in the child, of prudence and justice.
Environment, critical practice, explicit advice and correction all contribute.

ii.

Acknowledgement of the role of early training in teaching moderation
according to reason of what is pleasurable and what pains are worth
enduring for a sound reason. Parental facial expressions and body
language are beneficial or corrosive. As the child grows, obedience to
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parental reason in these matters transfers to obedience to their own
reason. Parental guidance gives way to self education and self-talk.
iii.

Attention to the quality of parent child habitual interaction and
communication as a prerequisite for moral learning.

iv.

Acknowledgement that early exposure to what is good, true and beautiful
is beneficial. A consequent appreciation of the urgency of proactive
parenting.

v.

Expertise in identifying incipient patterns of behaviour, both positive and
negative, in children, and readiness to intervene in the case of negative
patterns that can lead to bad habits and, with complacency, to vices.

vi.

Management of non parental inputs coming into the life of the child such
as technologies and peer group. Expertise in identifying, evaluating, and if
necessary intervening in response to, character traits apparent in those
with whom the child spends time. Parents are facing a great deal of
competition in raising their children, competition from peer group, from
media, from bad example of role models in society. If they do not manage
those inputs and actively build good habits their children will suffer.

vii.

The role of high but realistic parental expectations allowing a child to strive
for behaviours that are achievable and enriching. The importance of
accountability for those expectations.

viii.

A conviction that human beings need to focus not only on their own needs,
and that it is virtues that dispose us to good deeds. Good intentions are
not enough. Children without virtue lack the wherewithal to do good in
their lives. The end point of all parenting is that young people act well and
freely from their own dearly cherished convictions. So, the essential
challenge in teenage years is to help a young person internalize the values
they have learned. Good values must lead to a good heart, to habitually
good choices, and to self management. “It is no profit to have learnt well,
if we neglect to do well,” wrote Publilius Syrus sometime during the 1st
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century BC. Virtues give habits of acting1767. Furthermore, virtues enable a
person to take responsibility in a democratic society. Virtues affirm the
concept of personal responsibility... that in normal circumstances, I am
responsible for what I do, or for what I have decided. A society which
denies personal responsibility will be doomed to mediocrity and then to
decline.
ix.

Strategies for the formation of good habits through consistent
expectations, imitation and repetition, correction, guided practice,
reflection, and reinforcement of recent experiences given that the
common experience of human beings is that they can more readily repeat
recent actions than those further in the past. 1768

x.

Responsibility for a positive home environment. An understanding of the
role of habitual parental affection, specific emotional reinforcement,
praise, positive emotional associations, emotional engagement, etc, in
learning and the development of virtue. An understanding that parental
emotion is “contagious”.

xi.

An understanding that focused attention is required for cognitive learning.

xii.

An understanding that non cognitive learning leading to imitation of
behaviours and emotional states can be sub cognitive.

xiii.

An understanding that strategies such as visualisations and rehearsal of
physical actions assist in building virtues; thought facilitates behaviour,
and behaviour can facilitate intention.

xiv.

An understanding of virtues, brings an appreciation of the debilitating
effects of bad habits, vices. “A young person’s character is like wax for the
growth of bad habits,”1769 observed the old Roman soldier poet Horace.

xv.

Appreciation that the family is the natural environment par excellence for
fostering virtue. Virtues are best learned in a family, where an overriding

1767

The Dale Carnegie saying, “If you want to be enthusiastic, act enthusiastic” suggests a subtle
dynamic between modeling actions and incorporating them fully into our personality. This is
another version of the A.A. motto: “Fake it till you make it.”
1768
Joel Kupperman insists on the importance of “longitudinal close looks at the reality of human
lives” through history, stories and biographical studies. His book Character contains a very useful
appendix of strategies for moral education. J. Kupperman, Character (Oxford: OUP, 1995).
1769
Horace, Letters “To the Pisos”, 153.
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motivation is the welfare of the other members. In such an environment
the motive for action is love. In the family, love is unconditional; a failure
to exercise virtue is corrected. Institutions can also assist in fostering
virtue, provided the culture is right: respect for others; high but realistic
expectations; a positive philosophy of education where mistakes are part
of the process of learning and problems are not disasters because they
bring the underlying cause into relief so that it can be addressed.
xvi.

Recognition for the virtually indelible nature of first experiences and their
role in maximizing learning. Habits are most easily formed in childhood.1770
First impressions can be virtually indelible: “We are by nature most
tenacious of childish impressions...further it is the worst impressions that
are most durable.”1771 Because, as Aristotle observed, “We (human beings)
always like best whatever we first experience” parents do well to put great
care into the early experiences of children and focus on habits built in the
younger years. Experts talk of windows of opportunity for building
particular virtues1772; a child who has not learned the importance of
truthfulness by the middle of primary school, at the latest, is likely to have
real difficulties in facing reality, etc.

xvii.

Acknowledgement of the need to pass on to children an understanding of
rational anthropology, including an understanding of the integration of
rationality and emotional life, what virtues are, how they are acquired, and
the role of virtue in human flourishing.

xviii.

An understanding of virtues makes parenting much more effective. Parents
become much more aware of the need to establish good habits, to provide
consistent routines, to follow up misbehaviour before it becomes
entrenched, to help a child work against temperamental weaknesses such
as timidity, impulsivity, etc.

1770

Bennett, The Book of Virtues.
Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, trans. HE Butler (Loeb Classical Library). (Cambridge MA: Harvard
University Press, 1920), I, I, 1-7.
1772
Professor David Isaacs displays a chart in his Character Building which shows the most
appropriate virtues to focus on in the various stages of childhood.
1771
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xix.

Commitment to meticulous parental example. A necessary consequence of
this priority is that parents themselves strive to develop virtues in their
own character and to eliminate bad habits. Of the two forms of virtue
formation – training and education in childhood, or free, conscious, self
imposed, perhaps arduous, habit formation in adult life – the second
applies to parents. When parents grasp also that their own parenting
comes down to a collection of habits… good and bad, they can then
improve their parenting practices more easily. It is important for parents to
identify their own character defects and mistakes in order to minimize
negative example. A parent’s poor relationship, a habit of overmanagement, unresolved dependencies on drugs and alcohol, experience
of abuse, etc, have the potential to wreak intergenerational havoc. Unless
parents strive for virtue, they will not pass on a love for virtue as a source
and prerequisite of fulfilment. Key parental virtues include:
o Sincerity about the deepest values that underpin one’s behaviours.
o Sound judgement. Consistent and clear headed prioritizing.
o Generosity: loving dedication to one’s spouse and family, and a
capacity to model solidarity and compassion for those in need.
o Fortitude and self control: a demandingness on oneself. John Paul
II said of his own father, “He never had to be demanding on me, he
was so demanding on himself.”
o The virtues of humility, human warmth and approachability, and
the capacity to show affection and understand others.

xx.

Understanding of strategies parents may employ to change their own
behaviours may include:
o The necessity of sincere acknowledgement of mistakes.
o The necessity of reflective sorrow for impulsive or self centred
behaviours – sorrow and shame will act subliminally as
disincentives for the repetition of negative future behaviours.
o The role of making realistic commitments in order to put changes in
train (eg structured anger management programs, monitored
action plans on paper).
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o Readiness to accept the support of others, including one’s spouse,
in order to change one’s behaviour.
o Appreciation of constant performance of targeted concrete actions
such as getting up on time, eating the right foods, carrying out acts
of service to others, smiling when tired, etc, thereby overlaying old
habits with new preferred behaviours.
xxi.

Appreciation of the ultimate goal of parenting for virtue, that children
develop:
o The capacity to manage themselves – “Children have the right to
learn how to solve their own problems in life.”1773 This refers to the
virtue of prudence.
o Readiness to care for others – “Children grow up when they are
able to care for others, and want to.”1774 Here I refer to the virtue of
justice, underpinning charity. Augustine says that charity contains
all the cardinal virtues.1775 The capacity to truly love others is a
consequence of character with a well rounded development of
virtues. Virtues make love possible.1776

xxii.

An appreciation of the following neurobiological insights:
o A basic understanding of virtues (see 3.2) includes a taxonomy of
moral virtue though an schema such as that of the cardinal virtues.
o The priority of the cardinal virtues as essential character strengths.
o We like best what we first experience. We can be easily attracted
to what we have already experienced. We have a natural fondness
for the familiar.
o All our behaviours are essentially self reinforcing, for better or for
worse according to the law of association. “Neurons that fire
together wire together.”

1773

This gem comes from the late Rafael Pich, father of sixteen, and driving force behind the
Family Education movement in Catalonia.
1774
Jim Stenson.
1775
Augustine, Epistles CLXVII PL33 738.
1776
DeMarco, The Heart of Virtue.
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o Time can resolve many issues; passions can dissipate. Remove
oneself from the situation; don’t raise the emotional stakes, take
time to reflect, etc.
o The law of attenuation, “Use it or lose it”, also sometimes applies
to things we have learned, and to abilities and skills. If we do not
practise them we lose the facility.
o When we give our attention, we learn.
o Where we provide emotional reinforcement we facilitate learning.
o An appreciation of the relationship between virtue formation,
autonomy and self management, and human flourishing.
o An understanding of the processes of emotional control and of
formation of habits (including habits of mind under the umbrella of
prudence).
o Mastery of the range of strategies for virtue formation (see 3.3).

6.6 The last word.

This study commenced with a quotation from Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein.
Notwithstanding its ghoulish spawn over almost two centuries, the tale stands as
a moral and metaphysical reflection on human existence. The creature asks:
"Who was I? What was I? Whence did I come? What was
my destination? These questions continually recurred,…
but I was unable to solve them"1777
Much more than a gothic thriller, Frankenstein is a warning that science must
know its boundaries. It is also a reminder, from the youngest of women, that
while knowledge may bestow power, power must be exercised responsibly within
objective limits. Our rationality is grandly disproportionate to the nerves and
sinews which compose us. She reminds us too, in the tragic denoument of the
tale, of the stark contrast between human flourishing and its grim alternatives.

1777

Mary Shelley, Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus, The Pennsylvania Electronic Edition,
ed. Stuaart Curran, (http://knarf.english.upenn.edu/index.html; accessed 28 November 2012) 128.
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Einstein wrote, “Everything must be made as simple as possible. But not simpler.”
It is the very stuff of a corporeal existence to appreciate that a whole is made of
parts. I have explored the detail, not to get lost amongst the dendritic trees, but to
better appreciate the wood as a whole. In describing the biophysical basis and
developmental pathways for virtue, I have endeavoured to show that if we step
back from the complexity of the pathways and processes and multiplicity of
systems and brain areas that are involved, a grand picture emerges of a state of
being that offers heightened autonomy, functional efficiency, and affective and
contemplative peace of heart, true eudaimonia.

After first identifying characteristics of virtue in a close reading of Aristotelian and
Thomistic texts, supported by analysis of the human act and real life scenarios, I
proposed specific and identifiable neural elements underpinning these
characteristics. I suggested that they are integral to, and necessary conditions for,
the formation of virtue in the embodied life. I have described them as the material
causes of virtue. In the process, I proposed distinct biophysical part-constituents
for each of the cardinal virtues arguing that each virtue plays a necessary role in
every virtuous human action.

I have proposed that the state of virtue is demonstrably a state of systemic and
neural maturity, essentially an apogee of neurobiological development. It is a
state of grand coordination and integration of neural systems, directed primarily
to the harmonisation of the emotional and cognitive domains and thus, at the
service of personal fulfilment.

We must not miss the wood for the trees. Most importantly, not only is virtue a
disposition for good action, but human beings have a disposition to virtue itself.
There is an evident, genetic predisposition in human beings to the development of
virtue. Aristotle touches on this when he writes:
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There are three things which make a man good and virtuous:
these are nature, habit, rational principle; these must be in
harmony with one another. 1778
To be virtuous is of our very “nature”. By “habit” Aristotle refers to dispositions of
the sensitive appetites that we have developed, or allowed to develop, in our
characters.1779 Aristotle links the harmony intrinsic to eudaimonia with the
training of the appetites and free rational choices. Such elevated physical
development of an organism is inconceivable without specific biological
predispositions at the genetic level. Our characters are the outcome of nature
(genes), nurture (upbringing) and our own choices.

The virtuous person is thus endowed with a capacity for self-realisation, a key to
his flourishing. The development of virtue, provided we do not frustrate the
process by wayward appetitive habituation, consists in rational choices resulting
in the development of certain stable neural structures to which we are
predisposed. In turn these stable neural structures support ongoing rational
behaviours. There is a grand efficiency operating; one’s progress is not thwarted
by occasional mistakes. This optimisation of past efforts contributes to a sense of
fulfilment even during the acquisition stage of virtue.1780 Repeated good acts, over
time, build up a stability of virtue. “To him who has, more will be given.”

The dispositions of mature virtue guide us along the pathways of calm selfmanagement, bestowing peace in the face of difficulties and self-control in the
face of temptation or provocation. Think of Nagai. Virtue directly facilitates
rationality, by disposing us to accept reality and act well by freeing us from
unreasonable attachments to pleasure and from unreasonable fears. Such an
1778

Aristotle, Politics, 1332a39. “The rational principle” refers to the principle of
rationality and free choice;
1779
According to Sherman’s understanding of habit as “non-rational training of desires towards
appropriate objects”, habit then refers to the trained sensible desires, biophysical pathways.
Nancy Sherman, “The Habituation of Character” in Aristotle’s Ethics ed. Nancy Sherman (New York:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 231.
1780
Add to this the reality that habits acquired during the sensitive period of childhood may be
reactivated after lying dormant for years more easily than if they had to be established from
scratch.
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outcome is dependent both on actual development of the biological pathways and
on rational choices to act in ways disposed by those pathways.

The ramifications of this study are significant. Most importantly science itself is
now seen to validate the notion of virtue and fulfilment through virtue. Science
demonstrates that eudaimonia is dependent upon the development of specific
neurobiological qualities that are experience dependent in a dynamic process
whereby positive behaviours predispose to increased facility for action and
greater reward. The virtuous man is empowered to flourish: “In this life, nothing is
more precious than the virtues.”1781

And as a corollary, I argue that the alternative approaches to ethics, according to
deontological and consequentialist notions, are manifestly inferior to the rich
account of affective, functional and teleological fulfilment implicit in the
eudaimonist virtue based paradigm. Embodied reality trumps theory every time.
Our diligent response to the neural dispositions of our bodies makes for our
happiness in the deepest sense. Robert Browning captured this:
“All good things
Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more
Now, than flesh helps soul.”1782

Philosophy of mind requires a return to the notions of form and being. I am
convinced that it is realistically possible to articulate hylomorphic and Thomistic
arguments able to better engage with contemporary philosophy of mind. Such
arguments will be grounded in direct observation of reality, offering an
appreciation of contingency and participation in being, an enriched understanding
of causality, and avoid the unnecessary misunderstandings that can arise in
response to the concept of subsistent soul.

1781

St Thomas Aquinas, Meditations for Lent, trans. Philip Hughes (London: Sheed and Ward,
1935), Passion Wednesday.
1782
Robert Browning, “Rabbi Ben Ezra”
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Noting the current confusion in the field of moral pedagogy, I have touched but
briefly on the potential for this study to offer clarity of methodology to pedagogy
and parenting. Extensive repercussions for public policy, for research into further
specification of the neural bases, and formulation of psychological applications in
education and counselling remain largely implicit.

It is my hope that this study assists in a rediscovery of virtue as an intrinsic
necessity for moral development, happiness and abiding peace of heart. On this
note of intrinsic fulfilment I finish. I offer the final word to Antonio Damasio who
for two decades has been at the forefront of neuroscientific explorations of
cortical management of emotion, an articulate advocate for the importance of a
rich human emotional life and an opponent of dualistic understandings that would
deny a physical correlate to mental events or the possibility of an integration of
rationality and human passion.
Happiness is the power to be free of the tyranny of negative
emotions. Happiness is not a reward for virtue: it is virtue
itself.1783

1783

Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 175.
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Appendix 1
A Response to the Claims of Emergent Rationality by Non-reductive
Materialism.1784

a)

Non reductive materialism asks the wrong question.

The advocates of emergence pose the questions “What is a human being?” and
“How did human beings become like this?” Both questions focus on the
assumption that the central questions are essential rather than existential.

The emergent approach adopts a scientific method and therefore takes existence
as a given. But human existence is demonstrably contingent so we cannot dodge
the existential question.

Therefore these questions are mistakenly framed. They ought to ask “What is a
human being?” and “In what way do human beings have existence?” The first
question is essential; the second existential.

b)

“What is a human being?”

The advocates of emergence presuppose that human rationality is on a continuum
of development with the intelligence of animals. Yet the more evident the gap
between human beings and the highest animals, the more difficult it is to accept
the non-reductive materialist presupposition.1785 We do well to listen to Martha
Nussbaum’s advice to attend carefully “to the complex materiality of living
things.” 1786 Human rationality is of a patently different order to the intelligence of

1784

This non reductive materialist position is compatible with a belief in a theistic creation.
Theistic, non reductive, materialism asserts nevertheless that all that man is now, including his
existing now, comes to him by an evolutionary pathway.
1785
In conversation with me in October 2012 Tim Chappell agreed with this. Chappell holds a
theistic, non-reductive, materialist position.
1786
Martha Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, “Changing Aristotle’s mind,” 56.
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animals and it appears unscientific to support the view that human rationality
emerges from matter.

We human beings know ourselves and understand the world in which we find
ourselves because of our capacity to know universal ideas and reason with them.
We can both act in the world and stand above that world. Our agency is of a
different order to the limited freedom that animals enjoy; our choices can be
motivated by intangibles. We can respond to what is not immediate and sensible;
no animal has this capacity. Moreover our capacity to find fulfilment in idealistic
dedication to another is not instinctual but a choice. In a similar way, our capacity
to fulfil the will of another is not the result of training alone but of training and
choice. We are our own masters. This phenomenon is without parallel in the
animal world.

It is sometimes argued that our capacity for language is a sophisticated
development of the language of animals, that our capacity for communication
reached a tipping point and that human development from that point forwards
accelerated. Yet the gulf between animals and humans remains, and even if the
bridge were crossed, the apparent contingency of our being creates a further and
insuperable challenge.

c)

“In what way do human beings have existence?”

All that we see around us is contingent. Contingent things cannot be self
explanatory so how is it that they exist? How is it that they come into existence
and are sustained in existence?

It is a very different thing to ask how a planet was made, from asking for an
explanation of how a planet has existence. To focus just on how things became
can miss the significance of the fact of current existence. Contingency requires an
abiding existential causality.
568

Contingent living things seem to be a further category of existent, 1787 but human
life appears to be of another order all together. Aristotle argued that the human
capacity for knowledge and for love based on informed choice bespeaks a
dimension in human nature of non-materiality.

Rationality can neither be possessed by matter nor be bestowed by matter. Both
would be dualistic solutions failing to explain the profound unity in human nature.
Therefore the only alternative is that human nature participates in a principle of
being. Aristotle called this the “rational principle”. There can be no other solution.
Aquinas concluded that this non-materiality consists in a personal, abiding,
participation in rational life. Human beings enjoy a personal, rational identity,
something that matter cannot bestow.

The inevitable conclusion is that human participation in being is of a different
order to that of animals. Human beings have the capacity to understand their
world, and at the same time, to stand above it, to seek fulfilment in elective,
loving relationships with other rational beings. Rationality transcends the material
world. It can neither be derived from it nor find fulfilment in the merely material.

Our capacity for rational life, to make love-choices about what we know,
characterises the very being in which we share. Again apply the Martha Nussbaum
principle of close observation of reality. Because we share in this capacity to love,
inescapably we must conclude that we have been created by a personal being
who knows and loves us, and furthermore that, with our abiding participation in
rational life, we are invited to respond to this Loving One.

As our principle of rational identity is not derived from matter, it would appear
that we transcend death although how this will happen is unclear. Aristotle
suggested that the soul is immortal but that man loses his personal identity after
1787

Nevertheless there seems to be no rational objection to the statement that vegetative and
non-human animate life are emergent from matter.
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death. Aquinas however concluded that this individuated, rational participation
continues after decomposition of the body.

The view that we participate in being should not be understand as an artificial
construct, an inadequate model that raises more questions than it answers. It
seems clear that neither an emergent solution nor a dual substance solution
provide satisfactory answers. The big question of existence may be answered only
by close attention to reality. 1788 (See also 5.4.2.3.)

d)

The question of fulfilment.

There is a third question that must be asked: “What fulfils human beings?”

The answer to this question must be utterly different depending on whether one
just asks essential questions, or whether one asks also the existential question.

Advocates of emergent rationality who ask the essential questions define human
beings as free agents, able to know themselves, to know the world, and to choose
whatever course is preferred. The emergent view bestows purpose on life. It is
difficult, from this position, to demonstrate an objective purpose in life.

But if we answer the existential question we discover the purpose in life by
knowing ourselves to share in the life of one who knows and loves us. This is an
acceptance of the truth of participated being, a recognition that one cannot be
fulfilled in isolation, and that one is fulfilled by the use of rationality to know and
love other persons, first of all in knowing and loving the Loving One in whose
being one shares and to whom one owes one’s all.1789

1788

Martha Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, “Changing Aristotle’s mind,” 56.
This view underpins the philosophical writing of Benedict XVI.”Our nature is constituted not
only by matter but also by spirit and as such is endowed with transcendental meaning and
aspiration.” Benedict XVI, Charity in Truth (original title: Caritas in Veritate), (San Francisco:
Ignatius, 2005), 48.
1789
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In the Aristotelian and Thomistic understanding, virtue is a necessary means to
objective wellbeing. The personal excellence of virtue is ordered to fulfilment in
personal love. When fulfilment is framed in purely subjective terms, when
relationships with other persons becomes an optional extra and unabashed self
interest a viable alternative, there can be little room for virtue.

e)

Why has the existential question been neglected?

I argue that the existential answer is the most important answer of all. If so much
hinges on correctly framing and answering the existential question then the
current debate in philosophy of mind must rediscover the existential question. It is
essential to identify issues which cloud the discussion. I suggest causes for neglect
of the existential question, and the seeds of its reemphasis, lie in the following:


Aquinas, writing for another age where the Pauline vision of participated
existence “in him we live and move and have our being”1790 was not
questioned, gave great emphasis to the soul even in the embodied state.
Perhaps this was because primarily he was writing theology, and so gave
importance to man’s transcendence of the material world, and to personal
responsibility for one’s soul. Nevertheless, emphasis on soul as an entity in
itself rather than as a principle of participation in rational life, has served
to mask Aquinas’s doctrine of participation and has possibly contributed
to a widespread misunderstanding of the notion of form.



Kant argued that existence is not a property: “Being is evidently not a real
predicate, that is, a conception of something which is added to the
conception of some other thing.”1791 This has dissuaded philosophers from
engaging with the question of existence, yet Kant fails to consider
contingence as such, as well as notions of being and participated being.

1790

Acts 17:28.
I. Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, Chapter 12. He states, “All our knowledge of existence
belongs entirely to the sphere of experience.”
1791
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1792

He appears to consider whether being can be considered a quality of

a substance but is silent on being as the principle of existence.


In contemporary analytical circles there has been a Wittgensteinian bias
against metaphysics. The simple logic that underpins the conclusion of
participated being must be affirmed.



Certain teachings of Aquinas have been misinterpreted by his
commentators. At times English translations have not helped either.1793
Only in recent decades have modern commentators rediscovered the
primacy of existence in Aquinas, emphasised his doctrine of participation,
and given recognition to the Platonic sources of much of his thought. 1794



In major sectors of the fragmented, contemporary, Christian world there
is a distrust of philosophy in the service of faith: Orthodox theology was
bypassed by the insights of Aquinas, and the reformers in emphasising
faith unintentionally contributed to a distrust of human reason.
Philosophers have failed to recognise that participation in existence is a
crucial underpinning for an anthropology accommodating Christian belief.



Modern philosophy has largely bypassed the existential question caught
up with the pressing challenges of idealism, materialism, and dualism.



The growth of scientism has opened the door to a non critical acceptance
of physicalist constraints of thought.1795



Physicalist solutions dominate in contemporary neuroscience and
evolutionary biology.

1792

Roger Scruton writes, “I always have trouble with the concept of being (being tempted by
Kant's view that it is not a concept) and so these Thomistic arguments don't always spark off
assent in me. However, I do agree that there is a problem about accounting for rationality and the
general difference between man and the other animals, and that in the end we need some kind of
teleological metaphysics to make sense of our condition.” Personal correspondence, 3 November
2012.
1793
For example, esse was often translated in works of Jacques Maritain as “existence” rather than
“act of existence”.
1794
Note for example, the rediscovery of The primacy of existence in Thomas Aquinas by Dominic
Banez (1528-1604), and the work of Etienne Gilson in Being and some philosophers, (Toronto,
1952), of Cornelio Fabro in La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d’Aquino
(Milan, 1939), and A. Little in The Platonic Heritage of Thomism (Dublin, 1949).
1795
Scientism: a term used by John Paul II denoting the naïve confidence in the capacities of
science.
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Some have accepted the emergent view as compatible with Christianity.
For example, readings of the Christian scriptures can seem to support
emergence. For example, Adam received the “breath of life”, but Eve
received Adam’s rib. This suggests to some that God kickstarted a process
that biology has now taken over. This line of thought misses the fact that
all existence is by participation. Man’s participation in rational life is that
principle whereby he exists in the here and now; wholly material
substances also enjoy an abiding participation in existence. Man differs
from rocks in that his form, his principle of existence, being rational, is
therefore substantial in itself. But we don’t need to go there in this
discussion.
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Appendix 2
A brief introduction to neuroscientific concepts and terminology.
The nervous system is structurally comprised of the central nervous system (CNS)
and the peripheral nervous system (PNS). 1796 Our focus is principally on the CNS
although sensorimotor and autonomic communication utilises also the PNS.
Afferent messaging is from sensory organs and receptors. Efferent information is
outgoing from the CNS.

An anatomic division of the brain: cerebrum, the limbic system, the diencephalon
(thalamus and hypothalamus), cerebellum, brain stem, and reticular activating
system.1797

A functional division of the CNS into seven main parts:


The spinal cord.



The medulla oblongata (the area of the brain stem, the coordinating centre
for vital autonomic functions such as digestion, breathing, and heart rate
immediately at the top of the cord).



The pons (also in the brain stem and sitting above the medulla oblongata)
involved in movement management.



The cerebellum involved in movement and motor skills.



The midbrain (third part of the brain stem) which manages many sensory
and motor functions.



The diencephalon (containing thalamus, which links cerebral cortex to the
CNS, and the hypothalamus). This area is the regulator for autonomic,
endocrine and visceral function.

1796

A highly readable introductory overview of the nervous system may be found in: Carter, The
Brain Book. A concise overview for professionals may be found in: Crossman and Neary,
Neuroanatomy. An illustrated colour text. For an introduction to the anatomy and physiology of
the brain: Swanson, “Basic plan of the nervous system”.
1797
th
Anne M. R. Agur and Arthur S. Dalley II, Grant’s Atlas of Anatomy, 12 ed. (Philadelphia:
Wolters Kluwer, 2009) provides an excellent introduction to anatomy of the head (7.1 – 7.83) and
of the brain (7.84-7.96).
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The cerebral hemispheres consists of an outer layer, the cortex, and three
deeper structures, namely the basal ganglia (BG) which have a key role in
motor activity, the hippocampus which is the centre for memory and the
amygdaloid nuclei which have a key role in emotional response.1798

Neurons are the basic structural and functional units, the cellular building blocks,
of the nervous system. The human brain features some 100 billion neurons and an
estimated 100 trillion axonal connections between neurons.

Neurons are interconnected, bioelectrically active, highly polarised,
communication cells; 1799 they are highly specialised conductors with an
extremely high ratio of surface area to volume, most advantageous for receiving
and transmitting stimuli. 1800 Typically they have highly developed and active
secretory pathways that play a decisive role acting intra and extracellularly at the
synapse, the zone of connection between pre- and postsynaptic neurons. The
synaptic gap is the space between the neurons at this point of junction.

Groups of neurons, or their processes, may be grouped together in the PNS into
cordlike bundles commonly called nerves. Also clumps of neuronal cell bodies,
ganglia, are found especially around the spinal cord and in the CNS, within the
brain.
Neurons have principal components:1801


Cell body including nucleus and various cytoplasmic organelles. The cell
cytoskeleton features microtubules, microfilaments (short filaments some
100x diameter in length). 1802

1798

th

Marieb and Hoehn, Human anatomy and physiology, 8 ed., 431.
See Hof, et al., “Cellular components of nervous tissue,” Chapter 3.For detail concerning
patterns of individual neuronal circuitry.
1800
Siegal and Sapru, Essential neuroscience, Section II, provides a well structured account of the
neuron, its characteristics and function.
1801
For an introduction to cellular neuroscience: Hof, et al., “Cellular components of nervous
tissue,” Chapter 3.
1799
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Dendrites. For each neuron there are multiple dendrites (additional
processes from nerve cell body) which receive synaptic contacts from
other neurons. These have complex branching, the dendritic tree, and
sometimes, on the branches, multiple short protrusions, spines. These
neurite outgrowths have the effect of increasing dendritic surface area.
Usually excitatory contacts are located on spines when they are present.
They have a role in regulation of neurochemical events related to
transmission, and are capable of local synthesis of proteins.



Axon. Normally each neuron has one axon although that axon may itself
develop branches. The axon is the process of the neuron that connects
with and facilitates transmission to the dendritic positioned synapses on
target neurons. In comparison with the cell body proper, the axon can be
of great length. The axon connects to cell body via axon hillock, where an
action potential, or charge, is generated.

Neurons are highly differentiated throughout the various regions of the brain.
They are commonly classified by:
 Function.
 Location.
 The type of chemical neurotransmitter that they synthesise and release.
 Their shape. For example, according to a morphological description of the
cell itself (chandelier, double bouquet, bipolar), or according to the shape
of their dendritic tree.

In addition to neurons, nervous tissue contains neuroglia, cells which,
outnumbering neurons perhaps ten to one, support, functionally assist, and bind
neurons together to other neurons. Neuroglial cells are grouped into microglia
and microglia. Macroglia are most commonly astrocytes which provide metabolic
support and remove excess neurotransmitter secretions, and oligodendrocytes (in

1802

nd

Jenkins et al., Anatomy and Physiology, 2 ed, 72-73.
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CNS), and Schwann Cells (in PNS), both of which synthesise myelin and wrap
themselves around axons, in a process known as myelination. 1803 1804

Messaging in the nervous system is via specialised nerve impulse conduction
from neuron to neuron. Neural conduction requires both chemical and electrical
messaging.


Communication between neural cells is most commonly by chemical
messaging at the synapse. Each synapse consists of the presynaptic
element (on the axon), a cleft or physical gap between cells, and the
postsynaptic element (on dendrite). The active secretory pathways of the
synapse, releasing quanta of neurotransmitter, are a key to the function of
the neuron. Synapses and junctions have localised gatherings of tiny
organelles, synaptic vesicles, with roles in transmitter storage. Synaptic
vesicles are typically refilled with locally produced neurotransmitter (eg
small molecules of acetylcholine (ACh), amino acids such as glutamate) and
reused locally to the synapse.



Chemical messaging received across the synapse opens ion channels into
and out of the cell. Typically there are proteins for the takeup, recycling
and restorage of previously released transmitter molecules.1805



After initial inflow of Na+, further voltage gated Na+ channels are triggered
causing a massive influx of Na+ ions and local depolarisation. For a few
thousandths of a second Na+ enters freely, and if a threshold is reached, an
electrochemical pulse is generated known as an action potential.
Depolarisation activates K+ channels and gradually the system resets. The
electrical impulse carries the length of the cell, and produces a further
synaptic output via the axon, ie chemical messaging to dendrites of
proximate cells. Specifically, it is the rapid increase in Na+ followed by the
slower efflux of K+ which generates action potentials. Currents of Na+ are

1803

Hof, et al., “Cellular components of nervous tissue,” Chapter 3.
th
Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology, 6 ed., 448.
1805
Tortora and Derrickson, Principles of Anatomy and Physiology, 11th ed., 73-76.
1804

577

pronounced and transient, whereas the K+ currents are sustained and
gradual; this differential in time generates the action potential.1806 At
Nodes of Ranvier, which occur at approximately every 1mm on peripheral
nerves, there is a high density of Na+ channels causing saltatory
conduction whereby the electrical impulses jump from node to node and
are effectively generated almost simultaneously along length of neurons.


Coinciding with an action potential, Ca2+ second messenger mechanisms
may be triggered within the cell, internally messaging to the nucleus and
effecting genetic transcription and structural changes at the synapse itself.
This is one mechanism by which use dependent pathways are established,
and helping to explain at the neural level how experience and environment
leave a lasting biological footprint.

Neurons may be classified by their electrophysiological characteristics. These
classes admit to rough groupings. There are regular firing cells, generating
successive action potentials one spike at a time. This can be associated with the
phenomenon of decreasing frequency over time, known as spike frequency
adaptation. Also there are cells that generate rhythmic bursts of action potentials
usually through activation of Ca2+ currents. There are cells characterised by short
duration action potentials (<1ms) discharging at high frequencies (>300Hz), and
there are cells that spontaneously generate action potentials at slower
frequencies (1-10 Hz). These are especially associated with neurons releasing
neuromodulatory transmitters such as ACh, norepinephrine, serotonin,
histamine.1807 It will be seen that some of these variants are associated with
effecting structural and functional changes at the synapse.

There are some dozen classical neurotransmitters and dozens of neuropeptides
that function as transmitters. In addition, there are other unconventional

1806
1807

This was first documented by Overton in 1902.
McCormick, “Membrane potential and action potential,” Chapter 6.
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transmitters, essentially any compound that permits messaging from one neuron
to another at the synapse.1808

Neurotransmitters may be classified according to molecular structure: classical,
peptides, dissolved gases, and endocannabinoids (ECs) 1809

1810

or by function

(excitatory or inhibitory).

Neurotransmitters most commonly classified as classical are:


ACh which was the first neurotransmitter to be identified. It is a cholinergic
neurotransmitter that is released at all neuromuscular junctions
stimulating contraction of skeletal muscles. In addition, it is released at all
pre- and post- ganglionic parasympathetic neurons as well as all
preganglionic sympathetic neurons. Its action is excitatory if binding to a
muscarinic receptor and inhibitory if to a nicotinic receptor (nAChR).1811



The biogenic amines made up of the three catecholamines:
o norepinephrine (NE): NE also known as noradrenaline is an
adrenergic hormone acting as a vasoconstrictor. Its main function
appears to be linked to transmission through the sympathetic
nervous system associated with fight and flight.
o dopamine (DA): a precursor of NE. It is found concentrated in the
basal nuclei, acting in an inhibitory manner on the extrapyramidal
system. Dopaminergic neurons project via the mesolimbic pathway
to the limbic structures and the nucleus accumbens (NAc) in the BG,
and via the mesocortical pathway to the cingulate cortex and
especially the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex (omPFC). DA is
produced primarily in the substantia nigra (SN) and diffused in
cortex with 80% of the DA concentrated in the corpus striatum

1808

For an introduction to neurotransmitters and their action: Ariel Y. Deutch and Robert H. Roth,
rd
“Neurotransmitters” in Larry Squire, et al., Fundamental Neuroscience, 3 ed. (Burlington, MA:
Elsevier, 2008), Chapter 7.
1809
Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 120-121.
1810
Deutch, Ariel Y, and Roth, Robert H. “Neurotransmitters” Chapter 7 in Squire, Larry et al.
rd
Fundamental Neuroscience. 3 ed. Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008.p152.
1811
P. Harris, et al. ed. Mosby’s Dictionary of Medicine (Sydney: Elsevier, 2006).
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(part of the BG). It plays a major role in mechanisms for emotion,
motivation and reward.
o epinephrine (Epi): Effects are not unlike NE and act upon the
hypothalamus, the thalamus, the spinal cord, and the adrenal
medulla.


Serotonin (5-hydroxytryptamine, or 5-HT): 5-HT can act as a potent
vasoconstrictor. In the CNS it acts as a neurotransmitter.



Histamine: A vasodilator. Release is from basophils of the blood, and mast
cells of connective tissue.



Amino acid transmitters such as -Aminobutyric Acid (GABA): GABA is the
major inhibitory transmitter in the body, present in 20%- 30% of all CNS
synapses.



Glutamate and aspartate: These are the major excitatory
neurotransmitter in the CNS and responsible for most of the fast synaptic
transmission in the mammalian brain;



Glycine: It is the most common inhibitory neurotransmitter in the spinal
cord. It is present in inhibitory neurons of the CNS and in retina.



The purines: adenosine triphosphate (ATP) and adenosine. ATP is the
major energy transfer molecule. 1812

Neurotransmitter speed of action is also relevant. ‘Fast’ neurotransmitters are
excitatory amino acids (such as glutamate or aspartate) or inhibitory amino acids
(such as GABA or glycine), whereas slower acting neurotransmitters (such as DA,
NE, and 5-HT) produce longer lasting changes in excitability activating metabolic
processes within the post synaptic cells. These longer lasting changes are of
relevance to this study. DA, it will be seen, mediates permanent synaptic changes.

In addition to neurotransmitters, there are neuromodulators, not necessarily
released at the synapse, but affecting the strength of the synaptic transmission,

1812

Siegal and Sapru, Essential neuroscience, Chapter 8, provides a well structured account of
neurotransmitters, their characteristics and function.
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acting either presynaptically on mechanisms of release, degradation and reuptake
of neurotransmitter molecules, or postsynaptically affecting uptake.

Neurotransmitter receptors at the synapse are of two types: ionotropic receptors
containing an ion channel within their own structure; and metabolic or
metabotropic.

Ionotropic receptors are ligand gated (they open or close on receipt of the
chemical message of the neurotransmitter molecule, the ligand) and mediate
direct opening of the ion channel. Consequently these ion channels carry out very
fast transmission of signals, passing from an activated to deactivated state in only
10ms, and have been called “the underlying ‘hard wiring’ of the nervous
system.”1813 This class of receptors includes:1814


the excitatory (depolarising) receptors
o

nAChR, the nicotinic ACh receptor for ACh.

o the receptors for glutamate, including the α-amino-3-hydroxyl-5methyl-4-isoxazole-propionate (AMPA), N-methyl-D-aspartate
(NMDA) and kainite receptors.
o for aspartate.
o for ATP.


the inhibitory (hyperpolarising) receptors
o GABAA, a receptor for GABA.
o the receptor for glycine.
o the 5HT3 receptor for serotonin.

Metabotropic receptors are neurotransmitter binding sites but not containing an
ion channel within their own structure. 1815 In contrast to the activation of
ionotropic receptors these receptors allow slower onset, longer duration
responses (from a fraction of a second to hours) with a series of enzymatic steps
1813

Schulman and Roberts, “Intracellular signaling,” 205.
Dale Purves, et al., Neuroscience, 4th ed. (Sinauer Associates, 2008), 128–33.
1815
Bear, Neuroscience. Exploring the Brain, 157.
1814
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involved. Signalling also modulates transcription of genes. Essentially these
receptors alter the concentration of intracellular metabolites thereby indirectly
gating ion channels. They are of two types:


G-protein-coupled-receptors (GPCRs) which include the muscarinic ACh
receptor, and receptors that bind the biogenic amines and neuropeptides.



receptor tyrosine kinases that modulate the activity of ion channels
through the activation of protein phosphorylation (adding of a phosphate
group to the compound) reactions and are responsive to growth and
trophic factors affecting development and differentiation of neurons. We
will see that trophic factors promote structural changes in the neuronal
pathways.

Information processing takes place within the neuron itself.1816 The neuron has
been described as a “complex information processing system”.1817 A neuron may
receive multiple excitatory and inhibitory dendritic inputs of modulated intensity.
These inputs are altered in time and in intensity to form coded electrical outputs
via the single axon. This electrical output is then normally converted at the
synapse to chemical messaging pathways, both of an internal second messenger
nature, and via the release of neurotransmitters and modulators. The response of
the cell includes what could be called pathways for plasticity. These include
genetically driven anatomical changes at the synapse that profoundly influence
subsequent messaging downstream.

1816

th

Saladin provides a useful introduction to this topic. Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology, 5 ed.,
468-9. For more detail: Gordon M. Shepherd, “Electrotonic properties of axons and dendrites” in
rd
Larry Squire, et al. Fundamental Neuroscience, 3 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008), 88.
1817
Shepherd, “Electrotonic properties of axons and dendrites,” 88
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Appendix 3
Neuroimaging Technologies
Of great assistance to this current study have been the developments in imaging
over recent decades. Better imaging has led to a growing appreciation of:


The potential for widespread plastic change in the central nervous
system (CNS), both during development and in maturity.1818 Much
research also has been undertaken into addiction, habits, a more
refined understanding of the role of specific pathways and centres in
the brain, as well as the genetic, biochemical and electrochemical
bases processes.



The workings of living subcortical elements of the brain. The improved
imaging has greatly enriched our understanding not only of the roles of
subcortical elements such as the amygdala, the hippocampus, the
thalamus, the hypothalamus and the BG, but of their vital contribution
to “higher cortical activity”.



The fact that brain processes often utilize numerous regions of the
brain simultaneously.



The intricate interconnectivity of virtually all areas within the brain for
complex processing. Sophisticated tracer technologies allow the highly
complex neural pathways of the brain to be mapped.



The great complexity of both subtle and striking effects wrought by
chemical and hormonal neuromodulation of brain activity.



The importance of timing patterns of electrical neural activity.



Reward, attentional, and emotion regulatory systems of the brain are
understood with greater clarity.

1818

Two popular books standout for the quality of their synthesis and analysis: neuropsychiatrist
Jeffrey Schwartz documented his insights into cognitive treatments for patients with obsessive
compulsive disorder in his The Brain and the Mind; and Norman Doidge, in The Brain that Changes
Itself, focused almost exclusively on plasticity. His narrative distills amd popularises the insights of
current research. Schwartz and Begley, The Mind and the Brain. Norman Doidge, The brain that
changes itself (Melbourne: Scribe, 2008), 95.
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Neuroimaging Technologies
1819

Sources: Geake (2009) ; Magristretti (2008)
1822
1823
(2009) ; Ziemann et al. (2008) .

1820

; Nitsche et al. (2008)

Name

Abbreviation

Process

Strengths and
applications as
a research
tool
Great
improvement
over
conventional
x-ray imaging.

Computerised axial
tomography

CT or
CAT scan

Computerised
analysis of
multiple xrays.

Positron
emission
tomography

PET

Measurement
of emissions
from
radioactive
trace in blood.

A more direct
insight into
neural activity
with many
medical
applications.

Magnetic
resonance
imaging

MRI

Use of strong
magnetic field
delineates
contrasting
brain tissue by
collection and
processing of
echoes from

High
resolution 3D
image.
Non invasive.
Provides
precise
structural
imagery of the

1821

; Sweeney

Limitations

Safety
protocols
required in
use of x-rays.
Shortcomings
derive from
limitations to
resolution and
opacity
differentials
inherent to x
ray imaging.
Capital costs.
Short
radiation half
life restricts
design of
experiments.
Scans do not
allow
instantaneous
study of brain
response.

Unable to
demonstrate
short term
brain activity.
Capital costs
(a factor in
MRI
applications in

Comments

Widely used
from late
1970s
onwards.
Radioactive
glucose
crosses bloodbrain barrier.
On metabolisation emits
positrons,
which
produce
gamma rays
on interaction
with
electrons.
Originally
known as
NMR. Rabi
awarded
Nobel Prize in
1944 for
discovery.

1819

Geake, The Brain at School, Chapter 2, “Neuroimaging technologies”: a useful discussion of the
features and limitations of current technologies. Geake is both educator and neuroscientist by
training.
1820
Pierre J. Magistretti,“Brain energy metabolism” in Larry Squire, et al. Fundamental
rd
Neuroscience, 3 ed. (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008), Chapter 13.
1821
Nitsche, et al., “Transcranial direct current stimulation: State of the art 2008,” 206-23.
1822
Michael S. Sweeney, Brain. The Complete Mind (Washington: NG, 2009).
1823
Ziemann, et al., “Consensus: Motor cortex plasticity protocols,” 164-182.
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hydrogen
atoms in
water
molecules in
the brain.
Obtains a
blood oxygen
level
dependent
(BOLD)
response
through
measurement
of the
paramagnetic
qualities of
deoxygenated
haemoglobin.
Highly
processed MRI
data.
Specialised
MRI analysis
of neural
pathways.

Functional
magnetic
resonance
imaging

fMRI

Voxel based
morphometry
Diffusion
tensor
imaging

VBM

Magnetic
resonance
spectroscopy

MRS

MRI used to
identify
neurochemicals
present.

Electroencephalography

EEG

Electrodes on
scalp record
electrical
activity of
cortex.

Magnetoelectroencephalogr
aphy

MEG

Magnetic
sensors placed
on skull reveal
currents
created by
neural
discharges.

DT-MRI

brain.

general).

Allows
mapping of
brain activity
and
performance,
and insights
into function
of specific
brain areas.
Current
resolution
3
1mm .
Non invasive.
Allows refined
studies of
tissue density.
Allows
imaging of
connectivity
maps in the
brain.
Aids in studies
of both
neurotransmit
ters and
hormones.
MRS has
confirmed the
role of DA in
decision
making.
Excellent
temporal
discrimination
and non
invasive.

Owing to
sluggish
vasculature
changes (3-9
seconds
typically)
scans do not
allow
instantaneous
study of brain
response.
Capital costs.

Excellent
temporal
discrimination
to 1/1000
second.
Allows greater
clarity of
reception than
EEG, and
allows analysis

Widely used
from 1990s
onwards.

Capital costs.

Capital costs
as for other
MRI
technologies.

Also known as
diffusion
weighted MRI.

Not all neurochemicals
register.
Only
applicable to
whole brain
imaging.
Capital costs.

Developed by
Ernst (Nobel
Prize 1991)

Signals can
suffer from
distortion.

Used in
conjunction
with spatial
data of fMRI
and PET.
Used for study
of event
related
potentials
(ERPs).
Used in
conjunction
with spatial
data of fMRI
and PET.
MEG has been
used to
analyse
cortical
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of cortical
activity when
there is no net
signal
increase.

Near optical
infra red

NOIR

Detects
oxygenation
and
bloodvolume
changes on
region specific
basis during
functional
studies.
A unilateral
NMR non
invasive
sensor.

Nuclear
magnetic
resonance
mobile
universal
surface
explorer

NMRMOUSE

Transcranial
magnetic
stimulation

TMS

Localised
magnetic field
temporarily
knocks out
effective
neuronal
activity in
localised brain
areas.

Transcranial
direct
current
stimulation

tDCS

Application of
highly
localised
electrical
current to
cortex.

regions
implicated in
the first half
second of
visual word
recognition.
Used in
location of
tumors.
Under
development.

Apparatus
easy to handle
and portable.
Allows
functional
metabolic
investigation.

Optical field
dependent.

Non
destructive;
permitting 2D
and 3D
imaging.
Portability and
relatively low
cost are
strengths.
Used in
testing
implication of
various brain
areas in
particular
tasks. rTMS is
shown to be
useful in
treatment of
depression.
Will not
provoke
action
potentials and
so is less
invasive than
TMS and
rTMS.

Confined to
near surface
studies. Level
of resolution
is a deficiency.

Under
development.

rTMS has
provoked
epileptic
seizure in
individuals
with prior
history.

Introduced in
the 1980s.
Used in
conjunction
with MRI.
rTMS shown
to induce
plasticity in
certain
conditions.
Used in
conjunction
with MRI.
Induces long
term synaptic
change by
protein
synthesis.
Similarities to
neuromodulation.
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Tables
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Table 1.1
th
An hylomorphic critique of 20 century currents in philosophy of mind
Four categories are adopted from Kirk Ludwig “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview” in
Stephen P Stich and Ted A Warfield (eds.) The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind
(Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 2003).
*Note that hylomorphic responses in one subcategory may be applicable in other
subcategories. I have noted the more obvious of these. Responses within broad
categorisations are in many cases applicable across subcategories within the same broad
category. Responses are my own unless alternate source is cited.
Broad category

1824

Definitions and
subcategories

Advocates
and
antecedents

Tenets

Hylomorphic
responses*

Eliminativism is
the denial of the
existence of
mental
properties: “the
view that
beliefs, desires,
and other
mental states do
not exist, and
that
explanations in
terms of such
states will be
replaced by
neurobiological
explanations.”

P. Feyerabend
1827
(1963)
R. Rorty
1828
(1965)
Paul
Churchland
1829
(1981)
S.Stich
1830
(1983)
Patricia
Churchland
1831
(1986)

“… a strategy
which removes
the (ontological)
obstacles that
higher level
phenomena
pose to
naturalism… by
denying their
1833
existence.”

Eliminativism is
a radical
departure from
realist
epistemology.
Truth is found
not in being but
in a relativist a
priori denial of
mental
phenomena.

1825

1. Irrealism
Eliminative
materialism

1826

Antecedents of
eliminativism
are found in
Feyerabend,
Quine, and
Nietzschean
1832
nihilism.

Outspoken
opposition to
the mental
categories of
folk psychology,
arguing that
they fail to
capture physical

Critique of
physicalism: that
it is based on an
impoverished
metaphysical
conception of
1835
reality.

1824

As an introduction to the thought of the various figures mentioned in this table, I cite
representative texts presenting the views of each. Texts not explored in detail are omitted from
bioliography.
1825
Essentially the material eliminativist view, as proposed by Richard Rorty, that minds are not
real.
1826
Moran, ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 973.
1827
P. Feyerabend,“Mental events and the brain,” Journal of Philosophy 60, (1963): 295-6.
1828
R. Rorty, “Mind body identity, privacy and cateogories,” Review of Metaphysics 19, (1965): 2454.
1829
P. M. Churchland, “Eliminative materialism and propositional attitudes,” Journal of Philosophy
78, (1981): 67-90.
1830
S. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983).
1831
P. S. Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1986).
1832
Sarah Patterson, “Philosophy of Mind” in The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century
Philosophy, Dermot Moran ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 555 Chapter 12. Feyerabend argued
that should mental phenomena and brain processes be identified, then the brain processes would
have the same obscurity as the phenomena.
1833
Moran, ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 973.
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Eliminativist
neurophilosophy.

Connectionism
Connectionism
is also known as
neural networks
or parallel
distributed
processing.

The search for
the neural
correlates of
consciousness.

Connectionism
is a model of
cognitive
processing
taking into
account neural
structures.

“Self
representation
accounts of
consciousness”
1840

reality.

Paul Churchland
1837
(1988)
Kim Sterelny
1838
(1990)
Andy Clark
(1989, 1993,
1839
2001)

D. Armstrong
1841
(1981)
W. Lycan
1842
(1987)

1834

A synthesis of
eliminativist and
functionalist
approaches.

Consciousness
defined as
“when the brain
perceives, or
otherwise
represents,

“Ultimately
unintelligible”
1836
: a reductive
denial of
substance.
Reductionist
functional
approaches
focus on outputs
defined
according to
material criteria,
and disregard
ontological
questions.
Reality may not
be reduced to
actions or
relationships. An
effective
understanding
of outputs
requires a prior
understanding
of nature.
Consciousness
and subjective
perception are
not ontologically
prior to being.

1835

N. Chomsky, New horizons in the study of language and mind (Cambridge, MA; MIT Press,
2000). Chomsky’s critique of physicalism: it is a misapplication of methodologies of the
experimental sciences to metaphysical questions and, as such, is a methodological error.
1834
Folk psychology argues that the everyday practice of explaining behaviour in terms of beliefs,
desires and other mental states, the attribution of “propositional attitudes” to others, allows us to
predict how they will behave. In short the theory that this is how we predict others’ states and
intentions.
1836
Hylomorphism advocates that knowledge starts in being. As a consequence of their materialist
stance, eliminative materialists also deny freedom in human action, even a freedom that is limited.
John Haldane, “Incarnational Anthropology,” in ed. David Cockburn (ed.), Human Beings
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 75-93.
1837
Paul M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge MA: MIT, 1988) ; Paul M.
Churchland, The Engine of the Reason, the Seat of the Soul (Cambridge MA: MIT, 1995)
1838
Kim Sterelny, Thought in a Hostile World: The evolution of human cognition (Malden MA:
Blackwell, 2003).
1839
Andy Clarke, Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science and Parallel Distributed
Processing (Cambridge MA: MIT, 1989); Andy Clarke, Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy
of Cognitive Science (Cambridge MA: MIT, 2001).
1840
Terminology proposed by Paul M Churchland in “Consciousness” in Richard L Gregory (ed),
nd
Oxford Companion to the Mind. (2 ed) (Oxford: OUP, 2004
1841
Armstrong, D. (1981) The Nature of Mind.
1842
W. Lycan, Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).
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some of its own
cognitive states
and activities.
Consciousness is
thus a form of
metacognition.”
1843

Self control
accounts of
consciousness
1845

Special
architecture and
dynamics
account.

1843

P. Churchland
1846
(1995)
J.G.Taylor
1847
(2001)

G. Edelman
1850
(1993)
P. Churchland
1851
(1995)
R. Llinas
1852
(2001)

Consciousness
characterises an
agent that is
“modulating,
manipulating,
and steering its
own cognitive
activities…
partly
autonomous in
generating not
just its own
behaviour, but
its own
cognition as
1848
well.”

Higher function
derives from the
complexity of
neural pathways
and reverbatory
circuits.

Objective being
cannot be
verified through
subjective
experience.
Consciousness
itself may not be
reduced to self
1844
awareness.
False premises:
consciousness
may not be
reduced to self
control; nor may
self modulation
require
consciousness.
1849

Being is
ontologically
prior to activity.
Reductive
physicalism
cannot account
for rationality
and freedom.
Neural
complexity
cannot explain
or
accommodate
choice, freedom,
judgement of
conscience, and
the capacity to
abstract to
universal
principles.
nd

Paul M. Churchland, “Consciousness” in Oxford Companion to the Mind, 2 ed. Richard L.
Gregory ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2004).
1844
Churchland, “Consciousness”.
1845
Terminology proposed by Churchland, “Consciousness”.
1846
Churchland, The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain.
1847
J.G. Taylor, “The central representation: the where, what and how of consciousness” in The
Emergence of Mind: Proceedings of the international symposium, S. Colona ed. (Montedison,
2001).
1848
Churchland, “Consciousness”.
1849
Churchland, “Consciousness”.
1850
G. Edelman, “Neural Darwinism: selection and re-entrant signalling in higher brain function,”
Neuron 10, (1993).
1851
Churchland, The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain.
1852
R. Llinas, I of the Vortex: From Neurons to Self (Cambridge MA: MIT, 2001).
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Reductive
physicalism
cannot account
for rationality
and freedom.

Fictionalism.

1853

“Fictionalism is
the claim that,
whilst mental
states don’t,
strictly speaking,
exist, it is
nevertheless
useful to
pretend that
1854
they do.”
Fictionalism is
associated with
projectivism.

Daniel Dennett
1855 1856
(1991)
W. Lycan
1857
(1987)
Ryle’s logical
behaviourism is
a precursor to
Dennett’s
position.
Associated with
folk psychology,
regarding it as
indispensable.
1858

Fictionalism is
an example of
property
dualism
combined with
“substance
monism of a
physicalist
1859
type”.
Functional
explanation of
consciousness:
“necessarily,
anything that
has physical
behavioural
dispositions of a
certain kind and
complexity has a
1860
mental life.”
Belief and desire
“are real innercausal states of
1861 1862
people”.

Output may not
only be defined
in material
terms.
A form of total
conceptual
relativism:
humans are
given
characteristics
they do not in
1863
fact have.
The view seems
aligned with
relativist views
that meaning is
determined by
the receiver not
1864
the subject.
Critique of
eliminativist
roots as above.
The
functionalism
evident in
Dennett’s work
circumvents

1853

Also known as “Instrumentalism”.
Ian Ravenscroft, Philosophy of Mind. A beginner’s guide (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 193.
1855
Dennett, Consciousness Explained .
1856
Haldane, “Incarnational anthropology,” 76. Haldane suggests that Dennett holds to
projectivism with respect to some classes of phenomena, and to realism in relation to others.
1857
W. G. Lycan, Consciousness Cambridge, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).
1858
Dennett’s view.
1859
Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind,” 58.
1860
Samuel Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge MA: Blackwell,
1994), 136. A “behaviour-as-sufficient” view.
1861
William G. Lycan, “The Mind-Body Problem” in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, ed.
Stephen P. Stich and Ted A. Warfield (Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 2003), 60. Dennett proposed this
view in common with with identity theorists, functionalists and token physicalists.
1862
Ravenscroft, Philosophy of Mind. A beginner’s guide, 72. Ravenscroft classifies Dennett within
eliminativism and argues that although Dennett is on record suggesting he is not a fictionalist, his
writings suggest that he holds this position. He presents his thought in the section of his book
dedicated to eliminativism. Lycan, on the other hand argues that Dennett regards mental
ascriptions as real inner causal states.
1863
Haldane, “Incarnational anthropology,” 76.
1854
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deeper
ontological
questions. (See
above.)
1865

2. Conceptual reductionism
Neutral Monism Neutral Monism
holds that “...the
mental (and the
physical) are
reducible to
something more
1866
basic.”
It is
“the view that
mind and matter
are complex
constructions
out of more
basic elements
which are
neutral, neither
mental nor
1867
material.”

Ernst Mach
1868
1886)
William
1869
James(1904)
Bertrand Russell
1870
(1921)

A non dualist,
non physicalist,
approach. We
are
“constructed”
by experience.
1871 1872

James argued
that pure
experience, not
the subject of
pure experience,
should be the
focus of study.
Russell argued
that matter is a
“logical fiction
(giving) us a
convenient way
of stating causal
1873
laws”.
“Mind is …
exemplified in
number and
complexity of
habits… mind
and matter alike
are seen to be
constructed out

Neutral monism
reverses the
fundamental
tenet of
hylomorphism,
that activities of
an organism
follow upon its
nature - do
follows be. This
leads to a
consequent loss
of the sense of
substance.
A failure to
address richness
of substance,
and a
substitution of
idealism or
phenomenalism.
1875

Neutral monism
is incapable of
making
meaningful
statements
about the real
nature of things
because, as an a

1864

Haldane, “Incarnational anthropology,” 77. Dennett proposes a world in which “an event may
be wholly determined in its causes (but) conceived of in a fashion which allows it to be a free
action”. The view seems aligned to Hume’s relativistic argumentation.
1865
The view that whatever can be said about the whole can also be expressed in concepts
pertaining to the parts. In philosophy of mind, this presents as two strands: that man and his
mental life are reducible to the material, or to idealism.
1866
Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 21.
1867
Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 985.
1868
E. Mach, Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhältnis des Physischen zum Psychischen
(1886), available in translation as The Analysis of Sensations and the Relation of Physical to the
Psychical (New York: Dover, 1959).
1869
William James, “A World of Pure Experience,” Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific
Methods 1, 20-21 (1904).
1870
Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind (1921), 308.
1871
Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 21. The view of Mach and Russell.
1872
C.D. Broad, The Mind and its Place in Nature (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1925).
Charles Broad classified Russell’s position as “mentalistic neutralism”.
1873
Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind, 308. Russell advocates a monist metaphysics.

592

of neutral stuff.”
1874

Logical
Behaviourism

Behaviourism
sees behaviour
as intelligible
and rational.
Having a mind
“is constituted
by nothing more
than the
engaging in
especially
sophisticated
types of overt
behaviour, or of
being disposed
to engage in
such behaviour
in suitable
circumstances”.
1876

R. Carnap (1931)
G. Ryle
1877
(1949)
J.L. Austin. Their
followers: Peter
Geach, Anthony
Kenny, Normal
Malcolm, AI
Melden, and
1878
Peter Winch.
The early
articulation of
behaviourism
was by logical
positivists,
Carnap, Hempel,
and Ayer. It
developed from
the
verificationism
of logical
positivists prior
to WWII, and
was also
influenced by
British
Empiricism.
Wittgenstein
and Russell used
aspects of
behaviourism.

Logical
behaviourism
stands in
contrast to
physicalism and
in profound
opposition to
Cartesian
dualism.
“The
behaviourist
takes minds to
be (at least to a
significant
extent)
constituted by
(evident) outer
1880
effects.”
The link
between mental
states and
behaviour is
logical not
1881
causal.

priori position, it
holds that it is
experience that
creates reality.
Logical
behaviourism
fails to propose
an ontological
1882
framework,
nor to consider
the “non dualist,
dual aspect,
ontological anti1883
reductionist”
view.
The meaning of
terms such as
mind requires
clarification by
reference to
Aristotelian
terms such as
intellect and
rational
1884
nature.
Where
appropriate, an
hylomorphic
critique
addresses
behaviourist
affinities to
physicalism.
(See above).

1879

1875

Leopold Stubenberg, "Neutral Monism" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta ed., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/neutralmonism/.
1874
Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind, 308. Russell advocates a monist metaphysics.
1876
Armstrong, “Mind body problem: philosophical theory”. This “peripheralist” view
stands in contrast to the “centralist” position admitting the possibility of “‘inner’ mental processes
which interact causally with the rest of the body.”
1877
G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949).
1878
Adherents of logical behaviourism may or may not subscribe to a reductive materialism. Their
approach however is arguably reductive in its behaviourist focus.
1879
Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, 132.
1880
Minds are not “inner psychic mechanisms merely contingently connected with their outer
behavioural effects.” Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, 132. Logical
behaviourism manifests little interest in the ontological questions, or in the inner world for that
matter. There is a phenomenal approach to behaviour, with the assumption of a logical link
between the mental and behaviour which follows. Logical behaviourism exhibits non engagement
with the issue of mental causality.
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Idealism

1885

Identity
1894
theory

Idealism is the
view that reality
is composed of
minds and
collections of
1886
ideas.

The
identification of
sensations with
brain processes
is a type
physicalist
theory.
David Lewis’
psychophysical

G. Berkeley
1887
(1710)
R. Carnap
1888
(1928)
In more recent
forms see, for
example,
A.C. Grayling
1889
(1985)

Idealism began
as a refutation
of dualism.

U. T. Place
1895
(1956)
H. Feigl
1896
(1958)
J. J. C. Smart
1897
(1959)
David Lewis
1898
(1966)

Mental states
are identified
with brain
1899
states.

Idealism gave
rise to to
phenomenalism.
1890 1891

Idealism, as a
denial of the
material, is a
reductive and
unsatisfying
understanding
of the
complexity of
1892
substance.
1893

Identity theory
bestows causal
relevance on
mental
1900
properties.

The type-type
causality
attributed to
mental
properties by
identity theory
is unable to
account for the
non
predictability of

1881

Brian McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert
Audi (Cambridge: CUP, 1995). The position of Ryle and Wittgenstein.
1882
Patterson “Philosophy of Mind,” Chapter 12. It has been pointed out that Ryle tends to argue
as though dualism and behaviourism exhaust the philosophical alternatives.
1883
A classification suggested by Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind”.
1884
This approach is a response to the origin of behaviourism in semantics. Thus, the subjective
meaning of mind in behaviourism could be displaced by one founded on essential properties of
being.
1885
Also known as universal pure mental particle theory.
1886
Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 16.
1887
G. Berkeley, Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, (1710).
1888
Rudolf Carnap, Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Berlin: Bernary, 1928) trans. R.A. George: The
Logical Structure of the World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).
1889
A. C. Grayling, The Refutation of Scepticism (London: Duckworth, 1985).
1890
Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 16
1891
McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. Phenomenalism (as, for example, advocated by Ayer)
is a version of neutral monism or idealism: “all empirical statements are synonymous with
statements solely about phenomenal appearances”
1892
Haldane avoids offering opinions on questions of qualia and consciousness, preferring to
anchor his discussion on the primacy of existence.
1893
An hylomorphic metaphysics accounting for real existence and for substances having physical
and rational properties overcomes the difficulties posed by idealism.Without such an hylomorphic
response, the challenges raised by idealism with reference to consciousness are virtually
insurmountable.
1894
Identity theory known also as psychophysical (or mind-brain) identity theory. R. W. Sperry,
nd
“Consciousness and Causality” in Oxford Companion to the Mind, 2 ed., ed. Richard L Gregory
(Oxford: OUP, 2004).
1895
U.T. Place, “Is consciousness a brain process?” British Journal of Psychology 47, (1956): 44-50.
1896
H. Feigl, “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2,
H. Feigl, et al. ed. (Minneapolis: U Minnesota Press, 1958), 370-497.
1897
J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and brain processes,” Philosophical Review 68, (1959): 141-56.
1898
D. Lewis, “An argument for identity theory,” Journal of Philosophy 63, (1966): 17-25.
1899
McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597.
1900
The view of Feigl. This is an understanding of causality limited to efficient material causality
assuming , on an a priori basis, the identity of mental and physical.
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theory.
Mind and brain
appear different
things “because
we have used
different
languages and
perspectives”.
1901

Lewis makes use
of “functionalist
descriptions of
states extracted
from a ‘folk
theory’ of
psychology to
identify mental
states with
physical states”.
1902

Central state
materialism.

Central state
materialism is a
type physicalist
theory, a further
development of
identity theory
and a form of
functionalism.
1903

David Armstrong
1904
(1968)

“All mental
states are
contingently
identical with
states of the
brain or CNS
that are apt to
produce a
certain range of
behaviour….
Mental states
are actual
internal states
with causal
1905
effects”.
“We can give a
complete
account of man
in purely
physicochemical
terms… (by a)
purely
electrochemical

correspondence
between the
mental and the
physical, and is
ultimately a
consequence of
human freedom.
Instead,
however, of
opening the way
for hylomorphic
solutions that
uphold human
freedom, the
token
physicalist, nonreductive
solutions of
anomalous
monism (see
below) inherited
the middle
ground.
Armstrong
presented a
reductionist
view of the
human being as
“nothing but a
physic-chemical
1907
mechanism”.
Yet, since
mental events
and brain
processes have
different
intrinsic
properties, they
cannot be
identical.
Functionalist
stance is unable
to avoid
ontological
issues because
of its association
with the

1901

Sperry, “Consciousness and Causality”.
Lewis, “An argument for identity theory,” 17-25.
1903
McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597.
1904
David Armstrong, A Materialist theory of the mind (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968).
1905
McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. Some believed the mind is the brain, others subscribed
to Ryle’s view that the mind is capacities and dispositions, a view that has gained widespread
traction.
1902
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account of the
workings of the
1906
brain.”

Epiphenomenalism

Mental
phenomena are
the result of
physical
processes in the
brain, or else
both enjoy a
common cause.
A form of
interactive
1909
parallelism.

F. Jackson
1910
(1982)
David Chalmers
1911 1912
(1996)
Epiphenomenalism, began
as a reaction to
dualism,
asserting a form
of scientific
behaviourism.
Type
epiphenomenalism: “that
no state can
cause anything
in virtue of
falling under a
mental type”;
mental states
cannot be
causes.
Token
epiphenomenali
sm: “that no
mental state can
cause anything”.
1913

Essentially the
mind is a
spectator.
Conscious
experience is a
side effect of
brain activity.
1914

A denial that
human beings
can be
intentional
agents. “Mental
states do not
cause anything.”
1915 1916

Chalmers writes,
“the hard
problem of
consciousness is
that of
explaining how
it is that physical
processes in a
brain are
associated with
subjective
experiences…. A
science of
consciousness
needs to admit
both first-

physicalist
conception of
reality and a
mechanistic
view of human
1908
behaviour.
Hylomorphic
response would
address the
inconsistencies
in marrying a
1918
reductionist,
emergent
approach to the
Cartesian notion
of a mind
independent of
1919
matter.
See response to
dualism below.
Jackson (and
Van Cleve), by
arguing that
consciousness is
irreducible and
emergent, fall
into the
deterministic
1920
camp.
Their
position is
fundamentally
materialistic.
See refutation of
reductive
materialism
above.
Chalmers lacks

1907

Patterson, “Philosophy of Mind,” 547.
David Armstrong quotation. Sperry, “Consciousness and Causality”.
1908
Overt materialism can be answered by an hylomorphic defence of non material properties in
certain substances.
1909
nd
Richard L. Gregory ed., “Epiphenomena” in Oxford Companion to the Mind, 2 ed. (Oxford:
OUP, 2004). Epiphenomenalism admits only one way psychophysical action.
1910
F. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly 32, (1982): 127-36.
1911
Chalmers, The Conscious Mind.
1912
Paul M Churchland classifies Chalmers as an ephphenomenalist. Churchland, “Consciousness”.
1913
McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597.
1914
rd
A. Delbridge et al., Macquarie Dictionary, 3 ed. (Macquarie University: Macquarie Press,
2001). “Conscious processes, though distinct from physical processes, have no distinct causal
properties.”
1915
McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597.
1916
Haldane, “Incarnational anthropology,” 78.
1906
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person data and
third person
data as real and
mutually
1917
irreducible.”

both an
adequate
rational
psychology and
notion of formal
1921
causality.

C.D. Broad
following J.S.Mill
distinguishes
mechanism and
emergentism.

Hylomorphism
teaches that
properties
follow upon the
essence: the
nature of
something limits
its behaviour
and activities.
The emergence
of rationality, a
new class of
property, does
not correspond
to an empirical
understanding
1933
of the world.

1922

3. Conceptual anti reductionism
Emergentism
“Emergent
materialists hold
Emergent
that there are
theories may be only material
classified as
things, but that
type-type
some complex
(Category 2
material things...
above) or as
have mental
supervenient
properties and
non type-type.
that those
mental
properties are
not conceptually
reducible to any
of the physical
complexes of
the complexes
that have them”
1923

C.D.Broad(1925)
1924

Emergentism
began as a
materialist
rejection of
dualism,
idealism, and of
reductive
materialism as
empirically
1925
implausible.
It is associated
with the
nineteenth
century rise of
science and
theory of
1926
evolution.

1928

Emergentism is
non reductive,
1929 1930
and
essentially
1931
materialistic.
1932

1927

1918

Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind,” 58.
With some characteristics of a dualistic theory, epiphenomenalism asserts an unbridgeable gap
between two orders of being.This must lead either to a deterministic universe, or to an
incomprehensible universe unable to account for human freedom and causality.
1920
McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597.
1917
nd
David Chalmers, “Consciousness” in Oxford Companion to the Mind, 2 ed., Richard L Gregory
ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2004). Chalmers seeks to explain the connection of physical processes to
conscious experience. He advocates the development of “simple, basic and universal” principles
connecting physical processes and consciousness by means of correlating first-person data
(subjective description) and third person data (neuroscience and psychology).
1921
Without these, Chalmers’ goal of developing “principles connecting physical processes and
consciousness” appears impossible. His principles would simply reflect behavioural phenomena.
1922
That the mental activity of the human being and their minds, cannot be reduced constituent
parts.
1923
Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 18.
1924
C.D. Broad, The Mind and its Place in Nature (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1925).
1925
McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597.
1926
Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 9.
1927
In recent decades emergentism has resurfaced in numerous forms. It is currently the broad
materialist category into which many philosophers and neuroscientist classify themselves.
1928
He argues they are typified variously by mechanical and chemical combination... one the sum
of its individual effects, the other only known “inductively”.
1929
Patterson, “Philosophy of Mind,” 525. “Mind (is) beyond belief of reductive explanation”.
1930
Moran, ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 973. It is “the view
that wholes exhibit novel features which are emergent, or not explicable in terms of the properties
of the parts of the whole”.
1919
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Anomalous
monism.

“A metaphysical
view... according
to which all
mental events
are physical
events, but
there are no
strict laws
linking mental
and physical
1934
predicates.”
A form of dual
aspect theory
whereby events
can have
autonomous
mental and
physical aspects.
A token
1935
physicalism.

Donald
Davidson
1936
(1963)
Anomalous
monism built
upon the work
1937
of Kripke
who argued that
statements of
strict identity
between
sensation and
physical state
are not
1938
possible.

A form of
emergentism;
1939
a non
reductive
materialism.
Davidson
introduced
notion of
supervenience.
1940 1941
Mental
events can be
causally related
to physical
events but
mental events
are physical
events.
Anomalous
monism
established the
paradigm for
non-reductive

Anomalous
monism
circumvents
ontological
questions and
relies on
positivist
1943
principles.
Foundation on a
physicalism and
causalism seeing
the mind as the
efficient cause
of behavioural
1944
outputs.
Non reductive
materialist,
emergent, and
functionalist
understandings
(without an
explicit enriched

1931

Broad’s emergent materialism held that every substance is wholly made up of the physical.
Later advocates of emergentism tend to adopt an a priori materialist position. Drawing on an
evolutionary paradigm, emergentists assert that higher properties evolve according to mysterious
inner processes as yet unknown.
1932
Broad, “Mind and its Place in Nature,” 647. Mentality is “an emergent characteristic of certain
kinds of material complex”. Broad regards behaviourism as reductive materialism and opposes this
to emergent materialism.
1933
Hylomorphism argues that there is a lack of scientific foundation for the fundamental
emergentist presupposition, that higher properties (rationality) evolve. The more distinctive the
qualities that are recognised in human nature, the more difficult for the emergent position to gain
any traction. See Appendix 1 for detailed refutation of emergent rationality.
1934
Moran, ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 967.
1935
McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. “Every particular is physical... yet physical tokens can
fall under non physical types. Not all token physicalism is type physicalism.”
1936
D. Davidson, “Actions, reasons and causes,” Journal of Philosophy 60, (1963): 685-700.
“Interacting mental and physical events instantiate physical laws and hence are both physical”. He
upheld the anomality of the mental but offered no concession to dualism.
1937
S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).
1938
McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597.
1939
Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 9.
1940
McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. Supervenience: “An asymmetric relationship of
determination between sets of properties or facts. If mental properties supervene on physical
properties, then there is no variation in mental properties without a variation in physical
properties. There is a special kind of dependence between “higher level” properties and “lower
level properties that does not allow conceptual reductions”.... Davidson submits that the mental
supervenes on the physical, such that no mental change can occur without a physical change. See
Moran, ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 993.
1941
Davidson, “Actions, reasons and causes,” 214.“Mental characteristics are in some sense
dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics.”
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physicalism that
has
predominated in
th
latter 20
1942
century.
Biological
naturalism

Competition for
executive
control
1952
accounts

Biological
naturalism is the
belief that
mental and
physical
categories are
mistaken. Searle
argues that
higher level
features of the
human organism
are caused by
lower level
1945
elements.

A further form
of emergentism
- this account
proposes that

John Searle
1946
(1984)
M. Gazzaniga
1947
(2011)
Biological
naturalism is a
rejection of
functionalist and
Computational
Theory of Mind
understandings.
Searle moved
from this
position to
“quantum
indeterminism”
(see below) to
explain freedom
through physical
quantum
processes.
B.J.Baars
1953
(1988)
F.Crick and C.
1954
Koch (1990)

A subtle form of
emergentism.
Biological
naturalism
questions the
distinctions
between the
mental and
physical
suggesting there
is no basis in
reality for the
distinction.
Searle argues
consciousness is
a result of
neurobiological
processes, an
evolved brain
1948 1949
process.

These are
essentially
emergent
positions:

ontology) must
ultimately be
physicalist and
unable to
account for
human freedom.
Hylomorphism
mental and
physical
properties exist
1950
in reality.
If mind is
accorded
executive status
(in a dualist
paradigm of
substance) it will
necessarily lead
to a dualist, an
epiphenomenalist position
or a physicalist
1951
position.

The material
determinism of
these accounts
lacks adequate

1943

Hylomorphism also holds to the fundamental intelligibility of reality. Anomalous monism, and
the non reductive physicalisms in general, propose anomalous mental and physical properties on a
physical foundation. Essentially this must be either self contradictory or at the very least
paradoxical.
1944
Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind,” 45.
1942
Patterson, “Philosophy of Mind,” 552. Davidson rejected psychophysical laws and focused on
intention rather than sensation. He argued that what is mental are “attitudes such as believings,
desirings, intendings, identified by their content: what is believed, desired, intended.”
1945
Searle outlines his position in Guttenplan. Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of
Mind, 544-557.
1946
John Searle, Minds, Brains and Science, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).
1947
Gazzaniga, Who’s in charge. Free will and the science of the brain.
1948
Patterson, “Philosophy of Mind,” 569.
1949
Julian Baggini and Jeremy Stangroom, What Philosophers Think (London: Continuum, 2003),
185. “One of the things we know... is that all of our mental processes are caused by processes in
the brain. That’s the kind of starting point I can take when I work in the philosophy of mind.”
1950
This is so even if the distinction between mental and physical substances is misplaced at times.
1951
It is possible that a clarification of terminology is required: mental can be used synonymously
with mind understood as the very source of human consciousness and autonomy.
1952
Terminology proposed by Churchland, “Consciousness”.
1953
B.J. Baars, A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

599

neural
complexity leads
to consciousness
and executive
control.

D.A.Leopold and
N.K.Logothetis
1955
(1999)
W.Singer
1956
(2000)
S.Greenfield
1957
(2008)

consciousness
arises from
neuroscientific
complexity
Rationality and
autonomous
personhood
arise from brain
complexity.
Accounts of
mechanisms for
executive
control: the
“global
workspace
account”, the
“shifting
coalitions”
account, and the
“synchrony”
1958
account .

Non reductive
physiological
accounts.

These accounts
take advantage
of powerful
recent imaging

A.Damasio
1962
(1994)
1963
(1999)
1964
(2003)

‘Compatibilism’
accounts for
apparent
1959
freedom.
Supported by
quantities of
neuroscientific
research,

understanding
of the person
endowed with
both spiritual
and material
faculties.
Haldane urges,
“No
epistemology
without
1960
ontology”.
Hylomorphism
rejects the
position that
substances are
either material
or immaterial.
Instead it posits
the possibility of
psycho-physical
substances, with
a nature capable
of both physical
and mental
1961
activity.
Damasio’s
attempts
demonstrate the
difficulty,

1954

F. Crick and C. Koch, “Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness,” Seminars in the
Neurosciences 2, (1990).
1955
D. A. Leopold and N. K. Logothetis, “Multistable phenomena: changing views in perception,”
Trends in Cognitive Science 3, (1999).
1956
W. Singer, “Phenomenal awareness and consciousness from a neurobiological perspective,” in
Neural Correlates of Consciousness, T. Metzinger ed. (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000).
1957
st
Susan Greenfield, I.D. The Quest for identity in the 21 Century.
1958
The global workspace account posits a seat of consciousness in the brain. The shifting
coalitions (Baars, 1988) suggests temporary networks underpinning consciousness. The synchrony
account (Crick and Koch, 1990) which suggests synchronous firing of neurons is the key. This
account lends itself to utilising brain imagery to localise higher function. For example, Crick in The
Astonishing Hypothesis locates free will in the anterior cingulate region of the brain.
1959
This is the view, first proposed by Koch and Dennett, that free will and determinism are
compatible, essentially free will is reduced to freedom to act.
1960
Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind,” 57. This principle underpins the
hylomorphic refutation of attempts to discuss executive control, qualia or consciousness without
addressing the ontology of the substance.
1961
Haldane argues that an hylomorphic understanding of the person allows a richer model of
human behaviour than the various alternative contemporary approaches to the philosophy of
mind that are physicalist, or epiphenomenalist. He argues that these alternatives are both
reductionist. He insists that form contributes order, that forms received play a decisive role in
perception, and that intentional forms play a decisive role in action.
1962
Damasio, Descartes’ Error.
1963
Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens. Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness.
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techniques
revealing the
mechanisms of
emotion and
cognitive
processing.

J. LeDoux
1965
(1998)

Damasio and
LeDoux have
developed
arguments
supporting the
notion of a
profound unity
in the organism
on materialistic
assumptions.

perhaps
impossibility, of
defending
specific
metaphysiological
conclusions
about human
nature in the
absence of a
concept of
person. They
demonstrate the
need that mindbody
speculation
must be
supported by a
metaphysically
rich
anthropology.
1966

Functionalism.

Functionalism It
is “the view that
mental states
can be analysed
in terms of their
relationships to
sensory inputs,
behavioural
inputs, and
other mental
states. Thus pain
is not identical
with a particular
neurophysiological
state, but with
any state which
is caused by
injury and
manifests itself
in pain
1967
behaviour.”
Functionalism is
more a family of

Hilary Putnam
1970
(1968)
J.Fodor
1971
(1968)
N.Block
1972
(1978)

Functionalism
allows mental
states to be
causes of
1974
behaviour.

Ryle seems to
be a forerunner
of functionalism
which may be
seen as a
successor to
behaviourism.
Functionalism
built on the
insights of folk
psychology.

Functionalism is
a reassertion of
the language of
psychology.

Functionalism is
the orthodox
view in
contemporary
philosophy of
mind (going

1975

Mental states,
while physically
based, are not
conceptually
identified with
the physical. The
mental, while
supervening on
the physical, is
not conceptually
reducible to the
1976
physical.

Critique of the
functionalist
approach
observes that
the focus is on
the
phenomenon of
consciousness
rather than on
an articulation
of its causes.
Functionalism
finds its origins
in
behaviourism.
1978
(See above.)
The focus is on
black box inputs
and outputs.
Functionalism
has much in
common with
hylomorphism.
1979
It grants

1964

Damasio, Looking for Spinoza.
LeDoux, The Emotional Brain.
1966
See 5.2.1.1 and 5.2.1.2.
1967
Moran, ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 977.
1970
H. Putnam, “Brains and Behaviour” in Analytical Philosophy II, R.J.Butler ed. (Oxford: Blackwell,
1968), 1-19.
1971
J. Fodor, Psychological Explanation (New York: Random House, 1968).
1972
Not all those who describe their approach as “functional” are necessarily materialist.
1965
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Computational
functionalism.
1981

empirical
models
concerned with
sensory inputs
and behavioural
outputs, rather
than an
understanding
of mental
1968 1969
activity.
“According to
this theory,
mental states
are complex
symbols, and
mental
processes are
computational
processes. In
short: the mind
is a
1982
computer.”

back to Putnam
1973
and Fodor).

Functionalism
comes in many
forms. It
developed
primarily as a
token physicalist
1977
theory.

the real
existence of
things, avoids
treating mind as
a substance and
discusses
causality in
apparently nonmaterial terms.
1980

R.W. Sperry
1987
(1966)
J. Fodor (1990)
N. Block (1986
1988
and 1995)
H.Putnam(1992)
1989

Computational
Theory of Mind
was the
predominant

This non
reductive
physicalist form
of functionalism
emphasises the
reality of mental
phenomena,
consciousness
and mental
1991
causation.
1992
An account
that is

An hylomorphic
critique notes
the lack of
scientific
foundation for
emergentist
presupposition.
The hylomorphic
responses to
functionalism,
above, also

1974

Putnam (1968) and Chihara and Fodor (1965). McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. Their
position “appeals to the simplicity, plausibility, and predictive accuracy of an explanatory system as
1974
a whole”.
1975
nd
Ned Block, “Consciousness” in Oxford Companion to the Mind, 2 ed., Richard L. Gregory ed.
(Oxford: OUP, 2004). Yet the adoption of an a priori materialist position by some functionalists,
and a disregard for metaphysical considerations, lead to a deterministic reading of human action.
In contrast with others of behaviourist lineage but on the basis of real world observations,
functionalists do acknowledge the causal role that mental states play. Functionalism, in contrast to
behaviourism, allows that mental states should be causes and effects.
1976
Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 9.
1978
Block, “Consciousness”.
1979
“It is often said that Aristotle is the founder of functionalism because of his view that the
function of an entity determines its form.” Cf Moran, ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth
Century Philosophy, 977. Of course this is in the order of knowledge. Metaphysically, the reverse is
true: the form of an entity determines its function.
1968
st
For example, functionalism seems unable to grapple with the notion of 1 person experience.
1969
Functionalism shows little interest in the ontological questions. Cf Hilary Putnam in
Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, 513. It is telling that Putnam, after his
repudiation of functionalism, has written that the “key elements of functionalism operate... within
a seventeenth century perception of the mind”.
1973
Moran, ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 977.
1977
Patterson, “Philosophy of Mind”. In an early variant, the Australian Functionalists (Armstrong,
Lewis and Smart) “used functionalist analyses to argue for the type identity theory. They regarded
mental states as functionally specified physical states.”
1980
Nussbaum and Putnam, “Changing Aristotle’s mind,” 27-56. See Chapter 4. Prominent
Aristotelian philosopher, Martha Nussbaum, and Putnam have jointly issued publications
discussing what they describe as the functionalist aspect of hylomorphism.
1981
nd
Roger Penrose, “Consciousness” in Oxford Companion to the Mind, 2 ed., Richard L. Gregory
ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2004). Roger Penrose classifies the search for the neural correlates of
consciousness (see above “Competition for executive control accounts”) under this category.
1982
Ravenscroft, Philosophy of Mind. A beginner’s guide, 192.
1987
R.W. Sperry, “Mind, brain and humanist values,” Bulletin of Atomic Science 22, (1966).
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“Brain
physiology
determines the
mental effects”
in this
“interactionist”
model “in which
mental
phenomena are
described as
…supervening,
rather than
intervening in
the physiological
process”.
Consciousness is
an “autonomous
phenomena”.
1983

The mentalist
view
corresponds to
the ascendency
of cognitivism
over materialist
behaviourism in
psychology in
1984 1985
the 70s.

theory of mind
from the mid
70s to mid 80s.
1990

“emergentist,
functionalist,
interactionist
and monistic.”
1993

Proponents
contrast their
position with
both
behaviourist
materialism and
dualism.
In more recent
years it has been
influenced by
computer
development.
1994

Fodor and Block
have
investigated the
challenge of
qualia for
functionalism.

apply.
References to
neurobiology
are
characterised by
non sequitur
conclusions
typically
attributing
consciousness to
the complexities
of neurobiology.
1995 1996

Computational
functionalism is
bereft of a
metaphysical
basis upon
which to
demonstrate
freewill and
causality.
Ultimately, it
appears open to
reduction to
determinism or
dualism.

1986

1988

Ned Block, “On a confusion about the function of consciousness,” Behavioural and Brain
Science 18, (1995): 227-47.
1989
Nussbaum and Putnam, “Changing Aristotle’s mind,” 27-56. See Chapter 4.
1991
Patterson,“Philosophy of Mind,” Chapter 12. Again, this is a most broad category. Not all those
included would consider themselves materialist.
1992
Block, “Functionalism”. Putnam and Fodor “saw mental states in terms of an empirical
computational theory of the mind”
1983
Sperry, “Consciousness and Causality”.
1984
Moran, ed., The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 982. Mentalist
understandings of consciousness are founded on neurobiological explanations. “Mentalism treats
meaning and concepts as psychic phenomena in the mind of individuals.”
1985
Armstrong, “Mind body problem: philosophical theory”. Mentalist theories emphasise the
immediacy and certainty of the mind knowing itself in contrast with material things.
1986
Hilary Putnam in Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, 513. Fodor’s work
contributed to “The rehabilitation of mentalism, the conception of mental phenomena as inner
causes, involved its detachment from the ‘Cartesian’ conception of mental phenomena as
immaterial causes which were ‘inner’ in the sense of being private, of being subjective phenomena
uniquely accessible to a single consciousness.” Non reductive functionalism may include
teleological approaches.
1990
Jerry Fodor The Language of Thought. New York: Thomas Crowell, 1975.
1993
Sperry, “Consciousness and Causality”.
1994
Ned Block, “Functionalism” in Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind,
323.325. through Putnam (1967) who suggested mind to be analogous to software, and through
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Quantum
indeterminism.
This is an
attempt to
marry the
physics of
quantum theory
to neural
science in order
to account for
free will.

H.P Stapp
1997
(1993)
Roger Penrose
1998
(1994)
J.Schwartz
1999
(2002)
G.Vitiello
2000
(2002)
J.Searle
2001
(2007)
M.Gazzaniga
2002
(2011)

Penrose
proposes
“Quantum
gravitation
2003
coherence”.
Other advocates
adopt detailed
analysis of
neural
structures to
argue for laws of
quantum
mechanics and
therefore of
physical
indeterminacy.
Recently
Penrose and
Hameroff
publicized their
“quantum soul
2004
theory”.

This position
appears to be
characterised by
a misapplication
of the principles
of quantum
physics to
account for
phenomena not
reducible to the
physical. The
theory is based
on imagination
and assertion
rather than
weight of
evidence.
Physicalist
emergent
approaches
must fail to
demonstrate
any physical and
therefore
determined
basis for human
freedom, the
ability to know

Block’s (1978) psychofunctionalism: “that the scientific nature of the mental consists not in
anything biological, but in something organizational, analogous to computational structure.”
1995
Sperry, “Consciousness and Causality”. As for note above, this need not imply a position of
determinism. For example “Thus the critical, multinested space time pattern properties of the
neuronal infrastructure, as well as the mass-energy elements, must also be included in the causal
account.”
1996
“A representation is conscious if it is broadcast on a global neuronal workspace.” Block,
“Consciousness”. This position does not necessarily suggest physical determination but the exact
meaning requires clarification. Note also: the underpinning emergent view is primarily based on an
evolutionary development of the mind. Essentially it is materialist view, asserting that matter
possesses undescribed mechanisms that account for the phenomena of consciousness.
1997
H.P. Stapp, “A quantum theory of the mind-brain interface,” in Mind, Matter, and Quantum
Mechanics, (Berlin: Springer, 1993), 145–172.
1998
Roger Penrose, Shadows of the Mind (Oxford: OUP, 1994).
1999
Schwartz and Begley, The Mind and the Brain.
2000
G. Vitiello, “Dissipative quantum brain dynamics,” in No Matter, Never Mind, ed. K. Yasue, et al.
(Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2002), 43–61.
2001
J. Searle, Freedom and neurobiology. Reflections on free will, language and political power (NY:
Columbia University Press, 2007).
2002
Gazzaniga, Who’s in charge. Free will and the science of the brain.
2003
Churchland, “Consciousness”. “’Quantum gravitation coherence’ occurs within the
microtubules of the brain’s axonal fibres as the hallmark or essence of consciousness, on grounds
that blocking such coherence may explain how anaesthetics work, while the achievement of such
quantum-level coherences may explain the existence of sound but non algorithmic mathematical
knowledge.”
2004
The hypothesis that quantum effects within neuronal microtubules constitute the soul.
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New mysterian
account

Colin McGinn
2005
(1989)

The term harks
back to the “old
mysterians”,
supposedly the
Cartesians, who
proposed
nonnatural
solutions
without
adequate
explanation.

Panpsychism

"The view that
the basic
physical
constituents of
the universe
have mental
2008
properties."

“New
mysterianism is
a postmodern
position
designed to
drive a railroad
spike through
the heart of
2006
scientism”
The position
argues that the
hard problem of
consciousness
cannot be
resolved
because we can
never know
another’s
subjective
2007
experiences.

William James
(1900s)
Thomas Nagel
2009
(1974)
Panpsychism
has ignited
interest in

A form
of property
dualism
following four
premises:
materialism;
non
reductionism;

reality and
universals, and
to form lovechoices. The
notion of
participation in
being remains
an insuperable
obstacle for
materialist
indeterminacy.
As the New
mysterian
account is
essentially an
emergent view
of
consciousness,
the hylomorphic
responses to
emergentism
are applicable.
Ultimately
qualia, in a
physicalist
account, cannot
escape the
determinism of
their origins.
Haldane insists
that
preoccupation
with the study
of qualia must
not take priority
over the
ontological
questions. See
above.
Nagel’s concern
has been to
provide an
effective
refutation of
2012
physicalism.
Hylomorphic

2005

C. McGinn, Mental Content (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).
O.J. Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1992), 10,131.
2007
Nevertheless, as there is no possibility of studying consciousness from outside the system,
there is a certain common sense in these insights.
2008
Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 181.
2009
T. Nagel, “What is it like to be a bat?” Philosophical Review 83, (1974): 435-50.
2006
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consciousness
and qualia. It
was to some
extent a
reaction to the
materialist
identity theories
that were
dismissive of the
significance of
subjective
experience.

realism; and non
2010
emergence.
It is a universal
mental particle
theory.
Nagel
postulated nonmental, nonphysical
properties,
“proto mental
properties” in
response to the
difficulty of
understanding
subjective
2011
experience

critique would
question the
possibility of
discussion of
rationality, as a
prerequisite to
certain mental
experience,
within a
functionalist and
essentially
materialist
2013
paradigm.
As a non
reductive
materialist
position
responses above
apply.

2014

4. Ontological anti reductionism
Dualism
Dualism is “the
philosophical
theory that
supposes that
the mind is
essentially
independent of
the brain,
though mental
events run
parallel with
physical brain
2015
events”.

K.Popper and
J.Eccles
2016
(1977)
J.Foster
2017
(1996)
Following
Descartes other
figures modified
the theory.
Malebranche
developed
“occasionalism”

Descartes
proposed
separate
spiritual and
material
substances.
“Mind and body
interact and
ideas represent
material things
without
resembling
them”; “God

“The error of
the Cartesian is
to suppose that
non-physical
attributes imply
an exclusively
incorporeal
substance as
2021 2022
bearer.”
Cartesian
dualism
represents an

2012

Cf Nagel, “What is it like to be a bat?” 437. Nagel argued “If physicalism is to be defended, the
phenomenological features (of experience) must themselves be given a physical account. But
when we examine their subjective character it seems that such a result is impossible” His approach
respects the hylomorphic principle that only like properties may be compared.
2010
The view of Thomas Nagel.
2011
McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597.
2013
Nagel is preoccupied with demonstrating the reality of experience rather than the reality of
being itself. He chooses not to discuss key metaphysical questions. Strawson’s argument that
person is more fundamental than a person’s mind or body is relevant here.
2014
“Ontological antireductionism holds… that certain higher-order phenomena cannot even in
principle be fully explained by physics, but require additional principles that are not entailed by the
laws governing the basic constituents. With respect to biology, the question is whether the
existence and operation of highly complex functionally organized systems, and the appearance of
self-replicating systems in the universe, can be accounted for in terms of particle physics alone, or
whether they require independent principles of order.” T Nagel, “Reductionism and
Antireductionism” Novartis Foundation Symposium 213, (1998):3-10.
2015
nd
“Dualism” in Oxford Companion to the Mind, 2 ed., Richard L. Gregory ed. (Oxford: OUP,
2004), 271.
2016
K. Popper and J.Eccles, The Self and its Brain (Springer, New York, 1977).
2017
J. Foster, “A defence of dualism” in The Case for Dualism, J. Smythies and J. Beloff
ed.(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1989).
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2018

; Leibnitz
developed a
theory of
harmony among
non interacting
monads;
Spinoza within a
one substance
view proposed
a paradigm of
2019
property.

makes these
things
2020
happen”.
Cartesian
dualism has
difficulty in
accounting for
sensation,
knowledge and
causality.

essentially antiAristotelian view
of the material
2023
world.
Descartes’ view
of the mind as a
substance, an
object, was a
category
2024
mistake.
“There is no a
priori reason to
think that the
mind is
intimately
related to the
brain and
Aristotle did not
associate them.”
2025 2026

Attribute
Dualism

Essentially
attribute
dualism
proposes we
comprehend the
same reality
whether under
mental or

Spinoza
2028
(1677)
Strawson
2029
(1959)
Thomas Nagel
2030
(1986)
David Chalmers
2031
(1996)

The higher
region of the
brain is a
physical
substance “with
some non
physical
2032
properties”.

The “neo
dualist”
approach may
cite the “body or
some part of it,
ie the brain, as
being that with
which this

2021

Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind,” 58 Haldane argues that “a proper
understanding of substantiality should lead one to reject the idea that a wholly physical particular
could be the bearer of intrinsic attributes that are non-physical.`
2022
Anscombe insisted philosophy must once and for all discard Cartesian ways of thinking about
matter. “The divide between matter and mind was drawn differently by the ancients and
medievals from the way it is drawn in modern times. So far as I know, the source of the new way
of drawing the line is Descartes….” She nominated the very passage where Descartes made the
mistake of identifying brain and mind in his Second Meditation. G. E. M. Anscombe, Collected
papers of GEM Anscombe, Vol 2, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind. Republished as Human
Life, Action and Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), Chapter 1.
2018
Occasionalism: in which the mind and body do not interact but God makes them appear to.
2019
Richard A. Watson, “Dualism” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Robert Audi ed.
(Cambridge: CUP, 1995).
2020
McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597. Descartes held that extension is the essence of the
physical and so minds are not physical. He held that two way causation without any physical basis
connects our minds to our brains.
2023
Armstrong, “Mind body problem: philosophical theory”. This involves rejection of teleological
considerations, with bodies operating as machines according to physical principles. Ironically
Descartes opens the door to a materialist account of the mind.
2024
Ryle and Anscombe both argued this. Furthermore an hylomorphic critique points out the
mistake of attributing efficient causality to representations in the intellect and guards against a
materialisation of the process.
2025
McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597.
2026
McLaughlin, “Philosophy of Mind,” 597.Ryle argued that mind, while a noun, is not an object,
and so Descartes was confusing discourse about body with that of mind, which is to have
capacities and dispositions.
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physical
attributes.
There are many
forms of dual
aspect theory.
Double aspect
theory is in fact
a family of
theories:
universal or
restricted,
mixed mental
particle
2027
theories.

Non dualist,
dual aspect,
social being

A non reductive
account holding
that human
beings are truly
free and that
they operate in
a social context.

Attribute
dualism traces
back to Spinoza
who proposed a
single eternal
substance with
attributes
including
extension and
thought;
ordinary things
are modes of
this substance.
Spinoza’s theory
may also be
seen as a form
of panpsychism.

Gillett (2001)

2037

Attribute
dualism adopts
a “special
particle theory”
that
incorporates a
restricted mixed
mental particle
theory: “that
some basic
constituents of
things, which
are at least
spatially located,
have mental
properties, but
2033 2034
not all”.

There are
aspects of an
analytic
approach that
avoids the
metaphysical.
Gillett holds that
the explanation

subject is
associated” thus
permitting “a
psychophysical
subject of
thought and
2035
action”.
In contemporary
philosophy of
mind, the
attribute dualist
appears to
underestimate
the notion of
participation
and so struggles
to offer a
plausible
explanation for
2036
rationality.
Malo’s critique
of this position
centres on free
action as not to
be conceived as
external. It is
not a “freedom
from without”,
but rather “from

2028

B. Spinoza, Ethics (1677).
P. Strawson, Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen, 1959).
2030
T. Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
2031
Chalmers, The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory.
2032
Haldane, “A return to form in the philosophy of mind,” 58.
2027
Leopold Stubenberg, "Neutral Monism". “Its relationship to neutral monism is therefore
difficult to discern. All versions of the theory appear to be committed to the view that there are
certain substances—god or nature (Spinoza), persons (Strawson), body or brain (Thomas Nagel),
information (a view explored by David Chalmers)—that are intrinsically neither material nor
mental.”
2033
Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 17.
2034
Ludwig, “The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview,” 17. While this position is not among the
traditional responses to mind body problem it appears to hold currency in certain neuroscientific
circles
2035
Haldane, “Incarnational anthropology,” 78.
2036
This challenge was unanswered also by Spinoza whose one substance view was ultimately an
unsatisfying understanding of rationality. Cf David Papineau, “Consciousness” in Oxford
nd
Companion to the Mind, 2 ed., Richard L. Gregory ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2004), who notes that
attribute dualism requires us to make a false choice of either denying dualism or identifying
conscious experiences with the neural causes of behaviour.
2037
G. R. Gillett, “Free will and events in the brain,” Journal of Mind and Behaviour 22, 3 (2001):
287-310. (Available at www.btinternet.com/~Negativecharisma/freewill/gillet1.pdf.) Gillett’s
approach is to link freedom with the ability to accord one’s behaviour with socal rules: in a sense
this is another perspective on freedom shown in one’s capacity to carry out the will of another, or
the beloved.
2029
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Non dualist,
dual aspect,
hylomorphism.

2038

A non reductive
account holding
that, in the
person, the
material is
animated by a
non-material
principle, and
that operations
and activity,
both mental and
physical, are
carried out by
this ensouled
body.

AristotelianThomistic
philosophers of
mind. In recent
years, Haldane
and Nussbaum
among others.

of human action
lies in the the
person’s mental
acts. He argues
that there are
two kinds of
reality: physical
and psychic.
Psychic is
constituted not
by mental
processes but by
the form of the
human action in
a social context.
See extended
discussion in
1.5.

within”,
depending
“ontologically
on the
2038
person”.

Hylomorphism
provides a “third
way”, a most
attractive
solution that
allows for a non
dualist, dual
aspect,
alternative,
while allowing
for the nonmaterial
dimension of
human nature.

Antonio Malo, “Three theories about freedom” pre publication manuscript, 145.
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Table 2.1
Search Process
Search
number

Date

Database

1

21.8.08

Medline

2

10.2.09

Scopus

3

10.2.09

Scopus

4

10.02.09

Medline

5

10.02.09

Medline

6

22.04.09

Scopus

7

22.04.09

Scopus

8

22.04.09

Scopus

9

22.04.09

Scopus

10

22.04.09

Scopus

11

19.10.12

Pubmed

12

19.10.12

Pubmed

13

19.10.12

Pubmed

Key words
Numerous other searches
were conducted in
preparation, identifying
words that were most
2039
effective in the searches.
Learning. Plasticity. Synaptic
strengthening.
Neuroscience. Plasticity.
Habitual behaviour.
Neuroplasticity. Learning.
Emotion.
Neuroscience. Neuronal
plasticity. Behaviour.
Neuronal plasticity.
Learning. Habits.
Neuroplasticity OR Plasticity
AND Moral development.
Neuroplasticity OR Plasticity
AND cognition AND Habit
AND Moral
Neuroplasticity OR Plasticity
AND Cognition AND Habit
Plasticity AND Executive
Function AND Moral
Plasticity AND Personality
AND Neuroscience AND
Habit
Neuroscience AND Emotion
regulation (Recent reviews
only)
Basal Ganglia AND Emotion
regulation
Experience AND Plasticity

Number
of
studies

Number
of
relevant
results

18

9

20

12

23

1

27

3

11

2

82

12

12

3

188

19

3

2

13

4

82

7

67

3

75

5

2039

Prior to settling on searches of 10.2.09 and 22.04.09 I conducted extensive trial searches with
further key words: procedural learning, automatisation, automaticity, goal directed actions, mirror
neurons, virtue, emotion, emotion regulation, neuropsychology, attention.
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Table 2.2
Systems for sensitive periods of development
Principal sources: Arden and Linford (2009); Coon (1997); Kessels and Malinow (2009);
Knudson (2008); Stevens (2008).
Prima facie association with
development and exercise of
virtue

 The term “sensitive
periods” denotes a
developmental window of
opportunity, whereby
there is an enhanced
capacity for plastic change
and learning in response
to experience, emotional
content, or novelty.
 Of particular interest in
the field of virtue
education are sensitive
periods found in relation
to affection, early
experience, imitation, and
adoption of new
behaviours during early
years. First impressions
are lasting impressions.
Experiences during
upbringing, particularly
when the stimuli are
associated with emotional
significance, can be
virtually indelible.
 Windows of opportunity
in sensitive periods vary:
for imprinting the window
is open only for a few
hours; for language, for
years. Responsiveness to
maternal affection is
largely lost after the
earliest years. The
security of affection, in
turn, facilitates other
aspects of learning from
parents.

Principal associated brain
areas
Discussion proceeds from
overview, and thence to
higher brain areas, to
subcortical structures, the BG
and limbic structures.
 Sensitive periods of
development occur across
all neural structures and
pathways.
 Forms of sensitive period
learning relevant to virtue
education are closely
associated with
attentional systems.
Learning in critical periods
is effortless because the
nucleus basalis presents
as active throughout
during these periods. The
nucleus basalis, and the
attention system in which
it plays a critical part have
been described as “the
modulatory control
system of plasticity”.
(See Table 2.9 Attentional
systems.)
 The relationship between
sensitive periods and
cortical development is
much documented.
 The amygdala is
particularly active in
mediating early
attachment relationships,
and reaction to stress and
non conscious emotional
memories.

Principal pathways and
mechanisms.

 During the early stages of
neuronal development,
guidance mechanisms are
particularly active:
astrocyte, and associated
molecular guidance cues
of migrating neurons and
production of growth
(trophic) factors;
 Various mechanisms are
directly involved in
sensitive period learning.
Experience tunes both
excitatory and inhibitory
connections in a largely
non reversible manner
and according to Hebbian
principles. NMDA
receptors triggering gene
transcription associated
with LTP and LTD are
integral to the
mechanisms of the
sensitive periods and
developmental learning.
Also, BDNF, hypothalamic
oxytocin, DA and 5-HT are
implicated.
 Systems associated with
responsiveness to
affection are implicated in
sensitive periods.
 Attentive mothering leads
to gene transcripted
cellular changes in the
hippocampus reducing
basal levels of
glucocorticoids and
abolishing thereby anxiety
and fearfulness. The end
of the sensitive period is
triggered sensory input
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and possibly by
myelination.
 Neurotrophins
 Emotional arousal, for
example in the positive
affect produced by sound
mothering, appears to
promote synaptic
plasticity in memory
promoting learning.
Mechanisms include
release of NE.
 Attentional mechanisms
operate in conjunction
with the great range of
mechanisms of plasticity
associated with sensitive
periods of development
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Table 2.3
Overview of the numerous systems and mechanisms of plasticity operating at the cellular
and molecular level.
Principal sources: Butz (2009); Graybiel (2008).
Prima facie association with
Principal associated brain
development and exercise of areas
virtue
Discussion proceeds from
overview, and thence to
higher brain areas, to
subcortical structures, the BG
and limbic structures.
 The brain’s virtually
 Plasticity is evident
ubiquitous capacity for
throughout the cortical
plastic change permits the
and subcortical areas of
various forms of learning,
the human brain,
including the learning of
including areas of the
good habits.
brain associated with
emotional regulation and
 Plastic changes are shown
reward systems: most
to be triggered by neural
notably areas of the PFC,
activity itself. Hence
the limbic system and the
repeated experience lays
BG, areas central to the
down consolidated
changes evident in the
pathways whereby
acquisition of virtue.
previous behaviours are
more easily revisited.
 See also: 2.4.7; 2.5.4;
2.7.3.
 Plastic changes provide a
neural explanation for the
phenomenon of habit.
Furthermore, freely
chosen behaviours and
activities are selfreinforcing. Prior choices
are more easily replicated.
 Forms of structural
plasticity dependent on
gene expression bring
about permanent neural
changes, and potentially
new behaviours and a
modified personality.

Principal pathways and
mechanisms.

 Structural plasticity is
ubiquitously present in
the mature human brain.
(See Table 2.15 Summary
of mechanisms for
neuronal structural
plasticity as presented
throughout Chapter 2.)
 Developmental plasticities
allow neural development
driven by for timely inputs.
In the character
development of a young
child, training in
moderation of gratification
and endurance of
difficulties is more easily
learned.
 Activity dependent
plasticity is present across
the cortex, in subcortical,
limbic, and lower brain
areas, and at the
neuromuscular synapse.
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Table 2.4
Systems for learning
Principal sources: Ito (2001); LeDoux (2001); Manns and Hichenbaum (2008); Pollak (2005);
Siegal and Sapru (2006); Waxham (2008); Wickens (2009).
Prima facie association with
development and exercise of
virtue

 Learning denotes
knowledge acquired
through experience, or
changed behaviour as a
response to experience.
Learning may be either
conscious or unconscious.
 Learning and memory are
key processes by which
environment and
experience alter
behaviour.
 Systems implicated in
general learning will also
be implicated in moral
learning.
 Virtue is a form of
experiential learning.
Moral learning, moral
“education”, is central to
the development of
virtue, and in particular, to
the development of
conscience, an aspect of
the virtue of prudence.
 Growth of intrinsic
motivation over external
reward as automaticity is
developed accords with
view that virtue is carried
out for its own sake.
 Development of
automaticity is intrinsice
to virtue. That DA release
associated with rewarding
outcomes facilitates
learning, and that reward
paradigms convert over
time to automaticity in
the BG suggest a central
role for reward systems in
learning of at least some

Principal associated brain
areas
Discussion proceeds from
overview, and thence to
higher brain areas, to
subcortical structures, the BG
and limbic structures.
 Numerous brain centres
are implicated in learning,
including: hippocampus
(initially implicated in
classical conditioning but
now known to play a
major role in filing explicit
memory); cerebellum
(critical for long term
retention of the learned
response); striatum
(procedural and reward
learning); amygdala
(emotional memories);
cortex (long term
memories).
 The roles of the cortex
and of the BG are most
significant for this study.
The ventral striatum is
associated with emotional
and reward learning; the
dorsal striatum lays down
memory for motor habits
and instructs the PFC in SR situations. The cortex
(most especially areas of
PFC, association areas,
and the medial temporal
lobe) plays a role in many
forms of memory. The
networks of the major
learning systems include
cerebral cortex.

Principal pathways and
mechanisms.

 See 2.3 Neural bases for
learning and memory.
 Forms of functional and
structural neuronal
plasticities underpin
mechanisms of learning.
Forms of implicit learning
such as fear and operant
conditioning, classical
conditioning, habituation,
and sensitization utilise
various mechanisms
varying synaptic strength.
For example, there may
be decreases or increases
in synaptic strength
following changed
transmitter release or
presynaptic facilitation,
associated changes in the
dendritic tree, etc.
 Explicit learning, tends to
utilise forms of LTD
mediating longer term
changes. Learning
associated with LTP and
LTD is mediated by NMDA
receptors, coexisting with
A receptors, activated by
L-Glutamate.
 DA is a key mediator of
emotion and reward
associated learning
throughout the limbic,
striatal and cortical
regions. Various other
neurotransmitters and
modulators also effect
learning.
 ACh mediates learning at
the neuromuscular
synapse as well as vivid
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forms of volitional
behaviours associated
with virtue.

fearful memories in the
nucleus basalis.
 Forms of procedural
learning, involving
increased automaticity
may develop from prior
goal directed actions. This
appears to be a pattern
associated with habit
learning: A-O paradigms
transform to S-R
paradigms with over
learning. Automaticity
takes over with
accompanying changes
from external to intrinsic
motivation.
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Table 2.5
Memory systems
Principal sources: Alvarez et al. (2007); Arden and Linford (2009); Bailey and Chen (1983);
Bear (2007); Bechara et al. (2000); Butz et al. (2009); Byrne (2008); Chistiakova and Volgushev
(2009); Costa-Mattioli (2008); Da Cunha et al. (2009); Desmurget et al. (2007); Engert and
Bonhoeffer (1999); Deutch and Roth (2008); Floyer-Lea and Matthews (2008); Froemke et al.
(2007); Lynch (2004); Manns and Hichenbaum (2008); Marieb and Hoehn (2010); McGaugh
(2004); Pastalkova et al. (2006); Pasupathy and Miller (2005); Roesch and Schoenbaum (2006);
Romero et al. (2008); Squire et al. (2008); Stranahan and Mattson (2008); Tapia and Lichtman,
(2008); Tomita et al (1999); Tully et al. (2003); Vaynman and Gomez-Pinilla (2005); Waxham
(2008); Wickens (2009); Whitlock (2006); Yasumatsu et al. (2008).
Prima facie association with
development and exercise of
virtue

 Learning and memory are
key processes by which
environment and
experience alter
behaviour.
 Memory is the process of
encoding, storage and
retrieval of knowledge
acquired through
experience.
 Memory systems are
functionally implicit to
learning, to response to
reward and emotion, to
habit formation, to goal
election, and all cognitive
function.
 Memory is a functional
prerequisite for the
exercise of virtue:
memory of past
behaviours, of reward, of
contextual and emotional
resonances, and of
principles of right and
wrong, all have relevance.
 Mechanisms of nondeclarative memory
appear to facilitate the
ease of practice and the
inherent motivational
rewards in virtue, while
during the more arduous
process of acquisition of
virtue, declarative

Principal associated brain
areas
Discussion proceeds from
overview, and thence to
higher brain areas, to
subcortical structures, the BG
and limbic structures.
 Memory is distributed
through cortical and lower
brain areas. Actual
behaviour is supported by
multiple memory
systems. Memory may be
non-declarative (implicit
and procedural) or
declarative or episodic
(conscious and
recollective); it may be
long term, intermediate,
short term, or working
memory, an even more
transient form of short
term memory.
 Long term nondeclarative procedural
memory is located in BG
in association with
cerebellum and
neocortex. Memory in the
striatum instructs the PFC
with respect to S-R
situations. Long term nondeclarative emotional
memory is dependent on
amygdala which
associates rewards and
punishments with
particular cues. Long term
non-declarative motor
memory is distributed in
conditioned reflexes
dependent upon
cerebellum.

Principal pathways and
mechanisms.

 See 2.3 Neural bases for
learning and memory.
 The numerous
mechanisms of plasticity
are at the basis of
memory.
 LTP and LTD appear to be
mechanisms in the cortex
and hippocampus
associated with long term
memory storage.
Feedback loops, and
permanent loss of axonal
input are further
attractive mechanisms for
information storage.
 Further mechanisms for
consolidation of
memories include:
synaptic homeostasis;
use-induced plasticities
another;and BDNF is
implicated in converting
short term memories to
long term memories.
 Neural stem cells
persisting in regions near
ventricular layers
including the
hippocampus are
implicated in mechanisms
for memory and learning.
 There is remarkably
complex interplay of
brain areas in both short
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memory plays a more
significant role.
 Memory is enhanced in
the presence of emotion
that is not excessively
intense. That affection
enhances memory
establishes an early
childhood facilitation.

 Long term declarative
memory is based in the
median temporal lobe and
the medial diencephalon,
known as the
hippocampal memory
system.
 Memory in the cortex is
highly plastic. OFC is richly
connected to other
cortical areas and to the
limbic system mediating
emotional memory.
 Hippocampal memory is
important for both spatial
and non-spatial learning,
and is rapidly acquired by
facilitating novel
associations. The
hippocampus initially acts
as retrieval system for
information in widespread
areas of neocortex and
facilities ongoing cortical
plasticity. Hippocampal
plasticity is supplanted by
cortical plasticity over
time, mediated by the
striatum.
 Cerebellar memory is
involved in motor reflex
learning.











and long term learning.
Short term memory is
possibly mediated by
virtually instantaneous
spine growth, and
mechanisms of rapid spine
assembly (typically 20
mins) where modifications
can be virtually
instantaneous.
Activation of stored
memories depends on
PFC – temporal cortex
connection. Working
memory in neocortex
involves some form of
synaptic facilitation
possibly based on
reverberating circuits.
Short term memory in PFC
appears to depend on
dopaminergic receptors.
Emotional memory is laid
down by NE mediated
plasticity principally in the
BLA. Intentional recall is
managed by
hippocampus, which is
subject to cortical
direction.
Interconnections between
the PFC, the medial
temporal lobe, and
hippocampus appear
implicated in working
memory, which is linked
to problem solving and
planning.
The role of the BG in
action selection and
storage of non declarative
memories is mediated by
convergent projections,
synchronised by the
timing of ACh release by
giant cholinergic aspiny
neurons, which are
tonically active.
Sleep is shown to create a
context for Hebbian and
non-Hebbian
consolidation of memory.
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Table 2.6
Systems for imitation and empathy
Principal sources: Arden and Linford (2009); Byrne (2008); Carr and Jacoboni et al. (2003);
Jacoboni et al. (1999); Nitschke et al. (2003); Pollak (2005); Schore (2001); Rizzolatti G et al.
(2009).
Prima facie association with
development and exercise of
virtue







Imitation is one of the
core processes for
learning from the
environment and from
the example of others.
The neural basis for this
is now increasingly well
described and provides
an explanation for the
ease of acquisition of
virtuous behaviours by
children.
Imitation and empathy
are related at the level
of neural systems.
Plasticity in the systems
for empathetic response
appears integral to the
development of
sensitivity for the rights
and needs of others, and
an understanding of the
consequences of one’s
actions, which appear to
be are at the core of the
virtue of justice.
Effective emotional
modulation of
deliberation is essential
for sound reasoning
particularly in areas
requiring empathy with
others, understanding of
others viewpoints etc,
and TOM.

Principal associated brain
areas
Discussion proceeds from
overview, and thence to
higher brain areas, to
subcortical structures, the BG
and limbic structures.
 The imitation
mechanisms, mirror
neurons, are present in
the left frontal
operculum area (Broca’s
area) and the right
anterior parietal cortex.
Empathy and imitation
involve activity in frontoparietal, the superior
temporal cortex, the
amygdala, and insula.
 OFC, at the apex of a
limbic circuit connecting
the VMPFC, AC gyrus,
amygdala and temporal
pole, plays a major role
processing appreciation
of moral consequences
of behaviour, and
assessing interpersonal
context. Activation of
the OFC produces warm
and loving feelings, to
the extent that the OFC
can overwhelm
consciousness with these
feelings.
 Left and right OFC
appear to differ in
function, the right
decodes mental states of
others and is associated
with empathy with
others; the left reasons
about mental states. The
right orbitofrontal and
right anterior insula
cortices are components
of a pathway that
integrates bodily

Principal pathways and
mechanisms.

 Increasingly, the
mechanisms of imitation
and empathy are being
linked to the activity of
mirror neurons. The rapid
development of speech
appears to reflect the
maturation of the
association cortical areas
indicating that imitative
systems enjoy dense
cortical interconnections.
 There is now abundant
evidence that
developmental realities
as well as learned
realities (including moral
realities such as how one
exercises one’s freedom),
govern effective
consideration of the
consequences of actions.
Grey matter reaches a
maximum at 10-12 years
of age in parietal lobe, 1112 in frontal lobe, and 1617 in temporal lobe. In
contrast to grey matter,
white matter maturation
continues throughout
childhood and
adolescence, and into
early 20s for males.
Myelination tends to
progress from lower to
higher brain areas. Higher
cortical areas are last to
develop. All this bears
significantly on the
capacity to consideration
of consequences of one’s
actions, for example on
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responses with
attentional and
emotional states. The
right limbic system is key
to complex attachment
dynamics and
interpersonal coping.
BG are acknowledged to
have a key role in control
and modulation of social
behaviours and may be
integral to a progressive
evaluation process of
behaviours. “Current
findings are consistent
with a role for incoming
afferent input in
selectively stabilizing
functional synapses and
in eliminating or
suppressing inactive
contacts.” (Byrne, 2008.)

rational consideration of
risks, and of the impact of
one’s actions on others.
This area appears closely
associated with the
development of empathy
towards others.
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Table 2.7
Systems for habit formation
Principal sources: Beretta et al. (2008); Byrne (2008); Doyon et al. (2009); Marieb and Hoehn
(2010); Martin (2003); Wise and Shadmehr (2002); Yin and Knowlton (2006).
Prima facie association with
development and exercise of
virtue

 Virtues may be
understood as freely
chosen automatised
behaviours.
 Strictly speaking habit
learning refers to the
spectrum of automatized
behaviours supported by
the BG.
 Mechanisms of habit
learning also offer an
explanation for the
phenomenon of
behaviours that appear to
remain robust in the
absence of immediate
rewards. We have seen
immediately above that
emotional regulation and
reward processing are
interdependent. Reward
processing and habit
formation also are
interlinked systems, with
reward processing
essential in the early
stages of laying down
habits. This accords with
the view that extrinsic
motivation assists initially
in establishing patterns of
good behaviour; in time
this is transformed into
forms of intrinsic
motivation with the
development of a degree
of automaticity.
 The brain regions and
pathways associated with
the BG seem to offer a
significant key to

Principal associated brain
areas
Discussion proceeds from
overview, and thence to
higher brain areas, to
subcortical structures, the BG
and limbic structures.
 Brain regions associated
with habit formation are
areas of the BG as well as
the posterior parts of the
cerebellum, the non
primary motor cortex, and
the PPC. Via the
oculomotor and
skeletomotor limbic loop,
the BG play an integral
role in management of
motor responses to
cortical direction.
 BG are now seen as a
centre, not only for
subconscious facilitation
of habits, but also
mediating deliberate
attention, and limbic
modulation of cognition
and action. Hence it is an
area critical for learning,
cognition and behavioural
control. It appears to have
a key role both in habit
formation, and in the
pursuit of complex,
purposeful, behaviour
patterns. It may be argued
that individual goal
directed behaviours, on
repetition become
automated and less
reward dependent, but
nevertheless they remain
purposeful, thereby
fulfilling requirements for
virtuous action. That
actions are automatic,
should not be taken to
mean that they are less
conscious. The relevance

Principal pathways and
mechanisms.

 Procedural memory
consolidation is
associated with the
reward systems of the
brain. DA release from the
SN is believed to trigger
memory formation in the
BG. There is also evidence
for emotional facilitation
of memory in the BG.
 Striatal habit formation is
subject to cortical
management via the
striatal-cortical pathway.
The dorsal pars (dorsal
striatum and SN) lays
down memory for motor
habits, actions and
outcomes, playing a key
role in S-R habit learning.
It receives afferents from
associative (more
implicated in A-O learning)
and sensorimotor
domains. The caudate
nucleus receives
information from cortical
sensory, motor and
integrative areas. The
caudate is an area of the
“associative striatum” and
receives inputs from
association cortices. The
putamen is regarded as an
area of the sensorimotor
striatum. DA
neuromodulation inputs
this region from the SNpc.
This region is involved in
learning and movement
initiation.
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understanding the neural
bases of virtue.
Converging research over
the past decade links habit
formation and volition. In
particular, the BGthalamo-cortical loops
with their widespread
cognitive-emotional
interaction offer insights
into processes of planning,
goal selection, self
regulation, attention and
motivation. Furthermore
this automatisation lies at
the heart of the easy
repeatability of
behaviours associated
with virtue… for example
the habit of greeting
courteously, of getting up
when the alarm goes off,
of reacting to difficulties
with patient strategies,
etc. Mechanisms of habit
learning also offer an
explanation for the
phenomenon of
behaviours that appear to
remain robust in the
absence of immediate
rewards.

of this to virtues as
conscious, automatic
(performed with little
overt effort) behaviours, is
seen.
 Hippocampal plasticity
and memory are present
in the development phase
of habits in the striatum.

 The prefrontal cortexbasal ganglionic pathways
sustain voluntary
movement, whereas the
motor cortex-basal
ganglionic modules
underlie more automatic
movements.
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Table 2.8
Systems for emotional management
Principal sources: Arden and Linford (2009); Balbernie (2001); Barbas and Zikopoulos (2006);
Beauregard et al (2001); Bennett (2011); Carr and Jacoboni et al. (2003); Davidson
(2000);.Depue and Collins (1999); Graybiel (2008); Guyton and Hall (2006); Heatherton and
Wagner (2011); Keopp et al. (1998); LeDoux (1998); Lee (2007); Markowitsch et al. (2003);
Pare et al. (2004); Posner and Rothbart (2000); Rapp and Bachevalier (2008); Ray and Zald
(2012); Salzman and Fusi (2010); Schore (2001); Siegal and Sapru (2006); Squire (2008); Zotev
et al. (2011).
Prima facie association with
development and exercise of
virtue

 Emotion management
systems are at the heart
of directing our desires
towards appropriate
pleasure and towards
worthy goals despite
difficulty.
 The habitual
management of emotion
according to what is
rational is the essence of
the exercise of virtue.
 Appropriate
emotional/aesthetic/
social/moral education is
central to the
development of virtue.
 Emotional regulation
involves cortical
regulation of goals,
memories and emotional
experience. The potential
for emotion to enhance
rationality has been much
noted in recent years.

Principal associated brain
areas
Discussion proceeds from
overview, and thence to
higher brain areas, to
subcortical structures, the BG
and limbic structures.
 Emotion is processed in
the brain in various
regions including several
parts of the PFC, namely
DLPFC, VMPFC, OFC, as
well as the amygdala,
hippocampus, anterior
cingulate, and insular
cortex. Subcortical
sensory inputs to the
amygdala can drive
emotional responses that
precede cortical
awareness.
 Conscious regulation of
emotion utilizes OFC,
DLPFC and VMPFC,
although evidence
suggests that it is
reciprocal processing
rather than top-down
direction that is effective.
DLPFC appears to
“arbitrate” conflicting
emotional situations, and
in conjunction with VLPFC
and ACC can formulate
action plans not tied to
emotional input. The
VMPFC which appears to
play a key role in
predicting positive and
negative affective
consequences. The OFC is
regarded as the limbic
gateway to the cortex,
crucial in emotional
control. The OFC, within

Principal pathways and
mechanisms.

 There is no single
emotional system in the
brain and therefore no
single system for
emotional management.
Furthermore there is close
interplay between the
reward systems, the goal
directive and executive
systems of the brain, and
the systems of emotional
management.
 Major emotion associated
connections enter the PFC
and especially the OFC
and ACC from various
brain locations including
cortical memory centres,
amygdala, hippocampus,
thalamus, hypothalamus,
VTA, and olfactory system.
 The PFC utilises rich
interconnectivity to the
BG, amygdala,
hippocampus, anterior
cingulate, and insular
cortex. Several parts of
the PFC, namely DLPFC,
VMPFC and OFC are
involved in this processing
of emotion. The capacity
of the PFC to elicit
conscious representations
of emotion and to assess
affective consequences of
actions, via neuroplastic
remodelling, is at the core
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the lateral sulcus is
adjacent to both the
temporal lobe and the
parietal, appears to
integrate various
sensations, allowing
rational processing of raw
emotion:
viscerosensations, taste,
pain, and feelings of
disgust. The OFC is
activated by tasks where
processing of rewarding or
emotional information is
required.
 The proximity of these
areas of the PFC and
limbic centres facilitates
emotional regulation. The
DLPFC and ACC are
activated in suppression
of sexual response and in
conscious management of
lustful feelings. The ACC
appears to play a role in
inhibiting impulsive
behaviours and in
generating goal-directed
behaviours. There is
evidence that it plays a
role in analysing
conflicting options.
 There are brain circuits
for specific emotions, eg
hypothalamus associated
with the basic drives;
anterior insula plays a key
role in disgust; amygdala is
active in the experience of
fear and mediates
emotional influences on
attention and perception;
the BLA in the storage of
emotional memories; and
the PFC is active in
conscious representations
of emotion, and in
assessing affective
consequences of actions.
 Amygdala is active in
processing of emotion. Via
reciprocal pathways
reaching virtually all parts
of the cortex the
amygdala influences not
only fear response, but
higher order thought

of improved affect
regulation in the PFC,
allowing the OFC to
effectively inhibit
activation of subcortical
areas such as the
amygdala.
 The DMPFC is also closely
associated, linking with
inferior parietal cortex,
the DLPFC, and the
posterior cingulate. It
receives limbic inputs and,
with its linkages to other
PFC areas, integrates the
emotional reaction and
experience with cognitive
processing.
 BG-thalamo-cortical loops
permit complex cognitiveemotional interaction
offer insights into
processes of planning,
goal selection, self
regulation, attention and
motivation. The
prefrontal-limbic network
(including ACC, amygdala
and hippocampus),
modulated through
hypothalamus, BG and
midbrain, is central.
 The amygdala plays a
central role in fear
conditioning, via the
reciprocal corticoamygdalic pathway in
emotional regulation. The
amygdala is now known to
receive neuronal signals
from all limbic cortical
areas, and from the
temporal, parietal and
occipital cortex (most
especially the auditory
and visual association
areas). Efferent
connections return to
these cortical areas as well
as to the hippocampus,
the septum, the thalamus
and the hypothalamus.
Cortical afferents to the
amygdala appear to assist
in modifying fear
representations in the
amygdala. The frontal-
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process, working and long
term memories, ongoing
perceptions, attention,
mental imagery etc.
 The BG are strategically
positioned for regulation
of emotional responses as
it is positioned within the
thalamo-limbic-cortical
pathway, the limbic loop
of emotional
management; dysfunction
of basal ganglia-limbic
circuitry leads to
schizophrenia and severe
anxiety. “Increased
corticostriatal
transmission leads to
increased thalamocortical
activity, and an increased
likelihood of behavioural
response
expression”(Horvitz,
2009). In the case of tonic,
not phasic, DA output, LTD
is likely to result in these
cells.

amygdala pathway is less
effective in mediating
frontal regulation of
emotion than the frontalstriatal pathway.
 The architecture of the
brain facilitates the close
cooperation of basal
structures, OFC, amygdala
and hippocampus in
cognitive and emotional
deliberations. The ventral
striatum is the target of
inputs from the limbic
cortex, the hippocampus
and the amygdala.
 Neurotransmitters (most
particularly the amines,
DA, 5-HT and NE) play a
key role in modulating the
individual’s emotional
responses. DA, which
plays a major role in
mechanisms for emotion
and reward, is widely
diffused in cortex with
80% is concentrated in the
striatum. 5-HT receptors
are found in cells in the
raphe nucleus in the brain
stem, and also in nerve
endings throughout brain.
5-HT is known to inhibit
aggression.
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Table 2.9
Attentional Systems
Principal sources: Breedlove et al. (2010); Froemke et al. (2007); Kaas and Stepniewska
(2002); Knudson (2008); Koch (2008); Lundy Ekman (2007); Markowitsch et al. (2003); Pollak
(2005).
Prima facie association with
development and exercise of
virtue

 Plasticity both enables
and is directed by our
attention system. In turn
focussed attention
permits directed plasticity
in the brain: it is regarded
as the system controlling
aspects of plasticity. In
other words, our capacity
to direct attention allows
us some management of
plasticity mediated
learning, including the
development of habit and
virtue.
 Attention allows
suppression of goal
irrelevant issues and is a
prerequisite for many
forms of learning and
memory, and for goal
election, cognition and
executive function, all of
which are required for the
acquisition of virtue.
 The capacity to attend
and will power appear
closely linked.
 Normally we attend to
stimuli that our senses or
imagination present to us.
However, the ability to
pay attention to a goal
that is neither pressing
nor present is central to
rationality.

Principal associated brain
areas
Discussion proceeds from
overview, and thence to
higher brain areas, to
subcortical structures, the BG
and limbic structures.
 Various cortical and
subcortical areas
cooperate in the
attentional systems. The
parietal lobes, extensively
connected with
subcortical areas of the
thalamus and the nucleus
basalis, appear to account
for the capacity to direct
attention, known as
endogenous attention.
 The BG play an integral
role in attention
regulation, and in
attentional loops.
 ACC involvement in
attentional systems
appears necessary for
learning, and a
prerequisite for goal
election and executive
command.

Principal pathways and
mechanisms.

 Attention is dependent
upon the fronto-parietal
control system. Structures
in the parietal, frontal and
cingulated cortices at the
top of the visual system
hierarchy,
neuromodulated by the
cholinergic nucleus
basalis, generate signals
guiding selective
attention.
 Attentional mechanisms
are linked to NMDA
plasticities. Mechanisms
for enhancing attention
involve neural signalling
amplification.
 Various
neurotransmitters are
directly implicated in
mediating attention: DA
appears to facilitate
attention. ACh release
into thalamus is critical for
consciousness and for
selection of objects of
attention.
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Table 2.10
Instrumental learning in the basal ganglia.
Principal sources: Da Cunha et al. (2008); Graybiel (2008); Horvitz (2009); Robinson and
Berridge (2003); Yin and Knowlton (2006).
Learning with
respect to rewards
may be
Form of
instrumental
learning present in
BG
Form of memory

Goal directed

stimulus-outcome
(S-O)
Preceding A-O
learning.

action-outcome
(A-O)

stimulus-response
(S-R)

declarative (explicit
and conscious)

procedural
(unconscious or
automatic)
Appropriate
schedules of
reinforcement, or
overtraining of A-O
learning leads to
habitual learning and
movement of active
zone of BG towards
the dorsal striatum.
Coincident active
inputs for stimuli and
outputs for motor
responses are
strengthened.
A habitual
association between
specific stimulus and
response is
established.
Unaffected by
reward devaluation.

Facilitation

DA mediated in the
presence of
representations of
rewards.

DA mediated in the
presence of
representations of
rewards.

Process

Presentation of
reward.

Through learning the
behavioural response
is associated to a
particular outcome.

Core features

Immediate appetitive
response.

Conditions

Process of initial
exposures.

A cognitive and
explicit recognition
of the causal
relationship between
act and outcome.
The subject must
retain in memory the
value of the expected
outcome. The causal
relationship between
action and outcome
must be
demonstrated.
DLPFC and motor
cortices
Ventral striatum.
Caudate.
Association cortex to
DMS (caudate in
humans) and is
modulated by reward
expectancy (and by
the limbic loop which
plays a key role in
Pavlovian learning)

Cortical substrate
Striatal substrate

NAc.

Pathway

Limbic to NAc.

Habitual

Highest level of
automaticity.

Motor cortices
Dorsal striatum.
Sensorimotor cortex
to DLS... the
sensorimotor
striatum, the
putamen, in humans.
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Table 2.11
Reward and motivational systems
Principal sources: Arden and Linford (2009); Barbas and Zikopoulos (2006); Beretta et al.
(2008); Buitelaar (2012); Da Cunha et al. (2009); Depue and Collins (1999); Di Filippo et
al.(2009); Graybiel (2008); Guyton and Hall (2006); Hamann et al. (2002); Heatherton and
Wagner (2011); Koch (2008); Manns and Hichenbaum (2008); Miller and Cohen (2001); Horvitz
(2009 ); O'Doherty and Dolan (2006); Petersen (2007); Price (2006); Roesch and Schoenbaum
(2006); Roberts and Parkinson (2006); Shiflett and Balleine (2011); Somerville and Casey
(2010); Wagner and Silber (2004); Schultz and Tremblay (2006); Wickens (2009); Yin and
Knowlton (2006).
Prima facie association with
development and exercise of
virtue

 Reward systems are
implicated at most levels
of volitional and subvolitional activity.
Through their interaction
with the emotional
systems they provide
incentive for action,
including virtuous action.
 To find pleasure in
appropriate activities is
the mark of virtue, and
hence the link between
reward expectations,
emotional responses,
conscious goal election,
and virtue.
 Intrinsically motivated
activity is pleasurable in
itself and is an essential
characteristic of virtuous
activity.
 A habit of appropriate
reward expectation is
directly linked to the
development of the virtue
of temperance.

Principal associated brain
areas.
Discussion proceeds from
overview, and thence to
higher brain areas, to
subcortical structures, the BG
and limbic structures.

Areas of the amygdala,
BG, and OFC are
interconnected major
reward centres of the
brain.

The OFC is activated in
processing rewarding or
emotional information, of
both an affective and
attentional type; it is
associated with goaldirected conscious choices
of action, and in
integrating information
about rewards and
punishments and their
predictors to select goals
for action. Medial OFC
may be implicated in
reward and lateral OFC in
punishment. OFC allows
association information to
access representational
memory promoting
“voluntary, cognitive, and
goal directed (not stimulus
driven) behaviour and
facilitating new learning.”
Spindle cells link the OFC
and the ACC. They are
now believed to play a key
role in goal directed
behaviour and self
control, and possibly also
in mechanisms of
attention.

Principal pathways and
mechanisms.

 There are two major
reward systems: the
exciting DA driven, and
the blissful endorphin
driven. DA release is the
principal mechanism of
reward activation. 5-HT
and oxytocin also
mediate rewards.
 There are two major DA
systems in the brain:
o from the SNpc to
caudate and putamen
and in a minor way to
the NAc- this appears
linked to laying down
of procedural memory,
and possibly to higher
order personality
traits;
o the mesocorticolimbic
DA system (mesolimbic
dopamine system)
originating in the VTA
and innervating the
NAc, the amygdala and
the various parts of the
cortex, particularly the
PFC- central to the
brain’s reward circuit,
and critical in
facilitation of incentive
motivation.
 Emotion and reward
processing are
interdependent. The
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 BG are a central
component in both of the
principal DA reward
systems. The role of the
BG, and of the corticostriatal pathways, in
conscious goal election is
increasingly well
understood. Ventrally
based limbic reward
transforms to dorsally
based pathways
associated with habit
formation and also
addiction.
 Goal directed behaviours
modified by the BG are
based less on reward
representations in the
ventral striatum and more
on cortical based rewards.
A-O mechanisms give way
to S-R mechanisms also
mediated by the striatum.
These are not opposed to
actions carried out with
intention, expectancy and
internal representation:
such neural activity should
not be assumed to be
solely a function of
antecedent stimuli. In
turn, the BG exert a major
modulatory effect on
glutamatergic cortical
outputs via striatalcortical reciprocal
pathways.
 The BG and OFC are
closely associated in
reward processing. BG and
OFC are activated in
association with
movement for an
expected reward; cells of
the striatum become
active in anticipation of
reward, mirroring reward
coding in the OFC. BG are
a central component in
both of the principal DA
reward systems. Ventrally
based limbic reward
transforms to dorsally
based pathways
associated with habit
formation and also

ventral pars (NAc and the
VTA) is a key component
of mesolimbic pathway
which is active in reward
situations playing a major
role in motivation. DA
afferents to BG effect
modulatory output back
on the cortex via the
cortical-BG-cortical
pathways. Appetitive and
aversive systems share
aspects of common
neurobiology. Phasic DA
and -opioid messaging
are mutually
interdependent.
 The OFC has reciprocal
connections to the limbic
system and to the
striatum (including via the
cortico-striato-pallidothalamic loop) similar to a
loop associated with the
medial PFC. The OFC
(particularly area MOC13),
with rich connection to
the amygdala, plays a
complex processing role.
 DA release, triggered by
the novelty of reward
stimuli, is central to the
creation and
reinforcement of
associations, is the
condition for synaptic
plasticity in the BG
synapses between
corticostriatal neurons
and MSNs, possibly
involving reverberation in
the cortico-striatal loop.
this study proposes that
triggerings by deliberate
and conscious cortical
pathways offer the
satisfaction of greater self
management and are thus
attuned to the integrated
flourishing of the entire
organism.
 Cognitive control of goal
election depends on
interplay of a PFC areas,
reward system
(moderated by NAc), and
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addiction.
 NAc, pallidum and
amygdala, as well as areas
of the OFC are active in
reward and also in pain
processing.
 Cue-reward learning and
synaptic plasticity in LA
appears to be a decisive
mechanism underpinning
goal directed behaviour.
 The hippocampus appears
also to play an integral
role in the formulation of
goal directed motor plans.

harm avoidant system
(amygdala).
 Closed cortical (lateralPFC,
orbitalPFC, and the
premotor cortex) - BG
loops possibly enable PFC
to link complex
anticipated behaviours
with rewards and then
cache chunked to achieve
desired outcomes in the
rapid plasticities of the
striatum.
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Table 2.12
A summary of the domains of executive function.
Note: Regions of the PFC do not act in isolation in relation to the functions outlined below:
other brain regions provide provide input and feedback facilitating executive control.
Principal sources: Arden (2009); Balbernie (2001); Beauregard et al. (2001); Davidson (2000);
Koch (2008); Lazar et al. (2005); Lee (2007); Manns and Hichenbaum (2008); Markowitsch et
al. (2003); Miller and Wallis (2008); Moghaddam B & Homayoun H (2008); Nelson (2006);
Nolte (2009); Posner (2005); Reynolds et al. (2008); Tomita et al. (1999); Zald and Rauch
(2006).
Region

Location and linkages

DLPFC

 Top and sides of the
forward lobes.
 Closely linked to
parietal multimodal
cortex, and
somatosensory, visual
and parietal
association areas

VLPFC

 In interacting with
DLPFC and ACC, the
VLPFC is active in
choosing not to
follow familiar
behaviour or in
choosing a novel
behaviour.
 Includes anterior
cingulate and
orbitofrontal areas

VMPFC

Executive functions in
which implicated
 Key regulator of
cognitive processes.
 Manipulates sources
of information.
 Involvement in
cognitive strategies,
planning and
formulation of goals.
 Appears to be seat of
working memory;
(evidence that OFC
also implicated)

 VLPFC appears
contributory to self
control and emotional
inhibition.
 VLPFC activated by
tasks requiring
information in
working memory.
 Key role in inhibition
of inappropriate
behaviours.
 Mediation of
emotional processing
and social decision
making.
 Prediction of positive
and negative affective
consequences.
 Role in analysis of
conflicting options.
 Possible role in

Comment
 Damage leads to poor
contextual
modification of plans.
 DLPFC appears to
juggle the various
cognitive cortical
inputs of memories,
anticipations, self
evaluation, long and
short term planning.
It appears to play a
role in measuring
personal conduct
against norms.
 DLPFC and ACC have
been shown to be
directly related in
conscious
management of
lustful feelings.
 VLPFC appears
implicated in reward
circuitry in monkey
studies.

 Damage leads to
impulsivity, socially
inappropriate
behaviours and
inappropriate
emotional responses.
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working memory.
 Central role in
regulation of
motivated responses.
 Implicated in risk
taking and decision
making.
 Implication in
executive processing
of reward incentive.
OFC codes for the
reward value of
stimuli, responding to
anticipation of future
events and so are
shown to have access
to representations of
the external world.
 Olfactory processing
 Co-implication in
working memory in
the DLPFC.

OFC

 Adjacent to frontal
areas of the striatum
and provides gateway
for thalamo-striatal
and limbic connection
with higher cortical
regulation.
 Linkages to all PFC
areas, ACC and insula.
 Modulatory inputs
from VTA.

ACC

 Extensive links to
limbic system via the
hippocampus, the
shell region of the
NAc and the
amygdala.
 Extensive links to all
cortical areas.

 Involvement in
direction of attention,
inhibition of impulsive
behaviours, and in
generation of goaldirected behaviours
 Facilitation of
information transfer
between areas of the
PFC

DMPFC

 Links with inferior
parietal cortex, the
DLPFC, and the
posterior cingulate. It
receives limbic inputs
and, with its linkages
to other PFC areas,
integrates the
emotional reaction
and experience with
cognitive processing.
 Fronto-parietal
network implicated in

 Adjusts behaviour
according to
emotional cues, and
assists in regulation of
emotional response.

Parietal
cortex

 Involvement in
response inhibition

 Inhibition of
impulsive behaviour
may be localised to
the right lateral and
medial OFC.
 Right hemisphere
appears to play a
greater role in
response inhibition.
 NB: effective
regulation also
requires election of
appropriate choices.
 Possibility that mOFC
is implicated in
reward and the
lateral OFC in
punishment.
 Right OFC decodes
mental states of
others, and is
associated with
empathy with others;
left OFC reasons
about mental states.
 Activation of OFC can
flood consciousness
with warm positive
feelings.
 Parietal, frontal and
cingulated cortices at
the top of the visual
system hierarchy,
appear to generate
signals guiding
selective attention.
 Maintenance of
attention appears to
involve the ACC with
the cooperation of
the right anterior
insula.
 Active in perspective
taking and TOM.

 Parietal, frontal and
cingulated cortices at
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visuo-spatial
processing and
working memory.

Temporal
cortex

 Closely
interconnected to all
parts of the the
cortex, and especially
PFC.

and attentional
systems.

 Implication in
memory, processing
sensory input, use of
language, and aspects
of emotional
processing.

the top of the visual
system hierarchy,
appear to generate
signals guiding
selective attention.
 Hippocampus is
below the cortex of
the medial temporal
lobe.
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Table 2.13
Systems for cognition, consideration of consequences, planning, goal election and executive
direction.
Principal sources: Balbernie (2001); Barbas and Zikopoulos (2006); Beauregard et al (2001);
Boller and Grafman (1994); Crossman and Neary (2005); Zald and Rauch (2006); Fuster (1989);
Guyton and Hall (2006); Davidson (2000); Lazar et al (2005); Lee (2007); Markowitsch et al.
(2003); Miller and Wallis (2008); Moghaddam and Homayoun (2008); Passingham (1993);
Posner and Rothbart (2000); Reynolds et al. (2008); Siegal and Sapru (2006); Tomita et al
(1999).
Prima facie association with
development and exercise of
virtue

 The links between
cognition, rationality and
virtue are closely
associated at the
psychological level. Brain
systems associated with
cognition and goal
election interconnect with
neural subdivisions
implicated in moral
behaviour. (See Table
5.1.)
 Human cognition
normally implies rational
capacities: for conscious
goal setting, reasoning,
deliberation as to
consequences and means,
and final election.
 The capacity to set specific
goals, to direct one’s
actions to those goals, to
reason about
consequences and means,
appears central to
cognition and to rational
acts disposed by
prudence. That one
chooses goals fitting for
one’s nature is a mark of
rationality; virtue is
essentially the neuronal
disposition assisting in the
habituation of this
capacity.
 The capacity to pay due
regard to the impact of

Principal associated brain
areas
Discussion proceeds from
overview, and thence to
higher brain areas, to
subcortical structures, the BG
and limbic structures.
 The PFC presents as the
most significant region of
the brain associated with
cognition, deliberation
and executive direction.
Areas of the PFC are
central to control of
behaviour, awareness,
memory, and the general
interpretive area and the
speech centre; they are
responsible for limbic
regulation and reward,
deliberation and
assessment of
consequences, empathy,
motor planning,. The PFC
is centrally implicated in
higher order cognition,
and executive function,
involving many aspects of
personality, and planning,
insight and foresight. This
area has the capacity to
synthesise cognitive,
emotional, contextual and
somatic information into
goal directed behaviours.
 The interconnection
between lateral,
orbitofrontal and medial
sectors, including the ACC
appears to facilitate
cognitive and emotional
processing, and volitional
activity. (See also above:
Systems of Emotional
Management.)

Principal pathways and
mechanisms.

 The PFC is richly
interconnected with the
other functional sectors in
the frontal lobe (for motor
and speech), with the
other lobes, with
subcortical motor
systems, with limbic and
midbrain emotion and
reward circuits. This
interconnectivity
facilitates cognitive
activity.
 It is now apparent that
pathways for cognition,
executive function,
reward evaluation and
motivation, learning and
memory, include the BG
and do not reside solely in
the outer cortical layers.
The striatum is a key
target of excitatory major
projections from entire
cortex, and is “constantly
informed about most
aspects of cortical
function” (Nolte, 2002).
Afferent pathways, input
pathways to the BG, are
from all regions of the
cortex, from the VTA, the
ILN and the SNpc.
 Cooperation between
cortex and the BG is
necessary for effective
cognition and goal
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one’s actions on others,
modifying them
accordingly, characterises
acts disposed by the virtue
of justice.
 The exercise of virtue
requires rightness and
perfection of reason; the
operations of reason are
perfected by the virtues
of prudence and justice.
 The development of
rationality follows a
developmental trajectory.
Myelination and
development of the PFC
continues into the third
decade of life. In keeping
with the Aristotelian
proposal that infants and
children, not possessing
full rationality, are not
capable of perfect virtue,
neonates manifest little
activity in the cerebral
cortex. However the
speed of development is
striking: in first four years
of life, cerebral neuronal
activity increases to twice
adult levels (reflected in
twice adult levels of
metabolic rate). There is a
decline thereafter to age
15 at which adult levels
are achieved. This activity
parallels the rise and
decline of numbers of
synapses.











2040

The lateral PFC is
activated by cognitive
tasks, the VLPFC by tasks
requiring information in
working memory, and the
DLPFC when information
must be manipulated.
Anterior areas of PFC may
have a role in information
transfer between these
other areas. Furthermore,
the PFC appears
implicated in formulation
of possible futures. The
DLPFC appears to be the
key regulator of cognitive
processes, richly
interconnected to the
parietal multimodal cortex
as well as to the
somatosensory, visual and
parietal association areas.
The contribution of BG to
intentional behaviour,
learning and decision
making, is also recognised.
BG play an important role
in regulation of the
function of the cerebral
cortexperhaps in
overlaying deliberate
cognitive agendas onto
habituated actions. Check
ref.
Via the cortical association
areas-caudate loop, the
caudate is implicated in
modulation of cognitive
cortical function.
Interaction between BGPFC loops adds further
dimensions of limbic and
cortical modification of
outputs.
This study argues that in
the development and
exercise of virtue the BG
are closely associated
with, serves to modulate,
and ultimately is second in
importance to, the PFC as
central protagonist.
Learning in the BG is a
dynamic process,

2040

directed activity.
Cognitive control and
emotional self regulation
are closely
interdependent.
Cognition of appropriate
rules assists: the PFC
(focusing on acquisition of
new rules) and the BG
(focusing selection of rules
appropriate to the
situation) play
complementary roles in
rule learning. Attentional
mechanisms play a critical
role in achieving such
affect regulation and self
management.
 Rich neural loops
involving BG and PFC are
also deemed significant in
mediating recursive
thought. Fast plasticity in
the striatum favours
learning the “snapshots”
of action that capture
immediate circumstances,
favoured alternatives, and
how to get there; slow
plasticity of the PFC
favours links to other
centres and creation of
entire models, future
scenarios, of action.
Neural loops between the
BG and other areas
provide a basis for the
exchange of concrete
information inherent in
deliberation.
 Lower brain areas supply
the PFC, along with the
other cortical areas, with
continuous electrical
stimulation; a prerequisite
for conscious activity to
take place. Excitatory
signalling (utilising ACh),
and reverbatory excitatory
signalling, via the
thalamus, to almost all
cortical areas, are critical
in this process.
Mechanisms of control

Horvitz, “Stimulus-response and response outcome learning mechanisms in the striatum,” 131.
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facilitated by highly
redundant parallel
pathways. The BG
contains inhibitory
GABAergic neurons, spiny
in the striatum and aspiny
in the pallidum, requiring
strong and coherent
excitatory cortical inputs
from almost all cortical
areas to become active.
The BG are a region of
great biochemical
diversity, exhibiting
almost all the neuroactive
agents. Basal forebrain
projections innervate the
hippocampus, amygdala,
and neocortex.
(See also above: Systems for
habit formation, for
additional contribution of BG
in cognition.)

utilize the release of NE
from the LC (usually
excitatory), DA from the
SN (inhibitory in the BG,
and possibly excitatory
elsewhere in the cortex),
5-HT from the raphe
nuclei (inhibitory), and
ACh from the
gigantocellular neurons of
the reticular excitatory
area.
 Spindle cells in linkages
between ACC, OFC and
insula are associated with
quick decision making.
These pathways are
complemented by
neurochemical pathways
enabling appreciation of
rewards and difficulties.
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Table 2.14
Systems for effective execution of motor commands
Principal sources: Bear (2007); Byrne (2008); Doyon et al. (2009); Floyer-Lea and Matthews
(2008); Hof et al. (2008); Hoshi et al. (2005); Kaas and Stepniewska (2002); Kalat (2001);
Marieb and Hoehn (2010); Pollak (2005); Rapp and Bachevalier (2008); Squire (2008); Wise
and Shadmehr (2002).
Prima facie association with
development and exercise of
virtue

 Virtues empower action
in ways tailored to the
flourishing of our being.
This includes disposing us
to execute movement
towards worthy
objectives. Therefore the
neural bases for virtue
require effective
connections with motor
control, even though not
all virtuous activity
requires expression in
motor activity.
 Efficient and obedient
motor control is integral
to the practice of some, if
not all, of the virtues.
Some virtues, such as
generosity, require social
interaction for the
complete expression of
2041
the virtue.
And this is
not only the case with
social virtues: temperance
may manifest in the
capacity to redirect one’s
attention; courage may
require expression
through words; even
justice may necessitate
delivering, not just
considering, an apology.

Principal associated brain
areas
Discussion proceeds from
overview, and thence to
higher brain areas, to
subcortical structures, the BG
and limbic structures.
 The PFC is well connected
to motor cortices, primary
motor cortex, premotor
and supplementary motor
areas, allowing effective
command pathways.
 Long term storage of
explicit motor knowledge
is in the PFC and
associated parts of the BG,
while storage of
intermediate term explicit
motor knowledge is in the
MTL. The dorsal striatum
is implicated in the longterm storage of welllearned movement
sequences.
 The BG play a role in
anticipating movement
and in motor control:
putamen neurons are
active in anticipation of
body movements; caudate
nucleus neurons are active
prior to eye movements;
the putamen receives
input from motor and
somatosensory cortical
areas.
 The hippocampus plays an
integral role in the
formulation of goal
directed motor plans.
 The cerebellum assists in

Principal pathways and
mechanisms.

 The PFC is richly endowed
with connections for
conscious motor
management. Anatomical
loops between the PFC
and the BG, closely
associated with motor
systems and acting as a
site of converging inputs
from other cortical and
subcortical areas. Also the
PFC has direct and indirect
connections to the limbic
system and endowed with
abundant intrinsic
connectivity.
 Pathways of motor control
feature areas of the BG:
GP and the SN play major
roles in motor control
selecting patterns of
cortical activity and
ultimately selecting and
reinforcing chosen motor
programs; processing of
motor commands takes
place in the caudate
nucleus and in the GP,
with output across to
thalamus and then back to
cortical motor areas.
Outputs of the BG directly
impact on motor control
by affecting activity of
motor areas in the cortex.

2041

And although a person suffering from advanced Parkinson disease, and therefore without the
capacity to express emotion on the face, can possess the virtue of cheerfulness in his internal
dispositions, he lacks the capacity for the normal manifestation of virtue of cheerfulness, a ready
smile.
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movement and motor
habits has a likely role in
formation of cognitive
habits. There is now
evidence that the
cerebellum and the BG are
well interconnected and
interactive via a cerebellothalamo-striatal pathway.

The system operates
mainly “to modify cortical
motor representations
rather than control
behaviour through direct
motor inputs” (Manns,
2008).
 The BG-thalamo-cortical
loop is associated with
motor control and also
with habit formation. It
provides a direct route for
subsequent motor
commands. Motor
learning involves dynamic
interplay between corticostriatal, cortico-cerebellar,
and limbic systems. The
dorsal striatum instructs
the PFC in S-R situations.
 The mechanisms of
efficient motor control at
the cellular level are
reasonably well described.
The premotor cortex
appears to cache memory
for motor activities
triggered by ACh release
from the basal forebrain.
ACh is the principal
mediating agent
(excitatory) at the
neuromuscular synapse,
opening ion channels,
with Epi also playing a
role. Glutamate and
aspartate are the major
excitatory
neurotransmitter in the
CNS and responsible for
most of the fast synaptic
transmission in the
mammalian brain. NE is
distributed to the
cerebellum and other
areas from noradrenergic
nucleus, the locus
coeruleus, within the
pons.
 Axonal myelination is
required for speed of
sensory and motor
messaging along the long
pathways from the brain,
as well as for much
connectivity within the
brain itself. Mature
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myelination of motor
systems takes place in the
first two years of life,
although intracortical
connections are
myelinating into third
decade of life, a fact that
seems reflected in the
disconnect that can exist
between motor activity
and cognition. For
example a disproportion
of serious driving
accidents take place with
young drivers at the
wheel. Cortical
myelination is not
complete until the third or
fourth decade of life.
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Table 2.15
Summary of mechanisms for neuronal structural plasticity discussed in Chapter 2.
“Structural plasticity is ubiquitously present in the mature brain.” (Butz et al. 2009)
2042

2043

2044

Sources: Alvarez et al.(2007) ; Blakemore (2008) ; Blundon and Zakharenko (2008) ;
2045
2046
2047
Butz et al. (2009) ; Chistiakova and Volgushev (2009) ; Conde and Caceres (2009) ;
2048
2049
2050
Corlew et al (2008) ; Desmurget et al. (2007)
; Di Filippo et al. (2009) ; Johnston et al.
2051
2052
2053
(2009) ; Kessels and Malinow (2009) ; Kim and Hoffman (2008) ; Nelson et al.
2054
2055
2056
2057
(2006) ; Nestler (2001) ; Pyne and Shenker (2008) ; Squire et al. (2008) ; Scott and
2058
2059
2060
Aperia (2009) ; Stevens (2008) ; Stranahan and Mattson (2008) ; Vaynman and Gomez2061
Pinilla (2005) ;
Category
Developmental
plasticity

Mechanism
 Genetic mechanisms,
including neural
overproduction followed
by PCD, and
overproduction of
synapses and deletion of
immature synapses.
 Modification of genetic
transcription in response

Features
 Mature development of neural
structures appropriate to
environmental inputs.
 Various stages of development
manifest periods of elimination of
synapses, for example during
adolescence.

2042

Alvarez, et al. “Distinct Structural and Ionotropic Roles of NMDA Receptors in Controlling Spine
and Synapse Stability,” 7365-7376.
2043
Sarah-Jayne Blakemore (2008) “The social brain in adolescence” Nature reviews neuroscience
Vol 9 April 2008 267-277
2044
Blundon and Zakharenko, “Dissecting the components of LTP”.
2045
Butz, et al., “Activity dependent structural plasticity,” 287-305.
2046
Chistiakova and Volgushev, “Heterosynaptic plasticity in the neocortex (Review)”.
2047
Conde and Caceres, “Microtubule assembly, organisation and dynamics in axons and dendrites
(Review),” 319-332.
2048
Corlew et al., “Presynaptic NMDA Receptors: Newly appreciated roles in cortical synaptic
function and plasticity,” 609-625.
2049
Desmurget et al.,“Contrasting acute and slow growing lesions: a new door to brain plasticity
(Review),” 898-914.
2050
Di Filippo et al., “Short term and long-term plasticity at corticostriatal synapses: implications
for learning and memory,” 114.
2051
Johnston et al., “Plasticity and injury in the developing brain,” 1-10.
2052
Kessels and Malinow, “Synaptic AMPA Receptor Plasticity and Behaviour”.
2053
Jinhyun Kim and Dax A. Hoffman, “Potassium channels: newly found players in synaptic
plasticity,” Neuroscientist 14, (2008): 276-286.
2054
For introduction see Nelson, et al., Neuroscience of Cognitive Development, Chapters 1 and 2.
2055
E. Nestler, “Molecular basis of long-term plasticity underlying addiction,” Nature reviews
neuroscience 2, 2 (2001): 119-28.
2056
D. Pyne and N. G. Shenker, “Demystifying acupuncture,” Rheumatology 47, (2008): 1132-1136.
2057
rd
Squire et al., Fundamental Neuroscience. 3 ed.
2058
Scott and Aperia, “Interaction between N-Methyl-D-Aspartic Acid Receptors and D1 Dopamine
receptors: an important mechanism for brain plasticity,” 62-68.
2059
Stevens, “Neuron-astrocyte signalling in the development and plasticity of neural circuits,”
278-288.
2060
Stranahan and Mattson, “Impact of Energy Intake and Expenditure on Neuronal Plasticity,”
209-218.
2061
Vaynman and Gomez-Pinilla, “Licence to run. Exercise impacts functional plasticity in the intact
and injured central nervous system by using neurotrophins,” 283-95.
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Neurogenesis

Dendritic changes

Changes at the
synapse

to environmental inputs.
 Activity dependent
processes that allow for
ongoing stabilisation and
modification of
synapses.
 Genetic mechanisms
including BDNF induced
transcription.
 Modification of genetic
transcription in response
to environmental inputs,
including exercise
induced neurogenesis.
 Possibility of rapid
reaction to
environmental cues.
 Genetic mechanisms.
 Modification of genetic
transcription in response
to environmental inputs.
 Ca2+influx (fast large
amplitude influx leads to
LTP; slower, low
amplitude to LTD).
 NMDAR presence is
essential for spine
density and regulation of
the number of active
excitatory synapses.
 Genetic mechanisms
acting on synaptic
components and factors.
 Modification of genetic
transcription in response
to environmental inputs.
 Calcium influx
associated.
 Close LTP linkages to
synaptogenesis.
 Synaptic reorganisation
proceeds in stages.
 Activity dependent
synaptic pruning.
Postsynaptic NMDARs
trigger classical forms of
LTP and LTD.
 PreNMDARs mediate
tLTD at some synapses
with some evidence also
of LTP.
 Various forms of
synaptic strengthening
associated with gene
expression.

 Present at relatively few sites in the
mature human brain: olfactory bulb,
dentate gyrus of hippocampus,
cingulate gyrus and segments of the
parietal cortex. In addition possible
presence in amygdala, piriform cortex,
and inferior temporal cortex.
 Exercise and caloric restriction induces
BDNF associated plasticities in
hippocampus.
 Hippocampal dentate gyrus neurons
undergo ongoing replacement.
Changes may include:
 Formation of new dendrites, new
dendritic spines, new branches in the
dendritic tree, and retraction and
degeneration of postsynaptic spines.
 LTD leads to weakening of synapses
and spines.
 LTP promotes spine maturation and
stabilisation.

Changes of the synapse may include:
 Synaptogenesis and synapse
elimination.
Changes at the synapse may include:
 Changes in post synaptic receptor
density, and alterations to thickness of
the synapse, increase and decrease in
the strength and efficacy of synapses,
and physical changes at the synapse
leading to pre and post synaptic
alterations in membrane potential.
 NMDAR plasticities involved at many
sites throughout the brain.
 Stabilisation of synapses brings
plasticity to an end.
 Various forms of LTP and LTD can
produce long lasting synaptic plasticity.
 Intracellular calcium implicated in the
various forms of LTP and LTD.
 Classical conditioning exhibits forms of
LTP.
 Synaptogenesis is evident in motorskill
learning.
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Changes at the
axon

Formation of
additional
connections.

Further structural
and signalling
contributions to
plasticity.

 Genetic mechanisms
acting on axonal
structures and guidance
cues.
 Modification of genetic
transcription in response
to environmental inputs.
 Myelination of axons
(perhaps closing off
sensitive periods of
development)
 Processes associated
with axonal
overdevelopment.
 Modification of neuronal
connectivity in response
to genetic and
environmental inputs.
 Activation of
intracortical connections
that are dormant.

Growth factors.

Receptors.

Neurotransmitters.

Changes may include:
 Formation of new neural structures
related to the axon including axonal
growth zones, localized axonal
sprouting, changes to axonal fibre
densities, myelination of axons,
changes in the degree of myelination of
the axon, sprouting of boutons and
other presynaptic sites, interstitial
axonal branching, and retraction and
degeneration of pre synaptic terminals.

Changes may include:
 Additional connections may be
established between same axon and
dendrite.
 Changes in conjunction with further
outgrowth of axons and dendrites.
 Synaptic rewiring whereby targets are
disengaged and new targets
established using same presynaptic or
post synaptic element.
 Intracellular messengers and growth
signalling factors are commonly
associated with structural plasticity.
 BDNF induced transcription.
 Implication of astrocytes releasing
trophic factors and gliotransmitters.
 GABA may also act as a neurotrophic
agent.
 Cellular plasticity in the forms of LTP
and LTD can be a result of AMPA
receptor trafficking.
 preNMDARs mediate tLTD at some
synapses with some evidence also of
LTP.
 NMDARs assist in the stabilisation of
glutamatergic synapses.
 K+ channels are a postsynaptic
mechanism for regulation of synaptic
plasticity.
 Changes in voltage gated ion channels
function lead to plasticity changes the
probability of PSP and duration, and
mediates metaplasticity, the capacity
to induce consequent plasticity at the
synapse.
 Plasticity as a result of NMDA
interaction with DA.
 The mesolimbic reward system
supports reward seeking and
motivational behaviour by regulated
release of DA.
 AMPAR trafficking evident in fear
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Chemical signalling across
the synapse.

Bioelectrical mechanisms
for plasticity.

Internal signalling

Forms of
experiential

Contribution of
microtubules to structural
plasticity.
Hebbian mechanisms

conditioning in hippocampus.
 NMDA-LTP develops rapidly, is
expressed postsynaptically, and is
needed for short term memory
retention.
 NMDA-independent LTP develops more
slowly, is expressed presynaptically,
and allows longer term retention.
 Release of NE following emotional
arousal may promote synaptic
plasticity.
 Alteration to presynaptic release of
neurotransmitter
 Enkephalin dependent mechanisms of
neuroplasticity.
Ephrin/Eph signalling plays a role in
regulating the morphology of spines,
possibly in stabilising immature filipodia
into mature spines.
 STDP can produce calcium-triggered
activation of certain protein kinases
resulting in: variation in and
enhancement of AMPARs, increasing
responsiveness to glutamate, synaptic
strengthening, and activation of silent
synapses.
 Patterned tetanic electrical stimulation
can bring about NMDAR dependent
spine changes.
 High frequency firing of the cortical
neurons may also lead to LTD at the
striatal synapses according to principles
of heterosynaptic plasticity (see
below).
 PSPs trigger NMDA related plasticity as
a result of pre and post synaptic
interaction. Precise timing of
backpropagating PSPs following EPSP
leads to a strong depolarisation. This
leads to glutamate ejection from
NMDA receptors, thus allowing Ca2+
influx, a cascade of intracellular
messaging, and release of growth
signalling factors associated with
structural plasticity and consequent
LTP.
 Back propagation.
Addictive drugs produce the protein
DeltaFosB which accumulates to the point
of causing a gene transcription leading to
plastic change.
Regulation of growth cone motility
managed by microtubule-associatedprotein 1B (MAP1B).
With repeated firing, nerve cells become
firmly connected.
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plasticity
Anti-Hebbian mechanisms
Homeostatic plasticity:
 Synaptic changes of
transmission as a result
of the specific induction
related to learning.
Heterosynaptic, or
nonassociative, plasticity:
 Changes at other
synapses on a given
neuron that are noninvolved in the original
induction related to
learning.

Metaplasticity
 The capacity to induce
consequent plasticity at
the synapse.

Unwanted noise is filtered out allowing
only preferred spiking patterns to emerge.
The capacity for neurons to compensate
for network activity by regulating their
own excitability.

Occurs when presynaptic and postsynaptic
neurons are depolarized at the same time.
Repeated activation of cortical synapses
induces LTP.
Heterosynaptic plasticity:
 May result in a neuron as a result of
back propagation.
 May assist in synaptic homeostasis, the
maintenance of the overall synaptic
weight of a neuron, and in ensuring
that certain memories are given
greater permanence.
 Reverberation in loops may assist in
maintaining conditions for
heterosynaptic plasticity in the
striatum and cortical neurons.
Changes in voltage gated ion channels
function leads to change in the probability
of PSP and its duration, and mediates
metaplasticity.
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Table 5.1
Neural subdivisions implicated in moral behaviour.
Sources: Beauregard et al. (2001); Burnett et al. (2009); Casebeer (2003); D’Argembeau and
Salmon (2011); Fuster (1989); Grafman (1994); Green et al.(2001 and 2004); Green and Haidt
(2002); Harenski et al. (2008) (2012); Jackson et al. (2006); LeDoux (1998); Leknes and Tracey
(2008); Lee et al. (2007); Martin (2003); Moll et al. (2005); Passingham (1993); Ruby et al.
(2009); Wood et al (2004).
Neural
subdivision

Specific Area
Anterior PFC
(aPFC)
Ventral sectors of
PFC
Frontopolar
cortex

PFC

2062

Brodmann’s
2062
Area
9,10

VMPFC

9,10,12,32

Anterior rostral
medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC)
Medial portion of
the superior
frontal gyrus,
orbitofrontal
gyrus and rostral
anterior cingulate
cortex (MPFC)

11,12,25

Posterior PFC
areas
DLPFC
Mostly right
hemisphere.
Right lateral PFC

6,9,10,46,

9,10,11,32

46

44,45,46,47

Role
Active in moral evaluations relying on
predicting the long-term outcomes of
one’s own actions, such as the
anticipation of guilt. Active in social–
emotional contextual knowledge and
learning of learning of moral values.
Active in moral judgement.
Active in adherence to well-established
social norms and attitudes. Active in
reflection on impact on others.
Active in moral judgement.
Active in social emotional responses,
especially in adolescents.
MPFC active in moral judgement. Active in
processing various kinds of self‑
referential information, appraising and
coding the self‑relatedness or self‑
relevance of information.
Contribution to representations of specific
future events and autobiographical
memory retrieval. Active in inference of
mental states of others, and in empathy
for others in pain, with linkages to
anterior ACC and anterior IC.
Active in overlearned sequences.
Active in accepting external guidance.
Active in moral judgement. Pain and
reward processing.
Active in suppression of sexual arousal.
2063

rd

Based on Martin, Neuroanatomy: Text and Atlas, 3 ed., 48-49.
Beauregard and O’Leary, The Spiritual Brain. A Neuroscientist’s Case for the Existence of the
Soul, 272-3. Beauregard’s work noted in the table above refers to studies of subjects dismissing
pornography. He has also carried out some fascinating work identifying the neural bases of
spiritual and mystical experience. Debunking the fad idea of a “god spot” in the temporal lobe,
Beauregard reviewed brain activations during religious, mystical and spiritual experiences: “Our
objective and subjective data suggest that RSMEs (religious, spiritual, and or mystical experiences)
are complex and multidimensional and mediated by a number of brain regions normally implicated
in perception, cognition, emotion, body representation, and self consciousness.” He noted
significant loci of activation, relative to baseline condition, in the following (underlined indicates
significant activation with respect to control condition): right and left inferior parietal lobe, visual
2063
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OFC

Cingulate
cortex

Temporal
lobes

LPFC
Orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC)

44,45,46,47
11,25

Lateral OFC
(LOFC)
Right OFC
Anterior cingulate
cortex
(ACC)
Rostral ACC

47

Right ACC

(peri-genual
BA24/BA33;
subcallosal
BA32/BA25)
23,24

Posterior
cingulate/retrospl
enial cortex

23,26

Temporal lobes

20,21,22,35,
36, 38,41,42

Superior
temporal cortex
Posterior superior
temporal sulcus
(STS)

22

Posterior
temporal lobes

20,36,37

Anterior temporal
lobes ( aTL)

20,21,38

22

18,19,37,39,
40

Occipital
lobe

Parietal
lobe

47
24

Inferior parietal
lobe

40

Active in suppression of sadness.
Active in appreciation of moral
consequences of behaviour and
consideration of impact on others.
Active in adapting to social–emotional
cues.
Active in suppression of sadness.
Involvement in moral conflict resolution.
Active in consideration of impact on
others. Pain and pleasure processing.
Active in empathy with the pain of others.

Active in suppression of sexual arousal.
Contributing region to imagination of
specific future events and
autobiographical memory retrieval. Active
especially in females in responses
requiring moral sensitivity to others.
Active in adult moral judgement, less so in
adolescence.
Storage of social perceptual
representations. Contributing region to
imagination of specific future events and
autobiographical memory retrieval.
Active in adult moral judgement.
Active in recognition of socially relevant
perceptual features of faces, body posture
and movements. Active in moral
judgement.
Assists in storage of representations of
objects, actions and spatial maps; storage
of social semantic knowledge.
Storage of knowledge of social concepts
and values that are more context
independent (eg honour and greed).
Active in creating representations of
objects, actions and spatial maps; storage
of social semantic knowledge.
Contributing region to imagination of
specific future events and
autobiographical memory retrieval. Active
especially in males in responses requiring
moral sensitivity to others.

cortex, caudate nucleus, right medial orbitofrontal cortex, right medial prefrontal cortex, right
middle temporal cortex, right and left superior parietal lobule, left brain stem, left insula, left and
right anterior cingulate cortex, among others.
Beauregard’s insights accord with the view presented in this study that consciousness and decision
making involve complex and highly coordinated neural activation (note that three of the four
cortical lobes as well as other subcortical areas show heightened activity). To argue that there is a
single location for moral thought and responses is opposed both to neuroscientific data, and to the
philosophical expectation that higher activity must involve greater biological integration.
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Temporo-parietal
junction
(proximate to
insula and rich in
spindle cells)
Amygdala

Limbic and
paralimbic
areas

Hypothalamus
especially
ventromedial
sector
Insula

Anterior insula
Posterior insula
Hippocampus
Thalamus
Ventral striatum

Basal
ganglia (BG)

NAc (in
association with
Ventral striatum)
Caudate nucleus
Pallidum
Vental pallidum

Septal
nuclei
Cerebellum
Brainstem

Rostral brainstem
tegmentum

39,40

Active in adult moral judgement, less so in
adolescence.

Activation in basic emotional and
motivational states thereby affecting
moral behaviour. Active in exercise of self
control, patience, and empathy. Active in
moral judgement.
Activation in basic emotional and
motivational states thereby affecting
moral behaviour. Active in exercise of self
control, patience, and empathy.
Activation in basic emotional and
motivational states thereby affecting
moral behaviour. Active in exercise of self
control, patience, and empathy. Active in
judgements of fairness.
Active in empathy with the pain of others.
Pleasure and pain processing.
Processing of hypothetical reward
outcomes.
Role in storage of memories according to
context.
Contribution to pain and pleasure in initial
processing of sense input.
Active in judgements of fairness.
Activation in basic emotional and
motivational states thereby affecting
moral behaviour.
Hedonic and aversive processing.

Active in responding to moral values,
attitudes and moral emotions.
Active in judgements of fairness.
Aspects of pain and pleasure processing.
Participation in assessing the reward
potential of events.
Contribution to processing of unexpected
reward and pain.
Active in thalamic activity and therefore in
filtering cortical inputs.
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Table 5.2
A summary of the principal brain systems contributing to the development and exercise of
virtue.
System
The
numerous
systems and
mechanisms
of plasticity
operating at
the cellular
and molecular
2064
level.

Ref
2.2



Tables
2.3, 2.15.







Systems for
learning.

2.3



Table
2.4






Attentional
systems.

2.5.5



Table 2.9






Contribution to the development and exercise of virtue
The brain’s virtually ubiquitous capacity for plastic change
permits the various forms of learning, including the
learning of good habits.
Plastic changes are shown to be triggered by neural
activity itself. Hence repeated experience lays down
consolidated pathways whereby previous behaviours are
more easily revisited.
Plastic changes provide a neural explanation for the
phenomenon of habit. Furthermore, freely chosen
behaviours and activities are self-reinforcing. Prior choices
are more easily replicated.
Forms of structural plasticity dependent on gene
expression bring about permanent neural changes, and
potentially new behaviours and a modified personality.
Learning denotes knowledge acquired through experience,
or changed behaviour as a response to experience.
Learning may be either conscious or unconscious.
Moral learning is central to the development of virtue, and
in particular, to the development of conscience, an aspect
of the virtue of prudence. Moral learning will take
advantage of systems implicated in general learning.
Virtue is a form of experiential learning.
Development of automaticity is intrinsice to virtue. That
DA release associated with rewarding outcomes facilitates
learning, and that reward paradigms convert over time to
automaticity in the BG suggest a central role for reward
systems in learning of at least some forms of volitional
behaviours associated with virtue.
Plasticity both enables and is directed by our attention
system. In turn focussed attention permits directed
plasticity in the brain: it is “the modulatory control system
2065
of plasticity”.
In other words, our capacity to direct
attention allows us some management of plasticity
mediated learning, including the development of habit
and virtue.
Attention allows suppression of goal irrelevant issues and
is a prerequisite for many forms of learning and memory,
and for goal election, cognition and executive function, all
of which are required for the acquisition of virtue.
The capacity to attend appears closely linked to will
power.
Normally we attend to stimuli that our senses or
imagination present to us. However, the ability to pay
attention to a goal that is neither pressing nor present is
central to rationality and virtue development.

2064

Arguably plasticity involves both systems and mechanisms. Systems involve coordination of
various brain areas (eg VTA release of DA to striatum effecting cortical regulation) and cellular
mechanisms (eg second messenger plasticities).
2065
Michael Merzenich. cf 2.2.6; 2.3.4.1; 2.5.5; 2.7.3.1.
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Memory
systems

2.3
Table
2.5

Systems of
emotional
management

Reward and
motivational
systems

Systems for
habit
formation

2.5
Table
2.8

2.6
Table
2.11

2.4
Table 2.7

 Learning and memory are key processes by which
environment and experience alter behaviour. Structural
neuronal plasticities are a core mechanism underpinning
learning.
 Memory is the process of encoding, storage and retrieval
of knowledge acquired through experience. There is a self
evident link to habits reinforced by experience.
 Memory systems are functionally implicit to learning, to
response to reward and emotion, to habit formation, to
goal election, and all cognitive function.
 Memory is a functional prerequisite for the exercise of
virtue: memory of past behaviours, of reward, of
contextual and emotional resonances, and of principles of
right and wrong, all have relevance.
 Mechanisms of non-declarative memory appear to
facilitate the ease of practice and the inherent
motivational rewards in virtue, while during the more
arduous process of acquisition of virtue, declarative
memory plays a more significant role.
 Memory is enhanced in the presence of emotion that is
not excessively intense. That affection enhances memory
establishes an early childhood facilitation.
 Emotion management systems are at the heart of
directing our desires towards appropriate pleasure and
towards towards the endurance of pain, fear and
difficulties for the sake of worthy goals. Hence they are
the essence of the virtues of fortitude and temperance.
 The habitual management of emotion according to what is
rational is the essence of the exercise of virtue.
 Emotional regulation involves cortical regulation of goals,
memories and emotional experience. The potential for
emotion to enhance rationality has been much noted in
recent years.
 Appropriate emotional/aesthetic/social/ moral education
is central to the development of virtue.
 Reward systems are implicated at most levels of volitional
and sub-volitional activity. In concert with the emotional
systems they provide incentive for action, including
virtuous action.
 To find pleasure in appropriate activities is the mark of
virtue, and hence the link between reward expectations,
emotional responses, conscious goal election, and virtue.
 Intrinsically motivated action, activity is pleasurable in
itself, is an essential characteristic of virtuous activity.
Growth of intrinsic motivation over external reward as
automaticity is developed accords with view that virtue is
carried out for its own sake.
 A habit of appropriate reward expectation is directly
linked to the development of the virtue of temperance.
 Virtues may be understood as freely chosen automatised
behaviours.
 Mechanisms of habit learning also offer an explanation for
the phenomenon of behaviours that appear to remain
robust in the absence of immediate rewards. Just as
emotional regulation and reward processing are
interdependent systems, reward processing and habit
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Cognition,
consideration
of consequences, planning,
goal election,
and executive
direction.

2.7



Tables
2.13, 5.1.








Systems for
effective
execution of
motor
commands

2.7.3.1



Table
2.14



formation also are interlinked systems, with reward
processing essential in the early stages of laying down
habits. This accords with the view that extrinsic motivation
assists initially in establishing patterns of good behaviour;
in time this is transformed into forms of intrinsic
motivation with the development of a degree of
automaticity.
Strictly speaking habit learning refers to the spectrum of
automatized behaviours supported most particularly by
the BG via the BG-thalamo-cortical pathways.
The brain regions and pathways associated with the BG
seem to offer a significant key to understanding the neural
bases of virtue. Converging research over the past decade
links habit formation and volition. In particular, the BGthalamo-cortical loops with their widespread cognitiveemotional interaction offer insights into processes of
planning, goal selection, self regulation, attention and
motivation. Furthermore this automatisation lies at the
heart of the easy repeatability of behaviours associated
with virtue… for example the habit of greeting
courteously, of getting up when the alarm goes off, of
reacting to difficulties with patient strategies, etc.
Mechanisms of habit learning also offer an explanation for
the phenomenon of behaviours that appear to remain
robust in the absence of immediate rewards.
The links between cognition, rationality and virtue are
closely associated at the psychological level. Brain systems
associated with cognition and goal election interconnect
with neural subdivisions implicated in moral behaviour.
(See Table 5.1.)
Human cognition normally implies rational capacities: for
conscious goal setting, reasoning, deliberation as to
consequences and means, and final election.
The capacity to set specific goals, to direct one’s actions to
those goals, to reason about consequences and means,
appears central to cognition and to rational acts disposed
by prudence. That one chooses goals fitting for one’s
nature is a mark of rationality; virtue is essentially the
neuronal disposition assisting in the habituation of this
capacity.
The capacity to pay due regard to the impact of one’s
actions on others, modifying them accordingly,
characterises acts disposed by the virtue of justice.
The exercise of virtue requires rightness and perfection of
reason, the operations of which are perfected by the
virtues of prudence and justice.
Virtues empower action in ways tailored to the flourishing
of our being. This includes disposing us to execute
movement towards worthy objectives. Therefore the
neural bases for virtue require effective connections with
motor control, even though not all virtuous activity
requires expression in motor activity.
Some virtues, such as generosity, require social interaction
for the complete expression of the virtue. And this is not
only the case with social virtues: temperance may
manifest in the capacity to redirect one’s attention;
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Systems for
imitation and
empathy

2.3.6



Table
2.6




Sensitive
periods of
development

2.2.4.1



Table
2.2






courage may require expression through words; even
justice may necessitate delivering, not just considering, an
apology. Hence efficient and obedient motor control is
integral to the practice of some, if not all, of the virtues.
Imitation is one of the core processes for learning from
the environment and from the example of others. The
neural basis for this is now increasingly well described
and provides an explanation for the ease of acquisition of
virtuous behaviours by children.
Imitation and empathy are related at the level of neural
systems. Plasticity in the systems for empathetic
response appears integral to the development of
sensitivity for the rights and needs of others, and an
understanding of the consequences of one’s actions,
which appear to be are at the core of the virtue of
justice.
Effective emotional modulation of deliberation is
essential for sound reasoning particularly in areas
requiring empathy with others, understanding of others
viewpoints etc, and TOM.
The term “sensitive periods” denotes a developmental
window of opportunity, whereby there is an enhanced
capacity for plastic change and learning in response to
experience, emotional content, or novelty.
Of particular interest in the field of virtue education are
sensitive periods evident in responsiveness to affection,
early experience, ease of imitation, and in development of
new behaviours during early years. First impressions are
lasting impressions. Experiences during upbringing,
particularly when the stimuli are associated with
emotional significance, can be virtually indelible.
Windows of opportunity in sensitive periods vary: for
imprinting the window is open only for a few hours; for
language, for years. Responsiveness to maternal affection
is also established in the earliest years, and if an infant is
reared in an environment deprived of maternal affection
there will be lasting deficits.
The security of affection, in turn, facilitates, at the
neurophysiological level, other aspects of learning from
parents.
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‘Quando il corpo sta bene, l’anima balla’
When the body is well the soul dances.
Italian proverb.
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